

DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MALAYSIA  
DURING THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 1981-1992:  
A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY WITH PARTICULAR  
EMPHASIS ON THEIR IMPACT ON THE MUSLIM SOCIETY

By  
HAZIZAN MD.NOON

Supervisors

Dr. M.V. McDonald  
Dr. Carole Hillenbrand

A Dissertation  
Submitted to the University of Edinburgh  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Edinburgh  
Scotland, UNITED KINGDOM

June 1996



**DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MALAYSIA  
DURING THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 1981-1992:  
A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY WITH  
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THEIR IMPACT  
ON THE MUSLIM SOCIETY**



## Abstract

This work is a modest attempt at examining and understanding the nature and impact of development process in Malaysia during the Mahathir administration. The main time frame chosen is from the year 1981 to 1992, although the events after this period up to the completion of this thesis are also relevant in various ways. The analysis is made primarily in the light of the Government's Islamization policy and Vision 2020. The study is undertaken in view of a popular belief that development during this time demonstrates a significant shift from its long standing traditional approach. How far does this claim bear the truth? The result of this study reveals an answer to this primary question.

The research, which adopts what the researcher calls a *comparative sociological* study or approach that combines the elements of sociological and Islamic studies together, primarily analyses the Government development policies and strategy which are believed to have been responsible in bringing about the observed changes and impacts on the society, especially on the Muslims. For practical reasons, comparison takes place in various forms and on different levels. For example, in the theoretical chapter the philosophy of development and change as seen from both perspectives is established as a framework upon which our analysis of Malaysian development is based. Contrasts between certain development policies and the achievements of two different eras are also made through longitudinal comparison. Standard comparison is used more often due to the nature of the subjects under scrutiny. Despite its unavoidable reference to Malaysia as a whole, the research, however, places more emphasis on the development and changes in the Peninsular. Logistic and financial constraints explain the need for this geographic limitation.

Divided into five main chapters, namely *Introduction*, *Development and Change: A Comparative Theoretical Framework*, *Development Under Mahathir: Genesis, Ideological Foundation and*

*Profile, The Impact of Development Policy I: Various Impacts on the Society, and The Impact of Development Policy II: Various Muslim Responses* respectively, the study is multi-disciplinary in nature, with sociological and Islamic elements as its main features. The study involves both library research and field-work.

This research draws its resources from various types of materials like relevant Governmental and non-Governmental documents, interviews, Mahathir's articles, books and speeches, personal observations, journals, articles, working papers, newspapers, magazines and others. Recourse to data, statistical or descriptive, is reached by consulting important documents like the Social Statistics Bulletin, Annual Reports of relevant institutions, State and District Data Banks, Malaysia Plans, Economic Reports and Educational Statistics.

The writer is hopeful that this work will be a useful addition to existing academic works in the field, and will benefit those who are interested especially in such areas of study as Sociology of Development, Islamic Sociology, and Malaysian Studies.

H.M.Noon

October 1995.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract . . . . .	i
Table of Contents . . . . .	iii
List of Tables . . . . .	vii
Acknowledgements . . . . .	x
Declaration . . . . .	xiii
Notes on Transliteration . . . . .	xiv
Glossary of Acronyms . . . . .	xvi
 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION. . . . .	 1
1. Background to the Research. . . . .	1
1.1. The Rationale for the Choice of the Topic . . . . .	1
1.2. The Hypothesis of the Research . . . . .	8
1.3. Research Questions and Objectives . . . . .	9
1.4. Limitations and Delimitations of the Research . . . . .	10
1.5. Survey of Literature . . . . .	12
2. Definition of Terms and Phrases. . . . .	19
2.1. Malaysia: An Overview . . . . .	19
2.1.1. The Geographical Perspective . . . . .	20
2.1.2. The Demographical Perspective. . . . .	22
2.1.3. The Socio-religious and Cultural Perspective . . . . .	26
2.2. Islam and the Islamization Process in Malaysia: A Brief Historical Review . . . . .	29
2.3. Mahathir Mohamad: A Brief Profile . . . . .	34
2.4. The Comparative Sociological Study Defined . . . . .	39

CHAPTER TWO: DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A	
COMPARATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. . . . .	41
1. The Application of the Comparative Method. . . . .	42
1.1. The Scope and Use of the Comparative Approach .	43
1.2. Theory Formulation: A Brief Comparison Between Islamic and Conventional Approaches . . . . .	46
2. A Comparative Theory of Development and Change:	
A General Review . . . . .	52
2.1. Development and Change: A Conventional Perspective . . . . .	52
2.1.1. The Meanings of Development and Social Change . . . . .	53
2.1.2. Various Conventional Theories of Development . . . . .	61
2.2. Development and Change: An Islamic Perspective	69
2.2.1. The Islamic Ideological System . . . .	70
a) Muslim Perception of Religious authority . . . . .	70
b) An Islamic Weltanschauung . . . . .	74
i. Islamic Perspective of Religion and God . . . . .	75
ii. Islamic Perspective of Man and Society . . . . .	79
iii. Islamic Perspective of Life and the World. . . . .	83
2.2.2. Islamic Concept of Development and Change . . . . .	90
3. Local Muslim Perceptions of Development and Change .	99
Conclusion . . . . .	111

CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT UNDER MAHATHIR: GENESIS, IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION AND PROFILE . . . . .	116
1. The Genesis and Progress of Development Policy	
Before the Mahathir Period. . . . .	117
1.1. Pre- and Post-independence Malaysia Until the 1970 Period . . . . .	117
1.2. The Aftermath of the 1970 Period Until the Mahathir Era . . . . .	126
2. The Ideological Foundation of Mahathir's Development Policy. . . . .	133
2.1. Mahathir's Idealism. . . . .	113
2.2. The National Ideology . . . . .	147
2.2.1. The Religion . . . . .	148
2.2.2. The Royalty. . . . .	149
2.2.3. The Malays . . . . .	151
2.2.4. The Language . . . . .	153
3. A Profile of the Major Development Policies During the Mahathir Administration. . . . .	157
3.1. The Islamization Policy . . . . .	158
3.2. Vision 2020 . . . . .	162
3.3. Other Policies . . . . .	167
The Look-East Policy . . . . .	167
The Policy of 70 Million Population . . . . .	167
The Economic Policies. . . . .	168
The Foreign Policy. . . . .	171
Conclusion . . . . .	172

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY I: VARIOUS IMPACTS ON THE SOCIETY . . . . .	174
1. Mahathir's Impact on Government Policy. . . . .	175
1.1. Mahathir's Ideological Influence on Government Decision. . . . .	175
1.2. An Analysis of Mahathir's Islamization Policy	181
2. The Impact of the Government's Policy on the Muslim Society. . . . .	192
2.1. The Demographic Impact . . . . .	194
2.2. The Socio-political Impact . . . . .	210
2.3. The Impact on Ethnic Relations . . . . .	215
2.4. The Islamic Religious Impact . . . . .	221
2.5. The Educational Impact . . . . .	242
2.6. The Impact on Health . . . . .	247
2.7. The Impact of Urbanization and Industrialization . . . . .	250
Conclusion . . . . .	255
CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY II: VARIOUS MUSLIM RESPONSES. . . . .	257
1. Perspective I: The ABIM Response . . . . .	257
2. Perspective II: The Darul Arqam Response . . . . .	273
3. Perspective III: The PAS Response . . . . .	280
Conclusion . . . . .	292
CONCLUSION. . . . .	295
Appendices	
- Appendix I      Fieldwork in Malaysia: A Summary Report . . . . .	308
- Appendix II     List of Interviewees and Dates of Interviews . . . . .	310
- Appendix III    Mahathir: A Chronological Biography	313
- Appendix IV     Comparative Development Models . . . . .	316
- Appendix V      Progress of IIUM . . . . .	317
Bibliography . . . . .	318

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1.	Peninsular Malaysia: Estimated Population by Ethnic Group for Selected Years . . . . .	25
Table 2.1.	Various Perceptions of Social Change . . . . .	60
Table 2.2.	Post-Second World War Development Paradigms . . . . .	68
Table 3.1.	Peninsular Malaysia: Progress of Selected Indicators in 1970 and 1980 . . . . .	129
Table 3.2.	Malaysia: Percentage of Expenses by Major Sectors in the Development Plans . . . . .	130
Table 3.3.	Peninsular Malaysia: Progress of Some Selected Indicators During the NEP Period . . . . .	131
Table 4.1.	Malaysia and the Peninsular: Population Distribution by Urban Rural Proportion 1970- 1991 . . . . .	195
Table 4.2.	Peninsular Malaysia: Selected Basic Indicators for the Years 1980, 1987 and 1991 . . . . .	200
Table 4.3.	Number of Drug Addicts from 1980 to 1991 . . . . .	202

Table 4.4.	Number of Marriages and Divorces in Selected States 1981-1992 . . . . .	203
Table 4.5.	Total Number of Committed Juvenile Offences from 1981 to 1991 . . . . .	205
Table 4.6.	Peninsular Malaysia: Population Estimate by Ethnic Group ('000) . . . . .	216
Table 4.7.	Employment by Selected Sector and Ethnic Group 1985-1995 . . . . .	220
Table 4.8.	BIMB: Total Deposit from 1985 to 1993 (RM '000) . . . . .	228
Table 4.9.	BIMB: Net Profit Before Zakat and Total Assets from 1985 to 1993 . . . . .	229
Table 4.10.	Peninsular Malaysia: Number of Schools 1980-1991 . . . . .	245
Table 4.11.	Peninsular Malaysia: Number of Teachers 1980-1991 . . . . .	245
Table 4.12.	Peninsular Malaysia: Number of Pupils 1980-1991 . . . . .	246
Table 4.13.	Malaysia: Number of Higher Learning Institutions 1987-1991 . . . . .	246
Table 4.15.	Malaysia: Federal Government Expenditure (Million) . . . . .	246



Table 4.16.	Number of Government Hospitals and Beds . . . . .	248
-------------	--	-----

Table 4.17.	Malaysia: Number of Private Hospitals and Beds . . . . .	249
-------------	---	-----

Table 4.18.	Malaysia: Number of Health Centres . . . . .	249
-------------	---	-----

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It used to be said that few or no people can complete their job without the help of others. Academically, I am particularly indebted to my supervisor, Dr. M.V. McDonald who has taken so much trouble to ensure my smooth journey towards success. His academic guidance, advice, and encouragement have been extremely valuable and enlightening. His other types of assistance, sympathy and sacrifice helped to create a conducive learning environment and to ease my stay in Edinburgh. Similar thanks are extended to my second supervisor, Dr. Carole Hillenbrand, for the various ways she has helped me. Professor William R. Roff will always be remembered for his invaluable academic advice.

Thanks are also due to The University of Edinburgh for allowing me to work under its auspices. This includes my Head of the Department, its teaching staff members and the very cooperative and untiring Secretary, Miss Irene Crawford who, unfortunately, will have to leave the Department in August 1995 on her retirement. My use of the main and departmental libraries and the computer and other facilities, naturally makes me appreciate these services.

My two inspiring parents are the ones to whom my mandatory indebtedness should go. In addition to the love they have shown me, the trouble they took in bringing me up and in providing necessary education when I was in their care makes me really indebted to them. It is to them that my success is particularly dedicated.

My thanks would be incomplete without extending my sincere gratitudes to all my colleagues like Dr. Ahmad Shah Md.Noar, Dr. Che Omar Haji Awang, Mr. Wan Mohd. Naim, Mr. Dzul Haimi Hj. Zain, Dr. Zaid Mohamad, Mr. Md. Som Sujimon, Dr. Nik Min, Dr. Hikmatullah, Mr. Abdul Karim Ali, Mr. Joni Tamkin Borhan, Mr. Rafar and others and their families on their help and the joyous days we have shared in Edinburgh. Earlier, I also had an

opportunity to share those beautiful days with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ismawi Hj. Zin, Dr. Mohammad Redzuan Othman, Dr. Syed Mohd. Dawilah al-Edrus, Dr. Zainuddin Jaffar, Dr. Kamaruzzaman Yusuff and Dr. Mohd. Akram Laldin and their families who have already left the University after completing their study. The same gratitude goes to all other Malaysian and non-Malaysian friends who have been so close to me especially through our motivating Edinburgh Malaysian Students Association (EMSA) activities. The fortnightly academic circle has proved to be a useful forum for gaining knowledge and experience. EMSA, of which I was once the Secretary, will remain in my affections and those of family forever.

In Malaysia, I am indebted from the very beginning to my employer, The International Islamic University Malaysia (especially to the Rector, Prof. Datok Dr. AbdulHamid AbuSulayman and his deputies Prof. Dr. Mohd. Kamal Hassan [academic] and Dr. Sidek Baba [students]) and my sponsor, The Public Services Department Malaysia, who have extended various types of help to enable me to complete my study, and also to the Malaysian Students Department London through which my grants have been channelled especially to the officer in-charge Mr. Akashah Haji Ariff.

The various institutions and individuals listed in the relevant appendices have been very cooperative, especially when I was in Malaysia during a short field trip in April and May 1994. To them goes my Malay *pantun*:

*Pisang emas di bawa belayar,  
Masak sebiji di atas peti,  
Hutang emas boleh dibayar  
Hutang budi dibawa mati.*

Some individuals deserve special mention because of their extreme concern. Among them are Mr. Ruslan Hj.Kassim and family, Mr. Jamaluddin Yaacob (IIUM), Mr. Abd. Razak Abd. Rahman (IIUM), Mr. Yassin Baboo (IIUM), my elder brothers Azmi and Zulkifli and their families, my sister Sharifah and her husband, and my uncle Abd. Samad and family. My two younger brothers, Tarmizi and Mohd. Faisol (and family) and sister Munawwaroh together with my father and mother in-law and all other unmentioned relatives

have always been a motivating factor in one way or the other throughout my life as a student abroad.

It goes without saying that there is a woman behind the success of every man. I, thus, really appreciate the sacrifice, support and understanding of my beloved wife, Rubiah Abd. Rahman, who has shown continuous sympathy and care during those difficult days. I value all these contributions and her excellent performance in looking after me and our lovely children Ilham, Ajmal, Tasnim, Nadiya and Adlyn. It was their companionship that made life more lively and meaningful. Since January 1993, everybody in the family was excited as Adlyn joined the team despite the increasing hardship that had to be shouldered. For all this, I once again sincerely congratulate them. Indeed, my success is their success.

The above order of gratitude does not necessarily reflect the greater or lesser degree of help and sacrifice that each quarter or individual has sincerely offered to me. In fact, each of them has his or her own perfect contribution that have collectively contributed to my success. Equally excellent in their service are those whose names are unfortunately not stated here due to the space limitation. For all, may Allāh grant necessary reward. Āmīn.

Above all, and most importantly, I must, upon completion of this thesis, be thankful to Allāh s.w.t. Who has always been the ultimate determining factor behind my success. No word has its equivalent to express this gratitude except my humble Al-ḥamd li Allāh.

## DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby solemnly declare that this thesis is written by me and does not represent the work of any other person.

(HAZIZAN MD. NOON)

OCTOBER 1995

## NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND SPELLING

In this kind of research, Malay and Arabic words are often used besides the English. The spelling and use of Malay terms/words in English can be considered less problematic as Malay language uses the same Romanised characters similar to the English. Hence, transliteration is unnecessary. However, Arabic words need a greater attention in view of the absence of a standard system of transliteration. As a great deal of Malay words are also originally from Arabic but spelt or written in Malay style, the spelling of the Arabic-based Malay words in English needs some rules in order to avoid inconsistencies. Here are some general rules pertaining to the system of Arabic transliteration and Malay spelling as applied in this work.

In general, the system used by the Encyclopaedia of Islam is followed with the following exceptions:

- The word ending with *tā'* *marbūṭah* is spelt with 'h' instead of 'a'. For example, *Jumu<sup>h</sup>ah* and not *Jumu<sup>a</sup>a*.
- *ḵ* is rendered as *q*
- *ḍj* " " " *j*
- *ḍh* " " " *dh*
- *kh* " " " *kh*
- *sh* " " " *sh*

When an Arabic word is derived from Arabic source, and has also become part of the Malay vocabulary, its Arabic transliteration is preferred. For example, *Sulṭān* and not *Sultan*. However, if such word is quoted from a Malay source, the Malay spelling is used. For example, *Adat* and not *Ādah*. At any rate, both the Malay and Arabic terms are italicised. For convenience, exception is however made for three most frequently-used Arabic words which are also used widely in Malay, namely *Allāh*, *Islam* and *al-Qur'ān*. The term *Allāh* is transliterated but not italicised. 'Islam' is spelt as it is

without either transliteration or italic, and the word *al-Qur'ān* is both transliterated and italicised. If the quoted term is from Malay source, then it is spelt as it appears like *Quran* or *Kuran*.

As for Arabic proper names, like names of places, persons etc., they are spelt according to the popular used in the literature concerned. For example, if the place Mecca is used in Malay literature, it is spelt as *Mekah* instead of Arabic *Makkah*. Otherwise, the term *Makkah* is preferred. Similarly, the term *Syed* and *Sayyid* are used according to the same principle.

As a wider use of the Malay as an official language took place only since 1970, serious efforts to formulate a standard system of spelling have only been obvious since then. Therefore, spellings based on the new system only began to be used widely in contemporary works. Unless the words using the old system of spelling are quoted directly, their use in the present work follows the standard *Bahasa Malaysia* (lit. Malaysian language) system. Hence, the words like *chahaya* (old spelling) and *cahaya* (new spelling) are spelt according to this rule.

## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ABIM	<i>Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia</i> (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia)
AGM	Annual General Meeting
ALIRAN	<i>Aliran Kesedaran Rakyat</i> (Peoples' Consciousness Movement)
APU	<i>Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah</i> (United Ummah Front)
ASN	<i>Amanah Saham Nasional</i> (National Unit Trust Scheme)
BN	<i>Barisan Nasional</i> (Front Nasional)
BERJASA	<i>Barisan Jemaah Islam</i> (Islamic United Front)
CFK	Centre for Fundamental Knowledge
BIMB	<i>Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad</i> (the Islamic Bank of Malaysia)
DDP	Draft Development Plan (1950-1955)
FELCRA	Federal Land Corporation and Regional Authority
FELDA	Federal Land Development Authority
HAMIM	<i>Parti Hizbul Muslimin</i>
IIIT	International Institute of Islamic Thought
IIUM	International Islamic University of Malaysia
IKIM	<i>Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia</i> (IKIM)
IKD	<i>Institut Kajian Dasar</i> (Institute for Policy Research)
ISTAC	International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization
JMBRAS	Journal of the Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
LUTH	<i>Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji</i> (Pilgrim's Management and Fund Board)



KIMMA	<i>Kongres India Muslim Malaysia</i> (Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress)
MAPEN	<i>Majlis Perundangan Negara</i> (National Consultative Council)
MARA	<i>Majlis Amanah Rakyat</i> (Council of Trust for Indigenous People)
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MIC	Malaysian Congress Party
MLP1	First Malaya Plan (1956-1960)
MLP2	Second Malaya Plan (1961-1965)
MYP1	First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970)
MYP2	Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975)
MYP3	Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980)
MYP4	Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985)
MYP5	Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990)
MYP6	Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995)
NDP	National Development Plan (1991-2000)
NEP	New Economic Policy (1970-1990)
OPP1	First Outline Perspective Plan (1970-1990)
OPP2	Second Outline Perspective Plan (1991-2000)
PAS	<i>Parti Islam SeMalaysia</i> (Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia)
PERNAS	National Corporation
PERKIM	Muslim Welfare Organization Malaysia
PNB	<i>Perbadanan Nasional Berhad</i> (National Equity Corporation)
RIDA	Rural Industrial Development Authority
S46	<i>Parti (Melayu) Semangat 46</i> (Spirit of 46)
UKM	<i>Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia</i> (National University of Malaysia)
UM	University of Malaya
UMNO	United Malays National Organization
UN	United Nations
UPEN	Kelantan Economic Planning Unit
USM	<i>Universiti Sains Malaysia</i>

Chapter One

**INTRODUCTION**

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

As the title suggests, this preliminary chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive introduction to the present research work in order to define the scope and framework of this academic venture. It is hoped that early discussion of some major aspects pertaining to the research and research topic will make the discussion in subsequent chapters more fully understandable. Divided into two main sections, namely *Background to the Research and Definition of Terms and Phrases* respectively, the chapter will deal with such sub-topics as *The Rationale for the Choice of the Topic*, *The Hypothesis of the Research*, *Research Questions and Objectives*, *Limitations and Delimitations of the Research* and *Survey of Literature* in the first section, and *Malaysia: An Overview*, *Islam and the Islamization Process in Malaysia: A Brief Historical Review*, *Mahathir Mohamad: A Brief Profile* and *A Comparative Sociological Study Defined* in the second section.

#### 1. Background to the Research.

This section attempts to elaborate some important aspects pertaining to the general characteristics of the present research work, including the rationale for choosing the topic and other sub-topics as mentioned above. Upon reading this section, the reader is expected to be well informed of the nature of the research.

##### 1.1. The Rationale for the Choice of the Topic.

The undertaking of this work is justified by a number of considerations which can be outlined as follows.

When Malaysia finally obtained its independence from Britain in 1957,<sup>1</sup> rapid developments began to take place in a particular direction bringing about considerable changes to its political, economic and social behaviours and patterns. Striking changes could also be observed in the cultural and religious spheres, especially pertaining to the role of Islam, the official religion of the then Federation of Malaysia, in nation building.<sup>2</sup>

Since independence, the status of Islam in the Constitution has, generally speaking, never been questioned openly by people of other faiths.<sup>3</sup> This has in effect given it an advantage which allows it to flourish and expand within a safe constitutional limit. Some seven centuries earlier, history witnessed a number of significant developments which caused this religion to appear and subsequently expand rapidly throughout the Malay Archipelago region.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the religious

---

1 Malaya was successively colonised by Western powers from the early sixteenth century, beginning with the Portuguese in 1511 and later the Dutch and the British. Before independence was gained on August 31st, 1957 Malaya was under British domination. During the Japanese occupation (1941-45), British rule was interrupted for a short while. For a discussion of Malaysian history before independence, see for instance Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and Its History*, (London: Hutchinson University Library, 5th. ed., 1958) and John Bastin and R. Roolvink, ed., *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964).

2 Part I Article 3 of the Federal Constitution states that "Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation." For a more detailed discussion of this and other related constitutional provisions, see ch. 4 of this thesis and Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, "Islam in Malaya", in *Islam in the Modern Nation State*, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1965), pp. 287-306.

3 Although there were times when the issue was raised in a manner not considered as detrimental to the Constitution. See paper by Rev. Dr. Paul Tan, Director, Catholic Research, in Zakry Abadi, *Dilemma Barisan Nasional*, (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Syarikat Grafikset Abadi, July, 1986), pp. 47-66. For a brief historical role of Islam, see also Muhammad Kamal Hassan, "The Influence of Islam on Education and Family in Malaysia", a working paper presented at a seminar on *The Role and Influence of Religion on Society* jointly organized by the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM) and The Goethe Institute Kuala Lumpur on 13-16 September 1993.

4 Some of the works often cited in discussing the coming of Islam to the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago are *Preliminary Statement On the General Theory of Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago* by Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1969) and *Islam Comes to Malaysia* by S.Q. Fatimi (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd., See also Paul Coatalen, "The Coming of Islam to S.E. Asia: A Critical

behaviour of Malaysia today can be said to owe greatly to this early development, as will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter.

The above two major historical events, namely the Islamic penetration and expansion and the formal liberation from colonial domination marked by independence, are the most significant factors to have contributed to the development of modern Malaysia.<sup>5</sup>

Unlike other issues, Islam and development have never ceased to be at the nation's political forefront. Since independence, both factors have been equally crucial for the political struggle and for the battle of ideas. The relationship between the two is also somewhat complex as both are not necessarily mutually correlated at all times. For example, while the development issue was dominant and greatly responsible for the Government's landslide victory in the 1990 general election, the fall of Kelantan into the hands of opposition parties dominated by the *Islamic Party of Malaysia* (PAS) in that election best illustrates this unique feature of Malaysia's politics, Islam and the development issue.<sup>6</sup> In short, it can be said that Islamic factor has never been taken lightly by those who are involved in the nation's politics and development.

---

Review of Some Extant Theories", *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 & 4, 1981, pp. 100-119.

5

Certainly, various other factors have also contributed to national development. However, these two factors have evidently had a far-reaching impact on the nature of post-independent Malaysian development. As will be explained later, the phrase modern Malaysia is employed here to denote the country after independence in 1957. For a brief account of Malaysia during and after the British period, see Ira M. Lapidus, "British Malaya and Independent Malaysia", *A History of Islamic Societies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 776-783.

6

The other main party was *Semangat 46* or The Spirit of 46 (S46), a new party formed by ex-members of the old UMNO after the latter was declared illegal by the court in 1988 as a result of a continuing internal power struggle. PAS, S46 and other smaller locally-based parties like BERJASA and HAMIM, agreed to form a rarely-founded opposition alliance, namely *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah* (the *Ummah* Solidarity Movement) or APU, to oppose the Government in that election.

In the course of national development, various policies and strategies have been formulated and implemented at various stages by the previous administrations of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak Hussain, and Tun Hussain Onn, as well as by the present Government under the leadership of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, in order to provide appropriate physical and social infra-structures and facilities necessary for nation building.<sup>7</sup> A series of Malaysia Plans, official blue-prints of the nation's development policy, formulated and implemented since the early years of independence, illustrate the various efforts made by these administrations to advance the country. Today, one is compelled to recognize the various economic, political and socio-cultural changes brought about by the implementation of these plans.<sup>8</sup>

One of the important consequences arising from these changes is the gradual transformation of Malaysia's multi-religious and multi-racial society into a more complex socio-cultural and religious entity. In the process, a considerable degree of local traditional and cultural practices, especially among the Malays, have had to undergo some alterations or disappeared altogether due to the various demands of modernisation. Nonetheless, in the religious sphere, there have been emerging signs of Islamic recrystallisation in the country, followed by increasing manifestations of Islamic practices beyond personal acts especially since the 1970s, a phenomenon that partly inspires us to undertake the current research venture.<sup>9</sup>

---

7 See for instance, Jomo K. Sunderam., *Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy*, (Basington and London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990), V.V. Bhanoji Rao, *Malaysia Development Pattern and Policy 1947-1971*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980) and P. Arudsothy, "Malaysia", *The Economic Development of East and Southeast Asia*, ed. Shinichi Ichimura, (Honolulu: An East-West Center Book, 1972), pp. 81-128.

8 A series of Malaya and Malaysia Plans which will be discussed in the appropriate chapters has now reached the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1990-1995) under the Second Outline Perspective Plan (1990-2000).

9 Among the works discussing in greater detail this phenomenon are Chandra Muzaffar's *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*, (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti Sdn.

Earlier, we have seen that Islamic issues have been a powerful force in Malaysian development and politics. This is true especially among the Malays as almost all of them are Muslims and therefore, it has become almost exclusively a Malay affair. Among the non-Malays however, Islam is not an important issue as they are more concerned with such matters as the protection and defence of non-Malay interests in education, employment, university enrolment and above all their economy as the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman remarks:

"The Chinese are materialistic as a race and a practical-minded people. Generally, they were not interested in politics, they liked to live in places where law and order reigned, and with a minimum of interference, so that they could go about their business, merely to make money."<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the practice of Islam, both at individual and Government levels, only becomes relevant to them when it is found to be or interpreted as being detrimental to these interests.<sup>11</sup> In view of this socio-religious problem, it is quite understandable that the Government is also expected to address equally fairly the non-Malay issues, if only in order to maintain its long term political reputation and survival.<sup>12</sup>

Given the fact that a Government in Malaysia is formed through a democratic process which is based on popular votes during a general election, and that issue-oriented politics have been long practised, all political actors, politicians and followers alike, are expected to deal wisely with various issues raised among the people of different races, cultures and

---

Bhd. 1987), Zainah Anwar's *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among Students*, (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1987), Hussin Mutalib's *Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993) and Mohamad Abu Bakar's "Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXI, No. 10, (California: The Regents of the University of California, October 1981), pp. 1040-1059.

10

Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, *Looking Back: Monday Musings and Memories*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977), p. 78.

11

For example, when Islamization was launched, it appeared to be a controversial issue for some quarters.

12

The government claims that its development strategy is meant for all people regardless of their race and religion as stated, for instance, in their election manifestos.



religious beliefs which, as established earlier, are largely concentrated on development and religious concerns. In this respect, it is not difficult to explain why the *Barisan Nasional* (National Front) has been elected successively to run the Government, mainly as a result of its ability to manipulate and address to these crucial issues.<sup>13</sup> It is clear at this juncture that the research is intended to look into the present Government's approach of developing the nation and attempting to keep a balance between the pressing demand for Islamization in a context of rapid economic and material advancement, and various non-Muslim pressures.<sup>14</sup>

The research is also undertaken for specific academic reasons. With a background in Sociology and Anthropology and Islamic Studies and Study of Religions at his first and second degrees respectively, and some experience in social research and field work, the researcher has found it feasible and useful to embark on this kind of research. The fact that he is attached to a university in Malaysia explains further the desirability of selecting this topic. The research provides an opportunity for him to work on the proposed topic in order to develop his academic expertise in Malaysian and Islamic studies.

The current religious situation in Malaysia has also influenced the candidate's choice of the topic. Increasing religious awareness in Malaysia appears to have provided more favourable circumstances for Islam to express itself in a more comprehensive manner especially in the last two decades.<sup>15</sup> When

---

13

For a comprehensive coverage of the *Barisan's* dominance in the Government, see Diane K. Mauzy, *Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia*, (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Marican & Sons (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., 1983).

14

The mention of this apparently paradoxical relation between Islam and material development is not in any way to imply the dissociation of material from spiritual-moral aspects of a comprehensive Islamic development philosophy but to stress the practical difficulties it has to face when implemented in different social contexts.

15

For an overview of the Islamic resurgence in general see a special report on Middle Eastern Affairs entitled "Islamic Fundamentalism" by John L. Esposito in *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia Knowledge in Depth*, 5th. ed.



the Government began to place greater and more open emphasis on Islamic issues as manifested, for instance, in its efforts to incorporate Islamic values into administration, this religious momentum seemed to draw a wider support. As a result, more and more people, especially among the Malays, began to resort to this new religious tendency. Increasingly, they demanded that Islam be given a greater role in various social, economic and political programmes and activities.<sup>16</sup>

One of the widely-discussed subjects among the local Muslim intellectuals and scholars in particular during this resurgence period is the need for Islamizing modern disciplines. Naturally, this is only a part of the call for a global and comprehensive Islamization of the knowledge process. Since this demand has not been resolved to a single definite conceptual or operational framework, it frequently becomes a subject of many interpretations and elaborations. This is especially so when touching on the details of how its ideal philosophy can be translated into practice. As the subject is relatively new to the public, only some people with certain specializations have thus far been able to elaborate it satisfactorily.<sup>17</sup> In the light of this religious interest, the researcher finds it important to undertake the present academic venture in order to identify academically some possible areas in which the principles of Islamization of knowledge may find their ways in a more concrete fashion, that is by way of

---

Vol. 22, (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1994), and Chandra Muzaffar's "Islamic Resurgence: A Global View", *Challenges and Choices in Malaysian Politics and Society*, (Penang: Aliran Kesedaran Rakyat, September 1989), pp. 346-387.

16

Mohd. Nor Haji Nawawi, "Undang-undang Islam, Masyarakat Majmuk dan Hubungan Etnik di Malaysia", *Sarjana*, Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Vol. 4, Jun, 1989, pp. 139-148.

17

As a result some works have been produced in response to this phenomenon. Among them are *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Workplan* by Isma'il Rāji al-Farūqī (Washington D.C.: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982), "Islamizing the Social Sciences" by the same author, "Islamization of Social Sciences" by Abubaker A. Bagader both in *Islam and Sociological Perspective*, ed. Abubaker (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1983) and *Islamization of Knowledge: A Methodology* by Imaduddin, (Washington D.C.: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1991).

utilizing both conventional and Islamic methods of investigation.

### 1.2. The Hypothesis of the Research.

This research is undertaken against a popular belief that although Malaysian development has been striking in the aftermath of independence, it is not until the time of the present Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, that a drastic change in development strategy and approach can be observed. This implies that not only the nature of the new policies and measures introduced is somewhat different, but that the rate of change, impact, challenges, speed, controversies, and criticism has also been more striking during this time than in previous periods.<sup>18</sup>

Of these distinctive policies, the Islamization policy is said to have been a dynamic religious approach to nation building which has brought about a significant impact upon society. Provided the Government is really sincere and serious in its Islamization programmes, and that Islamization is really intended to eventually develop into more concrete manifestations towards fulfilling the real notion of Islamization as held by believing Muslim scholars at large, it can be said with a greater degree of confidence that the policy is not just another programme implemented within the narrow religious framework of earlier leaders, but aims to establish a wider and more effective religious role in modernising the country based on a dynamic and broader interpretation of Islamic postulates.<sup>19</sup>

---

18

Mahathir himself is seen as an architect of modern Malaysia and the main factor behind the present socio-economic, religious and political changes making him the one who, "is arguably the most analysed Prime Minister ever, the most relentlessly examined and the most controversial." (Hasan Hj. Hamzah, *Mahathir: Great Malaysian Hero*, 2nd. Ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Media Printext (M) Sdn. Bhd., Oct. 1990)).

19

Aidit Ghazali, *Development: An Islamic Perspective*, (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1990), pp. 130-131.

In short, the research attempts to verify the claim that although the move is said to have been introduced due to accelerating pressures from the public and a large number of Islamic social and political organizations such as *Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* (The Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement) or ABIM and PAS, and therefore, "will not satisfy the fundamentalist counter-elites until it has progressed so far that only they, and not the secular elite, are eligible and qualified to rule",<sup>20</sup> Mahathir's perception of Islam and his Government's approach to development especially in the field of religion are distinctive, more realistic and practical for social transformation compared to that of his predecessors.<sup>21</sup>

### 1.3. Research Questions and Objectives.

The above discussion provides a backdrop against which a number of significant questions may be asked: In what way is Mahathir's approach to development different from that of his predecessors?; What are the reasons which justify such a claim?; Do the new strategy, policies and approach have any significant impact on Malaysian society, especially on the Muslims?; How is Islam perceived by Mahathir and treated by his administration?; What is the extent of the religious role in the nation's development process?; In particular, what is meant by Islamization in the present context?; Is it really compatible with Islamic teachings, and the demands of Malaysia's plural society?

20

---

Diane K. Mauzy and R.S. Milne, "The Mahathir Administration In Malaysia: Discipline Through Islam", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 56 No. 4, (An International Review of Asia and the Pacific, Winter 1983-84), p. 645.

21

While Mahathir's Government is alleged to have "gradually moved UMNO (the United Malays' National Organization, the key component of the ruling *Barisan Nasional*) and the Government to a much closer association with formal Islamic principles and goals" (Diane K. Mauzy, *Barisan Nasional...*, op.cit. p. 127), its development policies especially pertaining to the economy of the nation are frequently criticised for being devoid of Islamic concerns. PAS in particular has consistently charged the Government and its policies with being secular. On the other hand, UMNO defends its development strategies against such accusations, pointing out that its development policies are compatible with Islam because the present economic progress, for instance, is matched by spiritual advancement and moral strength.

Obviously, attempts towards finding the answers to these questions themselves define the objectives of this research which can be summarized as follows: to understand objectively the nature of the current development process, policies and implementation; to study the role of Islam in nation building; and to analyze the impact of the Government's policy especially on Muslim society.

On a higher level, one can expect some generalizations to be derived directly or indirectly from the research findings. They are essentially based on the answers to another set of questions: How are contemporary Islamic practices in different parts of the world instrumental in explaining the present religious behaviour?; To what extent is the polemic over Islam's role in the modern world justifiable?; Can development as an important process for societal change be based on religion, especially in a racially and religiously plural society? and; What model of development framework can be offered to rationalize the practicality of an Islamic approach to development in a specific country?

In the final analysis, it is certainly hoped that researcher's attempts to find answers to these questions will end up with a reliable scholarly work which can contribute meaningfully to the academic world.

#### 1.4. Limitations and Delimitations of the Research.

To comply with the constraints of time and space, this research is carried out within the following limitations.

Firstly, only Peninsular or West Malaysia is identified as the main area of research concentration. The geographical exclusion of East Malaysia, namely Sabah and Sarawak, has been necessary due to several considerations. First and foremost, the Peninsular displays a fairly symmetrical cultural and religious picture, meaning that it is culturally, religiously and ethnically more representative of a country called Malaysia. This consideration is essential if one expects a greater research objectivity. East Malaysia requires a special

method of investigation to deal with its unique cultural, demographical and other local realities. Moreover, travel for data collection in this area are more costly and one needs to spend a longer time if the research is to be reliable. Matters are less problematic in the Peninsular. Thus, the preference for West Malaysia as the main research area is logistically justified.<sup>22</sup>

Secondly, the non-economic aspects of Malaysian development, especially its socio-cultural and the religious aspects, are more emphasized in our analysis although other aspects will also be discussed wherever relevant.<sup>23</sup> The greater emphasis on these aspects of development is due to two main reasons: First, they are closer to both the researcher's interest and the academic requirements. Second, it is found that in most development studies, the non-economic aspects such as these are rarely given serious attention compared to other non-social forces - technological, economic and physical.

Thirdly, in terms of time span, this research is limited to analysing development strategy and process during the Mahathir period, especially from 1981 to 1992. However, the limitation of the research period is only for ease of analysis. While the research is concerned mainly with *what has already happened* during the stipulated period, the developments which took place before and after that time are also considered, especially when they have proved to have a significant bearing upon earlier events, or are crucial to understanding subsequent developments.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> However, there are times when reference to the Peninsular alone cannot meet the specific objectives of a discussion in which case an extension to include East Malaysia, in other words Malaysia as a whole may be unavoidable.

<sup>23</sup> For Instance, the economic figures and data will be used to explain more clearly the socio-cultural and religious analysis.

<sup>24</sup> This especially concerns relevant developments that took place after the year 1992 until the general election of April 1995 which might be closely related to earlier events.

Having provided some academic and personal justifications for choosing the topic, research hypothesis, questions and objectives, and the scope of the research, it is now important to survey some available works related to this area of study. The main objective of this review is twofold: First, to identify available works related to the subject matter so that they can be consulted and benefitted from in various ways for this research, and second, to ensure that there are no other works on the same topic or of similar nature completed or being carried out elsewhere, thus justifying the need for the present work. The originality of this research lies partly in this early identification of an *unexplored* area.

### 1.5. Survey of Literature.

Of late there has been increasing interest in the study of Malaysia. However, there are comparatively more works pertaining to economic development than to the non-economic one. This is possibly due to the nation's earlier economic slowdown as well as to its outstanding economic performance which continues to record a growth rate of more than 8 per cent, especially since 1987. In the light of Emmanuel Todd's observation that "development is today perceived as an essentially economic phenomenon",<sup>25</sup> this preference is not difficult to understand.<sup>26</sup> The Government's dynamic economic approach and strategy could be another reason for the growing interest in this particular aspect.

This has left a comparatively smaller number of works on the non-economic side of national development, especially its social and cultural aspects, most being written by academic scholars specializing in the field. Still less numerous are

---

25

Emmanuel Todd, *The Causes of Progress: Culture, Authority and Change*, tr. by Richard Boulind, (New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987), p. 1.

26

It is quite observable then that today, prosperity and degree of advancement is defined and evaluated more in terms of money, technology and other material achievements than anything else. In general, this is what seems to matter most for modern society.



serious works discussing critically the state of religious expression in such a plural society and which are based on a dynamic academic analysis whether religious, sociological or inter-disciplinary, such the present work attempts to undertake. Given the time and space limitations, a comprehensive survey of works related to the present research is hardly possible. Only some such works are reviewed here in order to achieve the objective of this survey.

Working on a general introduction to Malaysia is less problematic than focusing on specific aspects as there are numerous works on the former subject. Some of the works have been written specially to introduce the country, while some others, because of their specific focus on a particular aspect of Malaysia, may include an introductory section as part of the work. Both kinds of work are helpful in various ways to provide an overview of the country. Geographical, demographic and cultural profiles of the country can be obtained by consulting such works as *Malaysia Kita: Panduan dan Rujukan Untuk Peperiksaan Am Kerajaan*,<sup>27</sup> *Masyarakat dan Perubahan, Masyarakat Malaysia dan Alam Sosialnya*,<sup>29</sup> *Nation Building in Malaysia 1946-1974*,<sup>30</sup> *Women and Culture: Between Malay Adat and Islam*,<sup>31</sup> and annual publication like *Asian Development Outlook*.<sup>32</sup>

Works on the history of Malaysia in general, and on the coming, expansion and influence of Islam upon the society in particular are also widely available in the forms of books,

---

<sup>27</sup> International Law Book Services (Kuala Lumpur, n.d.).

<sup>28</sup> Mohamed Salleh Lamry et. al., ed. (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1993).

<sup>29</sup> Shamsul Amri Baharuddin (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1993).

<sup>30</sup> James P. Ongkili (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

<sup>31</sup> Wazir Jahan Karim, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992).

<sup>32</sup> Yearly series published by Asian Development Bank, Manila.

articles, proceedings and the like *Malaya and Its History* by Richard Winstedt, *Malayan and Indonesian Studies* by John Bastin and R. Roolvink (ed.) and *Sejarah Melayu Raya* by Abdullah Abbas Nasution are informative for understanding the former, while *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* by William R. Roff, *Preliminary Statement On A General Theory of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago* by Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *Islam Comes to Malaysia* by S.Q. Fatimi and *Islam Dalam Sejarah Asia Tenggara Tradisional* by Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah, are a few classic examples of often-cited works for the understanding of the latter.

Chandra Muzaffar's *Islamic Resurgence In Malaysia*, Zainah Anwar's *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among Students* and Hussin Mutalib's *Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State* deserve consultation to obtain an overall picture of the contemporary religious awareness in Malaysia.

In this research, a brief introduction to Mahathir's administration has benefited from such works as *Mahathir Mohamad: Prime Minister of Malaysia* by M. Rajendran,<sup>33</sup> *Mahathir of Malaysia: Statesman and Leader* by Robin Adshead,<sup>34</sup> *Mahathir Administration: Leadership and Change in A Multi-racial Society* by Chung Kek Yoong,<sup>35</sup> *Mahathir: A Profile In Courage* by J. Victor Morais,<sup>36</sup> and *Mahathir: Di Sebalik Tabir* by Zainuddin Maidin.<sup>37</sup> In their own particular way, all the above works are helpful in various ways, especially in the writing of Chapter One.

---

<sup>33</sup> Petaling Jaya: IBS Buku Sdn. Bhd., 1993.

<sup>34</sup> London: Hibiscus Publishing Company, 1989.

<sup>35</sup> Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., October 1990.

<sup>36</sup> Petaling Jaya: Eastern Universities Press (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1984.

<sup>37</sup> Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications and Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1994.



As Chapter Two aims, among other things, at formulating the Islamic concept of development as seen by local Muslims, the writings of such scholars as Prof. Syed Muhamad Naquib al-Attas, Prof. Dr. Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Prof. Dr. Othman Alhabshi, Aidit Ghazali, Dr. Muhammad Syukri Salleh and Dr. Chandra Muzaffar are important for our consultation. Among their useful works are *Islam and Secularism*, *Pendidikan dan Pembangunan*, *Kaedah Perlaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam di Malaysia*, *Development: An Islamic Perspective*, *An Islamic Approach to Rural Development: The Arqam Way* and *The NEP, Development and Alternative Consciousness* respectively. These works form only a small part of numerous writings that they and other Muslim scholars have written and are found in various kinds of sources like books, journals,<sup>38</sup> magazines<sup>39</sup> and seminar papers.

In addition, the views of various local Muslim organizations like ABIM, PAS and Darul Arqam, are also examined through the study of their various publications as they exist in the forms of books, magazines, documents, pamphlets, speeches etc.<sup>40</sup>

As the focus of research will be on development and change during the Mahathir administration, it is essential to look into his perception of development and the way he sees it in practical terms for implementation in Malaysia. To compare his present philosophy to his earlier idealism, reference to his earlier writings (mainly his articles in the Sunday Times written in the late 1940s) his *The Malay Dilemma* (published in 1970) and *Menghadapi Cabaran* (1976), and his various speeches form an important part of this attempt. Among his articles

---

38

Among the important journals consulted are *JMBRAS*, *JRAS*, *Asian Survey*, *The Muslim World*, *The Islamic Quarterly*, *Journal of Asian History*, *Asian Outlook* and *Modern Asian Studies*.

39

Some examples are *Aliran Monthly*, *Dewan Budaya* and ABIM's *Risalah*.

40

This includes PAS's *Harakah* and Darul Arqam's *25 Years of Darul Arqam: The Struggle of Abuya Sheikh Imam Ashaari Muhammad At-Tamimi*.

written under the nickname C.H.E. Det in the *Sunday Times* in the late 1940s were the following: "Rulers and Raayats: Climax is Near",<sup>41</sup> "Malay Padi Planters Need Help",<sup>42</sup> "Changing Malay Marriage Customs",<sup>43</sup> "Malay Progress and the University",<sup>44</sup> "Malay - "Modern" Standard",<sup>45</sup> "Plight of Malay Fisherfolk",<sup>46</sup> "New Thought on Nationality",<sup>47</sup> "Malays in South Siam Struggle On",<sup>48</sup> "Rains Bring Fish to 'Sawahs'",<sup>49</sup> and "Malay Women Make Their Own Freedom."<sup>50</sup>

In this regard, it should be noted that the researcher has also been able to assemble an extensive collection of most of Mahathir's speeches on various social, economic, political and international subjects covering the period of 1981 to March 1994.<sup>51</sup> This is important especially in identifying the main aspects of his current development philosophy compared to his earlier idealism.

---

41

9.10.1949

42

30.10.1949

43

20.11.1949

44

27.11.1949

45

24.4.1949

46

23.4.1949

47

9.4.1950

48

8.1.1950

49

6.2.1949

50

20.7.1947

51

Four volumes of his speeches (compiled by the Department of Information Services, Ministry of Information, and which cover the period from the year 1981 to 1991), are *Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (Sosial)*, *Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (Ekonomi)*, *Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (Politik)* and *Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (Antarabangsa)*. Three other volumes of his speeches for the respective years 1992, 1993 and 1994 are the researcher's personal collections.

Despite some differences, especially in the details and aspects of emphasis, conventional theories of development and change can be said to be universal as they are generally based on dominant secular ideologies be they capitalist, socialist, Marxist or otherwise. Advocates of the conventional approach among the local people do not develop their own theories in a way highly different in substance from the universally accepted secular perspective. Therefore, there is no need to confine ourselves only to local views for the conceptualization of a conventional theory of development or change in the course of this research.

Thus R.M. MacIver and Charles H. Page's *Society: An Introductory Analysis*, Aidan Foster-Carter's *The Sociology of Development*, Philips Ruopp's (ed.) *Approaches to Community Development*, Jurg Martin Gabriel's *Worldviews and Theories of International Relation*, Leslie Sklair's (ed.) *Capitalism and Development*, Margareta Von Troil's (ed.) *Changing Paradigms in Development: South, East and West*, Johan Pottier's (ed.) *Practising Development: Social Science Perspectives* and Andrew Webster's *Introduction to the Sociology of Development*, are all useful in our attempt to formulate a conventional theoretical perspective of development as against the Islamic concept perceived by local Muslims.

In addition to what has been mentioned earlier, the following works have also been considered for the writing of Chapter Three and Chapter Four: Mahathir's *The Malay Dilemma*, the Tunku's *May 13th: Before and After*, Hamzah Hassan's *Mahathir: Great Malaysian Hero*, Diane Mauzy's *Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia* and *The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline Through Islam* and Chamil Wariya's *Dasar Luar Era Mahathir*. Specific issues like Mahathir's *Wawasan 2020* or *Vision 2020* can be critically analysed by studying works like *Malaysia: The Way Forward* by Mahathir Mohamad, *Menghala Wawasan 2020* by Abu Hasan Adam, *Wawasan 2020: Aspek Politik dan Social* edited by Jurij Jalaludin, *Kongres Menjelang Abad 21: Islam dan wawasan 2020*

by IKIM and *Wawasan Islam Sebagai Sebuah Negara Maju Menjelang 2020: Peranan Umat Islam* by Osman Bakar.

The data collected during the researcher's field work in Malaysia in the form of transcriptions of interviews, Government documents, the Prime Minister's speeches, personal observations, tapes, publications and annual reports of relevant institutions etc. are analyzed and interpreted in the light of the previous comparative development theory. The results of this analysis are incorporated in Chapter Four and Five which deals mainly with the quantitative and qualitative impacts of the Government's development policy on Muslim society and various Muslim responses to it respectively.

All the above-mentioned works are mainly in the form of either books or articles. They form only a part of the whole list of works helpful in various ways to this section of the research. Some other data also appears in the form of unpublished materials, speeches, seminar and working papers, theses or dissertations, interviews, questionnaires etc.<sup>52</sup> These have been brought together into a single system of reference developed purposely for this research. A full list of sources of reference is shown in the bibliography.

Meanwhile, the researcher's review of dissertation abstracts reveals that works of the present nature and given topic and with these specific features, have yet to be carried out. This is as far as the CD ROM review of the dissertation abstracts is concerned. Although this research may also touch on certain aspects discussed in other works, it is merely coincidental, without necessarily showing a similar outlook degree of emphasis. This gives the researcher every reason and opportunity to work on an unexplored area as defined earlier.

Examples of unpublished dissertations which are also important to understanding local scholars' views are *The Malaysian Study Circle Movement and Some Implications for Educational Development*, PhD dissertation by Sidek Baba (Northern Illinois University, 1991), and *Perceptions of Social Change: The Role of ABIM and Its Impact On Malaysian Society*, PhD dissertation by Muhammad Nur Manuty (Temple University, 1990).

## 2. Definition of Terms and Phrases.

In the second section of this chapter, we shall provide introductory notes on the specific terms and phrases that constitute the topic. Our main objective is not only to define and describe clearly the meanings of these terms, but also to elaborate them sufficiently as intended by the researcher. It is within these definitions that the current research operates.

### 2.1. Malaysia: An Overview.

Before independence, Malaysia was known variously as the Malay States, Malaya and the Malay Peninsular.<sup>53</sup> However, after that period it assumed the name Federation of Malaya as used in the Constitution. On 16 September 1963, a new name was assigned to it after it was joined by Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to form what was thereafter known as the Federation of Malaysia or simply Malaysia.<sup>54</sup> In 1965, Singapore left Malaysia to establish its own sovereign rule. It was this political entity which remained after the withdrawal of Singapore that can be considered as the real Malaysia when referring to its contemporary development process. For practical purposes, the term Malaysia is not necessarily used in such a strict periodic demarcation at all times. Unless the need arises, as may be notified accordingly, this name is used throughout to refer generally to the post-independent Malaya which may also be used interchangeably with such names as modern Malaysia and contemporary Malaysia.<sup>55</sup>

---

53

See for instance, V.V. Bhanoji Rao's description of the use of the term in the introduction of his *Malaysia: Development Pattern and Policy*, op.cit., p. xii.

54

International Law Book Services, *Malaysia Kita: Panduan dan Rujukan Untuk Peperiksaan Am Kerajaan*, (Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services, 1991) p.33.

55

Thus, prior to the forming of Federation of Malaysia in 1963, it understandably refers to Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak in their separate entities, and when referring to the period between 1963 to 1965 the reference is understandably inclusive of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak as one political entity.

In general, the social structure and cultural entities of modern Malaysia are influenced greatly by various local, Islamic and Western features because of its earlier historical experiences. Politically, Malaysia is known as a democratic country resembling closely the British system of constitutional monarchy. It differs however from the latter in that the King here occupies the throne for a period of five years, whereas the royal sovereignty in Britain is permanently hereditary. Likewise, the installation of a King as the Head of State is only symbolic as he is meant only to reign, not to rule.<sup>56</sup> Economic activities are diverse ranging from simple traditional village-based agriculture, handicraft and fishing to modern trading and commercial activities, especially in manufacturing. The following discussion elaborates more specifically the various perspectives of the country as a background for a better understanding of its development policy and impact.

#### 2.1.1. The Geographical Perspective.

On the world map, Malaysia or "the crossroads of the world" as it is also known, is the most southern land which projects from continental Asia and is surrounded by Singapore to the South, the Philippines to the East, Thailand to the North and Indonesia to the West.

Contemporary Malaysia consists of fourteen states: Twelve of them - *Wilayah Persekutuan, Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Pulau Pinang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor and Trengganu* - are located in West Malaysia which is also known as the Malay Peninsula that lies to the south of the Isthmus of Kra between latitudes 1° and 7° and longitudes 100° and 105° East.<sup>57</sup>

---

56

Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, *Challenging Times*, (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1986), p.40.

57

*Reader's Digest*, "Guide to Places of the World - A Geographical Dictionary", (London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited, 1987), p. 408.



The other two states - Sabah and Sarawak - are situated on the North and West coasts of Northern Borneo between latitudes 1° and 7° North and longitudes 109° and 120° East and known as East Malaysia which is surrounded by the South China Sea to the West and the Sulu and Celebes Sea to the East and Indonesia to the South. West and East Malaysia are separated by about 540 kilometres of the South China Sea. From 1984, the island of Labuan in Sabah has been made another Federal Territory which is administered from Kuala Lumpur.<sup>58</sup>

With the Malay Peninsula occupying approximately 131,587 sq.km. and East Malaysia (including Labuan) about 198,846 sq.km., the total area of Malaysia is approximately 330,433 sq.km.<sup>59</sup> Much of Malaysia is mountainous and covered by tropical jungles. The mountains rise to 2189 m (7182 ft) at Gunung Tahan in Pahang on the Malay Peninsula, and to 4094 m (13432 ft) at Gunung Kinabalu in Sabah.<sup>60</sup> Rainfall is high everywhere averaging 2540 mm (100in) a year. The driest part of Peninsular Malaysia is Jelebu in Negeri Sembilan with an average of 1625 mm and the wettest place is Maxwell Hill in Perak with 4950 mm a year. The average daily temperature varies from about 22°C (70°F) to 32°C (90°F).<sup>61</sup>

---

58

The first Federal Territory was gazetted in February 1974, covering an area of 243 square kilometres around the capital, Kuala Lumpur. Previously, this area was part of the state of Selangor.

59

Reader's Digest, op.cit., p.409. Cf. The Commonwealth Minister's Reference Book 1992, p. 250.

60

Ibid. p. 408.

61

Stefan Loose, Renate Ramb and Klaus Schindler, *Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei: The Traveller's Guide*, Steve Pothen, tr., (West Yorkshire: Springfield Books Limited, 1990), p. 13.

### 2.1.2. The Demographical Perspective.

The earliest population known to have inhabited the Malay Peninsula were called the *aborigines*.<sup>62</sup> The aborigines could be divided into three main ethnic groups namely the *Negrito*,<sup>63</sup> the *Senoi* or *Sakai*<sup>64</sup> and the *Jakun* or the *Proto-Malays*.<sup>65</sup> However, these aborigines are no longer very numerous now and can only be found very rarely in coastal areas or in the jungles.<sup>66</sup> The *Proto-Malays* (*Jakun* or Mongoloid Indonesian) were believed to have moved to the Peninsula before a massive migration of the so-called *Deutero-Malays* from regions around the Peninsula, especially from Java and Sumatra.<sup>67</sup> The later possessed more advanced techniques of agriculture and were also knowledgeable in metal-work.<sup>68</sup> These Malays were first spread throughout the Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago, settling down in different places, forming a multi-ethnic population. For centuries, the Straits of Malacca had never been a boundary

62

---

They are supposed by some scholars to have marched massively from Tibet and South China through the main land of South Asia to the Malay Peninsula and other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago some thousands years ago. There are many theories regarding the date which these aborigines arrived in this part of the world which is not the concern of this research.

63

They were the earliest inhabitants who are today living in the foot-hills along the main mountain range which forms the backbone of the Malay Peninsula. See Amran Kasimin, *Religion and Social Change Among the Indigenous People of the Malay Peninsula*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1991), pp. 4-7.

64

A later migratory group who are more settled agricultural tribes and are largely found in the central mountains. Ibid pp. 10-13.

65

Of a still later period and generally believed to have inhabited the southern states of the Malaya Peninsula, the Riau-lingga Archipelago, and other lands in the south.

66

Abdul Majeed Mohamad Mackeen, *Contemporary Islamic Legal Organization in Malaya*, (Yale, New Haven: Yale University South East Asian Studies, 1969).

67

Amran, *op.cit.* p.21.

68

Some historians believe that the *Proto-Malays* possessed Neolithic features, since their lives were associated with food producing, agriculture, and stock rearing. They did not stay in caves any more, but started building simple shelters in the remote areas in the jungle. *Deutero-Malays*, who were associated with metal using, lived along the Peninsula's coasts.



that separated the Peninsula from Sumatra and other parts of the world. Rather, it provided an exit for the people of both sides to visit and settle down in the places of their choice, concentrating mostly on riverine or maritime areas.

The Malays of today are, therefore, originated from this *Deutero-Malay* ethnic group. Culturally, they possessed common characteristics as manifested, for instance, in their agriculture-based economy, village life, collective leadership and attitudes based on common beliefs. Sir Richard Winstedt has quoted the words of Miss Isabella Bird, the author of *The Golden Chersonese*, to describe this race:

The Malays undoubtedly must be numbered among civilized people.... They have possessed for centuries systems of Government and codes of land and maritime law, which in theory at least show a considerable degree of enlightenment.<sup>69</sup>

Today, the Malays and other *orang asli* are referred to as the *Bumiputera* or sons of the soil, a political term used to show that they are the original population of the country.<sup>70</sup>

The population of Malaya was further diversified with a massive immigration of other races, namely the Chinese and the Indians, to the country especially during the British occupation.<sup>71</sup> At first, the Chinese were only interested in the wealth derived from the tin mining in Larut, especially during the 1840s, but later when they became involved in a variety of economic activities and exploitation of the country's resources, they decided to stay permanently. Quite naturally,

69

---

Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and Its History*, op.cit., p. 17. See especially pp. 13-23 of this work for a discussion of Aborigines, "The Civilized Malay", Chinese, Indians and other races.

70

Mahathir himself contends that the "Malays are accepted as the indigenous people of the country, but the country is no longer exclusively theirs". See Mahathir Mohamad, *The Malay Dilemma*, 9th. pr., (Singapore: Times Books International, 1992), pp. 69-70.

71

Although a small Chinese trading community already existed in Malacca at the time it was conquered by the Portuguese in 1511, Gordon P. Means is of the opinion that "...Chinese immigration to the Malay states reached significant numbers only after the British became established at Penang in 1786." (Gordon P. Means, "Malaysia: Islam In A Pluralistic Society" in *Religion and Society: Asia and the Middle East*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1982) p. 454.

these immigrants brought together with them the religious and cultural elements and practices inherited from such Chinese ethical religions as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. These cultural elements existed alongside local cultures although they did not absorb significantly into the latter. When Malaya obtained its independence in 1957, the number of the Chinese population in the Malay Peninsula was more than 2.3 million.<sup>72</sup> Upon independence, they were granted full citizenship to stay and work permanently here.<sup>73</sup>

In the mean time, a significant number of Indian immigrants also began to arrive with British encouragement, mainly for economic purposes. At first, they were employed in military service and for the construction of public works. As rapid development in the rubber industry took place especially after 1905, the demand for Indian estate labourers also increased. The *Kangany system*, a system which employed agents known as *kanganies* to recruit the labourers, operated actively from 1898 to 1938 to bring a large number of rural and lower caste Tamil, Malayali and Telugu Indians from South India to Malaya to work in estates, public works and railways. Some Indians from higher classes were also brought to work in trade, commerce and professional activities in urban centres.<sup>74</sup> By 1957, their number reached 707,108. These Indians were also granted full citizenship upon independence.

Besides these three main races (the Malay, the Chinese and the Indian), there was also a significant number of other races in the formative period of what could be referred to as

72

---

Department of Statistics Malaysia, *Vital Statistics Time Series Peninsular Malaysia 1911-1985*, (Kuala Lumpur, March 1991), p. 11. It is also mentioned by Winstedt that, "At the 1947 census, out of 2,398,186 Malays in the Federation, 275,700 were comparatively new-comers from Sumatra and Java, men of the Malay's own racial stock and religion, who alone of the country's immigrants rapidly become absorbed into the Malay community. In the Federation, Malays and aborigines were estimated in 1956 to number 3,048,899, Chinese 2,366,656, Indians 740,436 and other races 95,658.

73

K. Mauzy, *Barisan Nasional*, op.cit., pp. 20-22.

74

Winstedt says that, "in 1955 there were just under 808,100 Indians and Ceylonese in Malaya, of whom 713,810 were in the Federation."

Malaysian society. Arabs of Hadramawt origin who were more numerous in Singapore, wealthy Jews, Boyanese, Bataks, Tibetans, Turks and many other races also became parts of Malaya's human miscellany.<sup>75</sup> Table I.I provides relevant figures on the population of the Malay Peninsular after the Second World War up to the end of the first decade of the Mahathir administration.

Table 1.1  
Peninsular Malaysia: Estimated Population by Ethnic Groups  
For Selected Years<sup>76</sup>

YEAR	MALAY	CHINESE	INDIAN	OTHERS
1947	2,427,834	1,884,534	530,638	65,080
1957	3,125,474	2,333,756	707,108	112,420
1970	4,671,874	3,131,320	639,341	70,022
1981	6,512,204	3,947,095	1,199,500	76,040
1991	8,744,884	4,640,252	1,462,259	95,302
Source: <i>Vital Statistics Time Series Peninsular Malaysia 1911-1985</i> , <i>Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia 1992</i> and <i>The Fourth Malaysia Plan</i> .				

Clearly, the number of Malays in the year Malaya was granted independence was slightly lower than the non-Malays. Afterwards, the Malay population continued to grow at a faster rate and in 1991 has outnumbered the non-Malays by about 2.5 million. This was the nature of the society (with diverse social, cultural and religious realities) that Malaysia had to

75

Ibid, p.22.

76

The figures selected for this table are meant to show the breakdown of population into main ethnic groups after (1947) the Second World War, during the independence year (1957), in the aftermath of the 16 May 1969 incident and the commencing year of the New Economic Policy (1970), the year when Mahathir assumed his office as the Prime Minister (1981), and the initial year of the National Development Policy (1991). Figures for the years 1941, 1947 and 1957 are based on *Vital Statistics Times Series*, and the rest are from *The Fourth Malaysia Plan* and *Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia 1992*.

deal with in the course of its post-independent development process to the present day.

### 2.1.3. The Socio-religious and Cultural Perspective.

To avoid some difficulties in discussing the historical development of the social, religious and the cultural life of Malaysian society,<sup>77</sup> these aspects are studied simultaneously under one single theme, covering the period of early development until the colonial era.

Since the early centuries of the Christian era, Malaya had been exposed to a cultural encroachment of Indian, Indonesian, and to a lesser extent, Chinese influences brought in especially through trading ships which were sailing between India and China at that time.<sup>78</sup> It was also generally under the political control of one or other of the neighbouring South-East Asian powers.<sup>79</sup> Prior to the Hindu-Buddhist epoch, Malaya was ethnically quite diverse although not highly diversified culturally. In the absence of any other religious influence, animism was widespread among local people.

Although the trade with China began earlier than that with India, the Chinese made no attempt to settle down on the land. On the other hand, Indian traders did otherwise by opening trading posts, for instance, in Kedah (Merbok) and elsewhere on the West coast, bringing with them the influence of both the Buddhist and the Hindu religions.<sup>80</sup> Despite their

77

---

This is due partly to disagreement on the concepts of culture and religion, and also to the complexity of early cultural and religious developments.

78

As mentioned earlier, Malaya was located on a commercially strategic trade route which linked the traders of the two main land masses i.e. China in the East and countries in the Indian Sub-Continents, the Middle East and Europe in the West.

79

Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah, *Islam Dalam Sejarah Asia Tenggara Tradisional*, (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pena Sdn. Bhd. 1989), p.37.

80

The Indo-Malay empire of Sri Vijaya, based on the Buddhist rule in Palembang, South-East Sumatra, emerged as a trading centre for the region and controlled both sides of the Straits of Malacca from the 7th to the 13th centuries. The Sri Vijaya rule was also strong in the Malay Peninsula, especially in the North.

earlier arrivals compared to Islam, *Buddhism* and *Hinduism* do not appear to have left a far-reaching impact on the religious and spiritual life of the people compared to Islam.<sup>81</sup> All the above demographic, ethnic, cultural and religious factors have contributed in one way or the other to the formation of the early social order.

When the Malaccan Sultanate was established and Islam became the religion of the ruler and his subjects, the socio-political order of the Malayan people began to develop in a certain direction.<sup>82</sup> As Islam spread rapidly to other parts of South East Asia, Malacca became an important centre for Islamic propagation during that time. Thus Islamic teaching began to have a wider impact on the religious and socio-cultural

---

When China changed her trade policy towards Sri Vijaya, and as other trading centres also emerged in Siam and Java, the Sri Vijaya rule gradually became weak and was destroyed later by the expanding Thais and Javanese. It was the attack of Majapahit, Java's last Hindu empire, that finally caused the collapse of the Sri Vijaya Kingdom. Between 1331 and 1351 the whole of the Malay

Peninsula was dominated by the Javanese.

Upon the destruction of their kingdom, the settlers from Sri Vijaya had to migrate to other places. Towards the end of the 13th. century, one of the fugitive princes of Sri Vijaya from Palembang known as Parameswara founded and ruled *Temasik* (*Tumasik*), now known as Singapore. However, he was driven out later by Siam, forcing him to move towards the north, and he opened a new settlement in a port called *Melaka* or Malacca which was only a fishing village at that time. There are disputes among scholars as to the year of the founding of Malacca. Sir Richard Winstedt, for instance, suggests 1403 as the year (*Malaya and Its History*, op.cit.). Thereafter he was able to develop Malacca and to establish new trading contacts with China.

It is reported in *Sejarah Melayu* or the Malay Annals that the fourth Sultan of Malacca, Raja Kecil Besar, was married to a princess from Pasai (situated in Sumatra and the first centre of Islamic civilization in South East Asia) and became the first sultan to embrace Islam, changing his name to Sultan Muhammad Shah. This was believed to have taken place in the beginning of the 15th century or towards the end of the 14th. century. Cf. "A Brief History of the Spread of Islam in Malaysia", *The Islamic Review*, No.9-10 Vol. 53, Sept-Oct, 1965, p.18.

81

Nonetheless, the presence of Buddhism and Hinduism has also left behind monumental cultural, artistic, custom and social heritages like the archaeological remains in *Merbok*, *Kedah* and *Java*. See Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, "On Islamization: The Case of of The Malay-Indonesian Archipelago", in *Islam and Secularism*, (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1978), pp. 165-166, and Ibrahim Ahmad, "Kesan Tamadun Islam dan Penjajahan Barat: Satu Sorotan Sejarah", *Konflik UMNO-PAS Dalam Isu Islamisasi*, (Petaling Jaya: IBS Buku Sdn. Bhd., 1989), pp. 35-50.

82

The downfall of the Majapahit kingdom was said to have been partly due to the increasing influence of Islam.



behaviour of the people in the region.<sup>83</sup> It was during these days that a number of laws, rules and regulations based on Islamic teachings were introduced which were greatly influential in the evolution of a more systematic legal system in Malaya. *Hukum Kanun Melaka* (the Malaccan canon) was among those laws introduced by the Malaccan Sultanate which had Islamic influence.

Throughout the 15th. century, Malacca became a successful trading centre in South East Asia until the colonial Portuguese arrived in 1509 and subsequently conquered it in 1511, putting an end to the more-than-two-century rule of the Malaccan Sultanate. Since then, the role of spreading Islam went to Aceh,<sup>84</sup> Johore-Riau and the Bruneian Sultanate. The Malaccan Sultanate is often considered as a classic era of Malay and Islamic cultural achievements in the Malay Archipelago.

The coming of the Portuguese and their control of Malacca marked the beginning of a new era of colonialism which lasted for nearly four and a half centuries. Two other Western colonial powers, the Dutch and the British, later continued to dominate and implement laws and regulations which also had significant bearing upon the formation of the political system and social behaviour of contemporary Malaysian society. Malaya thereafter developed in quite a different direction, accommodating Western and secular elements in its socio-cultural, economic, political and even religious conduct. The social and political order of the people became more complex. One writer has described the state of contemporary Malaysia in relation to the colonial era in the following sentence:

---

83

Syed Farid Alatas, "Notes On Various Theories Regarding the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago", *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXV, No. 3 & 4, (Hartfort: The Duncan Black Mac Donald Center, 1986), p. 174.

84

"A Brief History...", op.cit., p.19.

Like that of many other ex-colonies, contemporary Malaysian history has also been complicated by developments of the colonial era; in the very profound sense, the Malaysian nation is a child, albeit a stepchild, of imperialism.<sup>85</sup>

## 2.2. Islam and the Islamization Process In Malaysia: A Brief Historical Review.

As noted earlier, one of the significant phases in Malaysian history is the arrival of Islam and its impact on peoples' religious behaviour and their social and political system. The development of Islam during the early period must be seen in the wider context of its penetration into the Malay Archipelago region which may be divided into three main phases, the arrival, the strengthening and the dissemination periods.<sup>86</sup> Although there is no exact date given as to when Islam was first brought into Malaya, the following accounts deserve mention to describe the various situations and perspectives regarding the nature of its inception and early expansion.

Before its arrival in the Malay Peninsula, Islam was already practised in some other parts of the Malay Archipelago like *Perlak*, as mentioned by Marco Polo when he stopped there for five months in 1292.<sup>87</sup> Apart from Marco Polo's account, a tombstone found on the east coast of Sumatra recording the death in 1297 of Sultan Abdul Malik al-Salih, the Sultan of Aceh, also indicates the existence of Muslims there. Ibn Battuta, a Moroccan traveller, is said to have arrived in Pasai

85

---

Jomo K. Sundaram., *Growth and Structural Change...*, op.cit., p.1.

86

Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah, *Islam Dalam Sejarah*, op.cit., p.89.

87

It is also claimed that the first historical reference implying conversion to Islam by the peoples of Sumatra is dated A.D. 1281. This refers to a mission sent from Sumatra to China in that year which included two *Melayus* (from Eastern Sumatra) bearing the Muslim names Sulaiman and Shams'ud-Din respectively. See Muhammad Abdul Rauf, *A Brief History of Islam With Special Reference to Malaya*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.77. In his "Islam in Southeast Asia: A Study of the Emergence and Growth in Malaysia and Indonesia" in *Islamic Studies* Vol. XIX No. 2, Summer 1980, Muhammad Saleem Ahmad describes the same event as follows: "The history of the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty tells that in 1282 A.D. a Chinese envoy in Quilon (India) met a minister from the Sumatra kingdom and advised him to send an embassy to China. The names of two Muslims, Hasan and Suleyman, appear later as envoys sent to the Chinese court."

(Samudra) in 1345 and described the deep interest of the ruler, al-Malik al-Zahir, in the pursuit of Islamic learning.<sup>88</sup>

In Malaya, an early piece of evidence of Islamic presence was found in the form of an inscription in Trengganu, which indicates Muslim presence in the year 1326 or 1386. There is also a Chinese explorer's record which mentions that he visited Malacca in 1413 and found that the Malays in Malacca at that time were Muslims.

As far as the places from which Islam was brought to the Malay Archipelago are concerned, there are also disputes among scholars as reflected in their various theories of its coming. However, there are three outstanding theories identifiable. The first suggests that Islam was brought from India, the second from China and the third from the Arabian Peninsula. Since the question of the validity of these theories is irrelevant to the present study, we shall not discuss the subject here.

As noted earlier, Malaya's pre-Islamic era had witnessed a widespread practice of animism which had existed for an unknown period of time prior to the Hindu-Buddhist epoch. The process of Indianization took place quite extensively around the 5th. century A.D.. Consequently, a number of small Indianized states which were based mostly on rivers were formed.<sup>89</sup> We have also noted that although Buddhism and Hinduism had arrived much earlier than Islam, they did not leave a far-reaching impact on the peoples's religious and spiritual life compared to the latter, apart from their artistic and monumental remains. On this subject, Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas observes:

---

88

Abd. Rahman, *Islam Dalam Sejarah...*, op.cit., p. 78.

89

Archaeological evidence suggests there were already some Buddhist and Hindu traditions in the north of Malaya as early as the 4th. and 5th. centuries A.D.. Between the 7th. and 14th. centuries Palembang, an ancient Malay kingdom in Sumatra which was said to be the historical home of the Malay race, became a powerful Buddhist kingdom whose domain had extended as far as Perak in the north of Malaya. Tumasek was founded by refugees from Palembang between 1200 and 1350 A.D.. But the suzerainty of this Malay power was virtually dissolved with the conquest by the Hindu Majapahit empire of Java not only of Palembang but also of her colonies in the north as well as Tumasik between 1338 and 1365 A.D., after which Hinduism spread rapidly throughout the Malay Peninsula.



Hinduism, as people of the Archipelago practised it, was a superstructure maintained by the ruling group above an indifferent community. The community's participation in Hinduism was a necessary influence from above; the religion was imposed on the community by the authority of the ruling group. The Malay-Indonesian society was therefore not a Hinduized society, rather the Malay-Indonesian dynasties were, to use the expression of Van Leur, "legitimized sacrally by an Indian hierocracy" [J.C. Van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, The Hague, 195, p. 108]. The philosophical influence of Hinduism upon the Malay-Indonesian world view has been unduly magnified [by the Dutch and British orientalis]. The people of the Archipelago were more aesthetic than philosophical by nature. They either did not fully grasp the subtleties of Hindu metaphysics or they ignored it in favour of that which was less complicated and more readily acceptable to their own world view. Philosophy was transformed into art at the expense of the rational and intellectual elements. Intellectual speculation, with its emphasis on logic and systematic reasoning, did not seem to have been popular".<sup>90</sup>

He also describes the state of Buddhist practice and influence during that time in the following sentences:

The same could also be said of Buddhism in the Archipelago. For many centuries, ... Sumatra seems to have been a great centre of Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy. Yet the influence of the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra did not seem to have made itself felt in the realm of philosophy, but again in that of art. It is further significant that this artistic manifestation occurred in Java in the form of the great Borobudur.<sup>91</sup>

When the Malaccan Sultanate became the first to represent the first Islamic rule in the Malay region, and was actively involved in Islamic propagation, other parts of South East Asia also felt the impact. The Islamization process continued to flourish actively and successfully since then.

This process however, suffered a serious set-back with the arrival and intervention of colonial powers in the region as mentioned earlier. Compared to other colonial powers, the British were able to establish a much more intensive type of colonial imperialism. Although the Malay rulers were the legitimate religious and state administrators prior to the British intervention, "the prerogative powers of the Malay rulers were severely circumscribed and diminished...[and] they became less involved in administration" during the British

---

90

Syed Muhammad Naquib, "On Islamization...", op.cit., p. 2.

91

Ibid., p. 3.

administration.<sup>92</sup> The difficulty of any attempt to revive and practice Islamic ideals today owes partly to the impact of this colonialism.<sup>93</sup> One logical consequence arising from Western colonialism was a change in the perception of Islam and of the public attitude, mostly in a negative way. As a result of this Islam found it difficult to regain credibility within a short time or to emerge as an influential religious force in the post-colonial period.<sup>94</sup>

After the colonial interval Malaysia, though not fully freed from the effects of colonial control as manifested in various forms of restrictions, agreements, conditions and above all feelings of psychological, intellectual and cultural inferiority, entered a new era of development during the period of formal independence. Although Islam was officially stated in the constitution to be the official religion of the Federation, the vagueness of the provisions often caused people

---

92

Gordon P. Means, "Malaysia: Islam In A Pluralistic Society", op.cit., p.450.

93

Despite today's new attitude among modern Malaysians of trying not to blame only external factors for their social, cultural, economic and political deficiencies, the fact remains that the period of British control contributed equally, if not more, to the problems which have had to be dealt with ever since. Devaluation and debasement of the Malay culture and distortion of the native realities, as Mohd. Nor Nawawi, a local academic sees it, have had a serious impact that has remapped social activities and influenced the value systems of the society. See Mohd. Nor Nawawi, "Islam in Malaysia", a paper presented at a seminar on *Islam di Dunia Melayu* organised by ABIM on 6 December 1986.

94

According to Syed Muhammad Naquib, the entire process of the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago can be divided into three phases: Phase I: from approximately 578-805 A.H./1200-1400 C.E., jurisprudence or *fiqh* played the major role of interpreting the religious law (*Sharī'ah*) in the conversion of the Malays. He describes this phase as the conversion of the "body"; Phase II: from approximately 805-1112 A.H./1400-1700 C.E., the continuation of the first phase, but the major role of interpreting religious law during this time had passed on to philosophical mysticism and metaphysics (*taṣawwuf*) and other rational and intellectual elements such as rational theology (*kalām*). Sūfism and ṣūfī and Mutakallimūn writings during this period aimed at the conversion of "the spirit": and phase III: from approximately 1112 A.H./1700 C.E. onwards, continuation of phase I and consummation of phase II which had been largely successful. He says that to this phase must be assigned the cultural influences brought about by the coming of the West, and what is generally known as "Westernization" is here conceived as "the perpetuation of the rationalistic, individualistic, and internationalistic spirit whose philosophical foundations were laid earlier by Islam. See Syed Muhammad Naquib, "On Islamization...", op.cit. pp. 161-162.

to believe that Islam was being relegated to a peripheral position in the country.

In the face of such a situation, it is not surprising to find that previous administrations strongly held the view that Malaysia should not be regarded as an Islamic state. This implies a tendency to reject the notion that religion should play a role in the social, cultural and political affairs of the country. This view has an obvious resemblance to the state-and-church conception of secular Western countries, and this attitude was often attributed to the direct result of colonialism. However, for the last two decades, Malaysia's Islamic religious consciousness seems to have been more fully manifested in the social and economic domains. At the individual level, religious spirituality has become a matter of common preference, as reflected in peoples' conduct of various religious activities like *qiyām al-layl*, *tafsīr* and *dhikr* sessions and other ritual activities in the mosques, *madrasahs* and schools. Public religious programmes such as *ceramah* (public talk), *kuliah subuh* (morning talk), *kuliah maghrib* (evening talk), seminars, *tamrīn* (religious training) etc. are often organized by various religious groups, movements and government departments. In short, the signs of Islamic resurgence, as Chandra describes it, are everywhere.

At the Government level, it was not until the time of the present Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad that one can witness quite a different religious approach being adopted by the Government, as will be analysed later. The inculcation of Islamic values into the Government administration policy is the cornerstone in the overall pursuance of this religious strategy by the present administration. Arguments over Mahathir's sincerity and his Government's seriousness on this policy as well as the question of the Islamicity of its various religious activities and programmes continue to add to the element of controversy surrounding this religious policy. In what way then is Mahathir's religious approach different from that of his

predecessors? And what does the Islamization policy really mean? These are among the main questions that this research intends to investigate. As the central figure in this research is the Prime Minister himself, it is appropriate to provide a brief profile of this personality prior to our examination of his development policy in the following chapters.

### 2.3. Mahathir Mohamad: A Brief Profile.

When the third Prime Minister of Malaysia Dato' Hussein Onn stepped down in July 1981 for health reasons, he was succeeded by a controversial figure, namely Mahathir bin Mohamad. Having been educated in medical studies, the doctor, together with his cabinet ministers, now began to run the country and has ever since drawn public attention to the image, style and identity of his administration.<sup>95</sup>

Mahathir was born on 20 December, 1925 in Alor Star, Kedah, a state in the northern part of Malaysia. He was the youngest in a family of nine siblings. His father, Mohamad bin Iskandar was the first headmaster of Alor Star's first Government English school, now known as Maktab Sultan Abdul Hamid.<sup>96</sup> He died in 1950 followed by his wife, Wan Tampawan, sixteen years later.

Mahathir received his early education at the Seberang Perak Malay School before attending the Sultan Abdul Hamid College. Fondly known to his family as *Che Det*, his studies were however, interrupted by the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1941-1945) during which he had to sell *cendol*, a Malaysian-style iced drink, set up a shop and sold fruit at the famous *Pekan Rabu* or Wednesday Market in the city. After the Japanese Occupation, he continued his studies at the college after which he was awarded a limited scholarship to further his studies in

---

95

Mahathir bin Mohamad officially assumed the post of Prime Minister on 16 July 1981 and continues to be in the office to the present day.

96

J.Victor Morais, *Mahathir: A Profile In Courage*, (Kuala Lumpur: Eastern Universities Press (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1984) p.1.

medicine at the King Edward VII Medical College in Singapore in 1947.<sup>97</sup> While at the secondary school he was active in school societies. He was the Secretary to the school's Literary and Debating Society and to King's House<sup>98</sup> as well as the chief editor of the school magazine, *Darulaman*. In one of his editorials he writes:

The world today presents a picture full of contrasts. On the one hand we see nations great and small, striving might and main to solve their problems by peaceful means, through arbitrations and negotiations, but on the other we see the great powers of the world devising new methods of warfare, inventing newer and more destructive weapons and, worst of all, carrying out propaganda which will foster hatred between nation and nation and thus sowing the seeds of another war.<sup>99</sup>

Mahathir was also known as an active participant in the anti-Malayan Union campaign in 1945-46 whilst still in school. In the course of his campaign, he was associated with *Massa Melayu*, a movement which opposed the colonisation of the Malay states. He also often wrote articles for the *Sunday Times* between 1946 and 1950, with the Malay economy and politics being the main themes of his writings.

During his school days, Mahathir took part in several social, cultural, welfare and political organizations in the state and had from time to time spoken out for the improvement of the life of the rural population. He was often seen speaking at local meetings and forums.<sup>100</sup> Among the first organizations in which he participated and which became his early political platforms were the *Kesatuan Melayu Kedah* (The United Malay Association of Kedah) and the *Seberkas Kesatuan Pemuda Malaysia*

97

---

Aziz Zariza Ahmad, *Mahathir: Triumph After Trials*, (Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co, 1990), p.22.

98

*Darulaman*, Vol. 1 (new series), No. 3, (Alor Star: Sultan Abdul Hamid College, December, 1946), pp. 14 and 25.

99

*Darulaman*, Vol. 1, No. 2, May 1946, p. 1. He also describes in the same issue the conditions during the re-occupation of Alor Star by the British forces through his article, "My Town in War Time" pp. 4-5.

100

Aziz Zariza, op.cit., p. 23.



Kedah (The United Malaysian Youth Association of Kedah).<sup>101</sup> In 1946 he joined UMNO as a member during its pioneering days. At that time the party was headed by its Founder-President Dato Onn bin Jaafar, and Mahathir was only 20. However, the latter did not come into the public eye in the Malaysian political scene until his election to Parliament in 1964.

Mahathir was married to Siti Hasmah Muhammad Ali, his college mate, on the 5th August 1956 and is now the father of three sons and two daughters. Having completed his medical studies at Medical College, Singapore, he joined the Malayan Medical Service and held the positions, first of houseman for one year and later of Medical Officer for three years. During this period, he served as a Medical Officer in Alor Star, the island of Langkawi (in Kedah) and Perlis.<sup>102</sup>

He later resigned from Government service in 1957 to pave the way for his own medical business, opening his own clinic, the *Maha Klinik*, in Jalan Tunku Ibrahim in Alor Star. In the course of his profession he was said to have refused to accept payments from patients if they were too poor.<sup>103</sup> His clinic, one of only three during that time and the first to be run by a Malay, was later relocated to the Pekan Rabu in 1959 due to increasing demand from the public.<sup>104</sup>

In 1959, he was offered a seat to contest in the Kedah state election but declined. His rejection was attributed largely to his differences with the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Indeed, he has never been a State Assembly member throughout his political career. However, in the 1964 election he contested a parliamentary seat in the constituency of Kota

---

101

On his struggle against colonialism see for instance ch. 2 of Zainuddin Maidin's *Mahathir: Di Sebalik Tabir*, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications and Distributions Sdn. Bhd., 1994), and J. Victor Morais, op.cit., ch. 2.

102

J. Victor Morais, *ibid*, p.9.

103

Zainuddin Maidin, op.cit., Ch. 1.

104

*Ibid*.

Star Selatan and won it against a PAS candidate. Although he had become more and more vocal against the UMNO leadership since then, the ruling party, *Parti Perikatan*, was cautious and was reluctant to take drastic action against him.<sup>105</sup>

Mahathir's political career later went through a difficult time when he was defeated in the 1969 election by a PAS candidate, Haji Yusuff Rawa, in the Kota Star Selatan constituency. Added to that bitter experience was his expulsion from UMNO in August 1969 following his deteriorating relationship with the UMNO leadership, especially with the Tunku who had always been in disagreement with him, particularly over the issue of Malay rights and the Malay economy.<sup>106</sup> Mahathir strongly defended the preservation of the so-called Malay special privileges especially against the Chinese economic domination, for which he was labelled as a racial extremist, or *ultra* in the Malaysian political parlance.<sup>107</sup> Tunku thus says:

Who is Dr. Mahathir and where does he stand in UMNO? The answer is that there is a group of men, usually referred to as the "Ultras", or as they prefer to be known the "intellectuals" who have manoeuvred themselves into positions in UMNO.... Behind all this inside opposition in UMNO there must be a man who knows how to plan and how to get others to operate. Is this Dr. Mahathir or someone else?<sup>108</sup>

When asked about his previous relationship with the Tunku, Mahathir says:

I recognise Tunku's efforts in achieving independence and respect his concept of independence. Many of his initiatives were positive. Only when he did not have confidence in his own people (the Malays) that I felt his opinion was wrong.... I was not against the Tunku in all matters... (or) because he is the

105

However, as a representative of the government, Mahathir was selected by the Government to take part in delegations to a number of conferences and seminars including the United Nations General Assembly in 1965 and a Harvard Seminar on International Affairs in 1967.

106

The background to this confrontation can be easily seen from the contents of Mahathir's *Malay Dilemma* and is expressed even more explicitly in the Tunku's *May 13: Before and After* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press Limited, 1969)

107

Tunku Abdul Rahman, *ibid.*, p. 163.

108

*Ibid*, p. 120.

Tunku.... Whatever he has been doing against me, I will never hate him. I respect him forever.<sup>109</sup>

During his term of expulsion, this "Young Turk" produced his ever controversial book, the *Malay Dilemma*, to express his views on the way Malaysia should be developed, particularly pertaining to the acute problems faced by the Malays, and to suggest solutions to overcome them. The book was immediately banned by the ruling government.<sup>110</sup>

Among other things, the *Malay Dilemma* reveals what the author thinks and believes to be the behaviour of his own race. He writes very frankly about the problem of inbreeding and heredity, the plight of the Malays and the need to devise special policies to help uplift their economy from a poverty-stricken state. On his view Mahathir comments,

"All I was asking for was fair treatment for the Malays, for the national interest...I was asking for the have-nots to be given a chance. The *bumiputras* must participate, though not by ousting everybody or taking over the whole show for I don't believe the others should take over in whatever field. I do not believe that *bumiputras* should take over everything for themselves. In that way there will be no fairness. I have been consistent in asking for fair treatment - for all".<sup>111</sup>

We will analyse the main aspects of Mahathir's thought as contained in this book especially in Chapter Three.

When Tun Abdul Razak took over the office of premiership from the Tunku, he brought back Mahathir to UMNO. The latter was subsequently appointed a member of the Supreme Council in 1972 and a senator in 1973. Upon his return to Parliament after his victory in the 1974 election, he was appointed the Minister of Education, a big boost to his political morale, and was later elected one of the Vice Presidents of UMNO at its General Assembly in June 1975. After the sudden demise of Tun Abdul Razak in London in 1976, Tun Hussein Onn took over the office and Mahathir was elevated to the

---

109

Zainuddin Maidin, op.cit. pp. 316-317.

110

J. Victor Morais, op.cit., p.27

111

Ibid.



post of Deputy Prime Minister and at the same time held the post of Minister of Trade and Industry.

It was only on the 16th July 1981 that history recorded Mahathir, at the age of 55, as the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia under whom Malaysia has entered a new era in its development history. It is to this new era of Malaysian development and its impact on Malaysian society especially the Muslims, that this research devotes its analysis. As the title suggests, our study of Malaysian development is to be based in various ways on an Islamic and sociological approach which we call *A Comparative Sociological Study* which we now turn to explain.

#### 2.4. The Comparative Sociological Study Defined.

We define a comparative sociological study in the following terms: First, our study of Malaysian society is concerned with the type and pattern of social changes and interaction that exist in the society due to the various development policies and programmes. To come closer to a standard sociological research we base our work on certain sociological procedures which, among other things, involve the formulation of the research problem, statement of hypothesis and a survey of the literature.<sup>112</sup>

In general, this work may contain certain elements of such types of research designs as analytical,<sup>113</sup> comparative,<sup>114</sup> developmental,<sup>115</sup> historical,<sup>116</sup> theoretical,<sup>117</sup> and case study.<sup>118</sup>

---

112

The objective of the literature review has been explained earlier.

113

Collection and study of data in order to discern and explicate principles to guide the action. For example, to study statistics as derived from such sources as the annual report of the *Islamic Bank* in order to see its progress and performance.

114

Study of two or more situations or periods in order to determine and explicate their likenesses and differences. In the present case, a comparison may be made between the religious policy of Mahathir and his predecessors.

115

Observable changes over time of factors, patterns or sequences of growth or decline. For instance, to study the change in rural-urban proportion over certain period of time in relation for instance to industrialization policy.

116

Study of the past in order to ascertain, document and interpret the impact or to understand the the background like the study of the early socio-cultural

Simple statistical presentations will be preferred to elaborate relevant points. These research techniques are used alongside other approaches which contain Islamic principles and elements. This means that: a) whenever relevant, such Islamic disciplines as *tafsīr*, *ḥadīth*, *ʿulūm al-Qur'ān* and *sīrah nabawīyyah* will be utilized to the required extent; b) an analysis of Malaysian development is carried out largely in the light of the Islamic understanding of religion and development; c) the study of Malaysian development policy will place greater emphasis on religious policy and its impact especially on the Muslim society. For example, other development policies will be examined especially in the light of Government's Islamization policy.

In general, the research can be said to be explanatory and inter-disciplinary in nature. It tries to benefit from various sociological and Islamic elements in analysing the Malaysian development during Mahathir's time and its impact especially on the Muslims. The scope and application of this comparative approach will be detailed in the next chapter.

---

order of Malay society and its evolution until today.

117

The development and description of principles for a concept or phenomenon. In this research, the main theoretical foundation is based on the concepts or theories of development and change.

118

The background, current conditions and developmental interactions of a selected entity (in this case of Malaysia under Mahathir) are observed and analysed in order to trace its progress.

## Chapter Two

### **DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

## CHAPTER TWO

### DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the previous chapter, the research background has been established by explaining, among other things, the researcher's justifications for embarking on the research and for selecting the topic. This was followed by an elaboration of the key terms and phrases used in the topic. It was then concluded that the analysis of Malaysian development should be carried out with reference to Islamic and conventional criticism with greater emphasis on the former, and also a particular attention will be paid to the study of the impact of Government's development policy on the Muslims. It was also proposed that the research will benefit in one way or the other the elements of sociological and Islamic studies. The writer refers to this methodology as a *comparative sociological study*.

In short, this approach is based on the following main principles: First, the research is concerned mainly with the changes especially in the various socio-cultural and religious aspects of Malaysian society as a result of various development policies and programmes. Second, it is based on certain sociological procedures as described in the formulation of research problem, statement of hypothesis, survey of literature etc.. In addition, it is characterized by certain Islamic elements or features which can be summarised as follows: i) utilization of Islamic disciplines like *Tafsīr*, *Ḥadīth* etc. whenever necessary, ii) analysis of Malaysian development is carried out in the light of Islamic concept of religion and development, iii) greater emphasis on religious policy such as the Islamization policy, and iv) particular emphasis on the

impact of development and change on the Muslim society. Quantitative impact is dealt with in Chapter Four and qualitative impact in Chapter Five.

The present chapter is partly devoted to clarifying further this approach by explaining its application in this research. This is done prior to our main task of elucidating the concepts of development and change as seen from conventional and Islamic perspectives, and of reviewing selected views of local Muslim scholars. In the first section, *The Application of the Comparative Method*, we will touch on two relevant subjects namely *The Scope and Use of the Comparative Approach* and *Theory Formulation: A Brief Comparison Between Conventional and Islamic Approaches*. This will be followed by a discussion of development theories in the second section entitled *A Comparative Theory of Development and Change: A General Review*. Specifically, this section is divided into two parts, namely *Development and Change: A Conventional Perspective*, and *Development and Change: An Islamic Perspective* respectively. The last section, *Local Muslim Perceptions of Development and Change*, pays particular attention to surveying selected views of local Muslim scholars on these concepts. Mahathir's perception of development will be dealt with separately in Chapter Three.

#### 1. The Application of the Comparative Methodology.

In the preceding chapter, we have identified the main elements that constitute our preferred approach called *A Comparative Sociological Study*. This section is meant to explain further the scope of this method, and the way it is expected to work in the present research. Two aspects of discussion deserve consideration: the scope and use of this approach, and a comparison between Islamic and conventional views on theory formulation.

It needs to be emphasised however that the use of any adjective like *conventional* in a work such as this is neither

imprecise in meaning nor unnecessary. Therefore, the context in which the term is used throughout needs to be clarified. Basically, it refers to all *non-Islamic* perspectives of development which are Western-originated in nature and have been dominant or customarily held or adopted worldwide. The general features of these perspectives, Marxist, neoclassical or other, reflect their detachment from religious foundation or principles.<sup>1</sup> In other words, they can be said to be basically *secular* in nature. But the term *secular* is also not a perfect alternative as it lacks certain elements necessary to convey the actual notion intended by the writer. For instance, it may give rise to other confusions when detailing the subject, for example an impression that anything secular is totally unacceptable to religion. Depending on how we define *secularism* and religion, we may reasonably hope that the use of the term *conventional* in the above sense serves most of our purposes. However, to be realistic, it may be said that the term *conventional* may be used interchangeably with other terms like *secular*, *non-Islamic* and others as long as they are used in the above sense. It is with this understanding that we hope the essential difference between Islamic and conventional perspectives can be explained and clarified by the use of the latter term.

#### 1.1. The Scope and Use of the Comparative Approach.

Comparison in this study assumes several connotations. In order to see its relation to the following chapters, it is important to briefly explain its usage which takes place on various levels, the chief of which can be referred to as the *theoretical*, the *longitudinal* and the *standard* comparisons.<sup>2</sup> The first level is

---

<sup>1</sup> Although there has been a tendency to associate conventional approach in the context of development theory only with the non-Marxist as held for instance by Akin Aina, clearly our specific context here does not subscribe to this notion.

<sup>2</sup>

For a more specific application of these methods in sociological study, see Beverly R. Dixon, Gary D. Bouma and G.B.J. Atkinson, *A Handbook of Social Science*

meant to compare the theoretical differences between Islamic and conventional perspectives of development, and this is specially discussed in greater detail in the present chapter. In this respect, the writer differentiates *ideological* from *utilitarian* differences in order to better understand the dissimilarities and commonalities that may exist in both perspectives.

Longitudinal comparison concerns the achievement or state of progress in a given aspect compared to that of the earlier period. For instance, the economic achievement of the Malays in the first decade of the NEP period is compared with that of the second decade as discussed especially in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. Similarly, it is also possible to observe the religious trends in the pre-Mahathir era compared to the present one as discussed in Chapter Four.

Meanwhile, standard comparison places greater emphasis on the comparison of or contrast between two situations which take place at almost the same time. For instance, a comparison of the Federal Government's religious approach and that of the state of Kelantan as will be analyzed in Chapter Four. In order to keep closer to the research framework, relevant religious criticism or remarks are passed whenever necessary.

As indicated earlier, this chapter is devoted to discussing in greater detail the conceptual framework of development as seen from two perspectives. In its basic sense, this signifies a critical consultation of Muslim and non-Muslim intellectual views in order to come out with an exhaustive elaboration of an



Islamic<sup>3</sup> as well as a conventional philosophy, concept or perspective of development and change.

It has to be noted that prior to the discussion of these concepts from an Islamic perspective, Muslims' understanding of Islam and their expectation from religious experience is explained in response to the long prevailing misconception regarding, firstly, the scope of religion according to Islam, secondly, the distinction between Islam and Muslim behaviour,<sup>4</sup> and lastly, the Islamic position on the idea of development and change. Early discussion of these aspects is hoped to clarify the nature of relationship between Islam and other ideologies as well as to provide basis for a fairer understanding and appreciation of arguments offered based on an Islamic worldview.

During our analysis of Malaysian development practice, comparative study takes place in different forms. For example, data on certain aspects of achievement gathered through various sources are compared by standard cross-reference procedure especially by counter checking them with the data in other sources of reference. Achievements in one aspect but in different places (like the economic achievement of two states) are compared also by using standard comparison procedures.

---

3

The varying emphases, attitudes and reasoning which constitute a Muslim perspective are shown by analysing some selected Muslim opinions on religion. A similar approach applies when discussing Islamic perspectives of development, change and other related concepts like social order, modernization and Islamization. Local Muslim perspectives are particularly emphasised by consulting their views gathered especially from interviews, books, essays, seminar papers, proceedings and speeches produced especially in the last decade or so.

4

For instance, Islam is often charged by many with being spiritual in the narrow sense of the word. Consequently, Islam's spiritual, physical and intellectual concerns are seen in their demarcating and de-integrating relationship. Thus, the integrity of Islam as a system of belief and a set of principles which regulates all aspects of life covering man's relationship with God and his fellow men and with nature has been categorically denied or misunderstood. This impression is further reinforced by the state of behaviour among some segments of the Muslim community which does not reflect the actual practice of religious teachings. See Mahathir Mohamad, "Towards Reviving the Golden Age of Islam", speech at a congress on "The Emergence of the 21st. Century and Vision 2020", at Putra World Trade Centre, Kuala Lumpur on 3rd. July 1992.



Through a *comparative-longitudinal* approach, some aspects of development or certain policies adopted during the Mahathir period may be compared to those of the previous times as may be notified accordingly. Although attempts are made to examine them from the Islamic and conventional perspectives, particular emphasis will be placed on the analysis based on an Islamic perspective, and on the impact of development on Muslim society.

#### 1.2. Theory Formulation: A Brief Comparison Between Islamic and Conventional Approaches.

Before turning to the actual formulation of development theory from both perspectives, it is appropriate to establish the basis upon which a theory is established in both traditions. The aim is to understand the distinction between Islamic and conventional approaches to theory formulation so that any inconsistencies that exist between them can be well understood. For convenience, the word *theory* is retained, and sometimes used interchangeably with the term *paradigm*, *perspective*, *philosophy* and *concept*, throughout this work, and the discussion begins with an elaboration of conventional views on theory formulation followed by an Islamic critique of the questions raised.

In general terms, a theory is an idea about how something works<sup>5</sup> (or is supposed to work). Theories are abstract notions about the way concepts relate to each other. It is said that "there are many ways of expressing theories; some are very formal, others are informal. Some theories are very elaborate, complex, sophisticated, and mind-boggling. Yet simplicity and clarity are often desirable features of theories."<sup>6</sup>

---

5

Beverly R. Dixon, *op. cit.* p. 23.

6

*Ibid*, p. 23.

A theory has been defined by one social scientist as,

"... simply a network of interrelated hypotheses (statements of probable relationships between two or more variables - actions or attributes that can be measured or categorized) or propositions (statements of relationships between two or more facts or concepts) concerning a phenomenon (an observed or observable fact, occurrence or circumstance) or set of phenomena".<sup>7</sup>

In other words, a theory is basically a culmination of tested hypothetical assumptions about any particular problem.<sup>8</sup> Assumptions are objective guessing<sup>9</sup> based on one's knowledge, experience, observation etc.. Today people derive their knowledge mainly from empirical and scientific experiments. Therefore, it is said that theories are never true or false, right or wrong, but always more or less adequate as seen from a particular point of view. Malcolm Waters says that, "a theory is done by reading, thinking, writing, publishing and arguing, but not necessarily in this order."<sup>10</sup>

In the light of the above understanding, some observations may be offered to see whether Islamic views on the questions raised have some similarities or distinctions. First of all, believing Muslims hold that Islamic arguments should always be derived from or based on the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah*.<sup>11</sup> They

---

7 Steven Vago, *Social Change*, 2nd. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. and London: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1989), p. 28.

8 When applied to sociology, theories can be understood, among other things, as attempted models - abstractions of reality that are used for analytical purposes - of social reality.

9 Beverly R. Dixon, op.cit..

10 Malcolm Waters, *Modern Sociological Theory*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 4.

11 *Sunnah* (pl. *sunan*) literally means custom, wont and usage. The prominent meaning of *Sunnah* is that of the spoken and acted example of the Prophet Muḥammad which includes what he approved, allowed or condoned when, under prevailing circumstances, he might well have taken issue with others' actions, decisions or practices; and what he himself refrained from and disapproved of. In other words, *al-Sunnah* is manifested in various forms of the Prophet's life - words (*qaulī*), actions (*fiʿlī*) and approval or disapproval (*taqrīrī*). *al-Sunnah* is described and

believe that both sources contain important principles (*uṣūl*) and guidelines pertaining to various specific and general subjects. In other words, the fundamental thoughts and principles regarding them must be directly or indirectly derived from these sources especially by utilising the special methods of *ijtihād*,<sup>12</sup> *qiyās*,<sup>13</sup> *ijmā'*<sup>14</sup> and *tafsīr* as used extensively especially in the discipline called *uṣūl al-fiqh*. On this point, the Islamic approach is undeniably distinctive from a conventional one as the latter is not based on standard religious procedures or fixed sources of reference.<sup>15</sup>

---

conveyed generally through *al-hadīth* (pl. *ahādīth*) or tradition.

12

In defining this term, Muhammad Kamal Hassan in his *Muslim Intellectual Responses...* has quoted Ghazalī's words which say that *ijtihād* means the "exercise of independent reasoning within the framework of scriptural guidelines." Meanwhile, Mohammad Hashim Kamali uses the phrase *personal reasoning* as the translation of the term. He further explains that "the main difference between *ijtihād* and the revealed sources of the *sharī'ah* lies in the fact that *ijtihād* is a continuous process of development whereas divine revelation and Prophetic legislation discontinued upon the demise of the Prophet" (Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, rev. ed., (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1991).

13

It generally means the practice of analogy in order to produce a legitimate judgment or perception on a new issue. The basic task of *qiyās* is to find reasons (*'illah*) behind the legitimacy or prohibition of one particular issue and to compare or relate it to the new issue, from which the interpretation as to whether the latter can be equalized to the former in terms of reasons. It is from this that its position in Islam is decided. *Qiyās* is done with strict adherence to the spirit of and principles laid down in the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah*.

14

*Ijmā'* is a consensus, expressed or tacit, of the religious scholars (*ulamā'*) especially on a question of law. It is a basis that legitimizes a religious view and is exercised along with the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah*.

15

*Tafsīr* is a special discipline dealing with guided interpretation of the verses of the *Qur'ān*. See also, Muḥammad Husayn al-Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa al-Mufasssīrūn*, (Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, 1976) and Badmas Lanre Yusuf, "Evolution and Development of *Tafsīr*, *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, 1991, (London: The Islamic Cultural Centre, 1994), pp. 34-47.

16

For a comprehensive discussion of the sources of Islamic religion, see for instance, C.G. Weeramantry, "The sources of Islamic Law", *Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective*, (Basingstoke and London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1988), pp. 30-45, Muhammad Hashim Kamali, *The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, op.cit., and S. Mahmassani, *Falsafat al-Tashrī' fī al-Islām*, tr. Farhat J. Ziadeh, (Shah Alam, Selangor: Penerbitan Hizbi, 1987).

Secondly, the purpose of a conventional theory is said to be for ease in the handling of large amount of data, a convenient way of organizing experience, and a tool to see the implications and relationships within the defined framework, hence, of providing guidance for further investigation. Based on the principle of *maṣāliḥ mursalah*,<sup>17</sup> it can be understood that this, a rather technical or operational aspect of a theory, is universal in nature, and therefore is necessarily acceptable as for Islam, as long as *the thing* can offer benefit (*maṣlaḥah*) to the people, and is not contradictory to other religious principles like social harmony and the lofty objectives of the religion (*maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*), it is permissible.<sup>18</sup> This can be attributed to the principle of changeability or resilience (*taghayyur*) in Islamic theory.

On another score, Muslims also agree that a theory may lead to a better prediction of the future. As a result, they are encouraged to make a systematic examination of present and past phenomena or situations and their possible bearings upon the future. Necessary steps can then be taken in the face of potential challenges. However, the Muslim view is different in the sense that prediction is never considered absolute (*muṭlaq*), even if it is based on a very sophisticated scientific procedure or method. The principle of indefiniteness of prediction in Islamic theory is purely a matter of faith which in turn is based on two main axiomatic premises: First, man himself, and the scientific mechanism that he invents, are all *makhluq* or the created beings, and therefore subject to various weaknesses and

---

17

The Islamic principle of public interest. Ibid, S. Mahmassani, pp. 87-89.

18

Muslim jurists agree that the objectives of the *Sharī'ah* concern the maintenance and protection of the following major interests: religion (*al-Dīn*), soul/life (*al-ḥayāh*), lineage (*al-Nasab*), and property (*al-Māl*).

limitations.<sup>19</sup> Second, the Divine intervention in man's actions and predictions is always possible because of His powerfulness (*qudrah*) and wish (*irādah*). As Allah's will can never be compared to man's planning, it becomes the Only Absolute Force that can produce the ultimate impact. A Muslim is supposed to be more humble and arrogance-free because of this belief. It is this moral-spiritual consciousness and axiomatic precaution that makes Muslim perspective somewhat different from conventional one.<sup>20</sup>

Steven Vago's definition of theory is only one of the many ways in which scholars try to interpret the term. In reality, Waters says that "sociological theory is neither unified nor a completed project. It is differentiated into specified foci of interest which are only partially linked together."<sup>21</sup> Using Waters's classification of the types of theories, we can assign the attribute "formal" to Islamic theory of development and change. As an Islamic theory is more concerned with what *ought-to-be* than *what is*, it is both "paradigmatic" and "foundational", the two main characteristics in Water's definition of a formal theory. It is paradigmatic because it seeks to set the entire agenda for future theoretical practice against the claims of opposing paradigms, and foundational as it seeks to identify a single set of principles which are the ultimate foundation for

---

19

See Maurice Bucaille, *What is the Origin of Man? The Answers of Science and the Holy Scriptures*, 8th. ed., (Paris: Seqhers, 1982), pp. 214-219

20

However, Islam stresses that belief in the Divine will should not make man passive, pessimistic, discouraged, and hopeless because this is contradictory to the principles of *ikhtiyār* (seeking ways to achieve something), *itqān* (refine and tidy), *ʿamal ṣāliḥ*, and *jihād* (striving). It is the internalization of these attributes and other *ṣifāt maḥmūdah* (praiseworthy attributes) like *taqwā* (piety), *khauf* (fear of God) and *duʿā* (prayer) that makes a Muslim active in social development, reform and change.

21

Malcolm Waters, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

social life and by which everything can be explained.<sup>22</sup> In general, conventional theory is more positivistic and substantive than formal.<sup>23</sup>

In short, one can say that to formulate a theory in Islam is to consider or to derive relevant principles pertaining to a subject or an issue from the said Divine and Divinely-inspired sources and to elaborate them in their light or guidelines especially by utilizing the religious principles of *ijtihad*, *qiyās*, *ijmā'* and others.<sup>24</sup> Muslims' interpretations of social phenomena and other events in the light of these sources in different phases of history have given rise to what may also be referred to as Muslim theories like Ibn Khaldun's concept of *ʿumrān*.

When the purpose of a theory is meant to find out the actual relationship between two variables (or concepts) in society, a Muslim is expected to understand such a relationship in the light of the above God-consciousness principle, directing it toward the *ought-to-be* rather than *what is*.<sup>25</sup> This is basically

22

Ibid, p. 3.

23

According to Waters, substantive theory is much less inclusive as it seeks not to explain all things but either specific, but very generally ramifying, events or specified types of social process like the theories of the emergence of the industrial society or of the maintenance of capitalism. A theory is said to be positivistic when it seeks to explain empirical relationships between variables by showing that they can be deduced from more abstract theoretical statements, *ibid*, pp.3-4.

24

Islam stresses the standard of development into which a society should be developed and not the different patterns of relationship that a society has created in the course of its development and which have become the basis of various social theories. However, the study of those relationships is encouraged in order to understand people's social realities so that they can be changed realistically according to the above standard.

25

Some examples of writings which reflect the use this principle of Islamic theory formulation are: M.A.M. Shukri, "Towards an Islamic Theory of Literature", *Islamic Studies*, Vol 31, No. 4, 1992, pp. 411-421, Ishaq Akintola, "Creation Theories and the Qur'ān", *Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, pp. 192-202, Ahmad Hassan, "Social Justice in Islam", *Islamic Studies*, Vol X, No. 3, September, 1971, pp. 209-219 and his "The Theory of Naskh", *Islamic Studies*, Vol IV, No. 2, June 1965, pp. 181-200.





the difference between Islamic and conventional approach to theory formulation.<sup>26</sup> It must be noted, however, that the relationship between Islamic and conventional theory is not always straightforward, especially when it touches on the detailed and more technical aspects of the theory in which many elements are necessarily indifferent.

## 2. A Comparative Theory of Development and Change: A General Review.

Having generally understood some distinctions between the two approaches to theory formulation, an attempt is now made to establish what we referred to earlier as *A Comparative Theoretical Framework*. At its root, this phrase denotes an elaboration of the philosophy, concept or notion of development and change as seen from both the conventional and Islamic perspectives.<sup>27</sup> The first part of this section will focus on the conventional perspective.

### 2.1. Development and Change: A Conventional Perspective.

There is no clear-cut distinction between development and change as this depends largely on the context of one's discussion. However, one may find that these two terms are often used interchangeably in many writings. The writers normally indicate

---

26

However, both conventional and Islamic theories may share common criteria identified by Waters as follows: They must be a) abstract, b) thematized, c) logically consistent, d) explanatory, e) general, f) independent, and g) substantively valid. Depending on the way one interprets it, the last criterion might not be relevant in the case of Islamic theory.

27

On the understanding that "economists, demographers, anthropologists, political scientists, historians and sociologists bring their own special disciplines to the diverse conceptualisation of change (and development)", and that "there are as many ways of describing social change (and development) as there are ways of studying societies", the researcher's approach is necessarily "conditioned by the author's theoretical and ideological orientation in an attempt to narrow the concept down" (Steven Vago, *Social Change*, op. cit. p.7.), and the need to serve the specific objectives of this work.



the conceptual dimension and the context in which the terms are employed. Let us first look at the term "development".

#### 2.1.1. The Meanings of Development and Social Change.

"Development" is said to be an antonym of "underdevelopment". Aidan Foster suggests it as being characterized by the following overtones: a sense of "process", and more than that of "progress".<sup>28</sup> However, there is no agreement among scholars on "what process? and what is progress?." To elaborate this point in relation to the rise of contemporary schools of development, Foster offers the following discussion.

First, he touches on "social evolutionism", a concept strongly held by early sociologists like Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and later shared by Karl Marx, Talcott Parson and others. The advocates of this view subscribe to the idea that society develops through a series of fixed stages in a definite order. This trend of thinking is said to have given rise to the first major school of Sociology of Development, namely modernization theory.<sup>29</sup> This theory is basically materialistic because of its overemphasis on the economic factor as the main concern of development process.<sup>30</sup> It views development as movement

---

28

Aidan Foster-Carter, *The Sociology of Development*, (Lancashire: Causeway Press Ltd., 1986), p.2.

29

Among the contemporary modernization theorists, Walt Rostow is often cited as an outstanding advocate of the theory although his research concentrates more on the stages of economic progress. Together with this perspective, there emerged some other self-explanatory terms like developed, less developed, developing and underdeveloped countries.

30

For instance, the term *developed* and *underdeveloped* are defined in terms of growth of gross national product (GNP) which is used in the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) to measure such qualities as average life expectancy, infant mortality and adult literacy. The universality of this theory is challenged by A. Thomas who cites Sri Lanka and Vietnam as examples of countries with low per capita GNP but achieving a high score on Physical Quality Life or PQLI. Many believe that the theory has given a political advantage to the economically dominant countries to control *less developed* countries, and this is done, for instance, in the names of humanitarian aid and human rights.

along a continuum of historical change upon which all national societies can be placed according to indices such as GNP, per capita income, acceptance of modern values, social differentiation, political integration etc..<sup>31</sup> At the one end of this continuum, there is an ideal type of modernity represented by advanced capitalist countries whose social structures are said to typify the structures of a developed nation. At the other, sits the ideal type of traditionality or underdevelopment represented by Third World countries which are said to be backward, late-starters and which lack the attributes of developed modernity.<sup>32</sup> The adequacy of these ideal typical end points of the modernization continuum has been a subject of criticism. For instance, it has been asked whether the ideal types of modernity and traditionality "truly capture the essential features of the social structures from which they have been abstracted".<sup>33</sup> On various other scores, the modernization theory has come under scrutiny which is beyond the scope of this research to probe.

Having realised the deficiency of this theory and its implication for a country, various alternative definitions of development have been advanced since then. Attempts have also been made by a number of political leaders to redefine the concept of development in order to suit the specific conditions of their countries. A notable example of this attempt is found in a Tanzanian policy document called *Mwongozo* (guidelines) made in 1971 which reads as follows:

---

31

Frank T. Fitzgerald, "Sociologies of Development", in *Neo-Marxist Theories of Development*, ed. by Peter Limqueco and Bruce McFarlane, (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 12-13.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.

For people who have been slaves or have been oppressed, exploited, and disregarded by colonialism or capitalism, 'development' means 'liberation'. Any action that gives them more control of their own affairs is an action for development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread. Any action that reduces their say in determining their own affairs or running their own lives is not development and retards them even if the action brings them a little better health and a little more bread. (cited in Rweyemamu et al, 1974, p. 24).<sup>34</sup>

It is clear from this statement that the main element of development intended by a country like Tanzania is the state of being free or liberated from any kind of oppression, exploitation and colonialism. In this context, we will discuss Mahathir's perspective of development as he sees suitable for Malaysia in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, the United Nations has used an official definition as its guideline to solving problems of a more international nature which reads:

The concept of development should include economic and social factors as well as the moral and cultural values on which depend the full development of the human personality and the dignity of man in the society...Not only is man at the origin of development, not only is he its instrument and beneficiary, but above all, he must be regarded as its justification and its end".<sup>35</sup>

In line with this definition, UNESCO,<sup>36</sup> one of the United Nation's agencies for the development of education, science and culture, has developed the following definition for its operational purposes:

---

34

Aidan, op.cit., p. 6.

35

Aidit Ghazali, *Development: An Islamic Perspective*, op.cit., p. 40. See also a report on "The Quest for a United Approach to Development" prepared by United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (Geneva, 1980), pp.1-24.

36

A body of similar nature has also been established by Organization of Islamic Conference called The Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization or ISESCO to cater the needs among the Muslim countries. It was first adopted by the Constitutive Conference in Fez in 1982 and later amended by the General Conference at its special session in Rabat in 1986. See document on "Charter of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization", *The Islamic Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1989, pp. 93-104, for a detailed explanation of its objectives, membership and function.

Development is meaningful only if man, who is both its instrument and beneficiary, is also its justification and its end. It must be integrated and harmonized: in other words, it must permit the full development of the human being on the spiritual, moral and material levels, thus ensuring the rights of man in society through respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>37</sup>

In theory, a more comprehensive connotation of development seems to have been accepted by the highest-level policy making body in the world namely the United Nations. Whenever necessary, the writer will return to consider these definitions when discussing Malaysian development later. For now, let us turn to "social change".

There are as many ways of describing social change as there are ways of studying society.<sup>38</sup> In other words, there is a multitude of definitions, types, perspectives and theories of social change.<sup>39</sup> This being the case, one has to define clearly his preference in discussing the subject matter. In our context, we choose to base our discussion on some selected views of social change as summarised by Steven Vago in his book, *Social Change*. To make it more understandable, the views selected by Vago are discussed in the light of Robert Nisbet's definition of change.

Nisbet defines change as "a succession of differences in time, in a persisting identity".<sup>40</sup> There are three vital elements

---

37

Op.cit.

38

Some clauses like objective and subjective change, historical change, life cycle change, change in superstructure, change in mode of production, revolutionary and evolutionary change etc., may reflect a multitude of dimensions in the study of social change.

39

Roberta Ash Garner, *Social Change*, (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1977), pp. 3-6.

40

Robert Nisbet, "Introduction: The Problem of Social Change", in *Social Change: Key Concepts in the Social Sciences*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), p. 1.

in Nisbet's definition, namely differences,<sup>41</sup> in time,<sup>42</sup> and persisting identity.<sup>43</sup> Thus, for Nisbet social change has reference to "successive differences in time of some social relationship, norm, role, status, or structure; e.g. the family, church, nation, property, role of women, status of the father, the village community".<sup>44</sup> Each of these is social in the exact sense that its essence derives from social rather than biological forces, symbolic interaction. The whole complex process is called socialization.<sup>45</sup> In some ways, Nisbet's definition of change sheds light on the views gathered by Steven Vago.<sup>46</sup>

For instance, Vago quotes Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills as saying that social change refers to "whatever may happen in the course of time to the roles, the institutions, or the orders comprising a social structure, their emergence, growth and decline".<sup>47</sup> He thus concludes that social change means modifications of the way people work, rear a family, educate

---

41

A difference between the object as one is looking at it and what he has seen at some earlier time.

42

The temporal dimension of change which means that change is inseparable from the dimension of time.

43

The identity which persists through all the successive differences.

44

Ibid, pp. 1-2.

45

Ibid.

46

See also John McLeish, "Theories of Social Change: A Comparative Analysis", in his *The Theory of Social Change: Four Views Considered*, (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1969), pp. 70-90.

47

Vago, op. cit., p. 7 as quoted in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure*, (New York: Harcourt, 1953), p. 398.

their children, govern themselves, and seek ultimate meaning in life."<sup>48</sup>

The view that social change is a change in the structure of society or alteration of the social structure is also shared by other scholars like Morris Ginsberg and Wilbert E. Moore. The latter, for instance, refers it to "the significant change of social structure (that is, of patterns of social action and interaction), including consequences and manifestations of such structures embodied in norms (rules of conduct), values and cultural products and symbols".<sup>49</sup>

Some other sociologists believe that social change involves change in the structure and functioning of society. Francis B. Allen says, "social change comprises modifications in social systems or subsystems in structure, functioning, or process over some period of time".<sup>50</sup> His opinion is shared by Davis Kingsley as reflected in his words, "by social change is meant only such alterations as occur in social organization - that is, the structure and functions of society".<sup>51</sup>

---

48

Ibid.

49

Wilbert E. Moore, *Social Change*, Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 366. Steven Vago understands social structure as the patterns of social behaviour that includes statuses, roles, groups, and institutions such as the family, religion, politics, and the economic system. These elements are said to be not stable, tightly integrated, or harmonious, but unstable, loosely put together, and torn by dissension, *ibid*, p.8. See also Morris Ginsberg, "Social Change", in *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 4, 1958, p. 205.

50

Francis B. Allen, *Socio-cultural Dynamics: An Introduction to Social Change*, New York: MacMillan, 1971), p. 39.

51

Kingsley Davis, *Human Society*, (New York: MacMillan, 1974), p. 622. Harry M. Johnson also has a similar opinion. He says, "social change is change in the structure of a social system; what has been stable or relatively unchanging changes. Moreover, of structural changes the most important are those that have consequences for the functioning of the system - for attaining its goals more (or less) efficiently or for fulfilling more (or less) efficiently the conditions that must be met if the system is to survive at all." (Harry M. Johnson, *Sociology: A Systematic Introduction*, New York: Harcourt, 1960, pp. 626 and 628.

There are other sociologists who think of social change as a specific change in *social relationship*. Robert M. MacIver and Charles H. Page thus say, "by social change is meant changes in social relationships...the changing ways in which human beings relate to one another".<sup>52</sup>

Others incline to say that changes take place in both *social structure and social relationships* of a society. In this regard, Ronald Edari identifies two things which are said to be the very minimum of social change: the change in the constitution of social entities over time, and the change in the relations among entities over time.<sup>53</sup>

Judson R. Landis combines the three dimensions of change by saying, "social change refers to change in 'the structure and functioning of the social relationships' of a society".<sup>54</sup>

To conclude, one may rely upon Robert H. Lauer's opinion which seems to accommodate the various existing views. He says of social change as "...an inclusive concept that refers to alterations in social phenomena at various levels of human life from the individual to the global".<sup>55</sup> Table 2.1. summarises the various perceptions regarding social change as held by the above writers:

---

52

Robert M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society: An Introductory Analysis*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1949), p. 511.

53

Steven Vago, op.cit., pp. 8-9. See also Ronald Edari, *Social Change*, (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1976), p. 2.

54

Judson R. Landis, *Sociology: Concepts and Characteristics*, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1974), p. 229.

55

Robert H. Lauer, *Perspectives on Social Change*, 3rd. ed., (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1982), p. 4.



Table 2.I  
Various Perceptions of Social Change

THEORISTS	SOCIAL STRUCTURE	FUNCTION ING	SOCIAL RELATION SHIP
Hans Gerth & C. Wright Mills	Roles, institutions, orders, emergence, growth and decline.	-	-
Morris Ginsberg & Wilbert E. More	Pattern of Social action, interaction (consequences and manifestation)	-	-
Francis B. Allen	System and Subsystem	Functioning	-
David Kingsley	Social organization	Functioning	-
Robert M. MacIver & Charles H. Page	-	-	S.Relationship
Honald Edan	Social entities	-	S.Relationship
Judson R. Landis	S. Structure	Functioning	S.Relationship
Robert H. Lauer	Social change is "...an inclusive concept that refers to alterations in social phenomena at various levels of human life from the individual to the global".		

Since social change involves alterations to the various aspects of society which are generally considered as the main elements which constitute "social order", it is therefore relevant to consider this concept when discussing the Islamic perspective of development and change later.

Having understood that development process is responsible for bringing about changes in various aspects of a society - social, political, economic and religious - it can be inferred that the type of change in these aspects is largely influenced by the development paradigm or theory which in turn is based on its philosophy or ideological foundation. It must be noted, however, that the discussion of development theory is equally

complex.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, in our approach, we prefer to explain generally the rise of modern conventional theories of development as it may be related in various ways to our analysis of Malaysian development later.

### 2.1.2. Various Conventional Theories of Development.<sup>57</sup>

In general, the rise of conventional schools of development in the post- World War II period can be said to have been based essentially on earlier classical philosophies of capitalism, socialism and communism.<sup>58</sup> These dominant Western ideologies share a number of common features, notable among them being that they are materialistic and economically-based, non-religious and value-free. In general, conventional philosophies and ideologies reflect a reference to a worldview based on a secular perceptions of man, world, life and religion.<sup>59</sup> Overshadowed by the above philosophies and worldview, there emerged periodically various

---

56

This may be reflected in, for instance, S.N. Eisenstadt, "The Problem of Modernization in Sociological Study", in his *Tradition, Change and Modernity*, (New York, Sydney and Toronto: John Willey and Son, 1973), pp. 3-21.

57

As has been indicated on page 36, although Marxist and neoclassical theories of development may not share similarities with regard for instance to their engines of and approach to development (as Marxist for instance strongly emphasises on *conflict* in its revolutionary approach to the societal change against the neoclassical evolutionary and unilinear approach), all of them can be considered to be in one group considering their irreligious foundation as against the pertinent religious principles emphasised by Islam as elaborated under sub-topic 2.2. and summarised on pp. 90-91. It is from this particular religious perspective that all conventional perspectives are the same regardless of the engines of development in each of the models.

58

Immanuel Wallerstein says, "we think of economic development as a post-1945 concept. And it is certainly true that most of our current language, as used by politicians and intellectuals, is the product of the geopolitics of the post-1945 era in the world system. And it is certainly also true that since 1945 the concept as doctrine has been applied more widely and with greater social legitimation than ever before." (Immanuel Wallerstein, "Development: Lodestar or illusion?", in *Capitalism and Development*, ed. Leslie Sklair, [London: Routledge, 1994], p.4.)

59

Cf. Roger Garaudy, "The Balance Sheet of Western Philosophy in This Century", a paper presented at Third International Seminar on Islamic Thought, organized by International Institute of Islamic Thought and Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur on 26-31 July 1984.

modern schools or theories of development like modernization,<sup>60</sup> dependency and world system, as will be explained here.<sup>61</sup>

The period after the war, especially during the fifties and sixties, was said to be the heyday of the modernization paradigm.<sup>62</sup> According to Georg Sorensen, the focus of this paradigm was on "industrialization in the vein of the West, eradicating traditional structures and promoting a modern, industrial sector through investment, entrepreneurship, and the transfer of technology from the West".<sup>63</sup> In modernization term, this is referred to as "diffusion".<sup>64</sup>

As the great expectations of fast economic development proved unfounded, the reaction came with the rise of the dependency paradigm of the sixties and early seventies which put emphasis on the negative effects of Third World integration into

---

<sup>60</sup> In the present context the term modernization is used as a specific terminology in the Sociology of Development which basically refers to the type of theory that emphasises the unilinear progress of society in a definite order.

<sup>61</sup> Although we can hardly produce a neat demarcation of time to show the dominance of one theoretical paradigm at certain period of time, the scholars seem to agree more or less to a general periodization in which a pattern of development thinking is more prominent in one stipulated period than another. This does not however suggest that the rise of a new paradigm has come into being immediately after a complete cease of the earlier one. Neither are the elements of any paradigm completely absent after the emergence or prominence of another. See also Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *Social Change: The Advent and Maturation of Modern Society*, (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), esp. Part I, Ch. 1,2 & 3.

<sup>62</sup> Georg Sorensen, "Strategies and Structures of Development: The New Dogma and the limits to its promises", in *Changing Paradigms in Development: South, East and West*, ed. Margareta von Troil, (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993), p.27. Also, Frank T. Fitzgerald, op.cit. p. 12.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> The modernization theorists have introduced a multi-level notion of diffusion: the individual/psychological level, the institutional and organizational level and the technological and financial level. The dependency theorists have renamed this concept as "mechanics of dependency or imperialism" to imply the opposite effects of what modernization theory supposed. See Frank T. Fitzgerald, in *Neo-Marxist Theories...*, op.cit., pp. 14 and 16.

the world market.<sup>65</sup> Strategic recommendations were forwarded which had something to do with de-linking from the world market and emphasising self-reliance, often in the context of a non-capitalist strategy of development.<sup>66</sup>

As the cases of failure and success of development in a number of Third World countries over time did not always reflect their attachment to this theoretical paradigm,<sup>67</sup> there emerged a renewed awareness which gave rise to a number of new development paradigms. Sorensen is of the opinion that among the dominant development dogmas in the eighties which replaced earlier traditional capitalist virtues was one which could be called the "Social Democratic" paradigm.<sup>68</sup>

Dealing with the issue of development in specific regions, scholars tend to adopt certain development theories which might be seen as dominant in those regions. For instance, Tade Akin Aina sees two broad development paradigms existing in Africa's development experience and process. The first is the Conventional Development Paradigm which refers to such currents as the neo-classical approach, the modernization approach or, in some cases, the developmental perspective. However, he says that the most popular nomenclature is modernization approach.<sup>69</sup> Aina calls the second broad paradigm the radical alternative which has expressed

---

65

Ibid.

66

Ibid.

67

Like the rapid economic development of a group of South-East Asian countries basing themselves to what seemed to be old capitalist virtues of private entrepreneurship and world market integration.

68

Op. cit.

69

Tade Akin Aina, "Development Theory and Africa's Lost Decade: Critical Reflections on Africa's Crisis and Current Trends in Development Thinking and Practice", in *Changing Paradigms*, ed. Margareta von Troil, (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993), p.17.

itself in two main currents, namely neo-Marxist/World System/Dependency Approaches and Orthodox Marxist Approach.<sup>70</sup> Let us consider the views of a local Muslim scholar to elaborate the development of these conventional theories.<sup>71</sup>

H.M. Dahlan shares a similar view that development has become a major enterprise in nation-building since 1945. The "political independence" paradigm was dominant during those years as many Third World countries were on their way to political liberation from colonial powers.<sup>72</sup> It was assumed that political independence would open ways for rapid economic development.<sup>73</sup> Dahlan says that for most, this means capitalist development.<sup>74</sup>

Then, the modernization paradigm came especially during the sixties to emphasize two components, namely GNP-centred economic growth and political development.<sup>75</sup> As this paradigm shift did not question the structural context of earlier development thinking, it seemed to accept the definition of development mainly as, "... a rapid and sustained rise in real output per head and attendant shifts in technological, demographic and economic characteristics

---

70

Ibid, p.18.

71

We choose to base our discussion on the writing of Associate Professor Dr. Mohd. Dahlan Haji Aman, who has been actively involved in the study of development, entitled "Socio-cultural Paradigm of Development", in *Socio-cultural Dimension of Development Planning*, ed. Mohd Yaakub Hj. Johari, (Kota Kinabalu, Sabah: Institute for Development Studies [Sabah], 1989).

72

See also Frank T. Fitzgerald, op.cit., p. 12.

73

Mohd. Dahlan Haji Aman, "Socio-cultural Paradigm of Development", op. cit., p.175.

74

Ibid.

75

Ibid, p. 176.

of society," (Eastern, 1968, V:395).<sup>76</sup> In general, this GNP-centred modernization paradigm implies the diffusion of ideas, capital, technology and institutions from the West variously known as the centre, the development generating and the development agencies, to the underdeveloped or developing nations which assume such labels as the peripheries, the development recipients and the clients.<sup>77</sup>

As the factors which reduced the confidence in the modernization paradigm emerged, a paradigm shift (or an intellectual shift) occurred around the 1970s which altered basic development conception.<sup>78</sup> On this point, Dr. C.K. Chan, a lecturer in Development Studies in the University of Science, Malaysia, observes that, "when the trickle-down effect did not materialize at a pace fast enough to stave off social unrest, policy makers conceded that conscious effort and attention to the distributional effects of economic growth was necessary."<sup>79</sup>

---

76

Ibid.

77

Ibid. H.M. Dahlan also cites the four elements of this paradigm as held by E.M. Roger which are: Economic growth through industrialization and accompanying urbanization, approximately equivalent to passing through the industrial revolution. GNP and per capita income became the main indicators of success without much consideration for which individuals actually got the higher incomes and who did not; Capital intensive, labour-saving technology, mainly transferred from industrialized nations; Centralized planning, mainly by government economists and bankers, in order to guide and speed up the process of development; and the view that the causes of underdevelopment lay mainly within the developing nations, rather than in their trade or other external relationships with industrialized countries.

78

The three factors cited are persistent poverty in spite of, and in the wake of, development programmes; lack of participation of the target groups/sectors in the politico-economic mainstreams; and structural dependency manifested in imbalanced inter-sectoral, regional and rural-urban connections and relationships at the national and international levels (ibid). For a critical assessment of modernization theory, see for instance A.R. Desai, "Need for Revaluation of the Concept", *Essays on Modernization of Underdeveloped Societies*, ed. A.R. Desai, Vol. 1, (Bombay: Thacker and Co., 1971), pp. 458-474, and Piotri Sztompka, "The Critique of the Idea of Modernization", in *The Sociology of Social Change*, (Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 135-136.

79

See C.K. Chan, "Development Re-defined?: Economics As If Ecology Mattered", *Aliran Monthly*, Vol. 13, No. 12, (Penang: Aliran Kesedaran Rakyat, 1993), pp. 33-35.



The dualistic thinking in the modernization theory has, according to Dahlan, been challenged by a holistic, historical and structural thinking which later brought to prominence at least three development theories which he calls structural theories; dependency and underdevelopment theories; and articulation and mode of production theories. Some significant implications arising from this shift could be observed. First, development was recognized as a selective and value-loaded process (Todaro, 1981:70, and Gibbons, 1976:89); second, these theories brought to the surface the need to comprehend the genesis of development namely its origin, characteristics and implications;<sup>80</sup> and third, while agreeing to the need for a growing GNP in every development process (Tamin, 1986:1), economic growth should not be considered as the ultimate end of development (Armstrong and McGee, 1985:19).<sup>81</sup> Insistence on participatory development has added a new dimension to development as reflected in such new watchwords as "Growth-with-Distribution Approach", "The Basic Need Approach", and "The Basic Services Approach".<sup>82</sup>

This has resulted in the redefinition of development within the new theoretical paradigm as held, for instance, by Roger:

---

80

H.M. Dahlan, op.cit., p.177. This relates to at least two main aspects: First, the issue of perceptions regarding the appropriate methods and social conditions for development, an epistemological issue in development; and the capacity of individuals in sponsoring change in society, and the behaviour and conception of self-esteem involved in selecting the choices/options for development.

81

Ibid, p.178.

82

Touching on this paradigm shift, Dahlan believes that people did not question the need to sustain a growing GNP but generally questioned the wisdom of sticking only to the GNP-oriented development. Hence, they proposed a people-oriented development against the GNP-oriented development.



... as a widely participatory process of social change in a society intended to bring about both social and material advancement (including greater equality, freedom, and other valued qualities) for the majority of people through their gaining greater control over their environment.<sup>83</sup>

Since then, the non-economic dimensions seem to have been given greater consideration in the course of this paradigm shift.<sup>84</sup>

As the traditional concept of growth (throughput growth), with its reliance on an ever-increasing throughput of energy and natural materials is no longer sustainable, there has developed a trend to re-define the concept of development which tries to bridge the divide between ecology and economics.<sup>85</sup> Thus, the concept of "sustainable development" began to dominate the 1990s period with such definitions as "development without growth in throughput beyond environmental carrying capacity".<sup>86</sup> Herman Daly, a senior economist at the World Bank's Environment Department, is said to be among the leading proponents for a paradigm shift from "empty-world economics" to "full-world economics".<sup>87</sup>

Table 2.2 summarises the various conventional theories over the stipulated periods as discussed earlier.

---

83

Op.cit.

84

For a critique of both theories, see for instance, John G. Taylor, *From Modernization to Mode of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment*, (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd.; 1979), esp. Part I, Ch. 1,2 & 3, pp. 3-97.

85

C.K. Chan, Loc. cit..

86

See also Thijs de la Court, "Towards Sustainable Development", in *Beyond Brundtland: Green Development in the 1990s*, Ed Bayens and Nigel Harle, tr. (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1990), pp. 9.18.

87

Ibid.

Table 2.2  
Post-Second World War Development Paradigms

	After World War II to 1950s	1960s to Early 1970s	1970s to 1980s	1990s Onwards
Dominant Paradigm or Theory	Political Independence	Modernization	Dependency/World System/ Under-Development	Sustainable Development
Main Features	-political liberation from colonial powers -economic development	- unilinear & teleological - capitalist-based -West-Third World Link -evolutionist -internalist -GNP-oriented	-participatory -people-oriented -externalist -bilinear -stagnationist -discontinuist -Growth-with-Redistribution -Basic-Needs Approach -Basic-Services Approach	-balance between ecology and economics - material balance in human development activity - recognition of the finiteness of ecosystem
Proponents	-	Walt Whitman Rostow	Andre Gundar Frank, Samir Amin, Walter Rodney	Herman Daly, Robert Goodland,

Earlier we argued that modern (post-World War II) development theories are basically based on the secular premise of conventional ideologies like capitalism, socialism and communism from which classical sociological schools had originated. Although modern theories are developed in response to the various new developments, and are said to be "new" theories, they carry a philosophy similar in substance to those early schools. For instance, modernization theory resembles closely the classical evolutionist approach held by scholars like Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Lewis Morgan, Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tonnies.<sup>88</sup> Similarly, as dependency theory seems to be

---

For a discussion of classical evolutionism and its criticism, see for instance Piotr Sztompka, op.cit., pp. 99-112, and Ankie M.M. Hoogvelt, *The Sociology of Developing Society*, 2nd. ed., (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978), pp. 11-19.

more concerned with the development from within, it does reflect the Marxist element of classical conflict theory. Thus, people like Andre Gunder Frank emerged to propagate the spirit of Marxism in a somewhat different approach, causing him to be labelled variously as the advocate of not only 'dependency', but also 'neo-Marxism' and 'underdevelopment' theory.<sup>89</sup>

In the course of our analysis of Malaysian development, we will return to consider these theories as they may be deemed relevant. For now, it is important to understand the concept of development and change as seen from an Islamic perspective.

## 2.2. Development and Change: An Islamic Perspective.

Earlier, we have said that Islamic theory is different from conventional one in certain respects. Essentially, there are two main features of an Islamic theory: First, Islamic view is based on the fixed sources of reference, and second, it is more concerned with the *ought-to-be* than *what is*. Muslims' interpretations of various events and aspects of society at different stages of history, and their attempts to understand certain subjects in the light of these sources, however, have given rise to different Islamic interpretations of the subjects viewed.

Therefore, the reader is reminded that the formulation of Islamic theory refers to the various attempts by Muslims to clarify the principle ideas pertaining to development and change as best understood by them. Their diverse views in explaining the concept should be seen as a necessary intellectual dynamism rather than total disagreement among scholars over the underlying religious principles pertaining to development as derived from the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*. Thus, it is important to bear in mind the difference between the dogmatic truism in Islamic ideology

regarding the subject and the numerous types of explanation and elaboration of the ideas by Muslims.

For a better review of an Islamic perspective of development and change, we propose to discuss it on three levels. The first level involves clarification of the Islamic ideological system in order to demonstrate its distinctions from the conventional ones. The second provides an elaboration of an Islamic worldview, and the third discusses the concept of development and change based on the above two premises. Local Muslim perceptions on the subject will be dealt with separately in the final section of this chapter.

#### 2.2.1. The Islamic Ideological System.

Apart from the reasons given earlier, the importance of discussing the Islamic system in the present context is two-fold: to elaborate clearly the ideological basis upon which our theory is formulated, and to establish its relevance to the later analysis of Malaysian development. The term ideology is used here to mean a composite system that regulates all human concerns and relationships - theological, social, economic, political and cultural. The writer opts to explain Islam by focusing on two most pressing themes, namely *Muslim Perception of Religious Authority* and *Islamic Weltanschauung*.

##### a. Muslim Perception of Religious Authority.<sup>90</sup>

It has been established earlier that any discussion of Islam must be based on the very source of this religion.<sup>91</sup> That is why

---

90

For a discussion of this topic, see also H.R. Seferta, "The Concept of Religious Authority According to Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Ridhā", in *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXX, No. 3, 1986, pp. 159-164.

91

See for instance, Ahmad Hasan, "The Sources of Islamic Law", *The Islamic Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 2, June 1968, pp. 165-184, and N.J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, Islamic Surveys Series No. 2, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964).

Muslims never define their religion by referring to sources other than *al-Qur'ān* and *al-Sunnah*.<sup>92</sup> These two main sources of reference are divinely-rooted by way of direct divine revelation in the case of the former, and of Divinely-guided inspiration manifested in the Prophet's actions and examples in the case of the latter.<sup>93</sup> For Muslims, *al-Qur'ān* is the absolute source of truth because of its assured protection by Allah from any corruption.<sup>94</sup> Averroes has said that, "the purpose of Scripture is to teach true theoretical and practical science and right practice and attitude."<sup>95</sup> The teachings of Judaism and Christianity are considered to lack originality in their present

---

92

In the face of modern realities and challenges, there have been continuous attempts by Muslims to discuss how the principles from these sources can be utilized fully and realistically for modern life as reflected, for instance, in the organization of International Seminar on the Qur'ān (The Qur'ān Through the 14th. H. Century Celebrations) held under the auspices of the Indo-Arab Cultural Association on 29-30 January 1983 at the Asiatic Society of Calcutta. See M.S. Khan, "An International Seminar on the Holy Qur'ān", *Islamic Culture*, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, April 1984, pp. 171-177.

93

Therefore, Islamic sources are distinctive from conventional ones whose roots are found largely in such traditions as secularism, empiricism, and rationalism. See Arthur P. Mendel, ed. *Essential Works of Marxism*, (New York, Toronto and London: Bantam Books, 1965), p. 1.

94

The authoritativeness of *al-Qur'ān* and *al-Sunnah* is firmly accepted at least for two main reasons: to stress the Divine nature of religious teachings, and to indicate a unique parameter for comparison with other sources, thus avoiding from any possible misunderstanding about the truth and the role this religion has to play. See also 'Alī Khashshān, *Wujūb al-Rujū' Ilā al-Kitāb wa al-Sunnah wa Khaṣar al-Taqlīd*, (Riyadh: Dār ibn al-Qayyim, 1993), (*al-Qur'ān al-Nisā'*: 59 and *al-Aḥzāb*: 36), and Abdul Majid Mackeen, "The Revelational Criteria in Islamic Thought", *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1986, p. 45-53.

95

George F. Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, (London: Luzac and Co., 1976), p. 63. See also Muhammad Abū Layla, "The Qur'ān: Nature, Authenticity, Authority and Influence on the Muslim Mind", *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, 1992, pp. 227-241.

forms because their scriptures are believed to be corrupt."

The main authority to take the role of interpreting Qur'anic verses and messages, other than al-Qur'ān itself, is its direct recipient, the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) and his *Sunnah*. The issues which are not directly treated in the former are touched by the latter in the shade of the former's principles, guidelines and spirit. The less explicit Qur'anic expressions or its more general principles are also clarified and detailed accordingly by the *Sunnah*. Since the words of the Prophet are divinely-inspired, as the Qur'ān says, "nor does he (Muḥammad) say aught of his own desire... it is no less than inspiration sent down to him" (al-Qur'ān 53:3-4), and the fact that the Prophet himself is held *ma'sūm*,<sup>97</sup> his *Sunnah* is therefore regarded as highly legitimate.<sup>98</sup> The Prophet is able to interpret the verses of the Qur'ān in general and in detail (*jumlatan wa tafṣīlan*).<sup>99</sup> In this sense, al-Qur'ān and al-Sunnah are both the sources and definers or interpreters of Islamic teachings.<sup>100</sup>

96

---

In short, the hierarchy of Islamic authority places al-Qur'ān as the most truthful source of faith and guidance, incomparable to that of others in terms of infallibility and authoritativeness. Its injunctions and teachings are absolutely binding and should not in any way be doubted (al-Qur'ān 2:2.). As to how reason is used to interpret the principles laid down in the Qur'ān see for instance, George F. Hourani, "Reason and Revelation in Ibn Hazm's Ethical Thought", *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, ed. Parviz Morewedge, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), pp. 142-164.

97

*Ma'sūm* refers to the protection of the Prophet's actions from any defect caused by human imperfection.

98

Ahmad Ibrahim, *Islamic Law in Malaya*, ed. Shirle Gordon, (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd., 1965), p. 45.

99

Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa al-Mufasssīrūn*, Vol. 1, (Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, 1976), p. 33.

100

Therefore, the problem among Muslims is not one of finding sources of references, but of deriving relevant principles and of detailing them as a practical prescription for various aspects of social life. With the emergence of various new realities, this aspect becomes more challenging. See for instance,



Some issues in the *Qur'ān* - theological or otherwise - are conveyed through the express Divine injunctions or *āyāt muḥkamāt*, while others are subject to interpretation due to their lesser degree of clarity or *āyāt mutashābihāt*.<sup>101</sup> Muslim scholars agree that the second type of verses are allowed to be interpreted through *ijtihād*, a guided intellectual interpretation carried out within Divine and prophetic guidelines.<sup>102</sup> This is particularly dealt with in a special discipline called *tafsīr*.<sup>103</sup>

It is *ijtihād* in its broader sense that "... continues to be the main instrument of interpreting the Divine message and relating it to the changing conditions of the Muslim community in its aspirations to attain justice, salvation and truth."<sup>104</sup> The *mujtahidūn* or men of *ijtihād* utilize the standard methodological procedures like *qiyās*, *istiṣḥāb*, *istiṣlāḥ* and *maṣāliḥ mursalah* in order to reach a religiously-guided consensus called *ijmā'* on a particular subject, including the most legitimate way to implement certain policies (*aḥkām*).<sup>105</sup> The degree of the

---

"Problems of Modernization in Islam", *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXV, No. 2, April 1975, pp. 174-185, and Mazheruddin Siddiqi, "General Characteristics of Muslim Modernism", *Islamic Studies*, Vol. IX, No. 1, March 1970, pp. 33-68.

101

The former refers to the specific Divine statements explaining especially the fundamental religious doctrines and practices like *Imān* and *'ibādah khāṣṣah* (prayer, fasting, pilgrimage etc.) and the latter is concerned more with the general teachings especially with the non-ritual matters or *'ibādah 'āmmah*. For a brief discussion of these types of verses, see Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, op.cit. pp. 102-103.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 366.

103

This discipline was specially developed to undertake the task of interpreting the words of God. *Tafsīr* literally means exegesis.

104

Hashim Kamali, *Principles*, Loc.cit.

105

*Ijtihād* is practised widely in the field of religious *fiqh* (jurisprudence) or *ḥukm* (judgment). In this sense it becomes "the most important source of Islamic law next to the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah*." Due to its wide application, the products of *ijtihād* can be seen to be manifested in numerous traditional works like Quranic exegesis (*tafsīr*), *'ulūm al-ḥadīth*, *fiqh*, and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Indeed, its impact is reflected practically in almost all other fields like medicine, astrology,



application of *ijtihād* is varied as can be seen in the following discussion of Islamic weltanschauung, the second important theme in our present discussion.

#### b. An Islamic Weltanschauung.

Man's action or conduct of life is basically a reflection of his ideological, political and moral commitments which in turn develop "a certain degree of metaphysical belief" known as worldview or weltanschauung.<sup>106</sup> Jurg Martin Gabriel says that worldviews are different from theories. Thus, he says,

Worldviews are simple devices but their very simplicity allows the isolation of a handful of terms central to describing and analysing international relations. Theories are more demanding, they are built upon worldviews but go beyond them; theories are more elaborate and contain numerous features not inherent in worldviews; theories are shaped by circumstance and have to be relevant for men acting under particular constraints.... Worldviews are not essentially different, however. Both share a number of features. Neither are objective constructs free of values and assumptions, and both exhibit a preference for rational schemes over empirical patterns, for understanding over explanation. Neither worldviews nor theories are purely descriptive but embrace a prescriptive and action-oriented component.<sup>107</sup>

Against this backdrop, we define Islamic worldview as a totality of perception based on proper Islamic understanding of some fundamental concepts like religion, God, man, society, world and life.<sup>108</sup>

---

astronomy and philosophy. See also Ahmad Hasan, "The Sources...", op.cit., pp. 170-172, and his "Origins of the Early Schools of Law", *The Islamic Studies*, Vol. IX, No. 3, September 1970, pp. 255-269, and Fazlur Rahman, "Concepts of *Sunnah*, *Ijtihād*, and *Ijmā'* in the early period, *Islamic Studies*, No. 1, March 1962.

106

It is also said that a worldview is "the totality of human interpretation of the world and of lives in the world ... and the totality of the value by which man lives".

107

Jurg Martin Gabriel, *Worldviews and Theories of International Relations*, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994), p.2.

108

Further explanations concerning the Islamic worldview can be found in such books as *al-Taṣawwur al-Islāmī Li al-Kawn wa al-Ḥayāt wa al-Insān* by ʿUthmān Jumūʿah Ḍamriyyah (Kuwait: Maktabat Dār al-Arqam, n.d.).

i. Islamic Perspective of Religion and God.<sup>109</sup>

Firstly, Islam does not subscribe to the idea that God is non-existent nor to a belief in a multitude of gods, or that all religious experiences are equally true.<sup>110</sup> While there is agreement on the true awareness of God as the only valuable experience to attain religious ultimacy or intimacy with God, Islam rejects the validity of all religious awarenesses. Since Islam only recognizes a series of uncorrupted monotheistic religious transcendental awarenesses of such previous Prophets as Ādam, Nūḥ, Ibrāhīm, Mūsā, ʿĪsā and others as the only true Divine experience, and to this end, it only recognises the ultimacy and perfection of Islam, the final religion in this series, the view that there are many truths for man is unacceptable to Muslims.<sup>111</sup>

Secondly, Islam holds that true religious awareness does not evolve gradually in the course of history, although false beliefs continue to develop in various forms due to the corruption of and diversion from the truth.<sup>112</sup> In human history,

109

---

For a philosophical discussion of the concept of religion by a local scholar, see for instance Syed Muḥammad Naquib Al-Attas, "Islam: The Concept of Religion and the Foundation of Ethics and Morality", Ch. 2 of his *Islam and Secularism*, op.cit. pp. 47-90. See also Fazlur Rahman, "The Qur'anic Concept of God, the Universe and Man", in *The Islamic Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 1, March 1967, pp. 1-19.

110

It is found that some people try to understand the diverse perceptions about God and his nature by studying various opinions in different traditions. While admitting the existence of rejectionism to the idea of religion and God by such groups as the atheists, the materialists and the naturalists, they may conclude that people in general agree that God exists and that "all true awareness of God is an experience at one and the same time of ultimacy and intimacy" (*Man and the Universe: The Great Questions*).

111

The objection to the plurality of truth does not signify the teaching of unethical dealing with people of other religions as this is not what Islam urges its followers to practice in the face of the practitioners of the untrue religions. For a Muslim modernist view of other religions, see William E. Shepard, "A Modernist View of Islam and Other Religions", *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXV, No. 2, April 1975, pp. 79-92, also interview with Dr. Wan Mohd. Nor at ISTAC on 6.5.1995.

112

The corruption of Divine truth is manifested in such forms as, 1) association of Allah with other elements, physical or metaphysical, 2) anthropomorphism as

Ādam, the first man created by God, became the first to be endowed with such a truth.<sup>113</sup>

Thirdly, God's *raḥmah* (mercy) is for men of all time. Therefore, *al-ḥaqq* (the eternal truth) and *tagwā* (fear of God, Divine consciousness or righteousness) have been made available to people of all times through a series of prophets or *anbiyā'* and messengers or *rusul* (*al-Qur'ān* 35:4; 39:65).<sup>114</sup> As Allah was for the people of the previous time, so He is and will be the One and Only true God for the present and future people, He Who:

... is Eternally Living (*al-ḥayy al-Qayyūm*), transcending the limitations of spatio-temporal order, being the First (*al-Awwal*), the Last (*al-Ākhir*), the External (*al-ẓāhir*), and the Internal (*al-Bāṭin*). The exact nature of God is not knowable for He is beyond comprehension... However, in order to facilitate human understanding and thus influence their behaviour, God uses metaphors and similitude from what is loftiest in the heaven and the earth (30:27) and from our own experience (20:28).<sup>115</sup>

Fourthly, although Islam and other previous monotheistic beliefs share the same doctrine of Divinity, they are different in terms of *sharī'ah*, a system that regulates people's daily

---

in the case of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, 3) denial of God's supremacy as held by pre-Islamic Arabs and, 4) denial of His existence as held by the atheists.

113

Islam teaches that during his creation Ādam was equipped with the Divine Truth. He was later made aware of the significance of that spiritual experience through the rational faculty. Having been spiritually and rationally conscious of such a Truth, Ādam tried his best to devote his life to the Divine laws and guidelines. The mistake he then committed during his early stay in heaven only caused him to be sent to the earth as a logical consequence of his negligence, and not to cause his offspring or descendants to inherit it as their Original Sin. Since Ādam's mistake was pardoned by Allah, there was nothing to restrain him (and so his descendants) from being a good and obedient servant of God. All men are born innocent until they consciously commit sins. Even if they do, they still have opportunities to correct themselves and to prove their total regret, sincerity and honesty by returning back on the straight path (*taubah*).

114

At no period of time were people blind to this Truth. As such, human history is not seen fundamentally as a series of conflicts between the *bourgeoisie* and the *proletariat* (Marxist's doctrine of *social conflict*) or between the strong and the weak (Charles Darwin's doctrine of the struggle of the fittest) but between the Truth and its antipode, the falsehood (*bāṭil*). Although a system to regulate human life is completed with the revelation of Islam, this type of conflict continues to exist.

115

Wan Mohd. Nor Wan Daud, *The Concept of Knowledge in Islam and Its Implication for Education in a Developing Country*, (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1989) p.11.

activities. In comparison to that of Islam, the previous systems did not possess comprehensive rules to cater for the problems of all time despite their adequacy for a given period.<sup>116</sup> It is only Islam that Allah acknowledges as the only perfect solver of all problems until *yaum al-ākhirah* (the Last Day).<sup>117</sup> Therefore, from a Muslim point of view, people are not expected to seek for other religious experience nor should they hope for the coming of another renewed religion to replace it despite various physical and social changes that may have arisen from rapid social and economic development.<sup>118</sup>

Fifthly, because of their firm belief in the perfection and superiority of Islam over others,<sup>119</sup> Muslims always feel obliged to perceive *things* Islamically, and to act within the comprehensive understanding of religious teachings and awareness. Therefore, their call for the restoration and implementation of Islamic ideals at various stages of history is quite understandable.

And finally, but most importantly, the core of Islam is *tawḥīd*, a single term employed to express the actual reality and totality of religion. It constitutes such literal meanings as

---

116

Previous monotheistic faiths were only meant to deal with the issues within their limited geographical location and period of time. As society developed and the need arose, the existing systems were succeeded by the more suitable ones to handle the developing societies. Despite such a change, not all previous teachings were abandoned. Some were incorporated in the succeeding system and others were modified accordingly while the rest were totally abolished. Such a process of *nasikh* and *mansukh* took place as a prerequisite for perfection. This process continued until its final stage when Islam was declared and recognised as a comprehensive system practicable to actualize the Divine teachings at all times.

117

*Al-Qur'ān* 5:3.

118

The Divine teachings of Islam are meant for men in their interaction with God (*ḥabl min Allāh*), other fellow men (*ḥabl min al-nās*) and with other creatures. In this sense, Islam is both ontologically theocentric (*rabbānī*) and teleologically humanistic (*insānī*).

119

Among the Prophetic traditions, there is one which means, "Islam is superior, (and) there are no other religions superior to it".

one, oneness, singleness, uniqueness, singularity, exclusiveness and the like. In Islamic religious understanding, it reflects the foundation upon which Islam is founded and perceived. Hence, the essence of religious teachings, experience and worldview.<sup>120</sup>

The doctrine of *tawḥīd* centres around conscious recognition of Allah as the Only God. The *Qur'ān* says that if there were many gods, the universe would be in chaos (*al-Qur'ān* 21:22). The existence of other gods is denied categorically in one's testification called *shahādah* which means, "There is no god but Allāh". Therefore, Allāh, "occupies the central position in every Muslim place, every Muslim action, every Muslim thought. The presence of God fills the Muslim's consciousness at all times."<sup>121</sup>

In this respect, 'Alī Sharī'atī concludes that anything perceived from this positive perspective represents a "worldview of *tawḥīd*" and the reverse polytheistic perception connotes a "worldview of *shirk*".<sup>122</sup> Ismā'īl Rājī al-Fārūqī's terminological employment of the phrase "tawhidic weltanschauung" is believed to bear a similar connotation. In view of the extreme importance

120

Insistence on the Divine disassociation, singleness, uniqueness and exclusiveness with regard to His existence results in one's life being devoted solely to His cause. This involves one's recognition of Allah's supremacy over all others (*al-tawḥīd al-rubūbiyyah*), and his mandatory subservience (*ta'abbud*) to Him (*al-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyyah*). The overall view of Allah's perfection is concluded in one's belief in His perfect attributes (*tawḥīd al-ṣifāt*). It is on account of *tawḥīd* that a Muslim is supposed to behave and to run his life either through specific ritual performance, namely *'ibādah khāṣṣah* (like prayer or *Salāt*, fasting or *Ṣawm*, obligatory charity or *zakāt* and pilgrimage or *Ḥajj*), or one's other non-ritual activities called *'ibādah 'āmmah* (like social works and pursuit of knowledge).

121

This highest idea of divine nobility and transcendence denies that the existence of God is consistent with a chaotic world because the world itself is a cosmos manifesting the orderliness of the universe. He created the universe with the laws natural to it in its governance. Allah is the first and ultimate source of norms and all which constitutes the axiological framework that explains the reality of ethics and morality. His commands and teachings provide the axiological ground of religion. Thus, there is no *ummah* to whom He does not send a reminder of this moral axiom. (*al-Qur'ān* 35:24; 16:36; 23:14). For a comprehensive explanation of the concept of *Tawḥīd*, see for instance Ismā'īl Rājī al-Fārūqī, *Al-Tawḥīd: Its Implications for Thought and Life*, 2nd. ed., (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1992).

122

'Alī Sharī'atī, *On the Sociology of Islam*, Hamid Algar, tr., (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979), pp. 82-87.



of *tawḥīd* in Islam, it is not an exaggeration to say that there is no Islam without *tawḥīd*.

## ii. Islamic Perspective of Man and Society.

Although the subject of man is central in both Islamic and sociological studies, it assumes different conceptual connotations in both disciplines. In the absence of a common source to understand man and his life on earth in the conventional tradition, scholars have developed different theories pertaining to the various aspects of his biological and social realities.<sup>123</sup>

In Islam, a comprehensive elucidation of both the biological and social realities of man begins with the acceptance of a standard overriding principle pertaining to human creation (*khalq*) and existence (*wujūd*). Such a principle is again profoundly based on the recognition of Allāh as man's Creator, Proprietor, and Determiner (*al-Qur'ān* 22:5; 36:77; 40:67).<sup>124</sup>

Islam holds that the earliest man ever created by Allāh was Ādam (*al-Qur'ān* 2:30). As the first human prototype, he had to undergo a unique process of creation<sup>125</sup> whereby he was erected from *turāb* (dust or clay) to form his physical body. He was then endowed with *nafs* (soul) and *rūḥ* (spirit) to make him

123

---

Charles Darwin, for instance, introduced his evolutionary theory in an attempt to explain man's biological origin and nature. His theory was later adopted by a number of social scientists in their interpretation of man's social and religious life.

124

See also John MacDonald, "The Creation of Man and Angels in the Eschatological Literature", *The Islamic Culture*, Vol. III, No. 3, September, 1964, pp. 285-308, and S. Vahiduddin, "The Qur'anic Vision of God, Man and His Destiny", *The Islamic Culture*, Vol. LX, No. 1, January 1986, pp. 1-18.

125

Allah's will to create Adam was first made known to His ever obedient servants, the angels who, fearing man's possible disobedience and bloodshed, argued against this will (*al-Qur'ān* 2:30). Allah made His wish acceptable to the angels by asking them to name the things which He taught Ādam earlier. They failed to do so. It thus proved to be an intellectual defect of the angels in understanding the wisdom behind such a creation. They were thus bound to respect (*Sujūd*) Adam's human privilege.

biologically functional and spiritually inspired by the Divine attributes.<sup>126</sup>

Upon completion of his body, Ādam was taught *al-asmā' kullahā* (all names of things) (*al-Qur'ān* 2:31). Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas holds that this implies *ʿilm* or knowledge.<sup>127</sup> With that *ʿilm*, he was in a better position to understand rationally his surroundings, his existence and his God. The status of Ādam as God's *ʿābid* (servant) and *khalīfah* (vicegerent) (*al-Qur'ān* 2:30) on the earth was qualified by such an intellectual quality. By its virtue, even the *malā'ikah* (angels) were commanded to honour him (*al-Qur'ān* 2:34).<sup>128</sup>

The next event in the history of human creation is the creation of Ādam's partner, Ḥawwā' or Eve, who is also distinctive due to her unique origin. However, only few accounts are available on this subject. There has been an opinion that Ḥawwā' or the first woman was created from the *rib* of Ādam or man. However, ʿAlī Shariʿatī says that the translation "rib" is incorrect as the word so translated has the real meaning in both Arabic and Hebrew of "nature, disposition or constitution." As the word has been misinterpreted as "rib" the legend arose that woman was created from the left rib of Ādam, and therefore all

---

126

Although the issue of *Rūḥ* has been discussed by Muslim scholars, the fact remains that Islam does not urge its followers to undertake an in-depth investigation, scientific or otherwise, in order to reach a final conclusion on its reality (*al-Qur'ān* 17:85). Rather, it stresses that it is Allah Who knows about it best. This, however, does not prevent them from seeking further knowledge in order to understand its scientific nature as long as this is carried out within religious principles. Among the main principles are that the research should not lead to the denial of Allah as the Creator or cast any doubt on His wisdom, and that it must be for good purposes as defined by religious teachings.

127

Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *The nature of Man...*, op.cit., p. 1.

128

All the angels (who were created from light or *nūr*) obeyed His command but not the devils (*iblis*) who argued that they were superior to any other creature in terms of origins because they were created from fire or *nār*, whereas man was created from clay or *turāb* (*al-Qur'ān* 7:12). Their defiance caused them to be categorized as betrayers (*kāfirūn*).



women are lacking one rib. He concedes that woman's creation should be understood in the light of the relevant verse of the *al-Qur'ān* which says, "We have created Ḥawwā' from the same nature or disposition as Adam; man and women proceed from the same substance."<sup>129</sup> As they share the same lineage and are originally from the same substance, man and women are, consequently, equal.<sup>130</sup>

Another case of creation which did not follow a standard biological process was the birth of ʿĪsā (Jesus) as he was born without his mother, Maryam, being touched by any male partner (*al-Qur'ān* 3:45-47). All these special cases are meant to show the ability, power and will of Allah in creating man as He wishes.<sup>131</sup>

The biological creation of *banū Ādam* (the offspring of the Prophet Ādam) follows a standard biological process as determined by *Sunnah Allāh* (Divine laws). In the conventional perspective these laws are often referred to as natural laws. An Islamic explanation of this process can be simplified as follows:

A kind of human egg or seed in the male known as *nuṭfah* (sperm) and in the female, the ovum, meet and stay in the woman's womb for forty days before turning into a clot of blood known as *ʿalaqah* which develops further in the next forty days into a solid flesh called *mudghah*. Another forty days involves the transformation of the *mudghah* into flesh or *laḥm* which is then

---

129

ʿAlī Shariʿatī, *On the Sociology...*, op.cit., pp. 75-76.

130

The question of equality between man and woman is, however, polemical especially when it deals with the extent of their equality given their biological, sexual and psychological inequalities.

131

Adam was born without father and mother, Ḥawwā' without mother and ʿĪsā without father.

strengthened necessarily with *‘iḏām* (bones).<sup>132</sup> At this stage, Allāh, based on His knowledge, commands Gabriel to write down the events of his or future life.<sup>133</sup>

Being human, Ādam and his descendants are equal in terms of their superiority over other creatures as manifested in their best physical, spiritual and intellectual creation or *aḥsan al-taqwīm* (al-Qur'ān 95:4). Similarly, all have a common responsibility, that is to worship God (al-Qur'ān 51:56) and to carry out their obligation as His vicegerent on the earth (al-Qur'ān 6:165; 45:39).

These scientific thoughts on the biological creation of man in al-Qur'ān do not mean, however, that people should base their faith solely on scientific evidence. The mention of man's biological process is not to show God's ability to create *per se*, but more importantly to reflect a composite Divine perfection as the Most Able, the Most Knowledgeable, the Most Perfect, the Supreme and the Incomparable Superpower, so that people are expected to have a firm belief in Him as the Giver of souls, and at the same time to feel obliged to worship Him *in toto* during his life.<sup>134</sup>

---

132

This is reported in the Prophetic tradition as contained in Muslim's compilation under the subject *qadr* as well as in Musnad Ibn Ḥanbal. See also al-Qur'ān 22:5.

133

Among those things mentioned in the Prophetic tradition are his/her age, death and good and evil doings. Although there are disagreements among scholars as to the nature of this writing, most of them believe that it does not refer to the divine pre-determination of one's fate to the extent that he or she has to follow what has already been fixed for him because this implies His unfairness to some of His creatures. Essentially, such a spiritual event is intended to recognize Allah's knowledge of the future. He is able to make available the facts of one's future actions and fortune. This includes the details of one's initiatives during life such the extension of one's age and the increase of bounties upon request (*du'ā*) to change his changeable or conditional (*mu'allaq*) or even the fixed (*mubram*) predetermination. In both interpretations, the overriding principle remains that it is Allah Who is most capable of doing or changing things according to His wisdom, knowledge and will.

134

Muslims are bound to accept literally the facts about this creation when they are conveyed through *Āyāt Muḥkamāt*. However, their interpretations of *Āyāt Mutashābihāt* are permissible as long as this is done within the spirit of recognising Allah as the actual Creator. After all, it is He Who knows best the details about His creatures and, it is man who lacks such a detailed knowledge.

In short, the creation of men is meant to form a society whose members are conscious of their duty towards the Creator. The messengers were sent to show the right path and to correct any divergence from this objective. Man is thus bi-functional: as an *'ābid*<sup>135</sup> and a vicegerent. *'Alī Shari'atī* says that the ideal society is called the *ummah*, a word imbued with progressive spirit and implying a dynamic, committed and ideological social vision.<sup>136</sup> It refers to "a society in which a number of individuals, possessing a common faith and goal, come together in harmony with the intention of advancing and moving toward their common goal."<sup>137</sup>

### iii. Islamic Perspective of Life and the World.

The question of life and the world has long been central especially in the fields of religion and philosophy. While the former is affirmative of the spiritual-based answer to such a question, the latter on the other hand tries to explain it based on various intellectual premises like rational assumptions, observations, experiences and experiments. Islam offers its own perspective in understanding these concepts. The first and foremost is by providing explanation to some fundamental issues related to the said concepts.

---

For instance, when people requested the Prophet to speak of the reality of the spirit (*Rūḥ*), they were reminded of their limitations in understanding its actual state as expressed by a verse of *al-Qur'ān* which literally means, "You are not given the knowledge (about the soul or spirit) except very little" (*al-Qur'ān* 17:85). For the details of the Islamic philosophy of science, see for instance, Osman Bakar, *Tawḥīd and Science: Essays on the History and Philosophy of Islamic Science*, (Kuala Lumpur and Penang: Secretariat for Islamic Philosophy and Science, 1991), and Mehdi Golshani, "Philosophy of Science from the Qur'ānic Perspective", in *Towards Islamization of Disciplines*, (Herndon, Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1989).

135

Fazlur Rahman, "The Qur'anic Concepts of God...", op.cit., p. 10.

136

*'Alī Shari'atī*, *On The Sociology of Islam*, op. cit. p. 119.

137

Ibid.

Firstly, Islam regards the uncertainty about what constitutes the starting point for a discussion of the origin, status and meanings of these concepts as the most crucial point to be addressed.<sup>138</sup> With man failing to find a satisfactory solution to this basic question through baseless intellectual means, Allāh provides him with a definite answer by establishing that it is Allah Who endows life and creates the world (*al-Qur'ān* 41:31).<sup>139</sup> With such an *‘aqīdah* (a conviction), the main problem for a Muslim is not any more of asking who is the giver or the creator, but of finding ways of how the given life and world can be run according to the prescribed rules of the Giver. As the relationship between life and world is so close that we cannot fully understand the former without discussing the latter, both concepts are hereby treated simultaneously.

*Al-Qur'ān* employs two main terms in reference to the world: *al-arḍ* which refers basically to the physical world or the earth, and *al-dunyā* which can be referred to generally as the social and cultural life on earth. There are a number of Islamic accounts explaining the creation of the earth.

In *al-Qur'ān*, *al-arḍ* is often mentioned together with the term *al-samāwāt* (sing. *samā'*, lit. sky) to signify the reality

138

---

Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi identifies some essential questions which are common to religion, philosophy and civilization. They are: What is the beginning and end of this universe?; Is there a life after death, and if there is, what sort of a life is it?; Is any particular code of conduct necessary for success in the Hereafter?; What is this universe in its totality?; Who is sustaining and managing it in an orderly fashion under a transcendental and universal law?; What are His attributes and what relationship does man bear towards Him?; What should be the attitude of man towards Him?; Is there any measuring yard of an ethical code prevailing in the universe, besides the physical laws, and if there is, what is it?; What is the place of man in this cosmic order?; Is he the master of himself or accountable to someone? What is or should be the object of his life in this world? (Abul Hasan, *Religion and Civilization*, tr. Muhiuddin Ahmad, (Lucknow: Islamic Research and Publications, 1980), p. 11. See also Maurice Bucaille, *op.cit.*, pp 214-219.

139

Thus, the religious overriding principle remain the same for Muslims despite the differences in the detailed discussion of the subject matter. For instance, the detailed explanation of the origin of the world by al-Ghazzali is different from that of Ibn Rushd, but both do not deny Allah as the Eternal Creator. See George F. Hourani, "The Dialogue Between al-Ghazzali and the Philosophers on the Origin of the World", *The Muslim World*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2, Part I (pp. 183-191), April 1959, and No. 4, Part II, October 1958, pp. 308-314.

of al-kawn (the entire cosmos or universe).<sup>140</sup> The contents of the universe are frequently highlighted so that man can ponder or contemplate them in order to increase his taqwā (al-Qur'ān 88:17-26). What constitutes its contents is beyond ordinary imagination other than what is mentioned in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, or which might be discovered from time to time by scientists.<sup>141</sup> However, religious commitment, consciousness and taqwā should become the overriding principles in any scientific experiment, understanding, interpretation and finding.<sup>142</sup> Thus, the primary

140

Uthmān Jumu'ah Jamriyyah, *al-Taṣawwur al-Islāmī Li al-Kawn wa al-Insān*, (Kuwait: Dār al-Arqam, n.d.), p. 19.

141

The teachings of the Qur'an pertaining to these issues provide the main principles and guidelines for man in understanding and interpreting the cosmological phenomena. It is in this spirit that man has to acquire and develop knowledge in order to understand these phenomena more deeply. And here science plays an important role. However, reliance upon scientific knowledge, though helpful, must not be considered absolute for two main reasons:

First, the scientific findings are generally assumptions even if they are claimed to be empirical. They are often theoretical. Due to human intellectual limitation, the findings may or may not be accurate. As such they are not absolutely able to tell the actual fact about certain things. Taking their results as definite without this precautionary measure can lead to the rejection of faith when new evidence is discovered. True scientific discoveries must be consistent with Islam because cosmological phenomena, Islam teaches, represent the actual reality of God's scientific creation referred to as His Sunnah. Revelation is another type of God's Sunnah which provides a literary explanation of the former Sunnah.

Second, there are interpretations of Quranic verses (especially of *āyāt mutashābihāt*), which, though done in the light of religious principles, may not be able to explain satisfactorily the actual meaning of the verses. However, those who sincerely devote their intellectual endeavour to the cause of Allah will gain reward from Him even if their interpretations or findings are inaccurate.

In short, it can be summarized that, in Islam, we can identify four main possibilities with regard to the religio-scientific interpretation: 1. Science on the one hand may produce a result exactly as intended by divine laws, and 'ulamā', on the other (and due probably to their lack of scientific knowledge and appreciation), may reach a less accurate interpretation pertaining to the issue; 2. The 'ulamā's interpretation of certain things may be in line with the divine laws whereas scientific discovery may happen to be inaccurate; 3. Scientists' findings and the 'ulamā's interpretations conform to the actual meaning of the verses and; 4. both are wrong or inaccurate in their findings and interpretations.

It is the underlying principle of putting Allah above everything that provides a necessary principle and motivation for man to further develop his knowledge both in science and religion.

142

The question of religion and science is very similar to that of revelation and reason. On the latter see for instance Arthur J. Arberry, *Revelation and Reason in Islam*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957) and its review by William Thomson in *The Muslim World*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2, April 1956, pp. 148-150. For the various types of attitude with regard to Religion and Science, see for instance, Laurence E. Browne, "The Conception of the Unity of God in Islam and Other



principle to apply here is to recognise that all the contents of the *arḍ* and the *samāwāt* are created <sup>by</sup> and belonged to by Allāh.<sup>143</sup>

Like the world, life also partakes of two meanings: physical and metaphysical. The first refers to the biological or physical aspect of living which enables a creature to survive biologically. In this sense, the life of a man and of an animal is no different as both have to do the same things to survive like taking food and drink to meet their nutritional requirement. God also has subjugated (*sakḥkhara*) to man whatever there is in the heavens and the earth.<sup>144</sup> There are several Quranic verses pertaining to this aspect of life which need not to be detailed here.

It is the second meaning of life which is more relevant to our discussion, the one which has dominated many philosophical discussions for centuries, and has invited many wise men to devote their lives to seeking an answer to questions like: What does this biological existence mean for a man? In this moral sense, *al-ḥayāt* and *al-dunyā* are two terms frequently used by the *Qur'ān* to mean the same thing. In almost all places in the *Qur'ān*, both terms are mentioned together as *al-ḥayāt al-dunyā* when it touches on this subject. This implicitly describes the nature of the worldly life as opposed to *al-ḥayāt al-ākhirah* or the other reality of life (*al-Qur'ān* 40:39). It is in this moral-spiritual sense that one's life is valued and accounted for as will be further clarified here.<sup>145</sup>

---

Religions in the Light of Modern Science", *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXV, Part I, Jubilee Number (January, April, July and October), 1951.

143

Uthmān Jumu'ah, op.cit., p.20.

144

Fazlur Rahman, "The Qur'anic Concepts of God...", op.cit., p. 10. See also *al-Qur'ān* (XLV: 12-13).

145

Though one man is biologically similar to another, they may be different in terms of this moral-spiritual quality. The principle that "the good deed is granted the good reward and vice-versa" is a typical divine policy of justice.



Besides recognition of Allāh as the Giver of life, Islam holds that human sufferings in this world are due to failure to observe the principle of *ʿadl* (justice) as determined by God. For instance, when justice is defined only in terms of economic, social, political or military criteria, people are forced in turn to accept judgments based on such superficial considerations. Consequently, good people often lose their right to a fair trial and judgment, while the mischievous and the immoral are often free to enjoy false justice.

Although *al-ḥayāt al-dunyā* is ontologically separated from *al-ḥayāt al-ākhirah*, it is teleologically inseparable. ʿUthmān Jumuʿah Ḍamriyyah says that the deeds for the worldly life and other-worldly life are one and the same.<sup>146</sup> The principle of man's accountability for his deeds clearly defines the impact of his present actions on his later life.<sup>147</sup> As such worldly life in Islam can be considered as a cultivating ground (*mazraʿah*) on which one cultivates his plants here so that he can harvest the results later, whether in this world or in *al-ḥayāt al-ākhirah*. At any rate, *al-ḥayāt al-ākhirah* is always more meaningful than *al-ḥayāt al-dunyā* because it is permanent (*al-Qurʾān* 40:39; 87:16-17). Since this world is the cultivating ground for the hereafter, Islam does not accept the notion that there are acts only for religion and acts only for the world as reflected in the secularistic notion of the church-and-state relationship. In Islam, all deeds are valued according to religious judgment.<sup>148</sup>

---

No one is less significant when he performs good deeds or less blameful for committing evil actions.

146

ʿUthmān Ḍamiriyah, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

147

The concept of conscious accountability itself explains the rationale for reward and punishment for the obedient and the rebellious respectively.

148

The value of devotion varies depending upon one's quality of worship which takes into account his standard of intention or *niyyat* and degree of conformance to the divine laws and to His code of practice.

This implies that the political involvement, economic activities, educational programmes, social works and other actions or deeds of a man are all religious when conforming to the various religious conditions.<sup>149</sup> This reflects the widest sense of *'ubūdiyyah* (servitude) in the Islamic concept of worship.<sup>150</sup>

Since the ultimate aim of life is to gain *marqāt Allāh* (Divine pleasure or consents) in this world and in the hereafter, man's *ḥabl min Allāh* (relationship with God) and *ḥabl min al-nās* (relationship with fellow men) (al-Qur'ān 3:116) are both significant for the attainment of *al-falāḥ* (the real success in both worlds).

Worldly life is also described as *matā' al-ghurūr* (al-Qur'ān 3:18), *la'ib wa lahw* (al-Qur'ān 6:32; 29:64), *zīnah* (al-Qur'ān 18:46), and the like. All these terms are used to denote life as materially, culturally and psychologically entertaining. Because of this, life is expressed as a *fitnah* or temptation that poses various challenges to man in his task of realising God's teachings. The elements of *fitnah* include children, property, status and women (al-Qur'ān 8:28; 64:15).

Although life is in a sense a *fitnah* for man, it is at the same time an *amānah* (al-Qur'ān 4:58) which must be taken up with

---

149

Among the main pre-requisites for a deed to have religious value are good intention (*niyyah*) and compatibility with Islamic rules.

150

Muhammad Kamal Hassan has cited the detailed definition of *'ibādah* given by a devout Muslim Indonesian General A.H. Nasution which contains the following elements: a. *'ibādah* is any act done according to norms laid down by Allāh, whether it be in the form of word or deed, overt or covert, individually or collectively, in order to attain the pleasure of Allāh and happiness in this world and in the hereafter; b. *'ibādah* is not just canonical prayer, fasting, paying the poor due, and pilgrimage. It is broader than that; it involves the life of the individual, the family and society; c. *'ibādah* must be done in conformity with Islamic law and; *'ibādah* is for the attainment of peace, prosperity and happiness for oneself in this world and the hereafter, and for the attainment of peace, prosperity and happiness for the family and society. Cited in Muhammad Kamal's *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982), p. 49.

full responsibility.<sup>151</sup> Man is taught to be faithful (*āmana*), meaning that he has to be patient, pious, hopeful, optimistic and sincere in facing this *ibtilā'* or test (combination of *fitnah* and *amānah*).<sup>152</sup> It is through this test that man is valued and different statuses are conferred on him, based on his degree of devotion and observance of the above attributes. The existence of different types of paradise (*jannah*) reflects the various degrees of the quality of its inhabitants. The same is true about Hell (*nār*).

Having discussed the above fundamental concepts, one can conclude that an Islamic worldview is generally characterized by the following main criteria: It is *rabbānī* (Divinely rooted and inspired) in contrast to other conventional man-initiated worldviews; *insānī* (humanistic) that it is addressed to and suitable for man; *‘ālamī* (universal) which transcends various racial and geographical barriers; *abadī* (permanent) that it surpasses all time limits; *ījābī* (positive); *shāmil* (comprehensive) that it covers the entire spectrum of life; *wāqī‘ī* (realistic); and *thābit* (firmly established and rooted).<sup>153</sup>

In the light of this worldview, the writer proposes to view Islam throughout this work as an entity which possesses a directional role in cultural change instead of being a part of culture as normally treated in many cultural and sociological

---

151

Syed Muhammad Naquib defines *amānah* as the trust and responsibility of ruling according to God's will and purpose and His pleasure. He says, "The trust implies responsibility to rule with justice, and the 'rule' means not simply ruling in the socio-political sense, nor in the controlling of nature in the scientific sense, but more fundamentally in its encompassing of the meaning of nature (*al-‘abī‘ah*), it means the ruling, governing, controlling and maintaining of man by his self or his rational soul." See Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul: A Brief Outline and a Framework for an Islamic Psychology and Epistemology*, (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, International Islamic University Malaysia, 1990), p. 4.

152

*al-Qur'ān* 67:2. Also ‘Uthmān Jumu‘ah, op.cit., p.61.

153

*Ibid.*

studies. If religion is to be considered as a social factor in the development of society,<sup>154</sup> we propose that this factor, when applied to Islam, is to be understood in the light of the above spirit,<sup>155</sup> that is to take it and not culture as the determinant and the dynamic of social change.<sup>156</sup> On this basis, we now turn to a general review of the concept and philosophy of development and change as seen from an Islamic perspective before taking up the various views of local Muslim scholars in the final section of this chapter.

#### 2.2.2. Islamic Concept of Development and Change.

In Islamic intellectual tradition, perhaps Ibn Khaldun is most representative of all Muslim sociologists in the modern sense of the word despite the fact that he lived in the fourteenth century. His discussion of various aspects of society like culture, society, history, change, power, sedentary and Bedouin, *‘aṣabiyyah* and *‘umrān* is very close to what was later found to be discussed in modern sociology. The theory of development and change is also expressed in various ways especially through his *magnum opus*, the *Muqaddimah*. As we are more concerned with the

---

154

R.M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society: An Introductory Analysis*, (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 580.

155

The writer agrees that the social factor, or in this context the religious factor, has a significant impact upon social change as expressed by R.M. Maciver and Charles H. Page in the following words, "Everyone acknowledges that there is an intimate connection between our beliefs and our institutions, our valuations and our social relationships. Certainly all cultural change involves social change, for, as we have seen, the social and cultural are closely interwoven."

156

On the historical role of Islam in social reform see for instance, "Islam and the Modern World" by S. Khuda Bukhsh in *The Moslem World*, Vol. XIX, 1929, pp. 62-69.

views of contemporary Muslims, reference to his ideas will only be made if the need arises.<sup>157</sup>

Earlier, we mentioned that social change involves alterations to various aspects of society which comprise the main elements of what sociologists call a social order. Hence, we begin our elaboration of the Islamic theory of development and change by discussing this concept.<sup>158</sup>

Social order refers to the alterable and non-alterable elements in society which are present to ensure social stability. The changeable aspects are also the factors of change, meaning that when some of them are altered changes take place. Although scholars have different opinions on what constitutes a social order, they generally accept coercion, interests, value-consensus and inertia (continuity and persistence) as being among its major constituents.<sup>159</sup>

To understand the relationship between social order and change from an Islamic perspective, let us first look at some striking points on this subject as derived from the writings of A.J. Halepota and Gaafar Sheikh Idris.<sup>160</sup>

157

---

For a comprehensive understanding of his thought, see Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, tr. Franz Rosenthal, 3 Vols., (New York: Bollingen Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), George S. Firzly, *Ibn Khaldun: A Socio-economic Study*, Ph.D Dissertation, University of Utah, March 1973 etc.

158

See also Khalid bin Sayeed, "Islamic Resurgence and Societal Change", *The Islamic Culture*, Vol. LX, No. 1, January 1986, pp. 45-60, and Hasan Askari, "Religion and Development: Search for Conceptual Clarity and New Methodology - the Special Case of Islam", *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 1986, pp. 69-81.

159

*Understanding Society*, (The Open University Press, 1970), p. 559.

160

This is an example of how the principle of *Ijtihād* in the field of *Tafsīr* is utilized in explaining such concepts as development and social change. See also Sidi Gazalba, *Islam dan Perubahan Sosiobudaya: Kajian Tentang Perubahan Masyarakat*, (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pustaka Antara, 1983) and Muhammad al-Buraey, *Pembangunan Pentadbiran Menurut Perspektif Islam*, tr. Abdullah Md. Noot, et.al., (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka dan Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia, 1992).

Halepota describes Islamic social order as a,

"...complex and multi-dimensional system of social life, envisaged for the whole of the human brotherhood that inhabits almost every part of the earth so far as the space dimension is concerned and had lived and will live during uncountable decades and epochs of history, so far as the time dimension is taken in view. Such a natural system of social order is reflected in the fundamental principles which are based on the natural laws that govern the universe at large and the society as a part of the universal scheme".<sup>161</sup>

He points out that the underlying principles to maintain social order can be found, among others, in *sūrah al-naḥl* which can be summarised as follows: 1) Members of a society must be conscious of their origin and position as creatures of God;<sup>162</sup> 2) They must also be aware of their relationship with God and with His bounties like food, comfort, sun and night;<sup>163</sup> 3) They must utilize the given resources to improve their life while maintaining their commitment to the ultimacy of God's power over their strength; 4) The overall outlook of a society should reflect peoples' serious struggle for the improvement of material and moral-spiritual prosperity in expectation of a better life in the hereafter;<sup>164</sup> 5) People must adhere strictly to the Prophet Muhammad's teaching in worshipping the Real God;<sup>165</sup> 6) People must be serious in seeking knowledge so that they realise the actual causes of the rise and fall of a nation, thus avoiding them in

---

161

A.J.Halepota, "Islamic Social Order", *Islamic Studies*, Vol. XIV, (1975), pp. 115-122.

162

*Al-Qur'ān* 16:4.

163

*Ibid*, 16:8-16.

164

*Ibid*, 16:29-34.

165

*Ibid*, 16:35-36.



the process of building up a better society;<sup>166</sup> 7) People must consult those who possess knowledge in order to acquire, preserve and maintain the good values;<sup>167</sup> 8) They should struggle continuously against tyranny and to adopt the spirit of *hijrah*;<sup>168</sup> 9) They must be patient and perseverant;<sup>169</sup> 10) They must have trust and faith in God and;<sup>170</sup> 11) They must be pious and intellectually alert or aware.<sup>171</sup>

Based on these principles, the core of all factors or causes of the rise and progress of a society can be seen as not fundamentally material but moral-spiritual in nature, having its root in one's or society's religious commitment and belief in God. Hence, all other factors, though important, are secondary.<sup>172</sup> Islam holds that human efforts to change society must be guided by religion if the real success or *al-falāḥ* is to be expected. Peace, harmony, happiness and progress can only be meaningfully achieved when this and other divine principles are upheld. Otherwise, people will have to face destruction, difficulty,

---

166

Ibid, 16:36.

167

Ibid, 16:43-44.

168

Ibid, 16:41.

169

Ibid, 16:421.

170

Ibid, 16:42.

171

Ibid, 16:44.

172

For a discussion of the causes of advancement and decline in Islam, see also Amir Shakib Arsalan, *Our Decline and Its Causes*, ed. M.A. Shakoor, (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976), pp. 3-10.

degeneration and decadence as the result of their negligence and disobedience.<sup>173</sup>

It follows logically from this that Islam does not stratify people according to caste, economic standard, political position, social status or other superficial factors. If the word "stratification" is to be used to show the different categories of people in society, then the overriding criterion used in Islam to value people's status is their degree of *taqwā*.<sup>174</sup> In Islam, a civilized or a developed society is the one which is able to reflect its members' realization of this attribute.

In addition, people's status is also identified with their level of commitment to knowledge (*ʿilm*). Islam urges its converts to seek knowledge by making it compulsory upon every male and female.<sup>175</sup> For God, the *ʿālimūn* (people with knowledge) are not comparable to the *jāhilūn* or the ignorant (*al-Qur'ān* 39:9). The deeds of the former are far more valuable than those of the latter as knowledge is a prerequisite for Allah's acceptance of one's deed. This recognition signifies the significant impact

---

173

This cause-and-effect law or principle of causation (social causation) in Islam applies to both individual and society. People are informed of such stories as the People of Lūṭ (*al-Qur'ān* 26:161-175), Aḥḥāb al-Rijr (15:80-84), Pharaoh etc., to prove the truth of this law. Loss of *barakah*, narrow-mindedness and a feeling of despair are some other invisible implications faced by those who act against these principles. All other principles like loyalty to a military commander during war, cooperation for good purposes, the struggle for knowledge and others which are meant to serve specific purposes of life must be consistent with this core principle. The case of the failure at Uhud best illustrates the consequence of adverse conviction culminating in the element of disobedience and divergence of interest. At individual level, *al-Qur'an* also presents numerous qualities for development of a good personality in order to achieve *al-Falāḥ*, the composite success in this world and hereafter, as clearly indicated by Surah *al-Mu'minun* verses 1-11.

174

"There are no distinctions between the Arabs and non-Arab except by virtue of their closeness to Allah (*taqwā*)". (Prophetic Tradition), "Indeed, Allah does not look at your physical appearance (*ṣuwar*) or property (*amwāl*) but He does consider (the quality of) your heart (*qulūb*) and your deeds (*a'māl*)" (Prophetic Tradition).

175

Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) says in one of his traditions, "seeking knowledge is compulsory upon every Muslim - male and female alike."

that knowledge and educated persons have upon the quality of one's personality or of society in general.

There are some other criteria which differentiate one person's status or class from another. These are reflected in a number of Quranic terms like *ṣāliḥūn* (the doers of good deeds), *ʿāqilūn* (those who correctly utilise their mental capacity), *ṣādiqūn* (the honest people), *muttaqūn* (the pious), *ʿādilūn* (the practitioners of justice), *ʿābidūn* (the worshippers), *muḥsinūn* (the excellent devotees), *mu'minūn* (the faithful), and *muslimūn* (those who submit fully to Allah). These terms generally refer to a category of obedient servants in contrast to another category of the disobedient represented by such terms as *ẓālimūn* (the unjust), *jāhilūn* (the ignorant), *kāfirūn* (the infidels), and *mushrikūn* (the polytheists).

To provide a further clarification of Halepota's points, we shall now analyze them in the light of Gaafar Sheikh Idris's perception of social change as contained in the latter's *The Process of Islamization*,<sup>176</sup> which explains how the above principles can be adopted to understand the philosophy of development and what are their implications upon society.

Gaafar begins by saying that the aim of Islamic movements is to establish somewhere in this world a new society which is committed whole-heartedly to the cause of Islam. He calls the move towards achieving such an objective the "Islamization process." Since Islam is both method and aim, this process must be based on the principles laid down in the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah*.<sup>177</sup>

In his approach, Gaafar proposes that the method and process of social change should be seen to work within the

---

176

Gaafar Sheikh Idris, *The Process of Islamization*, (The Muslim Students' Association of the United States and Canada, January 1983).

177

*Ibid.*, p.1.

principles of "social causation" and "historical explanation" which reveals a clear explanation of the causes and factors of the rise and fall of a nation and a civilization.<sup>178</sup>

He contrasts the Islamic philosophical idea of history to that of the secularistic or materialist approach. According to him, materialist theory suggests that society develops through a single and definite path that leads progressively and inevitably from one stage to a more developed one. Earlier, we have indicated this belief when discussing a conventional development theory like the modernization paradigm. Human power does not seem to be necessary in directing this so-called natural process. In general, man is expected to adapt to this natural change. Any attempt to go against this "historical wave" is considered as reactionary.<sup>179</sup>

Gaafar also argues that historical development of society is not merely material, and therefore should not be seen as a continuous conflict between the poor and the rich, the upper and the lower classes. In our earlier discussion, we suggested that such an idea is particularly close to the Marxist or communist conflict approach. As suggested earlier, Gaafar is rather of the opinion that history is basically a struggle between truth and falsehood, the grateful and the ungrateful and so on.<sup>180</sup>

On the need for determining the direction of societal change, he discusses them in the light of Chapter 13 verse 11 of the *Qur'ān* which literally means, "God does not change a people's

---

178

Ibid.

179

Ibid, p.2. See also a more classical theory of development and change against conventional approach in Mahmud Dhaouadi, "An Exploration into Ibn Khaldun and Western Classical Sociologists' Thought on the Dynamics of Change", *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. XXX, No. 3, pp. 139-158, and No. 4, pp. 248-266, 1986.

180

Ibid.

lot unless they change what is in their hearts."<sup>181</sup> From the verse he identified the following four main elements: 1) It is God who has the absolute power; 2) Man's freedom of action is limited; 3) A change which man brings about is from inside himself and; 4) A change in man's condition is a result of that human change.<sup>182</sup>

The verse and its identified elements are said to have significant implications when viewed against the conventional approach as explained below:

i. The first element denies the materialists' and the naturalists' rejection of the power and existence of God and their conviction of the self-sufficiency of this world. It is also distinguished from the atheistic viewpoint as it emphasises God as the Sole Power in action, Who is not only capable of creating man but also of sustaining him.<sup>183</sup>

ii. The second point denies the determinists' theories which assume that freedom of choice is imposed by divine power or by natural or social causes. In actual fact, God gives freedom for man to act in accordance or against Him after telling him the principles of good and evil deeds and the consequences of committing them.<sup>184</sup>

iii. The third reflects the change man brings about inside himself. On this point, there are two different opinions offered by Muslim scholars: a) That the change is from good to bad. This

---

181

Translation by N.J. Dawood in his *The Koran*, 5th. ed., (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1990)

182

This is another example of how Muslim scholars utilize the discipline of *Tafsir* in interpreting a subject.

183

Gaafar, op.cit., p.3.

184

Ibid.

means that God punishes man if he changes the good nature of his existence. b) That the change is from bad to good.<sup>185</sup>

iv. The final principle implies that Allah's punishment is reflected in His withdrawal of some spiritual and material bounties which He bestowed upon man, and the hardships which befall.<sup>186</sup>

On the third implication, Gaafar himself is of the opinion that the change in man takes place from good to evil or bad.<sup>187</sup> He substantiates his claim by offering the arguments which can be summarised as follows: 1) Man is born in *fiṭrah* (natural innocence). He is therefore originally sinless; 2) Allah's bounties are given to all because of His attribute of *raḥmah*. He does not wait until people do good in order to reward them. His bounties exist in various forms; spiritual and material, visible and invisible. If people are thankful, the bounties will be maintained and increased. Otherwise, they will be withdrawn. And if people realize their mistake and turn back, the bounties are restored as in the case of the Prophet Ādam.<sup>188</sup> He also cites the historical evidence of the ungrateful society to support his theory of change by referring to the downfall of people of Saba', who were drowned in the great flood of al-ʿArim (al-Qur'ān 34:17).<sup>189</sup>

To conclude, he says that, "decline or destruction/chastisement is therefore the ultimate and inevitable

---

185

Ibid, p.3.

186

Ibid.

187

Ibid, p.4.

188

Ibid, p.5.

189

Ibid.



destiny of any ungrateful nation, the nation which rebels against God and follows the path of immorality."<sup>190</sup> It is in the light of the above Islamic philosophical framework of development and change that we now turn to survey some local Muslim perceptions of these concepts.

### 3. Local Muslim Perceptions of Development and Change.

Earlier, we said that in the course of this comparative study, the emphasis on the Islamic approach and local Muslim views is given preference. Understanding local Muslim perspectives of development is particularly important in order to see how development is perceived from within Malaysia, and what contemporary Malaysian Muslims think is the best approach to implement it in their multi-religious society. Other than Mahathir's own view which will be elaborated separately in Chapter Three, opinions of others from different political, academic and Islamic religious spheres are consulted. These views are especially relevant in our analysis of the Government's Islamization policy as they provide a means of assessing the reactions of the public to Mahathir's religious approach.

---

190

However, Gaafar says that this ultimate destruction is brought about in accordance with divine principles which serve as conditions for that to happen. Among the principles are:

1. A nation does not fall until it is sufficiently warned. Who are then responsible to warn them? Both the Creator (Allah) and His vicegerent on earth (men) are two main sources of warning. Among men this warning is first brought by God's messengers and then extended by knowledgeable and conscious adherents - individual and collective. History reveals that the appointment of a series of Prophets throughout human history is basically in the light of this noble obligation. This is mentioned, among other things, in chapters 27:59 and 26:208-209 of the *Qur'ān*. Man's main task is therefore to cause the mischievous and immoral persons or nation to know in some way or other that they are guilty and should expect to be punished (*al-Qur'ān* 7:4-5).

2. Destruction is not (necessarily) immediate i.e. not every nation is destroyed immediately after it shows signs of ungratefulness. This is another *raḥmah* of Allah to allow people to repent (*al-Qur'ān* 22:48; 18:58-59).

3. The fall of every nation has a definite time which can neither be deferred nor hastened (*al-Qur'ān* 15:4-5).

4. Before a nation is destroyed, it might be put to severe hardships that might cause it to repent and return to the right path (*al-Qur'ān* 30:41). This type of warning comes directly from Allah.

5. Allah's punishment is not meted out for all sins in this world otherwise all people would have been destroyed (*al-Qur'ān* 16:61).

Professor Dr. Muhammad Kamal Hassan, a prominent local Muslim scholar, defines development as "the injunction and practice of Allah's command in economic, social, political and cultural development both at individual and collective levels". Observing today's various development problems, he concludes that they have their roots in people's disregard of Divine teachings or their failure to observe the principles and spirit of development as enshrined in the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah*.<sup>191</sup> He then discusses the concept of "integrated development" by referring to the views of Khurshid Ahmad and Dr. Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī.<sup>192</sup>

Muhammad Kamal says that according to Khurshid, Islam considers economic progress as part of a holistic approach to development.<sup>193</sup> The primary objective of development is to live up to the ethical and moral standard in every aspect of life including economics. Therefore, the focus of development must be on man, the actor and practitioner of development. This view is shared by Ahmad Mohamad Said who says that development should refer to "development around individuals and groups rather than

---

191

Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Pendidikan dan Pembangunan: Satu Perspektif Bersepadu*, Zambyr Abd. Kadir, ed., (Kuala Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise, 1988), p.247. He cites the dilemma in the present development policy which fails to fulfil the needs of the majority of the world's population, referring to the failure of what is called the *Second Decade of Development* (1971-1980) to produce a balanced development of social life. In view of this failure, the economists are now thinking of how the GNP and world income can be distributed fairly at least to meet the basic needs to the 800 million population who are suffering from poverty in the Third World. According to him, the predicament is also seen in the Malaysian developmental concept, strategy and implementation. Though the rate of economic achievement may have been higher as shown by the normal indicator of Gross National Products, the rate of poverty was simultaneously rising. This was due to the misguided development strategy which allowed the higher income group to monopolize two thirds of the GNP.

192

*Ibid*, p. 248. Muhammad Kamal has referred specifically to the writing of Khurshid Ahmad entitled "Economic Development in an Islamic Framework" in *Studies in Islamic Economics* edited by the latter.

193

\*Alī SharḤatī also emphasises that the infrastructure of the *ummah* is the economy because "Whoever has no wordly life has no spiritual life." \*Alī SharḤatī, *On the Sociology...*, op.cit. p. 119.

people around development."<sup>194</sup> Ahmad says that the Islamic approach to human development is, however, different from the conventional one as the latter adopts an anthropocentric concept of man which is based on what Garaudy calls the "Western notion of man as *homo economicus*", the diametrical opposite of the notion of man as discussed earlier.<sup>195</sup>

To achieve this objective, development must be based on the following philosophical principles:<sup>196</sup> (a) *Tawḥīd*. This doctrine is concerned with the presence of divine teachings in man's relationship with God as well as with his other fellow men and his surroundings; (b) *Rubūbiyyah*. Belief in the Divine Lordship acknowledges God's might, supremacy and powerfulness over man's effort. Recognition of the ultimate power of God leads someone to work according to His guidelines, and not to be pessimistic;<sup>197</sup> (c) *Khilāfah*. This recognises man as the trustee of God. Therefore, he should strive for the betterment of life and not to cause destruction because he is accountable towards what he does; (d) *Tazkiyah*. This doctrine of purification simply refers

---

194

Ahmad Mohamad Said, "Wawasan 2020: Model Pembangunan Negara dan Implikasi Pendidikan", a paper presented at Konvensyen Pendidikan Komuniti: Pengisahan Wawasan 2020", organized by Aminuddin Baki Institute and Ministry of Education Malaysia at Genting Highlands, Pahang on 26-31 December, 1991, p. 17. See also Dr. Hasan Hj. Mohd. Ali, "Konsep Individu Bersepadu di Dalam Kehidupan Profesional Muslim", a paper presented at Seminar on *Tuntutan Profesionalisme Kini: Pendekatan Islam*, organized by Badan Perunding Islam and Ministry of Education Malaysia on 1-2 December 1986 at Genting Highlands.

195

<sup>195</sup> Ibid Ahmad Mohd. Said. Cf. also Roger Garaudy, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

196

These principles are also cited by other local Muslim scholars like Prof. Syed Othman AlHabshi and Aidit Ghazali in order to explain the core of Islamic development. For further information see Uthman's article in *Konsep dan Perlaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam* (The Concept and Implementation of Islamic Development) edited by Muhammad Syukri Salleh (Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1990) pp. 108-126 and Aidit's *Development: An Islamic Perspective*.

197

Natural and human resources must therefore be developed in conformity with His commands as inspired through al-Qur'an and Sunnah and with legitimate objectives.

to the process of eradicating impurities at all levels in society in order to get *al-falāḥ*.<sup>198</sup>

Meanwhile, Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī basically shares similar views with Khurshid on the above approach to development, adding the following features of an Islamic development: (a) In order to avoid laziness among people, donation must be least encouraged. Each citizen should be encouraged to develop their skills and energy so that they can work to get the most out of their effort. Reasonable incentives should be given to encourage them to work hard and not to hope for contributions from others; (b) Collection of *zakāh* (alms-giving) should be run professionally in order to gain the most out of the system and to spread its benefits to those who have a right to receive it; (c) Any property gained through illegal means such as robbery, cheating and corruption must be held back by the nation after serious investigations and be allocated to public funds for social welfare; (d) In order to maintain high moral standards, people should be encouraged to be prudent, and extravagance should be eliminated especially through legal enforcement; (e) The gap between individuals should be reduced by limiting the power and influence of the privileged and by fighting against suppression of the people. This includes the reduction of the gap between urban and rural people; (f) The practice of usury (*ribā*) should be eliminated from all economic institutions and agencies by establishing Islamic Banks and adopting the same principles in other conventional banks; and (g) Scientific planning based on facts and statistics should be undertaken in order to increase the nation's sources of income and production.<sup>199</sup>

---

198

These principles are also cited by other local scholars like Prof. Dr. Syed Othman AlHabshi and Aidit Ghazali.

199

Muhammad Kamal, *Pendidikan dan Pembangunan*, op.cit., pp. 258-263.

Based on the above elaboration, Muhammad Kamal identifies the main principles and features of an integrated Islamic development as follows: (a) Man must be seen to possess spiritual, physical and mental aspects, and it must be held that his spiritual force dominates and guides his life; (b) The only and ultimate power lies in Allāh's hand. As such, there should not be any element of association with His power; (c) Man should offer total obedience to Allāh in his personal and social life;<sup>200</sup> (d) The concept of development should be global, embracing its moral, spiritual and material aspects. Further, it must be value-oriented, aiming at complete protection of the human being. The moral and material, economic and social, spiritual and physical aspects should all be seen to be integrated. Development should aim at achieving not only worldly benefit but also a more permanent place in the hereafter; (e) Since the focus of development is man, improvement in personal life should be given preference in the course of physical and socio-cultural advancement. This includes the development of his attitude, motivation, emotion, and aspirations; (f) Economic development must be multi-faceted in the sense that simultaneous efforts are made to ensure that economic and physical development is able to finance and promote other aspects of society with emphasis on maintaining its moral and ethical standards; (g) The striving for quantitative development should not be at the expense of quality; (h) Proper utilization of human and natural resources must be followed by fair distribution of its results so that people of all ranks can be more thankful (*shākirūn*) to God.

It from from this elaboration that some main objectives of an Islamic development can be identified as follows: (a) Personality Development. This should be given preference in all development strategies in order to provide correct attitude,

aspiration, character, education and training; (b) Fair Distribution of Development Output. Improvement in the national production is only meaningful when it can serve the needs of the majority of people in legitimate fields. Thus, allocations should not be made which will promote negative activities in society because this can create various social ills; (c) Priorities must be set to meet the most urgent demands, for instance, fulfilling the basic needs of the people like shelter, clothes and food. People must be able to get access to these needs at a cost. Allocation for the defence of the Muslim world should also be considered; (d) Improvement of Life Quality. Serious effort must be taken to improve people's standard of life with emphasis on achieving a higher standard of morality in the economic, political, social and educational fields. For this purpose, the following suggestions are proposed: i. The creation of job opportunities for people and adaptation to structural, technological and educational changes. ii. Establishment of a system to take care of and to help the unfortunate and those with disabilities. The *zakāh* system should be reformed so that it can be more functional in order to realise this idea. iii. A system or policy which is able to reduce the gap between the poor and the rich. This can be achieved by reforming the tax system. (e) The full practice of the concept of integrated development. This can be defined in the following terms: i. that development of all geographical areas is fairly treated. ii. that all sectors and aspects of life are given fair treatment. iii. that higher economic income must be striven for in order to provide enough financial support for other aspects. (f) People must be able to identify and adopt the latest technological know-how so that the nation can be on an equal basis with others in terms of physical and scientific advancement. This in turn will lead to more global security and a stronger society. (g) A nation must try to reduce dependency on foreign help and to be more integrated with Islamic



countries.<sup>201</sup> Figure A and Figure B in Appendix IV summarize the distinction between Islamic and conventional concepts of development as Professor Muhammad Kamal sees it.<sup>202</sup>

Taking into account all the elements that constitute an Islamic perspective of development and change held by some Muslim scholars, Malaysian and non-Malaysian alike, and the conventional elaboration of these concepts, it is appropriate to summarise the philosophical groundwork of an Islamic development against the conventional one. In our approach, this is done by consulting the views of a prominent local Muslim scholar, Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib Alattas, whose various philosophical discussions have been much consulted. In the present context, we are referring to his opinion given during an interview and published in an established local magazine, namely *Dewan Budaya*.<sup>203</sup>

Earlier, we have indicated that the principle of justice is crucial in an Islamic development. Islam defines justice or 'adl

201

---

Ibid, pp. 253-257. Having considered the above underlying principles, Muhammad Kamal proposes that a new approach be adopted in development planning. This includes the following points:

- a. To stop using all development models which use economic growth as the sole indicator of progress.
- b. To adopt a multi-objective approach and *problem-oriented* development.
- c. Muslim countries and people-based agencies should play a more active role in a *value-oriented* development which benefit the masses at large.
- d. In view of changing technologies and world situation, continuous research and planning be intensified in order to fulfil future ideological demands.

202

As taken from his *Moral and Ethical Issues in Human Resource Development: Old Problems and New Challenges*, op.cit.. pp. 26-27.

203

This refers to the opinion of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, a prominent local Muslim thinker and philosopher, who has carried out much research especially on Islamic philosophy and the Malay Archipelago. His *Islam and Secularism* has been one of the most thought-provoking on the nature of religion as seen from Islamic and secular perspectives. His most recent writings include *The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul: A Brief Outline* and *A Framework for An Islamic Psychology and Epistemology* (1990), *On Quiddity and Essence: An Outline of the Basic Structure of Reality in Islamic Metaphysics* (1990), *The Intuition of Existence: A Fundamental Basis of Islamic Metaphysics* (1990), and *The Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islam* (1993). However, his writing in *Dewan Budaya*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, January and February, 1992) is to be the basis of our discussion as it relates to all the relevant concepts concerned.

as "putting things in the right place"<sup>204</sup> as Syed Muhammad Naquib puts it. To put things in the right place is not only concerned with tangible objects like the position of fountains and walls in an Islamic architectural building, but it should also relate to the social life of society. In the context of personality development, the *‘adl* prevails when the *bāṭiniyyah* or spiritual aspect becomes the controlling force of man's actions. The external behaviour of man which includes his physical acts and surroundings must reflect the dominance of this internal drive.<sup>205</sup>

Within one's self, this *rūḥiyyah* factor, as the seat of *‘ilm* or knowledge, is known variously as the *al-laṭīfah* (the intuition), *al-qalb* (the heart), *al-nafs* (the soul or the self), *al-rūḥ* (the spirit), or *al-‘aql* (the intellect).<sup>206</sup> The struggle between the good and evil forces within man requires him to engage with *jihād* or *mujāhadah* in order to ensure the control of the former over the latter.<sup>207</sup> Given the nature of man's creation and the social reality outside him, *jihād* takes place against the evil both within himself and in society. In this context, the

204

*Waṣṭu al-shay' fī makānih.*

205

Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, *Dewan Budaya*, (Kuala Lumpur: DBP, January 1992), p.10.

206

Syed Muhammad Naquib, *The Nature of Man ...*, op.cit., p.3.. All these terms convey two meanings: the one referring to material or physical aspect of man, or to the body; and the other to the non-material, imaginal and intelligential or spiritual aspect, or to the soul of man. He argues that from the ethical point of view, the first meaning denotes that aspect from which originate the blameworthy qualities in man, and they are the animal powers which, in spite of their being beneficial to man in some respects, are in conflict with the intellectual powers. However, he says that the attachment of blameworthiness to the animal powers inherent in the physical aspect of man should not be confused with the idea of denigration of the human body, which is, indeed, against Islam. The reason is that human being is created in the best of moulds, but without true faith and good works he is worse than the lowly beast (*al-Qur'ān* 95:4-5). He explains that it is against these non beneficial aspects of the animal powers that the Holy Prophet urged us to strive when he alluded to the greater struggle (*jihād*) of man, for they are the enemy within.

207

‘Alī Shari‘ātī argues that man is a bi-dimensional being, a creature with a dual nature because man is basically a compound of mud and divine spirit, reflecting his composition of body and spirit. He is a compound of opposites, a dialectical being, a binary of miracle of God. See his *On the Sociology...*, op.cit., p. 91.

researcher is of the opinion that it is the *tazkiyat al-nafs* (purification of soul), as an important part of the whole process of *mujāhadah*, that helps man to eradicate or reduce the activeness of evil drives within himself, and that the same process of purification takes place in society in order to make the latter relatively clean from various social evils. This process may be called *al-tazkiyah al-ijtimā'iyah* (purification of society). This whole process of *tazkiyah* can be seen as the progressive dimension of an Islamic social change and development. Thus, in the social realm, the very substance of man as guided by his spiritual purity should become the driving force behind any move to improve the state of social achievement - economic, political, educational etc..

Nonetheless, the *mujāhadah* should not mean abandonment of worldly participation in expectation of a purified soul as some group of Muslims tend to believe or practise. This, according to Syed Muhammad Naquib, is not what Islam urges, as the Prophet himself never ran away from social realities in order to concentrate on strengthening his spiritual life.<sup>208</sup> As the inner and the outer life of a man are both realities, one is not *bāṭil* and the other real (*ḥaqīqah*); man is required to strive for a balance in the face of these realities. Between the two extremes of the rejectionist and adoptionist ideas in the face of the social realm, Islam takes the middle path (*auṣaṭ*) of harmonizing the visible realities with the invisible realities. Only then things can be put at the right places, so that *ʿadl* can be established. The question now is what is the right place for certain things? And how can they be put accordingly?

To this question, Syed Muhammad Naquib says that it is only through *ʿilm* that people know what is the right place for something, and the way it can be done. Here the role of *ʿilm* and

educated people ('ulamā') is crucial in any development planning and implementation. It can then be held with certainty that development must be guided by knowledgeable persons or experts<sup>209</sup> in all aspects and at all stages of the process so that the philosophical basis of development can be materialized and translated into reality in the right way.

The need for placing things at the right place is important in order to ensure that everything is in order, a prerequisite for achieving *ketenteraman* or peace, the very meaning of Islam itself. This results in the attainment of *sa'ādah* or happiness in one's life and society.

It is against this Islamic perception that Syed Muhammad Naquib is critical of conventional development philosophy which, according to him, is based on the concept of *tragedy*, the core principle of the Western worldview. By this he refers to the notion that man is always on the move, has to change continuously. The basis of progress is this liberal dynamism based on *shakk* or doubt.<sup>210</sup>

Contrasting the idea of dynamism in the conventional perspective with that of Islam, Syed Muhammad Naquib says that, while dynamism reflects a state of change or movement, a society does not have to change everything or change continuously. There are aspects in man and society which should not be subjected to change. In Islam, as Muhammad al-Buraey holds, there are such principles as "the changeable and unchangeable" aspects of development.<sup>211</sup> The first refers to the essential doctrines,

---

209

Variously known as scholars ('Ulamā'), intellectual (ūlu al-bāb), thinkers (Mufakkirūn), educated ('Ālimūn) of various fields.

210

Op.cit., p.12.

211

Muhammad al-Buraey, *Pembangunan Pentadbiran Menurut Perspektif Islam*, trans. Abdullah Md. Noor et. al., (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992), pp. xix-xx.

principles and articles of Islamic ideology which are not subject to any change over time,<sup>212</sup> and the second to the aspects other than the above.<sup>213</sup>

Syed Muhammad Naquib argues that dynamism in Islam rests on a permanent basis which allows progress to prevail on a firm foundation. In this context, belief in God or *tawḥīd* forms the core of this foundation. Besides, change must have an ultimate aim.<sup>214</sup> The goal must not only be fixed but also comprehensive and unchangeable.<sup>215</sup> The goal of development determines the direction of progress. Change is not for the sake of change. It must be able to result in attaining *al-falāḥ* and *saʿādah* in this world and in the hereafter, as for Islam both worlds are real. A change which is based on a static principle and fixed objective has clear direction and is more lasting. Moreover, change can only be possible when it begins from a static point. In other words, there is no change or movement without first involving the static. Thus, dynamism in Islam involves both permanence (*thubūt*)

---

212

Ibid. Among the unalterable principles are the revealed Divine laws as prescribed in the Qur'ān (*Sunnah Allāh*), the doctrine of *tawḥīd*, the need for satisfaction and moderation as against isolation, egoism, extravagance and *ḥubb al-dunyā* (solely inclining to worldly life) and the principle of *ḥalāl* (lawful) and *ḥarām* (prohibited).

213

Ibid, xxii. Some of the examples cited are scientific and technological investigation for better material life, modernising architecture, and sophisticated mechanisms for agriculture, industries etc..

214

Syed Muhammad Naquib, *Dewan Budaya*, op.cit., p.13.

215

Syed argues that if the change has no permanent aim, development will be in chaos as it has no certain direction in which to head. For instance, if someone is moving towards Johor Bharu (the capital city of Johore, one of the states in the southern part of Malaysia) his object of aim (Johor Bharu) must be fixed. Otherwise, he will be uncertain as to the direction he is making for.

and change (*taghayyur*).<sup>216</sup> Hence, the principle of permanent and change in an Islamic concept of development.<sup>217</sup>

In social reality, all aspects of life - political, economic, social etc - should be changed to suit the requirement of the permanent principle if an Islamic development is expected to take place. In general, development should mean the improvement of existing condition to a better one.<sup>218</sup> Although development connotes the utilization of resources available to man, it should not only be interpreted in a physical sense as this will result only in material perception of development, progress and achievements.

Syed Muhammad Naquib is of the opinion that various resources, natural and human, are bounties with meanings. They manifest the signs of God (*āyāt Allāh*) which must be utilised within a certain moral-spiritual framework. This means that the physical development should be compatible with the moral-spiritual principles. Thus, it can be concluded that the crucial task in the Malaysian development process is to redefine various development concepts and role in the light of this ideal and to translate them realistically into the local context.

---

216

See Ziauddin Sardar, "Permanence and Change in Islam", *The Future of Muslim Civilization*, (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1988), pp. 35-52.

217

In short, one can say that, in Islam, development is justified, among other things, by its noble purposes. It signifies the change from something less desirable to something more desirable (*the ought-to-be*). It further implies that the emphasis must be on the rational direction of human organization and skill towards the attainment of the desirable. In this sense, development is a means to the ends which in turn are determined by society's system of values. What are seen as desirable in conventional and Islamic perspectives have been directly or indirectly touched on earlier. What is desired by the Mahathir administration in its development strategy will be clear when we discuss his concept of and approach to development in the next chapter.

218

Op.cit., p.13.



## Conclusion.

Having considered the various aspects of conventional and Islamic theories of development and change as elaborated by Malaysian and non-Malaysian scholars, the writer proposes to develop a working theoretical framework upon which our analysis of Malaysian development will be based. This will be done by looking at two important aspects, namely a summary of the differences between Islamic and conventional perspectives of development, and the way this theoretical framework is applied to our analysis.<sup>219</sup>

From the above discussion, we can identify some distinctions between the two development perspectives as will be mentioned here. However, the reader must be reminded, as we said earlier, that the relationship between the two is not straightforward, especially in the details and at utilitarian level. What is presented here are some pertinent differences at ideological level. (a) Islamic development is based fundamentally on religion with *tawḥīd*, firm belief in God and His Oneness, as its core. Conventional development never considers religion to be its core foundation. (b) The main sources of reference for Islamic development are *al-Qur'ān* and *al-Sunnah* besides others like *ijmā'*, *qiyās*, and *ijtihād*, whereas there are no fixed sources of reference in the conventional perspective, or the sources are generally man-invented such as rationalism, empiricism, scienticism etc.. (c) Development in Islam has a fixed goal namely *maḥḍāt Allāh* or the pleasure of Allah. Allah will help those whose efforts are meant to attain this goal by endowing them with success in this world and in the hereafter,

For a comparison between Islamic and secular notion of development, see for instance, M.A. Hussein Mullick, "The Challenge of Modern Development Before the Muslim World - considered in the Light of European and Islamic Cultural History", *The Islamic Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 3, September 1967, pp. 225-240.

generally called *al-Falāḥ*, which exists in various forms, visible or otherwise. The secularistic perspective of conventional development denies this eschatological aspect of development. Therefore, the goal of development is totally mundane. (d) Development in Islam is global covering all aspects of human life, individually or collectively, with the moral-spiritual element being its guiding principle. Economic development is very much encouraged, but it must be carried out within this moral-spiritual framework. (e) The main focus of development in Islam is "human" or man himself, the agent of change. Only when a personality is properly developed can one expect him to change society according to the Divine teachings. Conventional perspective concerns itself with social development without necessarily having attempted to develop a personality according to a certain set of values because man himself is considered as the definer of values. (f) Islam encourages the use of any forms of utilitarian techniques or approaches like scientific or technological invention as they are helpful in various ways to help achieve the set goal more efficiently. Thus, the resilient aspect of Islamic development allows people to utilise any new discoveries, ideas and approaches especially in translating the ideal philosophy of Islamic development into practice as long as they are not used for destructive purposes and not against the overall objectives of the *sharī'ah*. The use of these scientific facilities in conventional development is not necessarily guided by these overriding principles. (g) The overall feature of an Islamic development must reflect people's religiosity in the widest sense of the word. For instance, immoral activities and irreligious behaviours should not be allowed to dominate people's culture in which case the role of religion must be continuously functional in order to improve the state of social behaviour. Wisdom in practising religion at individual or social level is highly urged. Hedonism, free-sex and other such phenomena seem to be tolerated in conventional development.

Based on the above discussion, we propose that the analysis of Malaysian development is carried out against this comparative theoretical framework by taking into account the following considerations: (a) Foster's perception of development as "a process" as well as a "progress" is considered. Development as a process is sensible in this work to refer to what Pitirim Sorokin defines as "any kind of movement, or modification, or transformation, or alteration, or "evolution", in brief, any change of a given logical subject in the course of time (in our case, during Mahathir period), whether it be a change in its place in space or a modification of its quantitative or qualitative aspects."<sup>220</sup> For instance, this research will analyze the new policies, measures, approaches, ideas, policies and programmes introduced by the Government during this period, especially those which concern its Islamization policy and Vision 2020. (b) The study seeks to analyze the overall change in Malaysian society with a focus on the impact of development on Muslim society. Although the analysis will be based on various aspects of conventional and Islamic theories, greater emphasis will be placed on the latter. (c) In identifying the aspects for analysis, the writer considers Steven Vago's definition of social change as "the process of planned or unplanned qualitative or quantitative alterations in social phenomena that can be depicted on a six-part continuum composed of interrelated analytic

components",<sup>221</sup> namely identity,<sup>222</sup> level,<sup>223</sup> duration,<sup>224</sup> direction,<sup>225</sup> magnitude,<sup>226</sup> and rate of change.<sup>227</sup> For example, these components are analyzed in conjunction with other factors of change like population;<sup>228</sup> innovation;<sup>229</sup> diffusion<sup>230</sup> and legal system;<sup>231</sup> with

221

Steven Vago, op.cit., p. 9.

222

Identity of change refers to a specific social phenomenon undergoing transformation such as a definite practice, behaviour, attitude, interaction, pattern, authority structure, productivity rate, voting pattern, prestige, and stratification system.

223

Level of change delineates the location in a social system where a particular change takes place. Several levels may be designated such as individual, group, organization, institution and society.

224

Duration refers to the question of how long a particular change form endures after it has been accepted. It may refer to the life span of long-term or short-term (transitory) change phenomena.

225

Direction of change may indicate development or decay, progress or decline. The pattern can also be linear or evolutionary, occur in cycles or stages, or correspond to some other pattern. It may also be a simple fluctuation or variation on a particular theme.

226

Magnitude may be based on a three-part scheme of incremental or marginal, comprehensive, and revolutionary changes, as discussed in the preceding section.

227

Rate of change may be based on any arbitrary scale such as fast or slow, continuous or spasmodic, orderly or erratic.

228

Changes in size, composition, and distribution of a population influence social changes.

229

Which refers to a new way of doing something which includes discovery i.e. an addition to knowledge on the basis of some existing phenomenon such as Einstein's theory of relativity and invention which uses of existing knowledge in some novel form like steam engine, plastic, or the automobile.

230

Innovations which are normally imported from other societies rather than developed independently within a society. Diffusion is the process by which innovations, and other culture traits, spread from one society to another.

231

Which says that legislatures, courts, and administrative bodies have an effect on a given segment of society by altering power relationships, redistributing

different degree of emphasis.<sup>232</sup> Wherever necessary certain aspects of this approach are left untreated and some others are included.

---

rights and obligations and modifying social relationships. Laws bring changes in behaviour and influence life-styles, values, modes of adaptation, and institutional membership patterns and practices through the continuous process of regulation, deregulation and selective enforcement.

### Chapter Three

#### **DEVELOPMENT UNDER MAHATHIR: GENESIS, IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION AND PROFILE**



## CHAPTER THREE

### DEVELOPMENT UNDER MAHATHIR: GENESIS, IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION AND PROFILE

In the previous chapter, the writer has shown that the formulation of a theory is influenced by one's worldview. The latter provides a general perception upon which the former is developed. Thus, the various perspectives of conventional and Islamic theories of development and change discussed in the chapter might have reflected scholars' ideological or personal inclination. While the accuracy of their theories has been a subject of scrutiny, the arguments they have offered help explain the rationale for their differing interpretations. At any rate, this comparative theoretical framework is necessary in the present academic work as it provides an appropriate foundation for the analysis of Malaysian development. Since the Mahathir era is chosen as the time frame of our analysis, an elaboration of some pertinent aspects of development during this period becomes the main objective of this chapter.

The first section entitled *The Genesis and Progress of Development Policy Before the Mahathir Period* provides an outline historical background to the current development strategy. It is mainly a description of the *Pre-and Post-independence Malaysia Until the 1970 Period*, and *The Aftermath of the 1970 Period Until the the Mahathir Era*. Section Two focuses on the *The Ideological Foundation of Mahathir's Development Policy* by elaborating two important themes namely *Mahathir's Idealism* and *The National Ideology*. In the final section, *A Profile of the Major Development Policies During the Mahathir Administration* will be taken up.

## 1. The Genesis and Progress of Development Policy Before the Mahathir Period.

Two significant phases of development deserve consideration in order to understand the root from which the present development strategy emerges: Malaysia before and after independence until 1970, and the period after it until the time of Mahathir. This chronological study is hoped to reveal the progress of development patterns over the stipulated periods as well as the extent to which the adoption of different strategies has been able to have an impact on social change.

### 1.1. Pre- and Post-independence Malaysia Until the 1970 Period.

As noted earlier, Malaya in its antiquity was inhabited by those who migrated mainly from the northern part of the mainland especially from Yunnan, and then settled in the jungles. Now they are known as *Orang Asli* or the aborigines. Their presence, however, did not give rise to a truly organized society as they were only scattered groups moving from one place to the other in the jungles.<sup>1</sup> Later, the migration of the *Deutero-Malays* from the regions around the Peninsular known as the Malay-Indonesian archipelago took place. These Malays settled down mainly on the coastal areas and river confluences. It is these first immigrants, the aborigines and the Malays, and their offspring who are today recognised constitutionally as the indigenous people of the country, and who assume the legal status as *the Bumiputera* or sons of the soil.<sup>2</sup>

1

---

Although the aborigines are said to have arrived earlier in the land, Mahathir contends that only the Malays are the original or indigenous people of Malaya and the only people who can claim Malaya as their one and only country. He terms it as "the definitive people". To understand his arguments on this issue, and the status of the non-Malays in Malaya, please refer his *The Malay Dilemma*, op.cit., pp. 121-138.

2

For a concise description of the various definitions for the concept Malay in the Malaysian context, see Hussin Mutalib's *Islam In Malaysia: From*

The peoples' habits and style of life at that time were closely related to their typical economic modes of production like simple agriculture, fishing and, in the case of the aborigines, hunting activities. Trading activities later developed between local Malay peoples and those from China, India and the Middle East.<sup>3</sup> Prior to the coming of Hinduism and Buddhism, animism became the most widespread belief of the people.<sup>4</sup> Upon the arrival of the two Indian-based religions, the Peninsula witnessed a mixture of these beliefs and various other cultural traits among its people. Hinduism and Buddhism were said to have been influential especially among the ruling elites.<sup>5</sup>

A more organized political establishment in the history of Malaya is often attributed to the time of Parameswara who founded Malacca towards the end of the 14th century. During this period, trading activities reached their peak as commercial contacts with other trading centres like Aceh and Brunei increased.<sup>6</sup> As a result,

---

Revivalism to Islamic State, op.cit., pp. 17-19, also, chapter one of Syed Husin Ali's *The Malays: Their Problems and Future* (Petaling Jaya: Longman Malaysia, 1981), pp. 1-7.

3 See "Perniagaan Dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu: Satu Catatan" (Trade in the Malay History and Culture: A Note) by Mohd. Fauzi Yaacob for a brief history of trade activities among the Malays in *Jurnal Akademi Pengajian Melayu*, Vol.1 No.1 April 1993, pp. 187-192.

4 For an elaboration of the animistic practices among the *Orang Asli*, see Amran Kasimin, *Religion and Social Change*, op.cit., ch. 2 and 7.

5 A deeper explanation of the influence of Hinduism and Buddhism on the indigenous people can be obtained by referring, for instance, to chapter four of Amran Kasimin's, *Religion and Social Change...*, ibid., pp. 114-139, also, chapter four of Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah's *Islam Dalam Sejarah...*, op.cit., pp. 22-29.

6 Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomas is of the opinion that the Malaccan Sultanate prior to the colonial era should be regarded more as a trading centre than anything else in view of its vigorous trading activities with other places in India, the Middle East and China. See his article entitled "Malacca's Society on the Eve of the Portuguese Conquest: A Tentative Interpretation Based on the Extant Portuguese Documents" in *Jurnal Budaya*:

religious and economic developments expanded rapidly, and have had a far reaching impact on the religious and social behaviour of the people up to the present day.<sup>7</sup> The Maritime Laws of Malacca (*Undang-undang Laut Melaka*),<sup>8</sup> possibly codified sometimes between 1488-1510 by Sultan Mahmud Shah, is an example of how Islamic teachings seemed to have been influential in the legal system of the state. Among other things, it states that, the "punishment for adultery on board ship is death to both offenders. If the offenders are both unmarried, fornication is punished by 100 lashes, and the offenders are obliged to marry."<sup>9</sup> This is an example of how Malay customary law has been influenced to some extent by Islamic religion.<sup>10</sup>

Politically, the system of the Raja (king) which centred around the influential power of ruler over the rakyat (people) gradually took a new dimension as Islamic elements penetrated it. The Raja later assumed the title *Sultan*, the Arabic equivalent,

---

*Kajian Interdisiplin Tentang Alam Melayu*, No. 1, December, 1989, pp. 32-67.

<sup>7</sup> Amran Kasimin, *Religion and Social Change*, op.cit., especially chapter five, "The Coming of Islam", pp. 140-170.

<sup>8</sup> Another important form of laws was the Malaccan Digest or *Hukum Kanun Melaka*. The Malaccan laws embodied all matters of criminal and civil laws, family laws, the legal power of the ruler, rules relating to proper conduct particularly with regard to sexual matters, the law regarding slavery, penalties for all offences etc., and the Maritime Laws were concerned solely with rules regulations, procedures and codes of conduct which were to be used at sea. See Mohd. Nur Manuty, *Perceptions of Social Change*, op.cit., p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> S.R. Winstedt and P.E. De Josselin De Jong (trans), "The Maritime Laws of Malacca", *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXIX, pt. 111, 1956, p.51.

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of the development of codification of Islamic Law in the early Muslim-Malay period, the period of British colonial rule and the period since independence, see for instance Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Shariah and Codification: Malaysian Experience", in *Shariah Law Journal*, Vol. 4, (Petaling Jaya: International Islamic University, January 1987), pp. 47-61.

whose role was to administer, spread and protect the religion of Islam.

The Islamic intellectual activities were also extensive as reflected in the emergence of such prolific Muslim scholars as Hamzah al-Fansūrī, Shams al-Dīn al-Sumatrānī, Nūr al-Dīn al-Rāniri and ʿAbd al-Raʿūf al-Sinkīlī.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the tremendous impact that Islam had had on Malay socio-cultural and political life, the fact remains that a great deal of old Malay and local adat (customs) and habits continued to prevail among them and were held side by side with the increasing Islamic practices. *Adat Pepateh* and *Adat Temenggong* are two examples of the established Malay adat which are still practiced in certain parts of the country until today. In the course of the Islamization process, this co-existence becomes part of the obstacles that continue to pose challenges to the Islamic religion in Malaysia until.<sup>12</sup>

Prior to the coming of the European colonial powers, Malaya and Indonesia were politically undifferentiated.<sup>13</sup> They were also identified with the same religious and cultural identity. However, the two were later divided into two geo-political entities to serve the political and economic interests of the colonial masters, the British and the Dutch respectively. Since then, these two nation-

---

11

Mohd. Nur, *Perceptions Social Change*, op.cit., p. 23.

12

For a brief analysis of socio-economic development in Malaysia from a perspective of sociological history, see for instance, Rahimah Abdul Aziz, "Pembangunan Sosial dan Ekonomi Malaysia: Suatu Analisis Awal dari Sudut Sociologi Sejarah", in *Masyarakat dan Perubahan*, ed. by Mohamed Salleh Lambry and Hasan Mat Nor, (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1993), pp. 11-39.

13

For a brief account of the socio-economic and political life of Malay society during this period see especially "Malay Society in the Mid-Nineteenth Century", in William R. Roff's, *The Origin of Malay Nationalism*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 1-11.

states have taken their own direction on the way to achieve independence, and have also chosen different directions in developing their countries. A significant impact on the people's religious, political and socio-cultural life can be observed as a result of this separation. For instance, in the political sphere, Indonesia has developed into a republican country, while Malaysia has retained its Constitutional monarchy system. In Malaya particularly, the formal establishment of the Council of Islamic Affairs and Malay Custom (*Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu*) during the colonial period meant a serious step in the secularization process which limited and restricted the power of the Sultan only to religious matters and adat. This was process that led eventually to the separation of the role of religion from politics, administration, laws, economics and education.<sup>14</sup>

In the economic sphere, the economic control of the Malay states passed from the ruling elite to foreigners.<sup>15</sup> They were no longer in control of the mode of production and the distribution network. Professor Khoo Kay Kim has these words to describe the economic situation at that time:

Before the establishment of British administration, the ruling elite at least enjoyed the privilege of collecting dues, mainly imposed on the export of tin and the import of goods. But, under British administration, the authority to collect revenue was taken away from them and they were paid, instead, monthly allowances or pensions.<sup>16</sup>

The expansion of British commercial activities provided an opportunity for Chinese traders to participate in the increasingly

---

14

Mohd. Nur Manuty, op.cit., pp. 29-30.

15

See Khoo Kay Kim, *Islam and Economic Development in Malaysia: A Historical Perspective*, a paper presented at the International Seminar on Islam and Development in Southeast Asia, organised by Akademi Pengajian Melayu dan Akademi Islam with the cooperation of the Information and Resource Centre, Singapore and held at Hotel Equatorial, Kuala Lumpur on 25-26 September 1991, p. 3.

16

Ibid.



flourishing trade of both Penang and Singapore.<sup>17</sup> Such was the socio-cultural, political and economic structure of Malayan society before independence.

After independence, economic development became Malaysia's main priority in all its development plannings.<sup>18</sup> By 1970, the government had already introduced three major national plans in order to improve people's standards of living.<sup>19</sup> The first of these was launched after the first national election in 1955, two years before independence. The plans were known as *Rancangan Malaya Pertama* (The First Malaya Plan) 1956-1960, *Rancangan Malaya Kedua* (The Second Malaya Plan) 1961-1965, and *Rancangan Malaysia Pertama* (The First Malaysia Plan) 1966-1970. Only the last plan can be said to reflect truly the beginning of development policy for modern Malaysia after the departure of Singapore from the Federation in 1965 to form its own sovereign state.<sup>20</sup>

17

Ibid, p. 2.

18

Syed Othman al-Habshi, "Kaedah Pelaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam di Malaysia", in *Konsep dan Pelaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam*, Muhammad Syukri Salleh, ed., (Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Pulau Pinang, 1990), p.110. The state of religious affairs in the aftermath of independence has been elaborated earlier. Cf. also P. Arudsothy, "Malaysia", in *The Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. by Shinichi Ichimura, (Honolulu: An East-West Center Book), pp.81-128, especially to its elaboration of the economic development which took place during the 1950-1970 period.

19

There was also an outline draft of development known as *Draft Development Plan of the Federation* or DDP introduced by the British prior to the First Malaya Plan. For earlier development policy see, for instance, D.E. Short and James C. Jackson, "The Origins of An Irrigation Policy in Malaya: A Review of Developments Prior to the Establishment of the Drainage and Irrigation Department" in *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXXIV, Part 1, 1971, pp. 78-103.

20

For an account of the "Exogenous Development Strategies and Their Impacts on Rural Society in Malaysia" see, for instance, Muhammad Syukri Salleh's *An Islamic Approach to Rural Development*, , op.cit., pp. 34-81 and "Sejarah Ringkas Perancangan dan Pembangunan Sosio Ekonomi Malaysia", by Mohd. Hafiah Piei in *Rancangan Malaysia Kelima* ed. by him and Chamhuri Siwar, (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1989). On the background to the departure of Singapore and Lee

Kuan Yew's insistence on a Malaysian Malaysia, see *The Times* 28.6.1965.

Since the main concern of these plans was economic improvement,<sup>21</sup> their objectives have been more or less the same and can be listed as follows: a) to achieve a higher rate of economic growth; b) to reduce the economic instability caused by changes in the price of exports; c) to reduce the rate of unemployment by increasing job opportunities, and; d) to balance the distribution of income and wealth.<sup>22</sup> Despite their main focus on economic well-being, it was naturally hoped that such an emphasis would help to improve the other aspects society - socially, educationally and culturally. The following two remarks on education and health in the review of the First Malaysia Plan progress may help to illustrate this expectation:

Under the First Malaysia Plan a number of policy decisions were taken which resulted in modifications to the education programme. These include: (i) the extension of the concept of basic education to include not only the primary cycle but also three years of lower secondary education; (ii) the reorganization of the pattern of secondary education with the introduction of comprehensive and post-comprehensive education; and (iii) the shift towards a better balance between general academic education, on the one hand, and vocational, technical and science education, on the other.<sup>23</sup>

During the period 1966-1970, emphasis continued to be placed on the provision of better health services and extension of such services to all sections of the population. Special attention was given to the expansion of the rural health service introduced in the early sixties. For the urban areas, the stress was on the establishment of new institutions, as well as the improvement and extension of existing facilities.<sup>24</sup>

---

21

For instance, the allocation to the economic sector was 63.3 per cent of the total public development expenditure in the *First Malaysia Plan* (*Second Malaysia Plan*, p.68).

22

Syed Othman cites five main areas which are said to have been identified in order to achieve these objectives. They are a. industrialization, b. economic diversification, c. infrastructure, d. agriculture and e. rural development, op.cit., "Kaedah Pelaksanaan...", p. 110.

23

*Second Malaysia Plan*, (Kuala Lumpur: The Government Printer, 1971), pp. 222-3.

24

Ibid, p 244.

Meanwhile, education received favourable attention in the Government's public development expenditure on the social sector. For instance, its allocation rose from \$255.6 million (6.0%) of the total expenditure of the First Malaysia Plan to \$448.48 million (6.2%) in the Second Malaysia Plan as compared to the allocation for health and housing which amounted to \$146.6 million (3.4%) and \$197.2 (4.6%), and \$213.65 (2.9%) and \$171.89 (2.4%) in the respective plans.<sup>25</sup>

However, being the first, the plans could not not expected to produce a full impact on society. They should rather be seen as the first step towards a greater effort to transform society. Thus, the weaknesses of the plans, or rather of their implementation, had always been the subject of criticism from various quarters.<sup>26</sup> Mahathir himself was critical of the approach taken by the past "old guard" leadership in implementing development plans especially because of their slowness to improve the Malays' standard of living.<sup>27</sup>

Despite these criticisms and weaknesses, the plans proved to have brought about some significant changes to society. For instance, the number of farm holdings of an economic size which used modern techniques of agricultural production and management has increased with the opening of more than 800,000 acres under public sector programmes from 1956 to 1965. Under the land settlement scheme, the Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA) managed to

25

---

Ibid, pp. 70-71.

26

Among those critics are Professor Dr. Jomo Kwame Sundaram as reflected in such writings as *Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990), and *Development Policies and Income Inequality in Peninsular Malaysia*, and Dr. Chandra Muzaffar in his *The NEP: Development and Alternative Consciousness* (Penang: Aliran Kesedaran Rakyat, 1989).

27

J. Victor Morais, *Mahathir: A Profile in Courage*, p.23.

develop 308,400 acres by 1970 and help settle 20,700 families on 90 schemes. During 1961-1965 period about 113,000 acres of paddy land in West Malaysia were improved through irrigation facilities, and a further 202,000 acres were irrigated during the 1966-1970 period.<sup>28</sup>

In education, impressive strides were also made. Over 90% of the primary school-age population was enrolled by 1970, and 3,830 classrooms were constructed under the First Malaysia Plan. Similarly another 3,395 classrooms, 494 science laboratories and 153 workshops were constructed for secondary education. At university level, not only did the University of Malaya double its intake during the 1966-1970 period, two other universities, *Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia* and *Universiti Sains Malaysia* were also established.<sup>29</sup>

Health facilities especially in the rural areas were also expanded. In 1965, there were about 39 main health centres, 122 health sub-centres and 643 midwives clinics in West Malaysia. These numbers rose to 44, 180 and 943 respectively in 1970.<sup>30</sup>

Despite such achievements, the plans were not able to fully overcome the various problems confronting Malaysia's complex multi-racial society particularly in achieving national unity. This partly explains the reason behind the racial riot of 13 May 1969.<sup>31</sup>

---

The above achievements were due to a considerable amount of expenditure allocated especially to the agricultural sector in the pre-1970 plans. For instance, in the 1960s period, emphasis in the agricultural sector was placed on three main areas, namely land development, drainage and irrigation, and rubber replanting. About \$17 million was allocated for this purpose in the First Malaya Plan, and this rose to \$130 million in the Second Malaya Plan, and \$310 in the First Malaysia Plan (Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, p.11.).

MYP2, op.cit., pp. 224-5.

Ibid, p.13.

In this month's general election, the ruling coalition, the Alliance, lost a considerable number of seats to the opposition. The state of Selangor, where the capital Kuala Lumpur was situated, fell into the hands of the

### 1.2. The Aftermath of the 1970 Period Until the Mahathir Era.

Having realized the danger of the racial problems that triggered the 1969 riot, the Government decided to embark on a new development strategy to correct the existing socio-economic imbalances among the ethnic groups in expectation of a more balanced and just society. Thus, the NEP was formulated under the First Outline Perspective Plan and launched in 1970. It was incorporated for the first time in the Second Malaysia Plan. The primary goal was to achieve the over-riding objective of the country, that was national unity as reflected in the following words:

A stage has been reached in the nation's economic and social development where greater emphasis must be placed on social integration and more equitable opportunities for national unity and progress.<sup>32</sup>

Two mutually-dependent prongs of the NEP were stated to be "the eradication of poverty among all Malaysians irrespective of race", and "the restructuring of Malaysian society in order to reduce and ultimately eliminate the identity of race with economic function and geographical location."<sup>33</sup> The implementation of this

---

opposition. It was the procession by the opposition to celebrate their victory in Kuala Lumpur that had provoked the Malays. Racial riots soon broke out which claimed a number of civilian lives. The Federal Constitution was suspended and the country was run by a *National Operation Council* for 18 months to allow the situation to return to normal. It was during this period that compromise was achieved among various racial groups to formulate an acceptable development policy that would be beneficial for the nation and national unity. Upon completion of this process, the Federal Constitution was reinstated in February 1971. For a deeper understanding of this event, see, for instance, *Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath* by Felix V. Gagliano, (Athens: Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1970) and Tunku Abdul Rahman's May 13.

32

MYP2, op.cit., p.1. Cf. also Mohamad Idris Saleh, et.al., *Sejarah Pembangunan Bangsa dan Negara*, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications and Distributors Sdn Bhd., 1994), esp. ch. 18, "Dasar Pembangunan Ekonomi Kerajaan", pp. 133-155.

33

Ibid. p.1.

new strategy should be guided by *Rukunegara*<sup>34</sup> which reflects a national consensus and commitment to the task of creating a united, socially just, economically equitable and progressive Malaysian nation.<sup>35</sup> In short, the long term objective of the NEP was to eradicate poverty through increased income and creation of full employment, and to restructure the Malaysian society and economy, and to correct racial economic imbalance in order to create a more united Malaysia.<sup>36</sup>

Among the important and specific strategies towards achieving the above objective was to create, over a period of time, "a viable and thriving Malay industrial and commercial community which will operate on a par and in effective partnership with non-Malays in the modern sector." The Government considered that involvement in the manufacturing and commercial sectors, or simply corporate sector, was the most important strategy to achieve this target, and for this purpose it set a target that within two decades at least 30% of the total commercial and industrial activities in all categories and scales of operation should have participation by Malays and other indigenous people in terms of ownership and management.<sup>37</sup>

1980, the year immediately before Mahathir took office as Prime Minister, marked the end of the first decade of the implementation of the NEP, and its last ten years (1981-1990) happened to be the first decade of his administration. Therefore, during most of the period in which he was Prime Minister he had in

---

34

Variously referred to as the pillars of the nation, national ideology and the like.

35

*MYP2*, op.cit., p.3.

36

*Ibid*, p.9.

37

*Ibid*, p.158.



practice to deal with the implementation of a plan already formulated before his period in office.<sup>38</sup> What has been the extent of achievement in the respective aspects after a decade of the implementation of the NEP?

The progress of GNP over the NEP period seems to suggest a higher achievement compared to the preceding decade (1960-1969). The average annual growth rate of GNP was 6.3 percent during the 1960-65 period and 5.5 percent for the 1965-1969 period.<sup>39</sup> The rates were 7.2 and 8.5 percents for the MYP2 period (1971-1975) and MYP3 period (1976-1980) respectively.<sup>40</sup>

It might be expected from this discussion that a considerable social change would have taken place which involved an improvement in some major aspects of society. The following table contains selected indicators and their quantitative progress in the first decade of the NEP.

---

38

It has to be noted that Mahathir was brought back into UMNO after his expulsion two years after the NEP was launched, and into the Government two years later (1974) as the Minister of Education. When he became Prime Minister, it goes without saying that his development strategy must have been carried out within this context.

39

At the 1960 price index. See *Pembangunan Di Malaysia*, p. 55.

40

*Ibid.*, 61.

Table 3.1  
Peninsular Malaysia: Progress of Selected Indicators in 1970 and 1980.

INDICATORS	1970	1980
Infant Mortality Rate <sup>41</sup>	40.8	28.1
Number of Population Per Doctor	3,859	3,959
Number of Population Per Dentist	31,760	22,787
Number of Population Per Hospital Bed	619	631
Number of Population Per Rural Clinic/Midwife	9,700	8,333
Number of Motorcars Per 1000 Population	2.7	5.0
Number of Motorcycles Per 1000 Population	4.1	10.1
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan, pp. 116, 118 & 329		

Based on this table, it is clear that some improvements in social aspect have been achieved, and this may be attributed mainly to an encouraging economic progress.

One important development was a remarkable change in the proportion of allocation for major development sectors over the period of thirty years since the introduction of the Draft Development Plan in 1950 up to the end of the NEP era. The largest percentage of expenses in 1950 went to the economic sector<sup>42</sup> which accounted for more than ninety percent compared to only 8.1 percent to the social sector. However, it has undergone a steady decline over the period to form about sixty five percent in 1980, giving the social sector a larger share of more than 17 percent. This reflects

41

---

No. of deaths under 1 year of age in year t/No. of live-births in year t x 1,000.

42

Which includes agriculture, infrastructure and industry.

a progressive realignment of allocation for major development sectors to meet the various demands of different times.<sup>43</sup> Table 3.2. summarises this progress.

Table 3.2  
Malaysia: Percentage of Expenses by Major Sectors in the Development Plans

SECTORS	DDP	MLP1	MLP2	MYP1	MYP2	MYP3
Economic	91.9	78.9	66.5	63.3	72.3	64.0
Social	8.1	14.4	15.6	17.8	13.7	17.2
Miscellaneous	n.a.	6.7	17.9	18.9	14.8	18.8
Source: Cited in <i>Pembangunan Malaysia</i> , p. 39 .						

As far as the achievement in poverty reduction is concerned, it is said that the rate of poverty in the Malay Peninsula has declined sharply from 49.3% in 1970 to 29.2% in 1980.<sup>44</sup> The total number of poor households was estimated at 666,100 in 1980 compared to 791,800 in 1970. In the agricultural sector the rate of poverty has declined from 68.3% in 1970 to 46.1% in 1980 compared to the non-agricultural sector which recorded a poverty rate of 27.8% and 16.8% for the respective years. Although the rate of poverty in urban areas was not as high as that of the rural, it has also undergone a considerable decline. For instance, the poverty rate in urban areas in 1970 which was 21% has reduced to 12.6% in 1980 against the rural 58.7% and 37.7% for the respective years.<sup>45</sup>

Among the important objectives of restructuring society, the second prong of the NEP, has been to reduce the imbalances of income

43

Two non-economic sectors have been referred to as social and Miscellaneous. The former includes education, health, housing, service and others, and the latter comprises administration and security.

44

Fourth Malaysia Plan, p. 36.

45

Ibid,, pp. 36037.

among ethnic groups and rural-urban areas as well as to create a viable community of *Bumiputera* entrepreneurs. The following table provides data on the progress in the distribution of income by ethnic groups and employment in major sectors by ethnic groups.

Table 3.3  
Peninsular Malaysia: Progress of Some Selected Indicators During the NEP Period<sup>46</sup>

	MALAY	CHINESE	INDIAN	OTHERS
Average Household Income in 1970/1979 (RM)	172.00 309.00 (6.7%) <sup>47</sup>	394.00 659.00 (5.9%)	304.00 467.00 (4.9%)	813.00 1,132.00
Rate of Unemployment 1970/1980 (%)	8.1 5.1	7.0 5.3	11.0 7.5	3.2 8.1
First Sector <sup>48</sup> Employment 1970/1980 (%)	67.6 66.3	19.9 19.9	11.5 13.0	1.0 0.9
Second Sector <sup>49</sup> Employment in 1970/1980 (%)	32.1 39.8	58.7 51.1	8.5 8.5	0.7 0.6
Third Sector <sup>50</sup> Employment 1970/1980 (%)	42.6 47.0	45.5 41.6	10.7 10.5	1.2 0.9
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan, pp. 62 and 64.				

As can be seen although the Malays seemed to have a higher annual growth rate (6.7%) over the period, their actual income was still behind the other ethnic groups when the NEP period was about

<sup>46</sup> Figures in the first rows are for the year 1970, and the second are for 1980.

<sup>47</sup> Average annual growth rate.

<sup>48</sup> Agriculture.

<sup>49</sup> Mining, manufacturing, construction and transport.

<sup>50</sup> Wholesale and retail, banking, civil service, education, health, defence and public service.

to end. In agricultural sector (first sector employment) there was almost no change in the proportion of employment with the Malays forming about two-thirds of the sector. In the second and third sector employment, the Malay participation achieved only a 7.7 percent and 4.4 percent increase respectively over the period. The explanation to the unequal distribution of earnings varies. One of the reasons is over concentration of Malays in the agricultural sector which is usually associated with low productivity and low wages. This is neither new nor unusual and the ethnic origin *per se* has nothing to do with it. The low productivity and consumption habits have caused the capital formation which has been the cause of Malays remaining in the agricultural sector, thus completing the vicious circle of poverty.

Meanwhile, the average annual growth rate of income for the rural population during the 1970-1979 period has been 6.6 percent, that is from an actual income of RM200.00 in 1970 to RM355.00 in 1979 compared to the urban rate of 5.2 percent from an actual income of RM428.00 to RM675.00 for the respective years.<sup>51</sup>

Despite these achievements, there have been criticisms of the NEP in various respects. We will touch on this subject whenever necessary when analysing Malaysian development in the next chapter. At this point, some questions need to be raised. In what way is Mahathir's approach to development different from that of his predecessors? What is Mahathir's own stand towards the NEP? What have been the national development plan, strategy and approach in the post-NEP period? Can they be said to be truly reflective of his ideas? Our deeper scrutiny of Malaysian development later is hoped to reveal answers to these questions. For now, let us examine closely the ideological justifications for his development policy.

---

51

Fourth Malaysia Plan, *op.cit.*, p. 62.

## 2. The Ideological Foundation of Mahathir's Development Policy.

The logic of Mahathir's development strategy cannot be critically analysed without taking into consideration two important dimensions of the philosophical matrix which must have been, in one way or the other, mutually co-related in the course of the present national development. The two are Mahathir's *idealism* and the *national ideology*.

### 2.1. Mahathir's Idealism.

The best way to understand Mahathir's idealism, which also reflects his philosophy and thought, is by embarking on two levels of observation: First, by studying his life chronologically, and second, by looking at some of the main themes that constitute his idealism. As the first was taken up in the introductory chapter, the present section will only deal with the second level of this discussion.

#### 2.1.1. The Main Themes of Mahathir's Philosophy and Thought.

The thoughts that constitute and influence Mahathir's idealism can be discerned especially from his own writings, works and speeches including his articles contributed as early as late 1940s to *The Sunday Times* newspaper in Singapore, up to the most recent speeches and policies he has made and introduced during his premiership.<sup>52</sup> Our attempt to understand his mind becomes more easier by virtue of the fact that he has been an outspoken leader who writes and talks frankly on various issues. He says what he means as former Lord

His articles in the newspaper as well as his editorials in the *Darulaman* school magazine become important sources to understand the basis of his early thought, while *The Malay Dilemma* and *Menghadapi Cabaran* are helpful to elaborate the major themes of his later thought which includes such subjects as the Malay dilemma, national unity, racial equality, Islam and nation building. Finally, his speeches and policies made and introduced while in office further contribute towards clarifying these ideas, and the way in which they have been taken up for implementation.



Justice, Tun Mohamed Suffian, observes, "even if we don't agree with him it is not for lack of understanding, for he has made his meaning crystal clear and we know exactly where he stands."<sup>53</sup> He himself said in an interview that he is not a diplomat who is not always keen to say "yes" or "no" whenever necessary.<sup>54</sup> This being the case, we hope our understanding of his thought will be reasonably justified.

#### i. The Malays, Their Dilemma and Their Attitude.

Right from the beginning, Mahathir's main concern has been the Malay condition. He has been vocal and frank in speaking especially of their economic and educational backwardness and dilemmas. Not only has he elaborated the issue as he thought legitimate, he has followed his arguments with some suggestions to rectify them. Among others, he identified three major factors of Malay backwardness, namely colonialism, immigrants and the Malays themselves. Before taking up each of these factors, it is important to understand the situation of the early Malay community as Mahathir sees it.<sup>55</sup>

Mahathir says that the early Malays were already quite developed in commerce and industry. They had the facilities and personnel to deal with import and export activities even before the Indians and Arabs came to Malaya.<sup>56</sup> They were also involved in

---

53

Foreword to J. Victor Morais's *Mahathir: A Profile in Courage*.

54

Interview with journalists after 100 days in office. *Utusan Malaysia*, 27.10.1981.

55

For a discussion of Mahathir's view on the economic history of the Malays during the different periods of Malayan history which provides a background for the present day condition, see especially ch. 4, "The Malay Economic Dilemma", pp. 32-61, and ch. 8, "The Malay Problem", pp. 115-153, of his *The Malay Dilemma*, op.cit..

56

Ibid, Mahathir, *The Malay Dilemma*, p.33.

marketing, petty trading and even manufacturing. Quite a number of them were skilled craftsmen, artisans and skilled labourers although it was for a much smaller population and a more limited area because their towns were mostly found at the confluence of rivers and their estuaries.<sup>57</sup> He describes the state of Malay life at that time as follows:

In the history of the Malay sultanates of Kedah, Kelantan and Malacca there was a period when the Chinese shopkeepers were absent. These sultanates were then already organized societies with distinct urban and rural communities, and with internal and external trade. The marketing of produce, transportation and the buying and selling of goods imported or manufactured locally went on without the so-called indispensable Chinese shopkeepers. It may be that the efficiency and enterprise of the Chinese were absent, but the states were organized for commerce, primitive and limited though it must have been.<sup>58</sup>

It was the coming of the European colonial powers which changed the existing setup of Malay economic and social life. Mahathir strongly believes that the British "divide-and-rule" policy was largely responsible for the rise of a series of events which precipitated the economic dilemma that the Malays find themselves today. In the words of Mahathir, the Malays had been "outstripped"<sup>59</sup> in almost every department first by the British, and then by the Chinese. They did it directly or indirectly to keep the Malays to their primitive and traditional life. Beside these two causes, the Malay factor helped to maintain the *status quo* and made the problem more complicated especially due to their attachment to certain negative traditional and local attitudes and practices. Thus, there was no easy way to overcome this deeply rooted problem when Malaya was granted independence in 1957. In what way were colonialism, the immigrants and the Malays responsible for the nation's racial

---

57

Ibid.

58

Ibid. pp. 32-33.

59

See his article, "Rulers & ra'ayats - climax is near", in *The Sunday Times*, 9.10.1949, p. 8.

disequilibrium and the Malay backwardness? This is the question to which we now turn to elaborate.

### The Colonial Factor.

As mentioned earlier, Mahathir blamed the European powers, especially the British, for the Malay underdevelopment. The latter's "divide-and-rule" policy had created a conducive situation in which the economic, political and social dilemmas of the Malays developed. Mahathir believed that the programmes and plans introduced by the British only helped to put the Malays under their control. Even when there were plans apparently beneficial for the Malays like the "Malay Reserve Land", the establishment of the Rural Industrial Development Authority or RIDA,<sup>60</sup> the scholarship scheme and the civil service allocation,<sup>61</sup> these were mere lip-service promises offered to please them temporarily, and when really implemented were not implemented to help them seriously. At best, these plans could only avoid potential resentment among the Malays which might destroy British business and economic interests.<sup>62</sup> For example, Mahathir was convinced that by and large RIDA did not fulfill the promise that the British made.<sup>63</sup> He says,

---

<sup>60</sup> Mahathir, *The Malay Dilemma*, op.cit., pp. 38-43.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. p.70.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, pp. 36-47.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, p. 41.

What happened with RIDA is now history. Run on the lines of a welfare department, RIDA denied money to capable Malay businessmen but gave hand-outs to poor people with vague notions of going into business. Any one with any indication at all of succeeding in business was denied aid on the ground that RIDA was not meant to help the rich people become richer. Indeed, in some instances RIDA ensured that where this fairly successful Malay businessmen had no competition, they now would have competition from RIDA-financed Malays whose business methods were culculated to destroy them.<sup>64</sup>

Although Mahathir believed that what the British wanted through RIDA was not the Malay economic rehabilitation, but something else entirely, and that RIDA has not succeeded as much as it should, he also recognized that it did a lot in changing the thinking of Malays in the economic activities of the country. Most importantly is that "it banished once and for all the idea that the Government has no obligation to help improve the lot of the Malays in business."<sup>65</sup> He says,

Henceforth every Malay venture, even if it expects no Government aid, can at least insist that the Government does not obstruct it on the ground of inexperience, lack of capital and a variety of other irrelevant excuses. RIDA has also impressed on the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, that neither the Malays nor the Government were going to accept as a matter of course the exclusion of the Malays from the commercial life of the country.<sup>66</sup>

Thus he concludes that once the principle that helping the Malays was not racialism, but was actually essential for the stability of the country, was accepted, various other agencies and methods were initiated by the Malays and the Government to take advantage of this change in attitude.<sup>67</sup>

64

Ibid, p. 40.

65

Ibid, p. 41.

66

Ibid, p. 41.

67

Ibid, p. 41. Mahathir gives examples of how this change of attitude has been followed by more encouraging developments. He says, "For example, the grossly unfair provision by which Malay Reserve Land rich in tin or other minerals could be excised and substituted with less valuable jungle was no longer invoked without first letting the Malays know of the intention. As expected, this small change in policy alone saved the Malays millions of dollars. Government even insisted that a certain percentage of employees in new industries must be Malays. Valuable lands in the rural areas belonging to the

The flood of immigrants into Malaya was seen as intentionally encouraged by the British in order to help them to gain maximum profits from the land.<sup>68</sup> The process soon developed as a means for the British to create a Malayan society without any one race really having a strong voice and influence. Having made every race dependent upon them, the British were able to suppress all major potentials of disturbance; when a situation was about to get out of proportion, they promised them some concessions apparently to overcome the problem, and thus kept the situation once again under their control. With such tactics, no one particular race could pose a real threat to the British.<sup>69</sup>

#### The Immigrant Factor.

The Chinese immigrants with their "only-money culture" made the situation worse. Since they were preferred and protected by the British,<sup>70</sup> they took every opportunity to develop their small businesses into large-scale enterprises which soon developed into a sophisticated business network, dominated the entire Malayan economy, and became a real threat to the Malays. From manipulation of the weighing scales to their typical public relations skills, the Chinese managed to win over the Malay customers who were

---

state are no longer sold only to the highest bidder or to the astute Chinese or Europeans who are quicker to realize their value and more able to use them. Malays are given the chance to buy the land at prices which are within their means, or at least to pay in instalments over a reasonable period of time.... Malay Chambers of Commerce are for the first time regarded as the voice of Malay businessmen even if their members are no more than hawkers and itinerant peddlers", (pp. 41-42).

68

Ibid, p.25.

69

Mahathir Muhamad, *Menghadapi Cabaran*, (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pustaka Antara, 1976), pp.139-143.

70

Op.cit., p. 35.

unfortunately also naive in understanding these exploitative tactics.

Mahathir also talked of the plight of the Malay fisherfolk who had become the victims of the new Chinese methods of fishing like *Belat Pok* or *Kelong*<sup>71</sup> and motor-boats introduced at the expense of the Malay traditional methods using non-motorised *perahus*. This new method was detrimental to the Malays because of its greater efficiency and the need for greater capital investment. Being financially inferior to the Chinese, the Malay fishermen were in no way able to compete with these companies.<sup>72</sup>

#### The Malay Factor.

As can be seen, Mahathir's criticism went beyond a mere desire to blame external factors for the Malay backwardness. He attacked not only on the colonial exploitative policies, the conspiracy to oust the Malays, and the unhealthy practices and attitude of the Chinese towards the Malays, but also the Malays' own negative attitudes. As for the latter, he pointed out, for instance, that the exploitation of the Malays by the British and the Chinese had been much easier because the Malays themselves had accepted and practised certain negative attitudes, traditions and habits which were tailored towards others' advantage.<sup>73</sup>

One of these attributes was their having good faith in others. They seldom expressed openly what they felt for fearing of hurting

71

---

This method of fishing requires a considerable initial outlay for the erection of the large traps. In the south the method was more popularly known as *kelong*.

72

C.H.E. Det (Mahathir), "Plight of Malay Fisherfolk", *The Sunday Times*, 23.4.1950, p.11.

73

See "Code of Ethics and Value Systems of the Malays", in chapter nine of *The Malay Dilemma* and his article, "Inter/action-Inte/gration", in *Intisari* Vol.1 No.3, 1963.



others. The Malays were also too tolerant and very concerned about etiquette, especially in dealing with their guests. And since the British and the Chinese were considered their "guests", they felt obliged to keep a good relationship with them even at the expense of their own comfort. It was also a typical Malay habit to give way to others in doing something if the others were seen to have a similar intention.<sup>74</sup> Further, they did not tend to take the first initiative even when they had brilliant suggestions and ideas to implement. Mahathir says,

The constant restraint the Malay imposes on himself is unnatural. There is always an internal struggle, a conflict, and this conflict finds expression on a variety of ways. The first and most important result is a withdrawing into himself and his race. He is never frank except with those whose sympathy can be relied on absolutely. And he can rely absolutely only on his own race.... It is therefore, fallacious to accept the Malay at face value.<sup>75</sup>

For him, it is far better if the Malay politeness and their abhorrence of unpleasantness are understood for what they really are.

Malays also did not seek confrontation with others in solving any problem. They would rather seek peaceful ways to overcome it even at the expense of their own stability. They could easily forgive the mistakes of others and were fast to forget them. Moreover, they were quite receptive to certain temptations and persuasions.

Mahathir also criticised the practice of negative adat (customs) among the Malays as can be seen, for instance, in his article "Inter/action Inte/gration" contributed to *Intisari* (Vol.1 no.3, 1963). Among others, he condemned the Malay dictum, *Biar Mati Anak Jangan Mati Adat* (Let our children die rather than our adat),

---

74

Mahathir, *The Malay Dilemma*, op.cit., pp. 115-121.

75

Ibid, p. 117.

which he saw as not only detrimental to their progress but also contrary to the Islamic philosophy.<sup>76</sup>

The Malays used to spend wastefully on certain traditional ceremonies. In the marriage ceremony, for instance, they used to put much effort into preparing a grand celebration which cost them more than they could afford. *Aqad Nikah*, a simple Islamic religious marriage ceremony, was given less importance in the overall marriage ceremonies. Consequently, they were dragged into debt especially with the Chinese money lender or *tawkeh*. When this was coupled with their unbudgeted spending attitude, such a habit only forced them to divert some or all of their already low income to the *tawkeh*.<sup>77</sup> For instance, the farmers could be easily forced to sell part or all of their young *padi* to the *tawkeh* before it had set the seed. Despite its incompatibility with Islamic law, this traditional type of borrow-and-pay practice known as the *padi kunca* system had been practised for a long time. As a result, the Malays had no means of getting out of this burdensome cycle. This type of extravagance was even more obvious in royal weddings. In one case, a marriage ceremony for five Kedah royal couples which took place at the same time took a whole one year to complete and cost more than two million dollars.<sup>78</sup>

---

76

If Islam permits the consumption of pork as means of saving life even though it strongly forbids it in normal circumstances, the dictum certainly goes beyond what Islam enjoins.

77

See his article, "Changing Malay Marriage Customs" in *Sunday Times*, 20.11.1949, p.6.

78

Ibid.

Moreover, the Malay world was full of nobility and a Malay was never far from his *rajas* and chiefs. He gave way and showed them deference.<sup>79</sup>

The Malay leaders were also wrong to give the impression that the Malays were already strong. For instance, they visited the Malay farming community and praised them as the backbone of the Malay race. They did this in expectation of the farmers' blind support for the sake of their own political survival, while in reality, their supporters were illiterate, tradition-bound and economically backward. Mahathir suggested that the leaders should instead go beyond that superficiality by making more serious efforts to improve the farmers' economic standing and education. Only when they were developed in these fields could the leaders expect them to be the real backbone of the Malay race.<sup>80</sup>

In short, the Malay cultural and customary practices at this time seemed to have reflected a community which could easily be exploited should a conducive situation be created. For him, "this peculiarity of the Malays is an integral part of the problem. In fact, it contributes to the magnitude and complexity of the problem."<sup>81</sup> It was these weaknesses among the Malays which the British and the Chinese were successful in manipulating. Thus, Mahathir contends that the Malays, "the definitive people" of the country,<sup>82</sup> should not be left alone to correct themselves. Time must not be allowed to pass without any serious effort being made to put

79

---

Mahathir, *The Malay Dilemma*, op.cit., p. 116.

80

See his article, "Malay Paddy Planters Need Help" in *Sunday Times*, 30.10.1949, p.8.

81

Op.cit., p. 116.

82

Ibid, especiallay pp. 121-128 & 135 for the arguments he offers to justify his claim.

these rightful citizens back into their proper place in the present heterogenous society.<sup>83</sup>

Having considered these three major factors, Mahathir proposed "a revolutionary approach" to rehabilitate the Malays.<sup>84</sup> By this he meant "a carefully planned revolution", a radical strategy to provide a fair opportunity for the Malays to enable them to compete on an equal basis with other races. Among other things, his proposal demanded stern action on the part of Government in adopting "constructive protection" of the Malays in its development policy. They must be given proper education and training in order to prepare themselves in the face of any new developments. In other words, they must be made well-prepared in order to gain by whatever new policies were advanced. Unless this was done, Mahathir was pessimistic about the future of the Malays in their own land.<sup>85</sup>

Despite some of their negative habits, attitudes and adat, Mahathir often tried to make his own people realise their potentials which they should utilize and develop in order to improve their standard of living. His philosophy on this was,

---

83

Ibid, especially chapter seven entitled "Rehabilitation of the Malays and the Malay Dilemma", pp. 103-114.

84

Ibid.

85

He even seemed to agree with measures to curb excessive advancement by other races if necessary, so that a more balanced competition could take place. This was evident in his support for the banning of the *kelong* by the Pahang Government.

The history of any group of people has its dark and bright eras. No one nation remains backward forever. And no one nation is progressive always... When industry, efficiency, honesty, discipline and other good values are held in high regard and practised, progressiveness is certain to be achieved. But when these values are placed low, or are held in high esteem but not practised, the nation eventually becomes backward.<sup>86</sup>

He cites as an example that before the coming of the Chinese and the Indian immigrants, the Malays were already able to organize their own trade with other parts of the world, and this was also the case with their ability in traditional craftsmanship. Obviously, the Malays actually had the ability and potential to succeed and progress.<sup>87</sup>

However, in view of the strength of adat among the Malays, any attempt to change society and eradicate the negative adat, which must be firmly taken, should be carried out wisely. To defend his view he argues that the early Muslim traders must have considered these adat when they set out to spread Islam among the Malays. Mahathir believes that the "liberalism" of Islam during this period played a great role in such an effective process.<sup>88</sup>

86

---

Translation quoted from the translated version, *The Challenge* (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1993 - 4th.pr.) p.3. The Malay version quoted in *Menghadapi Cabaran*, p.3. reads, "*Sejarah mana-mana golongan manusia memang ada zaman yang gelap dan zaman yang cerah. Sesuatu bangsa tidak akan mundur selama-lamanya. Juga sesuatu bangsa tidak akan maju selama-lamanya... Apabila kerajinan, kecekapan, kebenaran dan ketertiban dan nilai-nilai lain yang baik dijunjung tinggi dan diamalkan, kemajuan tetap tercapai. Tetapi apabila nilai-nilai ini dipandang rendah, atau jika dipandang tinggi sekalipun tetapi tidak diamalkan, maka lambat laun bangsa itu akan menjadi mundur.*"

87

To prove this, he himself was involved in a business venture beginning with his small coffee and fruit stall in *Pekan Rabu* and going on to become a housing developer. He places hard work and creativity above anything else as prerequisites for success.

88

For instance, the Hindu system of *rajas* (kingship) was allowed to remain despite their claim to have been descended from mythical gods. Adat survived during that time because the conversion of Malays was not carried out by dedicated groups of missionaries but by the influence of the wealth of the Muslim traders which attracted the *rajas*. That was why the practice of Islam in the early days was neither thorough nor uniform, although it could manage to transform the *body and soul of the Malay peoples* later on.. Thus, the custom of *raja sehari* (prince of the day), for instance remained practised

Having admitted that Malaysia was already composed of various ethnic groups with different religious beliefs, the question was not any more one of displacing the non-Malays so that the Malays could take their rights, but how the imbalances and inequalities could be corrected. It was on this premise that Mahathir argued critically when proposing his "revolutionary" approach to developing Malaysia.

In the past, the national leaders adopted an approach which generally seemed to ignore the above facts. In order to show that what they did was not racially biased, they accommodated various demands from the non-Malays to keep the situation under control. Their definition of racial equality seemed to suggest that after independence every race had an equal right to grab the available opportunities especially in the economic field. For Mahathir, what was seen as the racial harmony which apparently prevailed during those days was not real. It only existed because no one particular race really had an opportunity to confront any other.<sup>89</sup>

Mahathir was against this kind of thinking which might dominate and influence the development approach. He was quick to realize that letting every race to grab the opportunity without making sure that each race was fairly well-prepared and well-trained for the competition would lead to further injustices and imbalances. For him, this was just another extension of the same process which could hinder Malay progress. The long term impact was too far-reaching for Malaysia to bear. Thus, his definitions of equality, national unity, development and nation-building were different from

---

for a long time despite peoples' conversion to Islam. Nevertheless, he says that one should not be led to think that the Malays, having accepted Islam, made no attempt to eradicate their old faith and adherence to those adats which were contradictory to the codes of Islam. Evidently, they did, but the process was very gradual.



those of "the old guard" leadership. His different view from that of the leadership had led to his expulsion in 1969.<sup>90</sup>

In conclusion, it can be said that Mahathir has been known as a stern advocate of Malay nationalism. Because of that he was labelled a Malay "ultranationalist". A close look into his views on the problems confronting the Malays in their own homeland, especially during the colonial period and the immediate years after independence, soon reveals what a modern educated Malay believes to be the plight of his own people. His understanding of the "Malay dilemma" stems from what he believes to be the very root of the problem, that is the coming of colonial powers and their control of Malaya. What followed afterward, like the dominance of Chinese businessmen in the Malaysian economy and the *laisser-faire* attitude of the early leadership, were the resulting consequences of colonialism that had to be shouldered by the nation as a whole, especially the Malays.

Thus, the Malays must be "rehabilitated". Given the complex situation, this matter will not be easy. The Malays cannot be transformed overnight. They must be made aware of their negative habits and attitudes. They must be shown what are the *adats* they have to forego or modify in order to progress.<sup>91</sup> They need to be told of their proper religious teaching so that they can be motivated to advance. Islam, as a way of life, which can never be detached from the Malays, must be made functional more effectively

---

90

*The Times* on 27.9.1969 has specifically reported on this incident under the title "Tunku's party expel critic".

91

A comprehensive article by Mahathir on the Malay *adat* and his criticism of their practice can be read in his "Inter/action Inte/gration", *Intisari*, op.cit..

to ensure a dynamic development of society.<sup>92</sup> And, above all, the Government must be firm in its development policy in order to correct this situation.

The above discussion directly or indirectly touches on the main aspects that constitute Mahathir's idealism. This has also defined in one way or the other his approach to societal development. The translation of these ideals into practice is, however, much more complex than one might expect in view of the various psychological, constitutional, social and political realities. One of the constraints within which such an idealism is bound to operate is what we term the "national ideology". The following part seeks to identify the main philosophical elements that constitute this concept.

## 2.2. The National Ideology.

What we mean by the national ideology is the nation's main source of reference consisting of fundamental principles, regulations and laws that defines the main structures of the nation and its society, as well as controlling and guiding the running and progress of its society. Malaysian ideology cannot be fully understood without considering two main aspects, namely the sources from which this ideology is derived, and its major principles and aspects.

The most important source of national ideology is the Federal Constitution. This Constitution does not only provide key definitions fundamental to the makeup of the nation, but it also contains principal laws and regulations which relate to the governing of the nation as a whole. As such, it defines the main

---

92

His Islamic perspective of the various problems confronting the Malays can be found, among other things, in his *Menghadapi Cabaran*, his Prime Ministerial speeches on various issues related to Islam; and also occasionally in his early articles sent to *The Sunday Times* on various subjects.

pillars upon which Malaysia is built, and determines the limits of any changes which can be initiated at any stage.<sup>93</sup> The supremacy of this Constitution is instituted as follows:

This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law passed after Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.<sup>94</sup>

What are the main aspects of the Constitution which can be considered as the underlying principles of the national philosophy?

i. The Religion.

Previously, we said that constitutionally Islam is recognised as the official religion of the Federation, and other religions are allowed to be practised in peace and harmony.<sup>95</sup> This provision is further defined by Part II Article 11 under "Freedom of Religion" as follows: (that) every person has the right to profess and practise his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it; (that) no person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own; (that) every religious group has the right a) to manage its own religious affairs, b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes, and c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law. While Clause (4) states that state law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, federal law may

---

93

Any provision in the Federal constitution cannot be changed without the support of a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives.

94

*Federal Constitution*, (Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services, 1990), part I article 4.

95

*Ibid*, Part 1 Article 3.

control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.<sup>96</sup>

Other important provisions concerning Islam as enshrined in the Constitution are as follows: first, that the Ruler of each state is the Head of the religion of Islam, and that they may authorize the Yang di Pertuan Agong to represent them in any acts, observances or ceremonies with respect to which the Conference of Rulers has agreed that they should extend to the Federation; second, that the States of Malacca, Penang, Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan shall have the King as their Head of religion;<sup>97</sup> and third, that every religious group has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children in its own religion, and the Government, state and Federal, can assist in establishing and maintaining Islamic institutions, providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose.<sup>98</sup>

We shall examine in our later analysis how this constitutional Islam is relevant [or otherwise] in the context of the Government's development strategy especially regarding its Islamization programme.

## ii. The Royalty.

According to the Constitution, the Malaysian system of government is not only democratic but also monarchical. As such royalty has a special place in the Constitution. The King or the Yang di Pertuan Agong is the Supreme Head of the Federation, and shall take

---

96

Ibid, Part II Article 11.

97

Ibid, Part I Article 3.

98

Ibid, Part II Article 12.

precedence over all persons in the Federation and shall not be liable to any proceedings whatsoever in any court.<sup>99</sup> The King is elected by the Conference of Rulers for a term of five years. However, he can resign or be removed from office by the Conference upon his misbehaviour.<sup>100</sup>

Once elected, the King cannot, a) exercise his function as Ruler of his State except those of Head of the religion of Islam; b) hold any post carrying any remuneration; c) actively engage in any commercial enterprise; d) receive any emoluments of any kind whatever payable or accruing to him as the Ruler of his State under the provisions of the Constitution of that state or of any state law and; e) be absent from the country more than fifteen days without consent from the Conference of Rulers except on a state visit.<sup>101</sup>

Each of the nine Malaysian rulers performs a religious duty as head of Islam at state level. However, the states of Penang, Sabah, Sarawak, Malacca and the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan have the King as their religious head. The King has the power to grant pardons to offenders.<sup>102</sup> In exercising this function, the King shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, or of a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet.<sup>103</sup> To advise him in the exercise of his functions the King shall appoint a Cabinet of Ministers. It is the Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, which is responsible for the actual running of the

---

99

Ibid, Part IV Article 32 Clause 1.

100

Ibid, Clause 3.

101

Ibid, Part IV Article 34 Clauses 1 to 5.

102

Ibid, Part IV Article 42.

103

Ibid, Article 40.

Government.<sup>104</sup> The King is also the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the Federation.<sup>105</sup>

During the Mahathir era, two controversial amendments relating to the special status of the Rulers have been made, in 1984 and 1993, respectively.<sup>106</sup> Since any issue relating to Royalty is sensitive, Mahathir has been seen to have taken moves which could have risked his political future. Some people interpret such moves as the natural outcome of Mahathir's own style in dealing with any obstacle hindering societal development. We shall touch on this subject later.

### iii. The Malays.

There are some provisions in the Federal Constitution which have some bearings upon the definition and status of the Malays. For instance, Part VI Chapter 4 has a special provision regarding Malay Reservations. A Malay Reservation is defined by the Constitution as "land reserved for alienation to Malays or to natives of the State in which it lies."<sup>107</sup> A Malay in this context is defined as "any person who, under the law of the State in which he is resident, is treated as a Malay for the purposes of the reservation of land."<sup>108</sup> Clause 1 recognises that any land which was a Malay reservation before the independence continues to enjoy that status,

---

104

Ibid, Article 43.

105

Ibid, Article 41.

106

The first amendment concerns the length of period within which the King must give royal assent to the passed bill, and the second touches on to the power of court, to charge any member of the royal family who commits an offence.

107

Op.cit., Article 89 Clause 6.

108

Ibid.



while Clause 2 states that any land which is not, for the time being, a Malay reservation in accordance with the existing law and has not been developed or cultivated, may be declared as a Malay reservation in accordance with that law. Also, the Government of any State may declare a Malay reservation any land acquired by that Government through agreement for that purpose. However, a land cannot be declared a Malay reservation if it is owned or occupied by a non-Malay.<sup>109</sup>

Another important provision relating to the Malays can be found in Article 153 entitled "Reservation of quotas in respect of services, permits, etc., for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak". It first stresses that it is the responsibility of the King to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities.<sup>110</sup> Among its concerns is to ensure a reasonable proportion of positions in the public service (other than the public service of a State), and of trade and business permits or licences, and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities. However, the Constitution states that this should not operate to deprive any person of any right, privilege, permit etc. he enjoyed.<sup>111</sup>

If the number of places offered by the authority of a University, College or such educational institution for any course of study is less than the number of candidates qualified for such places, it is lawful for the King to give direction to the authority

---

109

Ibid, Clause 4.

110

Ibid, Clause 1 Article 153.

111

Ibid, Article 153, Clause 4.

to ensure the reservation of such proportion of places for the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak.<sup>112</sup>

However, the most important provision regarding the Malays is the definition of the Malays itself as stated in Part XII, Article 160 entitled "Interpretation". Thus, a "Malay" according to the Constitution is, "a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and - a. was before *Merdeka* day born in the Federation or in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or b. is the issue of such a person.

#### iv. The Language.

Although the Constitution recognizes the Malay language as the national language, it does not prevent people from using, teaching or learning other languages, except for official purposes.<sup>113</sup> "Official purpose" means any purpose of the Government, Federal or State, and includes any purpose of a public authority.<sup>114</sup>

The second important source from which the principles of national ideology are derived is *Rukunegara* or literally, pillars of the nation. We need to note that since independence, the Malaysian Constitution has been revised and amended from time to time to accommodate the demands of the changing situation. Other developments which ran parallel to the principle and spirit of the Constitution have also invariably taken place. One such development

---

112

Ibid.

113

Ibid, Article 152.

114

Ibid, Article 152, Clause 6.

was the introduction of the *Rukunegara* in 1970.<sup>115</sup> In that year, the Government was prompted to formulate an acceptable national consensus and declaration which could reflect everybody's commitment and loyalty to the nation after experiencing the bitter 1969 racial riot. It aimed at the creation of a united Malaysian society.

In a way, *Rukunegara* becomes an official declaration and summary of the national ideology to be followed by the Government and the public as it enshrines the main principles of the Federal Constitution. Hence, both the Constitution and the *Rukunegara* can be considered as the primary sources of the national ideology.<sup>116</sup> The full text of the *Rukunegara* Declaration reads as follows:

Our nation, Malaysia, being dedicated; to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; to maintain a democratic way of life; to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared; to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions; to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and technology. We, her peoples, pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided by these principles: Belief in God; Loyalty to King and Country; Upholding the Constitution; Rule of Law; Good Behaviour and Morality.<sup>117</sup>

Aidit Ghazali argues that on the superficial level, the elements of *Rukunegara* do not give rise to gross contradiction with Islamic tenets. However, he says,

---

115

International Law Book Services, *Malaysia Kita: Panduan dan Rujukan Untuk Peperiksaan Am Kerajaan*, (Kuala Lumpur, n.d.), p.45.

116

Speaking on Radio Malaysia on 17 July 1969, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie who headed the newly established National Unity Department said that the *Rukunegara* drew its inspiration from the Federal Constitution. In another speech at *Maktab Perguruan Lembah Pantai* on 2 August 1969, he said that the leaders should recognize the principle of *Bumiputera* and observe the accepted norms and values as enshrined in the National Ideology or *Rukunegara* (quoted from *Sejarah Pembangunan Bangsa dan Negara* or *The History of the National Development* by Mohamad Idris Saleh, pp.188-9).

117

Quoted as it appears on the opening page of all Malaysia plans since 1970.

A deeper analysis of the underlying philosophy behind these declarations will necessarily call for greater qualifications if these declarations are to be acceptable as truly Islamic. This is pertinent especially to an understanding of the formulating mode and nature of the development plans in Malaysia since the independence.<sup>118</sup>

Having considered the plurality of religious beliefs in Malaysia, the Government seemed to have a strong belief that these tenets could help in the creation of a peaceful society based on broad religious aspiration. It reflects, in the first place, the rejection of an atheistic society of any sort, communism and the like. Thus, people are not expected to live without religion.

On the other hand, belief in God does not necessarily refer to Allah, the true God according to Islam, the official religion of the Federation. Since a clear interpretation is absent, it is quite understandable that it remains obscure as to how Islam is to find its way to total implementation, a natural consequence of belief in Allah. And, if Islam is held up as being suitable for all, including the non-Muslims, by way of its provision for tolerance, freedom of faith etc., then such a general proclamation does not necessarily lead towards the intended direction. On the other hand, this very first pillar of *Rukunegara* may provide justification for the Government to implement Islam more intensively in the national development strategy.

This being the case, Islam in the Constitution has, more often than not, been the subject of interpretation by various quarters. It seems that the type of role that Islam can play in national development process depends largely on the type of the ruling political leaders, especially on the person who holds the highest position in the Government. It is his political will that largely

determines the extent to which Islam can be more or less acceptable for greater implementation, at least by the Government.<sup>119</sup>

Beside these two primary sources of the National ideology, the Federal Constitution and the *Rukunegara*, there are some major plans and policies which were formulated in the past to guide the medium and long term development of specific areas. These may be referred to as the secondary or complementary sources of national ideology or rather development guidelines. Among them are *Dasar Pelajaran Kebangsaan* (National Education Policy), *Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan* (National Culture Policy), the Malaysia Plans, and *Rancangan Jangka Panjang Pertama dan Kedua* (First and Second Outline Perspective Plans). In reality, these policies and plans were formulated based on the above two main sources, and they also have significant bearings upon the development process by way of their lofty objectives and specific programmes to be achieved and implemented within certain periods of time. In theory, the various stages of national development should be guided by this framework of national ideology.<sup>120</sup>

---

119

In our earlier remarks, we said that the past leaders generally held the view that the status of Islam in the Constitution should not be taken to imply that this country is an Islamic state. Thus, the Government's practice of Islam, at both the Federal and state levels, was confined mostly to official ceremonies and personal matters. The first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, for instance, was a strong advocate of such a view, and the typical Islamic orientation of his Government continued to be inherited without fundamental changes by his successors. Many scholars agree that only after Mahathir became the Prime Minister has Islam been treated with quite a different approach. We shall analyze critically his so-called dynamic and more global religious approach in the next chapter.

120

Of these policies, *Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan* (DKK) is crucial for interpreting the main socio-cultural elements which are supposed to characterize an ideal Malaysian society. Its three main principles or pillars are agreed to be as follows: a) that the national culture should have its roots in the culture of the original people of this region; b) that suitable elements from other cultures can be accommodated into it and; c) that Islam is an important element of it. Cf. *Malaysia Kita*, op.cit., pp. 264-266.

With the drawing up of the main principles and elements of the Federal Constitution, the *Rukunegara* and the major policies which together constitute the national ideology or the basis of national philosophy, it is understandable that any development strategy, at any period of time, should be based on such an ideological foundation. This ideological constraint, together with a number of other external and local constraints like historical, geo-political and socio-cultural factors, define, in one way or the other, the limitations of the development process in Malaysia. Mahathir's idealism and vision must be seen to operate within these constraints. It is in this context that our analysis of Malaysian development during Mahathir's period, and its impact on society, will take place in the next chapter. To provide a background to this analysis, let us first have a general impression of the major policies introduced by his administration.

### 3. A Profile of the Major Development Policies During the Mahathir Administration.

Several logical classifications can be adopted to view Mahathir's development policy from different perspectives: long term and short term; domestic and foreign; socio-economic, political and religious-cultural etcetera. Although this arrangement may serve certain purposes, we do not intend to follow it fully. Rather, we will select some policies which are closely related to our concern and which are believed to have a notable impact on the Muslims' socio-cultural and religious life. Special emphasis will be placed on Islamization policy and Vision 2020. In this research, the word *policy* is used interchangeably with such other terms of references as programme, slogan, plan and any other moves initiated and introduced during this period. As one policy does not stand



exclusively separated from the other, it is important to understand each policy in relation to the other.

### 3.1. Islamization Policy.

This policy which was launched in April 1982 and is closely related to our analysis can be attributed largely to Mahathir's personal commitment. In order to provide a critical analysis of this policy later, it is important to understand its background and philosophy.

As noted earlier, the official religion of the Malaysian Federation is Islam. Traditionally, the power to administer religious affairs belonged to the Malay Rulers who were also the heads of states. The power was, however, limited to the running of such institutions as religious schools, *Sharī'ah* courts and mosques. Since the independence, the power of the Federal Government has been extended to include the running of *Musabaqah Membaca Al-Qur'an* (Qur'an Recitation Competitions), the nation's annual international event.

Nonetheless, the contribution of earlier administrations to the development of Islamic religion in Malaysia should not be grossly underestimated. Considering the fact that the nation was still in the early years of independence, any contribution, however small according to the present standard or certain quarters, must be seen in the context of the situation that prevailed in the immediate post-independence period. Surrounded by a complicated political, social, ethnic and religious situation at that time, the moderate religious approach and programmes that took place during that time were probably thought of by the leadership as reasonable to accommodate the existing realities. Hence, the establishment of LUTH and PERKIM and the initiative to establish *Rabitah Alam Islamiyyah* by the Tunku etc. for instance, might explain the nature of 'the other contributions' made by the earlier leadership to the

Islamic religion apart from the said traditional religious programmes.

Under the Mahathir administration, the above structure was maintained. However, a new approach to practising Islam has been adopted. Having stressed the importance of gradual religious improvement, the government introduced what was originally called "the inculcation of Islamic values into the Government's administration" programme. We simply refer to it throughout this work as the Islamization policy. The policy however, does not involve directly the areas which have been traditionally under the Rulers' jurisdiction.

According to *Beberapa Konsep Tentang Nilai-nilai Islam Siri I* (Some Concepts On the Islamic Values - Series I) issued by the Islamic Centre, the main objectives of the policy are as follows: to cultivate the spirit of respecting Islamic values; to respect goodness and condemn evil; to develop useful attitude towards the nation; to eliminate the negative attitude towards duties; to produce excellent service; to train one's self to be more disciplined; and to discharge the duties with trust and dedication. The lofty objective of the policy is to establish a peaceful, respectable society or nation with its own identity.<sup>121</sup>

With this new religious emphasis and approach, people are urged to practice Islam in its broader sense, and the government itself seems to have taken significant moves accordingly. For example, *Musabagah Membaca Al-Qur'ān* has been renamed as *Ujian Tilāwah Al-Qur'ān* (Qur'an Reading Test) in order to be more

---

121

*Risalah Penerangan Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam*, (Kuala Lumpur: Prime Minister's Department, n.d.). Cf. *Malaysia Kita*, op.cit., p. 301.

consistent with the spirit of Islam as *al-Qur'ān* should not, in the first place, be used for competition but for practice.<sup>122</sup>

The policy was also manifested in the Government's "Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy"<sup>123</sup> slogan meant to improve the quality of work especially among civil servants in order to achieve higher productivity. "Leadership By Example"<sup>124</sup> is another important move that encourages the inculcation of leadership qualities among civil servants so that a better working environment can be created to help increase productivity.<sup>125</sup>

122

Reading of *al-Qur'ān* must be accurate. Therefore, the test aims at finding the best reading consistent with the rules of the recitation called *Tajwid*. The change of name was followed by a change in its contents which include memorization of *Qur'anic* verses or *Menghafaz*.

123

In Malay, it is called *Bersih, Cekap dan Amanah*.

124

Or *Kepimpinan Melalui Teladan*.

125

One of the characteristics of Mahathir's administration is introduction of various slogans as part of the Government's campaign to change people's attitudes and psychology. One of the earliest slogans introduced after he became Prime Minister was called *Kepimpinan Melalui Teladan* or Leadership By Example. Mahathir is committed to hard work and often stresses that words must be followed by action. To inspire the public, his Government came up with this slogan which was launched officially before an audience of 10,000 including ministers, state chief ministers, heads of departments and civil servants on 19 March 1983 at the Stadium Tun Razak at Kuala Lumpur. Among other things, the slogan emphasizes the inculcation of leadership qualities among civil servants, so that they can show a good example to others. By this process, the Government hopes to create a conducive environment in order to achieve better productivity.

Another important slogan introduced to reflect the image of his Government was *Bersih, Cekap dan Amanah* or Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy. The main aim was to upgrade the quality of work and productivity. The preference for such values was rather symbolic as it reflected the Government's commitment to genuine and positive values. The move has been seen as a

significant departure from previous administrations which did not seem to bother much with developing people's psychology through such means. In the end, it was hoped that such an official move could help develop and upgrade positive habits and attitudes among civil servants especially towards work and ethics which would, in turn, improve productivity.

Following this slogan, several steps have been initiated which include, a) compulsory declaration of individual property by Cabinet ministers, b) reactivation of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, c) an increase in the number of one-stop-centres for payment of various bills, d) introduction of a punch card system, e) use of name-tags by Government servants; f) an open-office

Most important of all is the establishment of some economic and education-based institutions like the International Islamic University, the Islamic Banking, the Islamic Insurance System (*Takāful*), the Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM), the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) and others. The impact of this institutions will be analysed in the next chapter.

Some people argue that the Government's Islamization programme was due to an increasing demand forced by a substantial degree of local Islamic consciousness manifesting itself in various organizational and behavioural forms. The announcement that such a religious agenda would be embarked on has prompted people to ask whether the policy has any political motives or has really been developed to help the Government establish an Islamic state.<sup>126</sup>

While the notion of an Islamic state is unclear to many people, the policy seems to have sown doubt among some quarters. For example, there are groups of Muslim activists who are sceptical about the Government's sincerity and seriousness about actualizing Islamic ideals on the one hand, and non-Muslims who are worried about the Government's commitment to and greater emphasis on Islam, which is thought to deny their religious rights on the other. It is between these two paradoxes that the Islamization policy expresses itself throughout the Mahathir era. We shall consider various responses to especially to this policy especially in Chapter Five.

---

system, g) conferment of Awards and certificates on excellent civil servants, h) advanced studies and training for officers and, i) report by the Chief Auditor. Cf. Mohd. Idris, *Sejarah Pembangunan Bangsa dan Negara*, op.cit. p. 156-157.

See Diane K. Mauzy's and R.S. Milne's "The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline Through Islam" in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 56. No.4 Winter 1983-84.

### 3.2. Vision 2020.

Vision 2020, or *Wawasan 2020* as it is generally known in Malaysia, has dominated public discussion since it was put forward for the first time by Mahathir in early 1991.<sup>127</sup> Following the announcement, various seminars, talks, conferences and the like, have been organized at various levels to discuss it which have given rise to a number of publications in the forms of books, articles, and proceedings etc..<sup>128</sup> What is interesting about this vision is that the Prime Minister has spelt out his views on the concept of development as he thought suitable for Malaysia, and how this could be achieved over a certain period of time. What does this vision mean. A better understanding of it can be obtained by consulting the said working paper entitled *Malaysia: The Way Forward*.

Taking a fully developed Malaysia by the year 2020 as the main theme of his paper, Mahathir suggests that in order to face the complex challenge of the modern time, Malaysia must be able to be developed "in its own mould". He hopes that the present Malaysian society will be the last generation to live a so-called developing country. His dream of a developed Malaysia is made crystal clear by defining the desired concept of development.<sup>129</sup> Generally, his concept of development is based on the premise that there are

---

127

As contained in his working paper entitled "Malaysia: The Way Forward". This paper was presented by him in conjunction with the launching of *Majlis Perdagangan Malaysia* (Malaysia Trade Council), of which he was the chairman, on 28 February 1991. It was published jointly by the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka and the Institut Kajian Strategik dan Antarabangsa (ISIS) under the title *Malaysia: Melangkah Ke hadapan* (Malaysia: The Way Forward). The first print dated September, 1991 on which our discussion is based.

128

It is quite obvious now that people are taking this vision as an agenda to develop the nation towards this direction in the coming years.

129

Mahathir's definition and concept of development is crucial for our analysis of Government's development policy especially in the next chapter.

strengths and weaknesses in all the nineteen developed countries, West and East, and in other ideologies which can be taken as a lesson in order to advance the country.<sup>130</sup> What does a fully developed country mean according to this vision?

First, Mahathir proposes that the intended development should not only mean economic development despite its paramount importance to support other aspects of development. He says,

Malaysia should not be developed only in the economic sense. It must be a nation that is fully developed along all the dimensions: economically politically, socially, spiritually, psychologically and culturally. We must be fully developed in terms of national unity and social cohesion, in terms of our economy, in terms of social justice, political stability, system of Government, quality of life, social and spiritual values, national pride and confidence.<sup>131</sup>

It is based on this definition of development that Mahathir foresees the creation of a fully developed Malaysia in "its own mould" by the year 2020, as he describes it;

By the year 2020, Malaysia can be a united nation, with a confident Malaysian society, infused by a strong moral and ethical values, living in a society that is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and prosperous, and in a full possession of an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient.<sup>132</sup>

Despite the noble aim to be achieved, Mahathir reminds people of the nine strategic challenges that need to be overcome before such a nation can be expected. They are the challenges: (i) of establishing a united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny;<sup>133</sup> (ii) of creating a psychologically liberated, secure and developed Malaysian society with faith and confidence in

130

---

Mahathir, *Malaysia: Melangkah Ke Hadapan*, op.cit., pp. 1-2.

131

Ibid.

132

Ibid.

133

This must be a nation at peace with itself, territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and full and fair partnership, made up of one "Bangsa Malaysia" with political loyalty and dedication to the nation.



itself, justifiably proud of what it is, of what it has accomplished, robust enough to face all manner of adversity;<sup>134</sup> (iii) of fostering and developing a mature democratic society, practising a form of mature consensual, community-oriented Malaysian democracy that can be a model for many developing countries; (iv) of establishing a fully moral and ethical society, whose citizens are strong in religious and spiritual values and imbued with the highest of ethical standards; (v) of establishing a mature, liberal and tolerant society in which Malaysians of all colours and creeds are free to practise and profess their customs, cultures and religious beliefs and yet feeling that they belong to one nation; (vi) of establishing a scientific and progressive society, a society that is innovative and forward-looking, one that is not only a consumer of technology but also a contributor to the scientific and technological civilisation of the future; (vii) of establishing a fully caring society and a caring culture, a social system in which the welfare of the people will revolve not around the state or the individual but around a strong and resilient family system; (viii) of ensuring an economically just society;<sup>135</sup> and (ix) of establishing a prosperous society, with an economy that is fully competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient.<sup>136</sup>

As economic development is crucial for any nation to progress, Mahathir elaborates this aspect with the following two precautions:

---

134

This Malaysian society must be distinguished by the pursuit of excellence, fully aware of all its potentials, psychologically subservient to none, and respected by the peoples of other nations.

135

This is a society in which there is a fair and equitable distribution of the wealth of the nation, in which there is a full partnership in economic progress. Such a society cannot be in place so long as there is the identification of race with economic function, and the identification of economic backwardness with race.

136

Mahathir, *Malaysia: The Way Forward*, op.cit., pp. 3-4.

first, "the comprehensive development towards the developed society that we want - however each of us may wish to define it - cannot mean material and economic advancement only. Far from it. Economic development must not become the be-all and end-all of our national endeavours", and second, the issues of economic development and economic social justice "must go hand in hand for the foreseeable future."<sup>137</sup>

For him, the economic development must be tailored towards achieving the two prongs of the NEP, namely eradication of poverty regardless of race and irrespective of geographical location, and removing the identification of race with major economic function. For the first objective it is important to ensure that all Malaysians living in rural or urban areas must be moved above the line of absolute poverty.<sup>138</sup> For Mahathir, a developed Malaysia must have a wide and vigorous middle class and must provide full opportunities for those in the bottom third to climb their way out of the pit of relative poverty.<sup>139</sup>

As for the second prong, he says, "if we want to build an equitable society, then we must accept some affirmative action."<sup>140</sup> Ultimately, it must be expected that, through legitimate means, the major and important sectors of employment should be a good mix of the ethnic groups that make the Malaysian nation. Also, there should be a healthy development of a viable and robust *Bumiputera* commercial and industrial community. It is desired that economic

---

137

Ibid, p.5.

138

Among other things, it means providing enough food so that not a solitary Malaysian is subjected to the travesty of gross under-nourishment, essential shelter, access to health facilities and all the basic essentials.

139

Mahathir, *Malayasia*, op.cit., p.6.

140

Ibid.

backwardness should not any more be identified with race in a developed Malaysia. However, this does not imply, Mahathir argues, that all individuals should have an equal income as this is impossible.<sup>141</sup> A full partnership in economic progress is important so that a fully competitive *Bumiputera* community will be at par with the non-*Bumiputera* community. This needs a mental revolution and a cultural transformation.<sup>142</sup>

Based on the previous economic achievements, Malaysia needs to progress at the rate of seven per cent growth annually for the next thirty years.<sup>143</sup> For this to be achieved, the constructive role of the private sector is necessary, while the Government will continue to provide physical infra-structures and the most conducive business environment consistent with its other social priorities besides being responsible for ensuring that economic activities are carried out within the laws and regulations.<sup>144</sup> More concentration will be placed on industrial activities, especially in the manufacturing sector.<sup>145</sup> This is necessary in order to ensure export-led growth despite the global slowdown, the rise of protectionism and trade blocks.<sup>146</sup> The inflow of foreign investment will be further fostered in order to accelerate the industrialization drive. In addition, the

---

141

Ibid, p.7.

142

Ibid, p.8.

143

In 1960s, the average growth rate was 5.1 per cent compared to 7.8 percent in 1970s and 5.9 per cent in 1980s.

144

Op. cit., pp.12-15.

145

Ibid.16.

146

Ibid, p.18.

human resource will be given greater attention as it is the lasting resource for productive development.<sup>147</sup>

### 3.3. Other Policies.

Look-East Policy. On February the 8th, 1982, the Prime Minister announced at the 5th. Joint Annual Conference of MAJECA/JAMEACA in Kuala Lumpur that the government was introducing a *Look-East Policy*. By this was meant to study and select the best examples from the East, especially from the more advanced Eastern countries like Japan and Korea.<sup>148</sup> These elements would have to be modified in order to suit the local environment. The success of these countries was to be studied, so that it could be made to inspire the national development, especially in such aspects as management and organization of public administration. Focus was given to such values as hard work, discipline, loyalty and dedication to work, priority to team or group, and lessening of the gap between the executive and general workers.<sup>149</sup> Several programmes have been introduced to help achieve this policy. Among them are industrial and technical training, the Academic Studies scheme, Inter-Institution Relations, and the Business Development Training Scheme.

The Policy of 70 Million Population. In September 1982, the Prime Minister suggested at the UMNO General Assembly that Malaysia should be able to increase the growth rate of its population in order to achieve an excellent success. He proposed that within 115

---

147

Ibid, p.21.

148

Mohamad Idris Saleh, Che Su Mustaffa and Fuziah Shaffie, *Sejarah Pembangunan Bangsa dan Negara*, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1994), p.175.

149

Ibid.

to 120 years from now the Malaysian population may be increased to 70 millions.<sup>150</sup> His proposal was incorporated in the *Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysian Plan*. In his *Mahathir Administration*, Chung Kek Yoong, summarizes the reason for such a move as follows:

Mahathir's vision of the newly industrialized Malaysia involved marketing most of the country's products locally. This, in turn, meant Malaysia's population base would have to be enlarged. This was the rationale behind the controversial decision to increase Malaysia's population to 70 million by the year 2100.<sup>151</sup>

Since the success of this policy is heavily dependent upon several other factors, it was thought crucial to improve simultaneously the economic, social, man power, environmental, food, agricultural and other aspects with speedier intensity. Theoretically, the policy involves all levels of society, the Government, private sector and the people. As such, there is a need for a closer cooperation among those involved to materialize the idea. On the Government side, some incentives and programmes have been introduced towards achieving its objective. They are tax reduction and benefits for those who have five children, various kinds of help and assistance for a mother (and her family) who gives birth, and review of the roles of The Lembaga Kependudukan dan Pembangunan Keluarga Negara (The National Authority of Population and Family Development) or LKPKN.<sup>152</sup>

The Economic Policies. It has to be noted here that Mahathir is an admirer and a stern advocate of industrialization. Parallel with his policy preferences, we can identify some of his Government's economic policies which bear this aspiration. Notable

150

---

Razak Mamat and Muhammad Zakaria, *Fakta dan Maklumat Kenegaraan Malaysia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Longman Malaysia, n.d.), p.144.

ChungKekYoong, *Mahathir Administration: Leadership and Change in a Multi-racial Society*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1987), p.20.

152

Ibid.

among them are privatization, Malaysia Incorporated and the National Industrial Plan.

Greater attention has been paid to privatization policy since the middle of 1983 i.e. after the launching of the Malaysia Incorporated by the Prime Minister. Among its objectives were to reduce the Government's financial burden, to improve efficiency and productivity, to encourage economic growth, to distribute national resources efficiently, and to speed up the creation of groups of Bumiputera entrepreneurs. Basically, this policy emphasizes the role of the private sector in national development. Privatization involves the transfer of certain Government controlled powers, interests and investments to the private sector as against nationalization which entails a process of increasing Government power and control over the private economy. In its simplest form, privatization requires the Government to hand over the running of its controlled services to private companies owned either by individuals or groups. Two of the Government fully-monopolized agencies which have been privatized are telecommunication (Telekom) and electricity (The National Electricity Board).<sup>153</sup>

For practical reasons, the Government has allowed privatization to take place in any of the following forms: a) Partial Privatization; b) Selective Privatization; c) company-like management; d) Privatization in form of private management; e) Contractual Privatization and; f) Lease Privatization.

---

153

In order to realize this policy, a committee was set up in the *Economic Planning Unit* (EPU) of the Prime Minister's Department. It comprises the Implementation and Coordinating Units of the Financial Ministry, and the Public Services Department (PSD) which are responsible for formulating comprehensive guidelines to help other ministries and departments in this direction. The following issues and aspects have been incorporated in the guidelines: a) Privatization and New Economic Policy (NEP); b) Privatization and Property Policy; c) Legal aspects; d) Assessment and Pricing Policy; e) Manpower and Service; f) Dialogue with private sectors and; f) Privatization Planning.



Meanwhile, the idea of Malaysia Incorporated was first proposed by the Prime Minister at the launching of an INTAN (National Institute of Public Administration), Forum on 25 February 1983. It was meant to encourage the private sector to contribute meaningfully to the national development. Its rationale has been that when the nation can achieve higher growth, the private sector can also benefit from it. The Government, in turn, was able to increase its income by collecting corporate tax. Theoretically, this policy should be able to develop closer cooperation between the private sector and the Government, so that the former's advancement could help develop the country.<sup>154</sup>

In order to develop Malaysia as an industrial country, the Prime Minister, on the 3rd. February 1986, launched the *National Industrial Plan* with the following objectives: a) to work out the details of industrial activities including small industries in order to fully utilize resources; b) to prepare a realistic industrial profile in order to suit market limits, extent of capacity, and demand and supply of the products; c) to consolidate the existing industries by means of raw material production; and d) to formulate

Several approaches have been identified in implementing this policy, namely a) to explain the policy particularly to the officials and executives of both public and private sectors in order to gain their support; b) to give directives to all ministries, State Government Agencies and departments, and District Offices to form Consultative Panels consisting of senior officers of both government and private sectors and; c) to place public service officers in private companies so that they are able to gain knowledge and understand their perspectives. This latter strategy has been assisted by The British-Malaysian Industry And Trade Association who have received public service officers to work in their companies for one year.

Another way to implement this concept was by establishing *Malaysian Sogoshoshas*, or (aggressive) giant conglomerates, in order to produce, distribute and market the products of the new industries under its heavy industrialization programme. The Government's call for the establishment of Malaysian-style *sogoshoshas*, which have full backing from the Government, was described as a bid to expand its exports overseas. Cf. also Cheng Kek Yoong, *Mahathir Administration*, op.cit., p.20.

the technological requirements of the sectors and comprehensive programmes to achieve them.<sup>155</sup>

The Government has identified a number of potential industries which have been given special attention. Among them are rubber-based products, palm-based products, food processing, timber-based products, chemicals and petrochemicals, non-iron-based products, non metal mining, electronics and electrical goods, transportation, machinery and engineering products, iron and aluminium-based products, and cloths and textiles.<sup>156</sup>

Several strategies have been developed in order to achieve the stipulated objectives, notably restructuring the existing industrial incentives, identifying new market countries such as socialist countries and other developing countries and encouraging the import substitutes sector, encouraging people to use Malaysian-made products, expanding industrial activities to less developed areas, encouraging research and development programmes among public and private sectors, encouraging heavy industry in order to generate new industrial development and encouraging the growth of small industries.<sup>157</sup>

Foreign Policy. Foreign policies are formulated according to the needs of a nation. Most of Malaysia's previous foreign policies have been maintained by the Mahathir administration, although some of them have either been redefined or given a new dimension in terms of priority and emphasis. A few other new policies have also been

---

155

Razak Mamat, *Fakta dan Maklumat*, op.cit., p.134.

156

Ibid, p.135.

157

The National Industrial Plan places greater emphasis on heavy industry. Since Malaysia is a small country and has limited financial resources, the move towards industrialization has to be very selective.

introduced.<sup>158</sup> Since Mahathir has quite a different perception as to how a country should play its role in the international affairs, his foreign policies seem to have taken a certain direction as manifested, for instance, in the nation's policy preferences. Under his administration, the order of countries with which Malaysia has established relations was set as follows: first, ASEAN; second, Muslim countries; third, Neutral countries; fourth, Commonwealth countries and lastly countries other than the above.<sup>159</sup>

Beside this preferential consideration, Mahathir has also been vocal at international forums and conferences when speaking on such subjects as Antarctica, apartheid, human rights, democracy and Western neo-imperialism. It is also during his time that two significant developments have taken place regarding the nation's foreign policies towards Britain. They are the "Buy-British Last policy" (1982) and the banning of Government contracts from British companies (1994).

#### Conclusion.

Contemporary Malaysian development has its roots in the earlier development experiences especially after the departure of Singapore in 1965. Prior to this year, Malaysia had to concentrate on dealing with the various socio-political problems as a result of long period of colonial rule despite the formal political independence in 1957. Western colonisation of Malaya seemed to be the central factor behind Mahathir's radical development philosophy. Before he came

---

158

For a discussion of the nature of foreign policy in the early years of independence (the Tunku era), see for instance, Martin C. Ott, "Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia", in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1971, pp. 225-239.

159

For an account of the Malaysian foreign policy see, for instance, Murugesu Pathmanathan, *Malaysia and World Affairs: The Mahathir Impact*, (Petaling Jaya: Economic research Associates, 1990), and Chamil Wariya, *Dasar Luar Era Mahathir* (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar bakti Adn. Bhd., 1989).

into office as the Prime Minister in 1981 there had been several development plans introduced by the previous administrations. In 1970 the NEP was introduced aiming at restructuring society and eliminating poverty. These were parts of the strategies to unite society after experiencing a bitter racial riot in 1969 in which year Mahathir was expelled from UMNO for his severe criticism of the party leadership over the Malay position. As a strong advocate of Malay nationalism, Mahathir seemed to be dissatisfied with the slow move taken by the leadership to improve the Malays. His idealism and philosophy on development is reflected especially in his controversial *The Malay Dilemma* published in 1970, the year when the NEP was launched, and his earlier articles to the newspaper *Sunday Time* in the late 1940s. The NEP which was said to have incorporated some of his radical ideas stretched for a period of twenty years. Thus, Mahathir inherited the development policy which was laid down before his time.

Upon becoming the Prime Minister, Mahathir has taken several moves to realise his idealism and ambition within the various constitutional, psychological, ethnic and socio-cultural constraints. Apart from continuing the earlier policies he was seen to have adopted new approach in developing the nation as reflected in such policies as the Islamization policy, Vision 2020, Look-East policy, privatization, industrialization policy as have been briefly introduced. Various slogans have also been emphasised to reflect this commitment. We shall look in greater detail into some of these policies when analysing the impact of the Government policy on the society in the next chapter.

## Chapter Four

### **THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY I: VARIOUS IMPACTS ON SOCIETY**

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY I: VARIOUS IMPACTS ON THE SOCIETY

This chapter seeks to analyze the impact of Government-initiated development especially on the Muslim society.<sup>1</sup> Although the analysis of this impact will be more apparent when we analyze the policies or programmes which are directly related to Islam like Islamization policy etc., it is equally important to look into the other programmes which might have been influenced by the Government's overall religious approach. As development involves every aspect of social life and Islamic approach to development is claimed to be multi-dimensional as discussed in Chapter Two, it is crucial to see the way this religious aspiration has penetrated into the various aspects of society besides the extent of its influence.

The present chapter also attempts to show whether the observed changes are attributable to the Government's policy and approach which in turn is heavily indebted to Mahathir's ideas as our earlier hypothesis suggested. Hence, Mahathir's influence in Government decisions becomes part of our analysis. The analysis is carried out in the light of the Islamization policy of 1982 and the Vision 2020 of 1991, which serve as an important point of reference as most other policies were implemented in a period between these two development strategies.

Section one, *Mahathir's Impact On Government Policy*, examines two relevant themes, namely *Mahathir's Ideological*

---

<sup>1</sup> This explains the reason why discussion on non-Muslims is not really emphasised in this research. Discussion on certain aspects which might have direct relevance to them like the impact on ethnic relations and on socio-politics is included only to serve the limited purposes of the research.



*Influence On Government Decision and An Analysis of His Islamization Policy.* The second section, *The Impact of Government Policy on the Society*, is devoted to analysing the impact of Government policy on various aspects of the society.

### 1. Mahathir's Impact on Government Policy.

As Prime Minister, Mahathir is understandably expected to shoulder the heaviest responsibility in the overall running of the country for he has to involve himself in major decision making processes. The following account examines the way his thoughts and ideas might have had some impact on the Government decisions.

#### 1.1. Mahathir's Ideological Influence On Government Decisions.

In a democratic country like Malaysia, popular votes can determine the pattern of leadership of an elected government, the highest decision-making body of the country. As the Federal Government has been in the hands of the Alliance or the *Barisan Nasional* since independence, it has been responsible for defining the philosophy, aims and policies of national development.<sup>2</sup> Since the beginning, UMNO has been the backbone of the Alliance, hence of the Federal Government.<sup>3</sup> The style of leadership has also been somewhat distinctive.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Hari Singh, "Political Change in Malaysia: The Role of *Semangat 46*", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXI, No. 8, August, 1991, p. 713.

<sup>3</sup> Mahathir reiterated this in his Presidential speech at the UMNO Annual General Meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 28th October, 1988.

<sup>4</sup> For a brief history of the formation of UMNO, its early struggle and power structure, see for instance A.J. Stockwell, "The Formation and First Years of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 1946-1948", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. II, No. 4, 1977, pp. 481-513. Cf. William Case, "The UMNO Party Election in Malaysia: One for Money", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 10, October, 1994, pp. 916-933, for its contemporary development.

By virtue of being UMNO President, the highest post in the hierarchy of the party administration, Mahathir has a political advantage in coordinating various proposals including the implementation of party decisions. Overshadowed by the President's policy preferences, decisions taken by members of the party normally reflect the leader's aspirations which, in turn, determine the direction and image of the party. Understandably, the President also has prerogatives over other executive members in some other key areas which help to reinforce this type of leadership role.<sup>5</sup> It is in this way that the Prime Minister's ideas penetrate naturally into the party's decision making processes.

As the *Barisan* is made up of several political parties from various ethnic groups,<sup>6</sup> compromise does takes place before all members can resort to a consensus. Diane K. Mauzy remarks that there has always been "bargaining" among component parties of the coalition to resolve any problem.<sup>7</sup> A typical example of significant concessions gained by the non-Malays were revisions in the citizenship regulations, and the granting of *jus soli* to non-Malays in the Federation after independence in return for their acceptance of the Malay special rights, Islam as the state religion, Malay as the sole official language from 1967, and the functions assigned to the Malay Rulers.<sup>8</sup>

---

5

The mechanics of administration of this kind reflect some leadership bias natural to any modern management style, just as the image of other organizations or associations have developed by identification or association with their leaders' personality and standing.

6

The chief of which are UMNO (representing Malays), MCA (representing Chinese), and MIC (representing Indians).

7

Diane K. Mauzy, *Coalition Government In Malaysia*, op.cit., p.20.

8

Ibid.

Being the core party of the Government administration,<sup>9</sup> UMNO appears to be in a better position to influence the decisions taken by the coalition's component parties.<sup>10</sup> It can be expected then that any decision must be agreed or consented to, in one way or another, by UMNO. Therefore, Government policy can be said to have subject to UMNO's influence and the Prime Minister's aspirations. The stronger the ability of the Prime Minister to convince UMNO members and the *Barisan* components, the greater the impact he has on the the party and Government decisions.<sup>11</sup> This practice has been typical of the Malaysian politics over the years. Perhaps UMNO's central position in the Alliance/National Front vis-a-vis other component parties is best summed up in the following observation:

It was not unnatural that UMNO should be the strongest partner in the Alliance, given the numerical superiority of the Malays, aided further by electoral rural weighting, and the widespread support UMNO received, as well as the historical identification of the Malays as the indigenous race. The MCA and MIC combined did not have the electoral weight, the unity, the support, or the historical precedents to be exact political equals with UMNO...Despite UMNO supremacy, genuine bargaining did occur, and compromise solutions did emerge. The Tunku acknowledged that, while UMNO supremacy in the Alliance was understood, the non-Malays could drive hard bargains and there could be concessions. The essence of Alliance bargaining was not equality but mutual dependency combined with a willingness to cooperate and accommodate.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, it would be catastrophic for the coalition at any time to overlook this type of mutual dependency and willingness

9

Mahathir, UMNO AGM, 1982, p. 9.

10

Mahathir has reiterated from time to time that UMNO is the core of national politics. This is not only due to its nationalism but also to its philosophy which can bring about changes for the happiness of people and nation. He sums up by saying that UMNO and its constitution recognizes its responsibly to fight for the Malays, Islam and the nation (UMNO 1987 p.26).

11

The extent of the Prime Minister's influence upon Government policies depends heavily upon the degree of acceptance among the elite group of the Government's executive which in turn is determined by his (or her) ability to convince them of the rationale of his proposals or ideas.

12

Diane K. Mauzy, *Barisan Nasional*, op.cit. p.24.

to cooperate and accomodate among coalition members.<sup>13</sup>

Against this backdrop, any attempt to analyze the Government policy and its impact on the society should be done in the light of the Prime Minister's own idealism. Some constituent aspects of his idealism have been discussed in Chapter Three. To serve our limited analytical purposes, a brief review of his development philosophy as reflected in his more contemporary views is brought here to obtain a better picture of his aspirations for Malaysia.

Mahathir's aim is to make Malaysia a developed and a successful country whose citizens are highly respected, honoured and are not looked down by others.<sup>14</sup> He thus says, "the Malaysia that we dream of is the one which is peaceful, prosperous and free from any threat".<sup>15</sup> Thus, Mahathir demonstrates that he desires a just and fair political process, elimination of destructive elements, justice for those abiding by the law and a healthy way of seeking wealth and its proper use to ensure peace and to protect religion.

Happiness is often emphasized by the Prime Minister as the main objective of man's existence, hence of development.<sup>16</sup> Happiness prevails when people feel secure economically, socially and psychologically. Conceding unity, justice, harmony,

---

13

What was true of the Alliance is also true of the present *Barisan Nasional* as the latter is only a slightly modified version of the Alliance which came about after the 1969 riot. The basic structure of Malaysian politics did not undergo any significant alteration such that we might expect of any comprehensive political reform after that incident.

14

Presidential speech at the UMNO Annual General Meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 10th September 1982, p. 37-38.

15

"Malaysia yang kita idami ialah Malaysia yang aman, yang makmur, yang bebas dari segala ancaman". Ibid, UMNO 82, p. 38. In order to liberate the nation from any such threat, Mahathir says that people need to defend the nation by wealth and soul. This requires sacrifices and effort from ourselves, not from others (Ibid, p.39).

16

Ibid, p. 39.

prosperity, peace and stability as the basis of happiness,<sup>17</sup> he likens a nation to an organism which also needs good health, happiness and longer age.<sup>18</sup> As with an organism, there are always factors which can retard the nation's progress or destroy it altogether as happened to such nations as Rome, Byzantium or even the Malaccan Sultanate. For him, people should take a lesson from the past history if they wish to avoid the fate of those nations to befall them.<sup>19</sup> Although he believes that politics can be used to achieve an objective, he reminds that, "politics is the means, not the goal, our goal is happy life."<sup>20</sup> The posts held by party members are merely trusts to enable them to serve the people, religion and the nation effectively.<sup>21</sup>

While insisting on this lofty objective, he defines clearly the role of UMNO by saying, "Our objective is the creation of a dignified Malaysia. UMNO will set an example and guide the Malays and other Malaysians towards this noble goal."<sup>22</sup> UMNO needs to be united, and the unity of UMNO must be based on its objectives which are to uplift the dignity (*maruah dan*

17

Ibid, p.10.

18

Presidential speech at UMNO Annual General Meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 19.18.1993, p.2.

19

Mahathir has quoted the model (UMNO 83, p.3) in which, according to Ibn Khaldun, human civilization undergoes a three-stage cycle. The first generation, due to their strong will, firmness and hard work, are able to lay down a foundation for a concrete system; the second generation, based on the established foundation, continue to fulfil the system leading to glorious achievements and the third generation, due to their lack of spirit and zealotry due to their wealth and glory, begin to plant the elements which lead to destruction.

20

UMNO 1982, p. 14.

21

UMNO 82, pp. 3 & 6.

22

*Malaysia yang bermaruah ialah matlamat kita. UMNO akan menjadi teladan dan memimpin orang-orang Melayu dan semua rakyat Malaysia ke arah matlamat yang mulia ini. UMNO 82, p.41.*

kehormatan) of the Malays and other Muslims in the country.<sup>23</sup>

Apart from protecting the Malays and other Muslims,<sup>24</sup> UMNO exists to ensure the prevalence of peace and harmony for future generations.<sup>25</sup> *De facto*, UMNO must be able to look after the interests of not only the Malays but also the nation at large. However, as a predominantly Malay and Muslim party, the struggle of UMNO is to ensure that the Malays truly practice the teachings of Islam. Now, this responsibility becomes much more important than ever before.<sup>26</sup> He says, "But I must stress yet again that the UMNO struggle is not yet completed. The greater struggle before us now is to change the attitudes of the Malays so that they can be in line with Islam in this modern time."<sup>27</sup> It can be discerned that by this he means, among other things, the creation of a generation of self-reliant Malays characterized by hard work, highly educated, knowledgeable, efficient in all aspects and committed to their religion.<sup>28</sup> The emphasis on the last point can be seen in his frequent call for Muslims to observe the proper practice of Islamic teachings.<sup>29</sup> UMNO must ensure that the Malays do not become the victims of their own weaknesses. Their

---

23 AGM UMNO, 1982, 7.

24 UMNO 82 p.7-8. Also UMNO AGM 1984, p.2.

25 Ibid, p.10.

26 UMNO 82, p.26. The previous role of UMNO was to fight for Independence,

27 "Tetapi saya ulangi sekali lagi, perjuangan UMNO belum tamat. Sekarang ini kita menghadapi perjuangan yang terbesar sekali - perjuangan untuk mengubah sikap orang Melayu supaya sesuai dengan kehendak agama Islam di zaman moden". (UMNO 82, p.25.)

28 See his frequent stress on this in almost all of his Presidential speeches at the UMNO Annual General Meetings.

29 UMNO 82, p.26.



political, economic and social strength must be improved,<sup>30</sup> so that they can compete fairly on an equal basis with other ethnic groups.

Mahathir has been consistent in his view that no elements should be allowed to retard the Malay and Muslim progress. Quite often he justifies his arguments with religious reasons when this seems to work more effectively.<sup>31</sup> A deeper examination of his thought reveals that Mahathir prefers a dynamic interpretation of religious teachings in order to bring progress to society. Let us elaborate his religious perception and interpretations as reflected in his version of Islamization.

### 1.2. An Analysis of Mahathir's Islamization Policy.

"Islamization" was among the first policies that Mahathir introduced when he became Prime Minister. Of its many aspects, we choose to look critically into the foundation upon which this policy has been founded, and the nature of its application in the existing Government development strategy. A deeper analysis of selected Islamic programmes will be done separately later in this chapter.

Earlier, we have provided a brief introduction to the Islamization policy which touched on its rationale, objectives and certain manifestations.<sup>32</sup> Among other things, Islamization is meant to cultivate the spirit of respecting Islamic values, to respect goodness and condemn evil, to develop a useful attitude towards the nation, to eliminate the negative attitude towards duties, to produce excellent service, to train one's self to be more disciplined, and to discharge the duties with trust and

---

31 UMNO 84, p.30.

31

Earlier, we have seen that as early as 1946 he used to condemn such Malay practices as the *Padi Kunga* system and the Malay proverb *biar mati anak, jangan mati bapak* as being without religious foundation.

32

See the discussion on "Islamization Policy" in Ch. 3.

dedication.<sup>33</sup> The lofty objective of the policy is to establish a peaceful, respectable society or nation with its own identity. We concluded that the Islamization policy seems to signify the Government's idea of practicing Islam in a broader sense and in a more dynamic way.

In retrospect, Mahathir's Islamization policy seems to have been justified as interpreting the general provision regarding the status of Islam in the Federal Constitution, especially Part I Article 3 which reads, "Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation." Elsewhere, we have noted that in the early periods of *Merdeka*, the popular interpretation of this provision did not imply that Islam should be implemented *in toto* or that Malaysia was an Islamic state.<sup>34</sup> Having been confined mainly to ceremonial, personal and family affairs, Islam was used only to symbolize the official religious image of the nation.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the type of religious programmes implemented during those periods was reflective of such an interpretation. Indeed, there is no single provision in the constitution which clearly states that Malaysia is an Islamic state or that the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah* are the basis of the

---

33

Ibid.

34

This was strongly advocated especially by the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, who viewed Islam as a ceremonial religion which became mere solemnised a number of selected national events. This implies that Malaysia was a secular state. The Tunku insisted that Islam was not against secularism and he maintained that Malaysia was a secular state. See for instance his reply to an interview with the journalist, Rosnah Majid, which was published in *Utusan Malaysia* 27, 28 and 29 April 1980. See also his interpretation of personal freedom within a secular framework in, for example, his *Sudut Pandangan* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books [Asia] Ltd., 1979) Chapters 28 and 30, and his views on the Islamic Welfare Organization (PERKIM) in Chapter 26.

<sup>35</sup> This is seen in such ceremonies as reciting a prayer before a national or state event, the Qur'an reading competition, the mass procession during the Prophet's birthday and the like. This type of religious treatment continues to be a tradition for the Malaysian Government even until the present day.

Constitution.<sup>36</sup> In the absence of such a clear interpretation, the advocates of Islamic state for instance often capitalise on this constitutional deficiency in order to bring people over to their side.<sup>37</sup> However, as the question notion of an Islamic state has been a subject of continuous polemics, the Government and its opponents have not been successful in bridging the gap between their differing stands.<sup>38</sup> More often than not, every quarter tried to justify the legitimacy of its own religious stand.

It can be inferred then that the type and extent of Islamic practice at a national level has been largely influenced by the leadership's interpretation of the said constitutional provision. When Mahathir asserted his dynamic religious perception and understanding, it is quite understandable that this leadership interpretation of Islam has had a considerable bearing upon the Government's religious approach. Among other things, Mahathir considered that proper understanding of Islam would lead to progress, and insisted that this dynamic of Islamic religion should be manifested in the Government's development strategy. The Islamization policy was such a manifestation.<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, Part II Article 12 of the Constitution indicates that "the Government, state and Federal, can assist in

---

36

The absence of such a clear interpretation regarding the status of Islam in the Federal Constitution has prompted the opposition, especially those who demand total implementation of the *Sharī'ah*, to label the Government as unIslamic or even infidel.

37

For a brief insight into PAS philosophy, objectives, approach and criticism of Government, see especially the two relevant chapters (the 5th. on "The Resurgents and Their Ideologies: The Electoral Actors", and the 6th. "Other Aspects of PAS's Ideology and UMNO's Islam") of Chandra Muzaffar's *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*.

38

See for instance, Hussin Mutalib's *Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State*, Ch. 3 & 4., and Mohamad Hashim Kamali, "Characteristics of the Islamic State", *The Islamic Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1993, pp. 17-40.

39

Cf. Fred R. Von Der Mehden, "Islamic Revival in Malaysia and Indonesia", in *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 3-4, July/October 1986, p. 232.

establishing and maintaining Islamic institutions, providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose." In other words, the Government may provide allocations for the development of Islamic religion as it thought necessary. It is in this context, and perhaps in a broader interpretation of the first pillar of *Rukunegara* i.e. belief in God, that the introduction of the Islamization policy can be said to bear some constitutional justifications. However, the extent of Islamic practice in socio-political spheres based on the leadership interpretation of religion has neither been clear-cut nor straightforward. Consequently, the said legal justification of the Islamization programme could not deter its critics from questioning the very reason for its introduction as well as the Islamicity of the policy.<sup>40</sup>

---

40

There have been many groups which have taken a stance with regard to the Islam-state issue. Briefly, they may be categorised into three main groups. The first can be associated with those who strongly demand a complete implementation of the Islamic system. For them Islamic system must be applied in the political, economic and social spheres of the nation reflecting their totalitarian ideological-political understanding of Islam as *al-Dīn*. All major Islamic groups like ABIM, PAS and Darul Arqam can be said to represent this category. However, there have been different views, hence different approaches, among these groups as to how this objective can be achieved. Rationalist-accommodationist, radical and sufistic are among the terms often used to describe the approaches peculiar to them.

Another group is opposed to such a call. Given the nature of Malaysian society today, it can be held with a certain degree of confidence that the majority of non-Muslims are of this category. The DAP's statement rejecting the efforts of the Kelantan Government to Islamize the state, and the meeting of a Chinese Chambers of Commerce delegation with the Kelantan *Mentri Besar* or Chief Minister to discuss the matter are examples of how this fear is prevalent especially among the Chinese community. Within the Muslim community, the defenders of this view are mostly from the early generation of educated people who received their education in the West or the admirers of Western-style development. Given the present day Islamic consciousness and the public inclination towards religion, this group can hardly be seen professing their stand openly.

The third category reflects the attitude of those who declare neither open rejection of nor professed agreement to the above call nor a total denial of the religious role. Some people in this category might also be sympathizers, admirers or even stern advocates of one of the above categories, but for various reasons they prefer to appear impartial. For them to take a neutral stand, or rather to be seen as a neutral person, is the best way to achieve their hidden objectives. Often, their actions reveal their actual inclination. On this basis, there actually exist three types of person in this group with regard to their stand towards Islam:

Some quarters claim that the Islamization policy has been introduced for fear of the emerging religious activism among the Muslim populace.<sup>41</sup> Thus, it is not based on a sincere intention or genuine religious commitment,<sup>42</sup> but is politically-motivated and religiously questionable. As Mahathir himself has not received a formal religious education, his interpretation of Islam cannot be taken to reflect an actual Islamic aspiration. Hence, his Islamization policy should not be condoned. The Government's apparent reluctance to commit itself to any suggestion for a full implementation of *sharī'ah* laws, or to declare openly that Malaysia is to be a full Islamic state, further reinforces such an allegation.<sup>43</sup>

On the other hand, Islamization is seen by some as a first step towards a greater Islamic role in the national affairs. For a rationalist-accommodationist Islamic group like ABIM, this move is welcome provided it continues to progress towards fulfilling greater Islamic ideals. However, among the sceptics especially the non-Muslims, Islamization is interpreted as a deviation from the accepted religious practice.<sup>44</sup>

---

the admirer, sympathizer or the advocate of adoptionism; the admirer, sympathizer or advocate of rejectionism; and the real neutralist.

41

Fred R. Von Der Mehden, "Islamic Revival...", op.cit., p. 230.

42

For these people, Mahathir is trying to play safe with the religious issue, and therefore he does not have a sincere intention to implement a full Islamic system.

43

PAS and radical Islamic proponents, for instance, have often charged the Government with being hypocritical and unIslamic for choosing only certain aspects of religious values for its Islamization programme and for not being willing to implement Islam *in toto*.

44

DAP and non-Muslim religious organizations, for instance, accused Mahathir of trying to move gradually to convert Malaysia into an Islamic state.

In answer to these types of criticism, Mahathir tries to prove that his Islamization programme is not only constitutionally legitimate but also acceptable and beneficial to the majority of Malaysian Muslims and non-Muslims alike as evidenced in the following analysis.

M. Rajendran says that Islam and its values "have had a considerable impact on the values of the nation."<sup>45</sup> However, he remarks that the values of Islam often contradict the values of other religions, making them difficult to reconcile with the thrust of modern ideas.<sup>46</sup> Rajendran's opinion might have been influenced by the old leadership's interpretation of the Islamic role in the social sphere, and the realities of Malaysian socio-cultural, religious and racial realities, an argument which has often been cited in support of the rejectionist group.

Contrasting Mahathir's approach to that of PAS, Rajendran considers that the former can be interpreted as "being involved with Islamic values and ideals while making sure that the religion does not hinder the nation's progress."<sup>47</sup> Having been a strong defender of Malay nationalism, Mahathir, apparently adopting the idea propagated earlier by Malay Islamic nationalists like Dr. Burhanuddin Alhelmy and others, believes that religion should be made an effective tool to educate the Malays to be more efficient and industrious.<sup>48</sup> This includes

---

45 M. Rajendran, *Mahathir Mohamad: Prime Minister of Malaysia*, (P.Jaya: IBS Buku Sdn. Bhd., 1993), p. 137.

46 Ibid.

47 *Dewan Budaya* (January 1994) has quoted an expert in Islamic Banking as saying that the word "values" is a new term used by the Government instead of the clearly Qur'anic terminology "hukum" (laws). He, however, agrees that the use of the term is strategically acceptable for the present day situation.

48 A view that bears a similarity to that of Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy and Dr. Zulkifli Muhammad. See also M. Rajendran, p. 139.



Islam's call for man to seek for knowledge so that he can be successful in this world and the hereafter. Mahathir finds that Islam has the necessary doctrines and values which can help create a generation of self-sufficient Malays.<sup>49</sup>

Although Mahathir is often heard condemning the West for its destructive values,<sup>50</sup> he does realize that there is no way for Muslims to become advanced without benefitting from the good aspects of other societies and civilizations.<sup>51</sup> On this score, M. Rajendran says that Mahathir's Islamization policy does not mean total rejection of Western ideas as Muslims should imbibe the positive ideas from the West as well as the East like technology and administrative skills so that they can be more self-sufficient. This *selectivist approach* requires someone to accept as a fact the influence of Western ideas on society while struggling to control "cultural pollution".<sup>52</sup>

As for the Islamic institutions established as part of the Islamization programme, Rajendran considers that the Islamic Bank, for instance, has been established as an alternative for Muslims who prefer to hoard their money at home rather than keeping it in interest-bearing accounts. Given the nature of the Muslim society today, it is premature to assume that it is only the simple feeling that there is no alternative place to keep their money that forces Muslims to demand the establishment of Islamic banks. Rather, the call is reflective of reformists'

---

49 *Dewan Budaya*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, January 1994), p. 7.

50 See for instance his Presidential speech at UMNO AGM 1983, p.16, and UMNO 1984, p.19.

51 Hence, his Look-East policy and industrialization policy. His preference for selecting good values is clearly shown when he discusses "the Educational Dilemma" and "West and East" in his *The Challenge*.

52 Ibid, M. Rajendran.

ideological commitment which always desires the establishment of a comprehensive Islamic economic system that deals with various business activities, investments, savings and transactions free from interest-based practices. Therefore, it is not justified to hold the view that the whole idea behind this revivalist demand is simply to ask for the establishment of physical premises that operate on a limited religious scale so that money can be transferred physically from Muslims' houses to these banks.<sup>53</sup>

The establishment of *Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.* is said to have come about on similar grounds. Muslims are said to be reluctant to buy insurance from the common Western-based insurance companies. Thus, the existence of this Islamic insurance company is helpful in various ways for Muslims as well as non-Muslims.<sup>54</sup>

Meanwhile the establishment of the International Islamic University is said to have had a direct impact on the nation's educational system. Claimed to be based on the Islamic philosophy

---

53

Although it cannot be denied that there are some Muslims, especially in the *kampung*, who prefer to keep their money at home, this has been traditional to them for a long period of time due to their earlier cultural attachments. Given their limited knowledge, even their reluctance to save money in a conventional bank reflects their genuine attachment to religious teaching at least in the narrow sense of the word.

Obviously, it was not from this segment of Muslim community that the ideological seeds of the present day Islamic revivalism in general and the idea of the Islamic bank in particular originated. It was instead the educated people inspired by Muslim reformist ideas who became the main actors in this revival. PKPIM, for instance, had demanded the establishment of an Islamic College, an Islamic Bank and an Islamic University as early as 1969 in order to enable Muslims to opt for a more Islamic education and economy. These demands were, of course, not meant to be their only aim as they expected the Government to do more for the eventual creation of an Islamic system. In the face of new realities, even this group of Islamists rationalized that people are allowed to utilize temporarily the existing non-Islamic financial system pending the establishment of such an Islamic system.

54

It must be stated, however, that in the absence of such an Islamic insurance Muslim have no choice but to buy insurance, especially to use a car or own a house, and thus Muslims do take non-Islamic insurance under the Islamic legal provision of *darūrah*. This also explains why other types of insurance such as life insurance etc. are not popular among Muslims. Since they have the option not to take them out, they try to avoid such prohibited or doubtful insurances, reflecting their concern over the latter's conformity to religious teachings.

of education, IIUM's impact can be felt especially in the fields of law and economics. We will examine the impact of these two institutions (the Islamic Bank and the Islamic University) in greater detail later in this chapter.

In comparison to the previous administrations, especially that of the Tunku, Mahathir's religious approach is different in two main respects. Firstly, Mahathir himself in a way holds the view that instead of solely depending on other factors like economy and politics to protect religion, the religion itself should be made more effective not only to protect itself and the Muslims, but also to advance society. Thus, religious teachings must be reinterpreted in the light of the Divine sources and new developments. A greater and more dynamic role must be assigned to it in order enable it to develop society more effectively.

Secondly, Islamic programmes during this period are no longer confined to ceremonial, ritual, personal and family matters, but have extended to other spheres of social life especially economics, education and management. As a result, the role of religion has penetrated into "non-traditional" areas. The themes and topics of the following seminars, conferences and convention organized by the newly-established Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), for instance, constitute only small examples to reflect both the new role of Islam in the Malaysian development process, and the type of the Government's religious preference:<sup>55</sup> (a) Convention on "The Muslim Ummah: Challenges in the 21st. Century", 26-27 September 1992, (b) Conference on "Islam and Industrialization", 21-22 January 1993, (c) Convention on "Islam's Contribution Towards Achieving the Objectives of Vision 2020", 13-14 February 1993, (d) Conference on "Islam and Justice", 3-4 June 1993, (e) Seminar on

As listed in Syed Othman Alhabshi, *An Inspiration for the Future of Islam: A Brief History and Objectives of the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM)*, (Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1994), pp. 43-49.

"Understanding Islam for the Mass Media", 25-26 June 1993, (f) Seminar on "The Role and Influence of Religion in Society", 13-16 September 1993, (g) Seminar on "Islam and Its Worldview: An American Perspective, 19-20 August 1993, (h) Seminar on "Islamic Intellectual Writing", 4-5 October 1993, (i) Seminar on "Assimilation of Values in the Development of Science and Technology", 6-7 December 1993, (j) Seminar on "The Revolution of Knowledge: Towards Reviving the Image of the Ummah", 17-19 December 1993, and (k) Seminar on "Towards Enhancing Working Relations in Multi-Cultural Society", 21 December 1993.

It is also a common feature of religious conferences and seminars held in Malaysia today to discuss Islam in relation to such aspects as technology, management, industrialization, social justice, plural society and employment, besides the traditional themes of *al-Qur'ān*, *ḥadīth*, the contribution of classical Muslim 'ulamā' etc.. This new religious phenomenon could hardly be observed in the previous periods.

Mahathir's religious strategy is also distinctive because of its emphasis on Islamic values which are universal in nature. His inculcation of Islamic values into the Government administration, as his Islamization programme is often described in official publications, reflects this approach. Although Mahathir's understanding of Islam seems to be global, he is apparently sceptical about the practicality of mere legal enforcement without taking into consideration other aspects of national interests.<sup>56</sup> On this subject, he often says that Islam is tolerant enough in allowing its followers to adopt a reasonable approach to achieve the higher objectives of life,

---

56

See his interview on the role of religion in society at IKIM 13 September 1993.

which are peace and happiness.<sup>57</sup> It is the different priorities, preferences and approach especially between the two main political parties, UMNO and PAS, which have partly contributed to their prevailing animosity. Having written on various issues confronting the Malays, Muslims and society since as early as late 1940s. and offered his religious arguments about them, Mahathir may feel entitled to argue against the claim that his approach is not based on genuine religious intention and that it is secularistic in nature. The Islamicity of his religious approach and the contents of his Islamization programmes, however, continue to come under review by various quarters as will be elaborated later.

In summary, it can be said that Mahathir's Islamization policy has been implemented through two main strategies: direct and indirect. The former refers to the formal religious programmes like the establishment of the Islamic Bank, the International Islamic University and the Institute of Islamic Understanding, and the inculcation of Islamic values into the Government administration, while the latter is manifested in various ways through other policies like the Look-east policy, the various slogans and Vision 2020. In general, Mahathir believes that anything good for the development of society like hardwork and higher productivity is religious. This underlying principle is incorporated into other policies which do not bear Islamic labels.

Clearly, Mahathir prefers a dynamic interpretation of religious teachings and a more moderate and "liberal" approach in implementing religious policy and programmes. In some ways, it may also be interpreted as being in line with the Government's

---

57

See for instance his speech at the launching ceremony of Islamic Bank on 1st. July 1983, and his speech on "Religion and Society" when officiating at a seminar on *The Role and Influence of religion in Society*, jointly organized by IKIM and the Goethe Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 13-16 September, 1993.

pragmatic. attitude in dealing with national issues. Thus, he is often heard to emphasize that "proper" religious practice must prevail in all personal and social life of society.<sup>58</sup> The stress on the "positive values" is one of the ways that shows his open and liberal religious approach. For him, the practice of Islam must be more in essence than form.<sup>59</sup> Hence, any move or initiative meant for good is for him Islamic despite the absence of religious names. His Vision 2020, for instance, is claimed to have this principle and spirit of modernist interpretation.

## 2. The Impact of the Government's Policy on Muslim Society.

Earlier, we established that the Government's basic development strategy has been to improve the economic performance of the nation in order to finance various other projects for the betterment of peoples' social, educational, political, religious and cultural life. Nonetheless, in the early years of independence, the development was emphasized more for economic purposes than for any other. At that time, the nation depended heavily upon the commodity-export strategy to achieve that purpose. As dependence upon major commodities like rubber, tin and palm oil has proved to be burdensome to the Government especially during the periods of recession, it decided to shift from this type of economic orientation to that of the non-resource-based. This had taken place as early as the 1960s. Diversification of economic resources, mainly through industrialization, became highly characteristic of the Malaysian

---

58

What is "proper" according to Mahathir seems to suggest that Islam is a moderate, simple, easy and tolerant religion. It stresses the eternal values and the main principle of good and bad, and is more concerned with essence than form.

59

His general remark on the importance of essence and form, however, has been questioned by some quarters for fear that this would imply rejecting something which might be in essence Islamic, like the covering of the *aurat*.



development strategy, especially during the post 1970 period.<sup>60</sup> During the Mahathir era, industrialization and business-related activities become more robust, reflecting his most preferred approach to fulfilling the nation's development objectives.

As Mahathir also insists on the need for a balance between material and moral-spiritual advancement, justifications for and critique of his development policy and programmes can be seen as futile within this context. Thus, the impact of the Government policies should be studied in the light of this development ideal.<sup>61</sup>

In the first part, we will base our analysis on relevant statistical and quantitative data in order to obtain a picture of progress in various fields before coming up with assessments and responses from different Islamic groups to the Government's development policy later in the next chapter.<sup>62</sup> In order to reflect the overall picture of these achievements (or failures), we propose that some important aspects like demographic, educational, socio-cultural and religious indicators be selected for a deeper study. The religious indicator is particularly emphasized in order to observe the extent and effectiveness of

---

60

Abdul Aziz Muhamad, *Human and Institutional Capacity to Achieve National Development: The Malaysian Approach*, (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Policy Research), p.2.

61

It must be stressed, however, that the impact is not necessarily a direct result of these two "strategies" as other policies are also involved and all of them are mutually interrelated. Nonetheless, as Islamization reflects a significant shift from previous Government religious policy and has been made an official policy by itself and more proclaimed than any previous religious commitment, it must be expected to overshadow the overall Government development strategy. The spirit of Islamization is, thus, said to be present, directly or indirectly, in other Government policies, most notable among them being Vision 2020. It is with this rationale that the development process during this period can be said to be overshadowed by these two grand agendas.

62

Despite the impossibility of reaching an absolute conclusion as to whether the Government has been successful or otherwise in its development strategy, an examination of relevant indicators will help in one way or other to draw some reasonable conclusions about it.

the new role of the Islamic religion in the present development process.<sup>63</sup>

### 2.1. The Demographic Impact.

Although Malaysia, demographically, may be said to be a country with a small population,<sup>64</sup> the actual increase of its population over the past twenty years until 1991 has been remarkable by normal standards. According to the Malaysia Yearbook of Statistics 1992 published by The Department of Statistics Malaysia, the total population of Malaysia in 1991 was 17,566,982 compared to 10,439,430 and 13,136,109 in 1970 and 1980 respectively.<sup>65</sup> When divided by the total area of land, the number of persons per square kilometre are 31, 40, and 53 in the respective years.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, in approximately two decades since the introduction of the NEP in 1970, the rural-urban proportion has undergone a tremendous change.

It can be seen from the above figures that, by comparison, the growth rate of population in Malaysia during the 1980-1991 period was greater than that of the 1970-1980 decade. By 1991, the urban population outnumbered the rural by 225,468. Thus, a demographic change in terms of rural-urban proportion has been more dramatic in the latter decade (1980-1990). This type of demographic movement was more obvious in the Peninsular as people living in towns formed roughly 54 per cent of its total

---

63

It must be reiterated here that, from an Islamic point of view, the use of such quantitative data and other techniques often claimed to be conventional in nature like statistical and comparative analysis, is not in essence against religious principles as our earlier discussion suggested. It is the usefulness and proper utilization of these techniques that determine their legitimacy.

64

See Mahathir, UMNO, 1982.

65

Malaysia Yearbook of Statistics 1992, p.19..

66

Ibid, p. 20.

population. The figures in Table 4.1. are self-explanatory in regard to this demographic development.

Table 4.1  
Malaysia and the Peninsular: Population Distribution by Urban-Rural Proportion  
1970-1991<sup>67</sup>

	1970	1980	1991
Rural	7,640,798 (73.2%)	8,643,701 (65.8%)	8,670,757 (49.4%)
	6,269,670 (71.2%)	6,871,739 (62.8%)	6,479,051 (45.7%)
Urban	2,798,648 (26.8%)	4,492,408 (34.2%)	8,896,225 (50.6%)
	2,539,887 (28.8%)	4,073,105 (37.2%)	7,702,812 (54.3%)
TOTAL	10,439,430	13,136,109	17,566,982
	8,809,557	10,944,844	14,181,863
Source: Yearbook of Statistics 1992, Department of Statistics, Malaysia, p. 19. <sup>68</sup>			

From our earlier analysis, we can say with a greater degree of confidence that this change is closely related the Government's development strategy whose focus has been more on industrialization which made urban or city-based life more popular. We will examine more deeply the impact of urbanization on society in the later part of this chapter. For now, let us see what impact this demographic trend has upon Malaysian society. As the exact time at which changes in the social aspect of a society take place cannot be precisely determined, a cursory socio-historical review of Malaysian development since the earlier years is necessary in order to reveal the background to the rise of current social and religious behaviours and tendencies.

---

67

Figures in second rows refers to the population of Peninsular Malaysia, and each percentage indicates the proportion of population of that area against the other.

68

Cf. also United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific* 1993, (Bangkok: UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), p. 238, and Table 1.1. in Ch. 1.

At least in a limited economic sense, the Government was correct to realize that heavy and continuous dependance upon major commodities in the early years of independence could cost peoples' prosperity and its own political survival in the long run. The decision to shift from a traditional commodity-export economy to a more viable and diversified economy prompted it to look into the various options, resulting in its preference for more industrial-based activities. It is this change that provided the basis for continuous migration of rural people to various towns and cities, a logical consequence of an urban-based industrialization. The economic development has somewhat altered people's life style and culture.

For instance, peoples' "cultures" were closely associated with their traditional modes of production, notably rubber-tapping, paddy transplanting and harvesting, fishing and others which reflected their long standing socio-cultural status quo. For instance, they were happy to have *gotong-royong* during *kenduri*, *menanam*, *menuai* and *menangkap ikan* in their respective *kampungs*. Thus, the larger proportion of the rural population during that time seemed to accommodate neatly these cultural demands and the prevailing social order.<sup>69</sup>

It was also typical of the *kampung* people to send their children to learn to read and study the *Qur'ān* and basic religious teachings (*fard 'ain*) with a local *Guru Qur'an* (*Qur'ān* teacher) or *Tok Guru* (religious teacher) who were available not by official Government appointment but by mutual recognition of the locals. As time passed, even this voluntary service underwent changes towards more formalisation marked by official appointments by the establishment. The *Tok Gurus*, consequently, began to receive monthly allowances for their service. For some

*Gotong royong* means collective effort, *kenduri* thankful celebration for various reasons like having a baby, marriage etc., *menanam* paddy transplanting, *menuai* harvesting, *menangkap ikan* fishing, and *kampung* village.

traditional *kampung* people, this change might be seen as having reduced the spirit of sacrifice among the *kampung* people as they were used to voluntarily giving away things like *beras* (rice), *pisang* (bananas) and other foodstuff to the Tok Guru as tokens of appreciation for his service. They strongly believed that *barakah* or divine blessing was enshrined in such a practice.<sup>70</sup> In such a society, it could be observed that family ties were also very close due to the maintenance of extended families. Respect for the elders and Tok Gurus was highly regarded.

Folklore, main *layang-layang* dan *gasing* (playing with kites and spinning-tops) and *kenduri kahwin* (marriage fair) were among traditional daily and seasonal activities, the popular modes of entertainment in those days. If "modern" elements existed at all during that time, *ghazal pati* and *kugiran* can be said to be among the limited external influences to have absorbed into and mixed with, for instance, the *kampung's* *kenduri* tradition, along with other Islamic elements like *marhaban* and *berzanji*.<sup>71</sup>

As the make up of post-independence Malay culture had its roots in the mixture of various animistic, Indian, Chinese and Christian beliefs, it is not surprising to find that even the Indian-origin *bersanding* was very much subscribed to and popular

---

70

Some Islamically unfounded traditional beliefs and *adat* have been the subject of Mahathir criticism since the mid-1940s. See, for instance, his writings on various topics in the Sunday Times from 1946-1950, and his *inter/action-integ/ration*.

71

*Ghazal Pati* was a group of performers who used to sing Arabic and religious based songs especially during the night of the marriage ceremony. They utilized various Arabic-based music instruments like *gambus* (like a guitar), *seruling* (clarinet) and tambourine. The *kugiran* was quite similar to *ghazal pati* except that the performers sang non-religious and non-Arabic based songs and used Western musical instruments like guitar, drum and others. *Marhaban* was a group of male (and sometimes female) Muslims who used to recite religious poems especially during the marriage ceremony. For other examples of the practice of *adat* alongside *marhaban* and *berzanji*, see for instance Wazir Jahan Karim, *Women and Culture: Between Malay Adat and Islam*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 209-211.

in the Malay marriage ceremony.<sup>72</sup> Over time, most of these "traditions" gradually found their way out of the modern mainstream due to changing cultural preferences as a result of the development process. A new culture evolved with the new generation as the educated people, for instance, began to give greater attention to more serious daily business largely related to their new types of professions, or to use the Marxist term, modes of production, leaving behind these traditional cultures at the margin of modernization. The younger generation did not seem to have so much appreciation of what was once the favourite of their parents and grandparents. It is also observed that popular traditional group performances closely associated with a particular zone of the country like *boria* in the northern part of the country especially in Penang, *dondang sayang* in the South, especially Malacca, and *dikir barat* in the East, especially Kelantan, slowly became insignificant or developed a different outlook as the development process began to embrace rural areas. There have been attempts to "modernise" these "cultures" so that they can be kept alive within the modern environment despite their lack of authenticity. Thus, it is customary nowadays to find the modified versions of these "cultures" being performed at some official state functions or promoted as tourist attractions abroad.<sup>73</sup> These are the types of cultural survivals which may still exist in Malaysia today.

As Islamic awareness began to spread in the country, these "cultures" have also come under review. People of various social groups, especially among the revivalists, began to be more

---

72

Ibid, p. 212.

73

*Boria*, *Dikir Barat* and *Dedang Sayang* are similar in being collective group performances. The differences can be found in their ways of performing the different types of lyrics of "songs". *Boria* is performed while standing and with a little movement like dancing. *Dedang Sayang* is more like dancing in a group with special exchanges of *pantun*, and *Dikir Barat* is performed normally while sitting, the wording of the "song" are being normally spontaneous and humorous.



critical of them on the ground that they were against Islamic idealism. For instance, the Kelantan Chief Minister, Haji Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, has proposed that *dikir barat* should be given a new image by replacing its less meaningful lyrics composed by the leader of the group (*tukang karut*) with more positive themes and wordings invented by a new-style leader (*tukang reka*).<sup>74</sup>

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the Government's various socio-economic programmes, especially its greater emphasis on industrialization and rural development programmes, have been responsible for encouraging the villagers to migrate to the urban areas.<sup>75</sup> As the modes of production in both rural and urban areas began to either take new forms or modernise and became less relevant to the available traditional expertise, people of the former working area had to find other jobs which seemed to be more available in towns. Hence, the migration took place.

Similarly, as new settlement areas were extensively opened, especially by FELDA and FELCRA, population was distributed to the new regions with relatively new types of job closely related to rubber and palm-oil plantation. Consequently, the pattern of population distribution by region also changed, gradually altering peoples' socio-economic, cultural and religious outlooks, most important among which being the change of religious perception that triggered the Islamic resurgence.<sup>76</sup>

Based on earlier figures on the Malaysian population, it can be seen that the urban population forms 50.6% of the total inhabitants in 1991 compared to only 26.8% in 1970 and 34.2% in 1980. Parallel with this development are achievements in various

---

74

Religious talk on tape entitled *Islam dan Keadilan* by Nik Aziz Nik Mat.

75

Other factors were also important to reflect this population movement.

76

For a more detailed figures on rural and agricultural development, see for instance MYP4, pp. 292-327.

aspects of society. Table 4.2. provides data on some selected indicators for the early decade of the Mahathir administration in order to show this progress.

Table 4.2  
Peninsular Malaysia: Selected Basic Indicators For the Years 1980,  
1987 and 1990/1

	1980	1987	1991
Density of Population (per sq. km)	87	104	113
Population Under 15 (million./per cent)	4.4 (38.8)	5.0 (36.9)	5.4 (36.0)
Total Fertility Rate <sup>77</sup>	3.9	3.5	3.3
Crude Rate of Natural Increase <sup>78</sup>	24.7	23.9	21.9
Crude Birth Rate (per 1000) <sup>79</sup>	30.3	28.7	26.9
Crude Death Rate <sup>80</sup>	5.6	4.8	4.9
Annual Population Growth Rate	2.26	2.4	2.2
Life Expectancy at Birth <sup>81</sup>	66.4 70.5	68.5 72.9	68.8 73.5
Infant Mortality Rate <sup>82</sup>	24.0	14.4	12.4

77

The average number of children which would be born per woman if women experienced the age specific fertility rates of the period in question throughout their child-bearing lifespan.

78

No. of live births - no. of deaths in year t x 1,000  
Mid-year population in year t

79

No. of live births in year t x 1,000  
Mid-year population in year t

80

No. of deaths in year t x 1,000  
Mid-year population in year t

81

Life expectancy at birth is the expected average number of years lived by a newly born baby, assuming a fixed schedule of age-specific mortality rate.

82

No. of deaths under 1 year of age in year t x 1000  
No. of live births in year t

	1980	1987	1991
Toddler Mortality Rate <sup>83</sup>	2.0	1.1	0.9
Maternal Mortality Rate <sup>84</sup>	0.60	0.28	0.20
Population Per Doctor	3,248	2,576	2,283
Government Expenditure on Health	777.1	1,126.0	2,071.1
Source: Social Statistics Bulletin Malaysia 1991 and Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia Department of Statistics Malaysia.			

It is inferrable from this table that almost all socio-demographic indicators have made progress in the course of this development period. Based on our earlier analysis, it is not an exaggeration hold that this achievement can be attributed to a certain degree to the Government's development strategy, hence to Mahathir's ideas.

Parallel to these socio-demographic improvements, however, is the prevalence of negative socio-cultural elements in society, an impact which can hardly be wiped out in an industrializing country. Despite the difficulty in measuring the degree of their seriousness, relevant records of crimes and moral offences as shown in the following statistics may help to map out an impression of the current state of social dissension. As the drug addiction is considered number one social enemy in Malaysia, and divorce is very much discouraged by the Islamic religion, the relevant figures on them are brought in Tables 4.3. and 4.4. to reflect this situation, alongside other selected crimes.

---

83

$$\frac{\text{No. of deaths of age (1-4) years in year } t}{\text{No. of persons of ages (1-4) years in year } t} \times 1,000$$

84

$$\frac{\text{No. of deaths from puerperal causes in year } t}{\text{No. of live-births in year } t} \times 1,000$$

Table 4.3  
Number of Drug Addicts from 1980-1991

Year	Total	New Cases	Year	Total	New Cases
1980	10,661	7,154	1986	17,058	7,329
1981	16,366	10,391	1987	16,335	7,596
1982	26,513	13,363	1988	21,856	9,710
1983	26,245	14,426	1989	17,729	9,960
1984	19,901	11,915	1990	16,893	7,372
1985	21,552	9,591	1991	19,085	7,790
Source: Anti Dadah Task Force, National Security Council, Prime Ministers Department. <sup>85</sup>					

Table 4.3. shows that from only 10,661 cases of drug addiction recorded for the year 1980, the number has risen sharply to record 26,513 cases in 1982 before dropping slightly to 26,245 in 1983 and further down to 19,901 in 1984. After rising again to 21,552 cases in 1985 the number dropped further to record its lowest number in 1987 which was 16,335 cases. After a sharp rise in 1988, the number dropped again in 1989 and 1990 to about 17,729 and 16,893 cases respectively before a recorded 19,085 cases in 1991.

From 1981 to 1984, the number of new cases had been more than 10,000. However, it has been below this figure since then. In 1991, there were only 7,790 new cases. The highest number of new cases recorded during that period was 14,426 in 1983 and, the lowest was 7,154 in 1980. The declined percentage of new cases in the later years might be due partly to the serious efforts made by the Government in combating drug abuse, especially through its special agency called PEMADAM.

Meanwhile the numbers of marriages, divorcees and *ruju*<sup>c</sup> (reunion) for three states - Kedah, the Federal Territory and

85

Cf. *Social statistics Bulletin* 1991, p. 167.

Kelantan - have been recorded for the 1981-1992 period as in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4  
Number of Marriages and Divorces in Selected States  
1981-1992<sup>86</sup>

YEAR	KEDAH	F. TERRITORY	KELANTAN
1981	8,946 - 721	1,821 561 165	-
1982	7,757 1,929 548	1,879 624 144	-
1983	7,284 2,190 542	2,063 626 162	-
1984	8,123 1,895 520	2,290 698 160	7,728 1,307 153
1985	7,107 1,636 513	2,614 734 180	7,013 1,387 156
1986	8,114 1,295 370	2,478 845 170	7,701 1,653 125
1987	8,413 1110 271	2,528 629 146	8,531 1556 113
1988	8,066 1,181 298	2,144 486 54	9,086 1,628 117
1989	9,782 1,301 326	2,450 884 68	9,118 1,596 117
1990	9,200 1,318 305	2,750 593 75	9,792 1,648 133
1991	9,208 1,323 231	2,889 557 56	10,127 1,663 126
1992	13,146 1,562 373	2,930 613 64	10,150 1,472 108

Figures in the first row of every cell indicate the total number of marriages for a particular year, the second row refers to the number of divorces and the third to the number of those who have resumed their marriage after divorce (*ruju'*). Cf. also "Perceraian di Malaysia: Kajian Kes di Kedah, Perlis dan Pulau Pinang" in *Jurnal Syariah*, Vol. I, No. 1, January-June, pp. 94-103.

YEAR	KEDAH	F.TERRITORY	KELANTAN
Sources: The Religious Departments of Kedah, Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory and Kelantan.			

As can be seen from the figures in Table 4.4., Kedah and Kelantan have recorded the highest number of marriages for the stipulated years as compared to Federal Territory. Throughout the decade, the number of marriages ranged from about 7,000<sup>87</sup> to slightly more than 10,000,<sup>88</sup> whereas in the Territory, the highest number recorded for the decade was in 1991 (2,889).

There has been a considerable incidence of divorce as indicated by the second row of each cell. By percentage, we can see clearly that Federal Territory has recorded highest rate of divorce for all years compared to Kelantan and Kedah. Its lowest rate of divorce was in 1991 at 19.3 per cent, the highest being 36.1 per cent in 1989. Being highly urbanized and metropolitan in nature, the Territory, in this regard, reflects an example of the impact of modernity upon people's social behaviour and life.<sup>89</sup>

From 1982 to 1985, Kedah recorded a higher divorce rate compared to Kelantan. After that year, the pattern of divorce rates indicates that Kedah was the lowest followed by Kelantan and the Federal Territory for the remaining years until 1991. In 1991, the rates for these states are 14.4 per cent, 16.4 per cent and 19.3 per cent respectively.

There has also been an increase in the number of committed juvenile offences during the same decade as reflected in Table 4.5.

---

87

The lowest number of marriages recorded in Kelantan being 7013 for the year 1985.

88

The highest number being 10150 recorded also for Kelantan in 1992.

89

The analysis of marriage and divorce is based on the data available. The missing data are not counted for this analysis.



Table 4.5  
Total Number of Committed Juvenile Offences from 1981 to 1991

Year	Total	Year	Total
1981	3,686	1,987	4,451
1982	3,393	1,988	4,190
1983	3,593	1,989	4,458
1984	3,993	1,990	4,241
1985	4,197	1,991	4,017
1986	4,324		
Source: Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of National Unity and Social Development as cited in Muhammad Kamal Hassan's "The Influence...".			

Although the number of committed juvenile offences dropped to the lowest point in 1982 (i.e. 3,393), it later rose consistently to reach 4,458 cases in 1987 before dropping again to 4190 cases in 1982. After recording the highest number ever in 1989 (4458 cases), the pattern seems to drop steadily since 1990. In 1991, only 4017 cases were reported which was slightly higher than that of the year 1984.

The reasons for all the above social problems are multifaceted. No specific reason can be singled out as being solely responsible for those phenomena. Nonetheless, it is typical of people of various walks of life in Malaysia, including the Government, to talk of the lack of religious and moral consciousness as one of the major factors behind this moral degeneration. Elaborating the marriage-divorce subject, Mohammad Kamal Hassan, for instance, has cited the study made by the Religious Department of the Federal Territory which, among other things, finds that the rate of divorce among Muslim couples in the Territory has increased by 100 per cent.<sup>90</sup> The study shows

---

90

A paper entitled "The Influence of Islam on Education and Family in Malaysia" presented by the writer at a seminar on *The Role and Influence of Religion in Society* organized by IKIM and the Goethe Institut Kuala Lumpur.

that the breakdown of causes of divorce is as follows: 25 per cent are due to lack of religious knowledge and upbringing, 20 per cent are related to parental interference, 20 per cent due to sexual problems, 15 per cent to financial problems and 20 per cent to other causes.

If the above indication can be said to reflect the impact of development on society, or rather the problem of development vis-a-vis morality, there should be ways in which this development-morality issue can be resolved. Unfortunately, the matter is far from straightforward, leaving different views to be expressed within individual or group perceptions as the following analysis shows.

PAS is of the opinion that the Government is to be blamed for its failure to contain this phenomenon, pointing that the root of the problems lies mainly in the Government's reluctance to adopt an Islamic-based development philosophy and strategy which recognizes the supremacy of *al-Qur'ān* and *al-Sunnah* as the main development reference. For instance, while agreeing to certain Government programmes like Islamic Bank and IIUM, the PAS President, Fadil Noor, is opposed to the Government's strategy in general and its religious approach in particular as this, according to him, can create confusions among the people<sup>91</sup> as they may think that inculcating good values is what Islam is all about, or is the most proper way of practising Islam. He disagrees with the Government's pragmatic attitude which practises dualism in its development strategy. While there exist programmes good for the people, there are also many practices which allow vices or *munkar* to prevail and to destroy society. For example, the Langkawi development project has cost local people their own culture and morality. Smoking has been rampant even among the youngsters of the island, besides exposure to

---

91

Interview with him at his residence in Jalan Langgar Alor Star on 8 May 1994.

religiously prohibited alcohol. The new "Western" culture has gradually developed and influenced local people who seem to be incapable of resisting it due to its strong temptation.<sup>92</sup> Licences for various types of gambling and religiously prohibited premises like massage houses are also frequently cited as examples of the Government's hypocritical approach.

Realizing that the issue of development is much more complex than what one can perceive, Chandra Muzaffar remarks that, while the Government's approach is lacking essential ingredients to ensure justice and peace for all, PAS's slogan and demand seem to be simplistic and lacking concrete solutions.<sup>93</sup> While Chandra's criticism of PAS's simplicity might have been based on his observation or some evidence, his remarks, however, cannot be taken to suggest the denial of the need for referring to these primary sources for deriving development principles and for creating a conducive moral environment for development.

On the current social problems, Fadil says that this is specifically due to the Government's efforts to advance the nation at the fastest possible rate. He feels that the Government should be able to reconsider the present speed of physical development to allow the people to prepare a better moral and spiritual strength so that any further progress will not shake their good culture and morality.<sup>94</sup> Indeed, Fadil's dream of an ideal moral society has always been an ultimate aim of every Muslim idealist. Nonetheless, they do not always share similar views as to how this ideal can be materialized. For instance,

---

92

Ibid.

93

For his critique of PAS and UMNO, see Ch. 6, "Other Aspects of PAS's Ideology and UMNO's Islam", of his *Islamic Resurgence In Malaysia*. To put this view in a proper perspective, please refer to PAS's approach in Islamizing Kelantan after regaining it from the Barisan in the 1990 election and compare it to what is being done by the Federal Government.

94

Ibid.

despite their agreement on the need for resolving present social problems, both Nakhaie Ahmad,<sup>95</sup> the former deputy vice-president of PAS, and Shahnnon Ahmad, a well known man of letters and lecturer and the present Chairman of Islamic Centre (Pusat Islam) of USM, disagree with Fadil's proposal that the Government should restrain the current development process. Their view is shared by the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Abdul Hamid Othman.<sup>96</sup> Nakhaie believes that the move to slow down economic development would retard peoples' material progress, and in the present world this is not a realistic alternative. Since other nations are competing with each other to progress in various aspects, it cannot be accepted that moderate material progress within a fast-changing world community is the best solution. A nation with weak economic, technological, military and other material achievements is, he says, more vulnerable to various threats, internal and external, than a physically and materially well developed nation.

The need for a faster physical development is more revealing when it is viewed in relation to the complex Malaysian ethnic situation. The Malay ethnic group, according to Abdul Hamid and Shahnnon, will be most affected as a result of the proposed slowdown. As a social dynamic, development progress cannot be, in the first place, easily frozen or reversed to allow certain aspects of society to prevail as all of them are interconnected.<sup>97</sup> Given the nature of Malaysian society, it is not possible, for instance, to request various ethnic groups to slow down their advancement. Even if this is done through legal enforcement, the victims of stagnation will still be the Malays,

---

95

Interview with Nakhaie at his office on 29 April 1994 and with Shahnnon on 9 May 1994.

96

Interview with him at his office on 13 May 1994.

97

Ibid.

and hence the Muslims.<sup>98</sup> Thus the objective of restructuring society by improving the socio-economic achievements of all races can never be realised. After all, Nakhaie argues, there have been evidences that even the economically least developed societies are not automatically able to demonstrate a higher standard of morality. More often than not, they are worse in both material and moral achievements.<sup>99</sup> The question is, therefore, not one of suppressing material progress in expectation of a moral society, but of finding practical solutions in the face of various new developments including that of morality.

Nakhaie says that social and moral problems have been, are and will always be existent in any society with varying degrees of seriousness. It is, therefore, the responsibility of everyone, including the Government, to help reduce the effect of modernization on society's morality. As side effects of development, the existence of social and moral problems can neither be denied nor disregarded. Every quarter of society must be serious in devising all possible means to overcome these predicaments.<sup>100</sup>

Meanwhile, Professor Khoo Kay Kim concedes that there has been quite a different type of behaviour among today's youngsters.<sup>101</sup> Basing himself upon personal observation, he feels that respecting elders and teachers, and intermingling with people of other ethnic groups in schools seem to have declined compared to that of his childhood days. However, he proposes that a study be carried out to get a better picture of today's

---

98

Ibid.

99

Interview with Nakhaie, op.cit..

100

Ibid.

101

Interview with Khoo Kay Kim at his office on 26 April 1994.

morality. Only on the basis of reliable findings, can the Government and the people take practical steps to overcome the problem. Of all solutions, he believes that education is the most important means to instill good values regarding inter-ethnic relations and morality in people.<sup>102</sup>

In summary, it can be said that while development has to take place for various socio-economic, cultural, political and military reasons, people are not uniform in their suggestions as to how the effects of physical advancement such as social and moral problems can be resolved realistically.<sup>103</sup> Constructive criticism is helpful in order to shed light on the need for correcting the defects in the philosophical basis of the current development strategy. Nonetheless, the absence of concrete and practical solutions to remedy the problem equally demonstrates the failure of critics to offer viable alternatives to current development deficiencies. Lack of detailed and practical programmes has been frequently cited as the main reasons behind this lack.

## 2.2. The Socio-political Impact.

The above analysis has shown that the change in rural-urban proportion over the stipulated development period has had an impact on socio-cultural, demographic and religious patterns. Contemporary demographic arrangements have also entailed the population being demarcated along ethnic lines, affecting in various ways Malaysia's political culture and social behaviour as the following analysis tries to show.

In Malaysia, the political opposition, the group most potentially able to influence the Government, has not

---

102

Ibid.

103

This is due mainly to their different conceptions and perceptions of religion and development.



demonstrated a really acceptable alternative to the people. The reasons are varied. In the first place, political opposition is not as united as the Government's *Barisan Nasional*. In fact, there has been no such permanent oppositional coalition in the history of Malaysian politics. Since independence, each opposition party has worked in its own way to achieve specific objectives of the party. Despite their claim to be a better Government if they win the election, they have often failed to present a viable alternative, mainly because of the absence of this unity.<sup>104</sup>

Lack of capable leadership could be another reason for the opposition's failure. For instance, Tengku Razaleigh, once a well known advocate of UMNO, joined the opposition in the 1990 election after failing to displace Mahathir in his bid to become UMNO President in 1987, and consequently, the Prime Minister. His hurried move to form *Semangat 46* (S46) Party after UMNO was declared illegal in 1988, and his later leading role in the formation of *Gagasan Rakyat* in the face of the election is not difficult to understand. In a number of cases, political frustration in Malaysia has led to immediate reaction culminating in the establishment of new political parties by outgoing leaders, or a sudden change of attitude on their part by supporting their one-time political enemies. Being outside the Government, these "desperados", understandably, speak a different language. What was once good about the Government is no longer so now.

The forming of the *Gagasan* was viewed as a betrayal by some PAS and S46 followers. While all predominantly Muslim parties, notably S46, PAS, HAMIM and BERJASA formed what they called

The strongest ever coalition, *Gagasan Rakyat*, was formed to face the Barisan in the 1990 general election. Nonetheless, the *Gagasan* failed to demonstrate a truly valid political alternative to the Government for a number of reasons, despite the fall of Kelantan and Sabah to PAS and PBS respectively.

*Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah*, the S46 established a mutual relationship with other non-Malay parties like DAP and the All Indian Progressive Party (AIPP).<sup>105</sup> The latter was a party formed by ex-members of the MIC splinter group. It is within this loose coalition that the *Gagasan* worked temporarily to face the 1990 election and to achieve their immediate political interest.<sup>106</sup>

Another feature of Malaysian politics which has some impact on the people's mentality and psychology is that the opposition parties in general do not incline to support the Government despite the merits of the latter's initiatives. The same is true of the Government's attitude. This is due partly to their fear of losing support among followers. This scenario seems to suggest that Malaysian politics has not yet arrived at a conducive political ethos that enables the good proposed by an opposing party to be openly accepted by the other. This aspect of political practice has been the subject of criticism especially

---

105

Also included as members of the *Gagasan* were *Parti Rakyat Malaysia* (formerly *Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia*) and The Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (KIMMA).

106

Such a concept of coalition has confused the followers of especially PAS and DAP, as both are against each other. Some of the PAS followers reacted to this cooperation by forming another party known as *Parti Islah* arguing that since DAP has been consistently against PAS's aspiration to establish an Islamic state there should not be any cooperation, directly or indirectly, with them. They also said that even the intention of *Semangat 46* is in question in view of their long active involvement in the nationalistic party of UMNO. S46's sympathy for PAS's Islamic cause, thus, cannot, be accepted as genuine despite their apparent and verbal support. This later proved to be justified when one by one the leaders of *Semangat* left their party and returned to UMNO. Understandably, there have been a great number of grassroots supporters who have also made the same move. The DAP also has withdrawn from *Gagasan Rakyat* leaving *Tengku Razaleigh* to plan to concentrate outside Kelantan during the 1995 election. Gradually, his prospects have lost ground to PAS whose supporters are far more cohesive than those of S46. Again, each opposition party has to work independently to achieve its objective despite the existence of the loose *Angkatan* in Kelantan.

This political diversity can be understood as all political parties are of different ethnic groups with an uncompromising attitude towards accommodating other parties' wishes. Having claimed to represent Muslims with a true Islamic cause, PAS, for example, is not, in the short term, prepared to seem to be willing for any direct compromise with the DAP, a predominantly Chinese-based party struggling for the benefit of the Chinese community.

among the intellectuals who consider that the present type of inter-political relationships does not help to develop a healthy intellectual tradition and positive political culture among the people. More often than not, this has created confusions among people, especially when they have to reach decisions based on religious considerations. For instance, as both PAS and UMNO claim to fight for Islam, every argument seems to justify the need to support only their own party.<sup>107</sup> Although people are free to choose, in reality they are not much inclined to do so. It has been observed that the prevalence of such political milieu can create more harm than good for societal development, particularly for the Malays.

Thus Chandra Muzaffar, for instance, has criticised PAS for not being able to demonstrate a principled stand when it failed to show support for the Government's amendment of the Constitution which enabled the Rulers to be brought to court whenever they, or any member of the royal families, commit an offence. He says that it is ironic for PAS to remain indifferent over this proposal when there is clear evidence that the Government's step was meant for a good cause, that is to reduce vices in society, a cause that PAS has long claimed to fight for. To assume that the Government's move was not genuine, and to argue that the proposed amendment was not comprehensive, and that the Government had a political motive behind this motion was, for Chandra, unacceptable as the overriding objective of the amendment was noble and could help resist or reduce human rights

<sup>107</sup> Despite a brief political wedding of PAS and UMNO when the former was accepted as a member of the Barisan in 1974, the cooperation did not last long. PAS decided to withdraw from the Barisan after the 1978 election due to its dissatisfaction over the treatment it received from UMNO. For the Islamic elements in PAS and UMNO, see for instance Mohd. Nakhaie Hj. Ahmad, "Elemen Islam Dalam Perjuangan Kebangsaan Melayu", in his *Mantapkan Landasan Perjuangan*, (Kuala Lumpur: Rangkain Analysis dan Penyelidikan Islam (RAPI), October, 1993), pp. 51-72.

violations.<sup>108</sup>

This type of Government-opposition relationship has also received a critical assessment by the Advisor of Institute for Policy Studies, Associate Professor Dr. Siddiq Fāḍil, who remarks that any opinion as to whether a move by the Government or the opposition is acceptable or not must be based on an academic and rational considerations rather than political ones, as the latter will reduce many good things to a mere loss for all concerned.<sup>109</sup> Hence, the present type of relationship must change.

Despite the unquestionable merit of such a proposal, the matter is, however, far from straightforward. While admitting the importance of healthy and constructive inter-political relationship, Malaysian situation demands more than mere verbal expression of support for the opposing party. The crucial question is not whether it should change, but how it can be changed for good purposes. Given the ethnic, religious and other national interests, how can this overriding and noble principle of "political freedom" be appreciated by all parties so that the change can promise more benefit than harm? This needs to be ensured particularly when the said principle is still to be viewed from the narrow ethnic perspective of various political parties which seek to fulfill only their own political interest. Only when this type of narrow political bias ceases from the minds of all political actors can any move for political reform and change in Malaysia be meaningful.

---

108

Another example of this type of political exercise took place in 1990, the year the NEP was to expire, when the Government formed a national committee known as MAPEN (National Consultative Council) to work out suggestions to be considered for formulating a new post-1990 development policy to replace the NEP. the DAP representatives had, in the midst of MAPEN progress, withdrawn from the committee leaving the committee with less weight for a real consensus.

109

Talk at University of Aberystwyth, Wales on 2nd July 1994. Refer tape B.

### 2.3. The Impact on Ethnic Relations.

One of the most important aspects of Malaysian development is the creation and maintenance of ethnic relations, an important prerequisite for national unity. All ethnic groups are expected to show high respect the importance of preserving unity and harmony among different races so as to ensure the prevalence of political, economic and social stability at all time.<sup>110</sup> We have elaborated in Chapter One the historical origin of today's multi-ethnic society which has observed the evolution of the nation's complex multi-cultural and multi-religious society, consisting of three main ethnic groups namely the Malay, the Chinese and the Indian.

We also said that upon compromise and agreement by all races on fundamental issues, Malaysia secured its independence in 1957. In that spirit all Malaysians are expected to live as a family in an independent nation despite differences of skin colour, language and other aspects. Nonetheless, ethnic and cultural relations have not appeared to be an easy affair in the post-independence period. It is premature to assume that all races which have had a series of bitter experiences during the colonial period would easily become absorbed into a new social environment free from all psychological and racial difficulties. The problem was so deep-rooted that ethnic relations are never a matter of the past. Table 4.6. is provided to show the Malaysian ethnic composition in the Peninsular during the first decade of Mahathir era.

---

110

The lofty objective of the NEP and *Rukunegara* was said to be the creation of a united Malaysia.

Table 4.6  
Peninsular Malaysia: Population Estimate By Ethnic Group ('000)

	1980	1985	1990
Malay and Other Bumiputera	6,324.4 (55.1)	7,325.6 (56.5)	8,493.0 (58.1)
Chinese	3,894.3 (33.9)	4,248.4 (32.8)	4,579.2 (31.4)
Indian	1,178.9 (10.3)	1,311.9 (10.1)	1,441.1 (9.9)
Others	75.4 (0.7)	82.9 (0.6)	91.9 (0.6)
TOTAL	11,473 .0 (82.7)	12,968 .8 (82.1)	14,605 .2 (81.7)
Source: Fifth Malaysia Plan, p. 128.			

As can be seen, a slight adjustment to the ethnic proportions has occurred during this period. The Malay and other Bumiputera population has recorded an increased average annual growth rate of 2.9 % and 3.0% for the respective 1980-1985 and 1985-1990 periods. The growth rate for the Chinese is 1.7% and 1.5%, and 2.1% and 1.9% for the Indians for the respective periods. Thus, the percentage of the Malay population rose from 55.1% in 1980 to 58.1% in 1990 compared with 33.9% and 31.4% for Chinese and 10.3% and 9.9% for the Indians in the respective years. These differentials are attributed mainly to the differences in fertility rate among the communities.<sup>111</sup> Given this type of polarization by ethnic group, the maintenance of ethnic relations in a country like Malaysia is understandably very important as well as delicate.

Mahathir was convinced that in the early years of independence what appeared to be a racial harmony was, in fact,

---

111

Fifth Malaysia Plan, p. 128.



a superficial togetherness.<sup>112</sup> The absence of direct clashes among races was not due to the absence of causes of dispute, but only because people did not come to a potential momentum that could give rise to a quarrel. He strongly disagreed in particular with the Tunku's view which seemed to be to let the Malays concentrate on politics and let the Chinese do well in the economy as a means of maintaining racial harmony. When the racial riot of 13 May 1969 broke out, Mahathir had a greater opportunity to manipulate the issue to his advantage. The question is economic equality is most important in maintaining racial harmony in a country like Malaysia? Obviously, the answer to this question is not easy to be agreed upon. During Mahathir's period, the state of ethnic relation can be studied from various angles. In our analysis, we propose to examine it from the political, economic and religious perspectives.

In the context of *Barisan Nasional*, it is understandable that every ethnic group would demand that more opportunities and benefits be given to their people. Although compromise did take place in this bargaining process, one can expect that sometimes dissatisfaction might arise. Most of the time, these *internal affairs* were dealt with privately within the bounds of the coalition limits and understandings, as all the members were expected to respect its rules and disciplines in order to keep it functional in the most healthy way. This practice and spirit has developed and become an important element in the coalition's tradition.<sup>113</sup>

There were times when this feeling could not be contained for one reason or another. Various factors could cause resentment among the coalition members which might lead to quite a different

---

112

Malay Dilemma.

113

Mahathir, speech at MCA AGM on 31 July 1988, and also at MIC AGM on 2 July 1988.

direction. As examples, we find such incidents as the withdrawal of PBS from Barisan in the midst of the 1990 election. In earlier period, we saw the departure of PAS from the coalition before the 1978 general election. Despite these incidents, it can be said that in general ethnic relations within the coalition during this period demonstrated a more intimate relationship compared to other political parties. Common political interest was largely responsible for this political unity.

On the other hand, such a relationship did not appear to work well among the opposition despite their first ever experiment in the 1990 election. The establishment of the *Gagasan Rakyat* proved to be short-lived when DAP withdrew from it for fear of greater political disadvantage and risk in the face of the 1995 election. The fact that most opposition parties were not prepared to take political risks by supporting parties of different ethnic and religious ideologies was the major factor behind this disunity. Consequently, ethnic relations among the opposition parties have not been effective during this period. By June 1995, only *Parti Melayu S46* and *Parti Rakyat Malaysia* remained in the dying *Gagasan* after the pullout of KIMMA in that month.

Perhaps it was in the economic sphere that ethnic relations have presented fewer difficulties compared to other areas. As the main cause of the 1969 incident was said to be economic inequality among races, the NEP was formulated with two prongs: eradication of poverty regardless of race and restructuring of society. The Government's move to intensify industrial activities and business, for instance, has forced people of various professions to accept each other's role in meeting the economic demands of the day. Business-related activities could not effectively take place without one ethnic group having contact, in one way or the other, with other ethnic groups. This was more so in heavy industry where manufacturing, production and marketing sectors required the participation of more than one

ethnic group. The NEP period has also covered the first decade of the Mahathir administration. After about two decades of its implementation, what have been the results of the NEP? For instance, what has been the progress of income distribution among the main ethnic groups during the Mahathir period which might have had some implications on the ethnic relations?

Although the growth rate of population among the Malays and the Bumiputera was the highest among the ethnic groups, their actual growth of income has been the lowest during the 1984-1989 period. For instance, the average annual growth rate of mean monthly gross household income for the 1987-1989 period was only 3.6% compared to 5.%, 5.0% and 9.3% for the Chinese, Indians and others respectively.<sup>114</sup> The actual household income of the Malays in 1984 was RM852.00 per month compared to RM1,502 for the Chinese, RM1094.00 for the Indians and RM2,454.00 for the others. In 1989 the mean monthly income for the respective ethnic groups was RM931.00, RM1,582.00, RM1,202.00 and RM3,446.00.<sup>115</sup> This means that the numerical increase of the Malay and Bumiputera population over the period has not been accompanied by a rise in their income. Some have taken this argument to show that the NEP has failed to help even the Malays.

In terms of employment by sector and ethnic group, there has not been much change in the agricultural sector for all groups. However, in the manufacturing sector the Malays seemed to have made good progress as shown in Table 4.7..

---

114

Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia 1992, p. 209.

115

Ibid.

Table 4.7  
Employment by Selected Sector and Ethnic Group, 1985-1995<sup>116</sup>

SECTOR	BUMIPUTERA	CHINESE	INDIAN	OTHERS
Agriculture & Forestry	75.0	16.1	8.3	0.7
	76.4	16.1	6.7	0.8
	76.1	16.5	6.6	0.8
Manufacturing	45.1	43.3	11.0	0.6
	50.3	36.9	12.2	0.6
	53.9	33.2	12.4	0.5
Wholesale & Retail Trade, Hotel and Restaurant	36.1	56.0	7.1	0.8
	38.2	54.1	6.9	0.8
	41.1	51.5	6.5	0.9
Government Services	65.7	24.7	8.9	0.7
	65.9	25.3	8.2	0.6
	65.2	25.5	8.8	0.5
Unemployment Rate	7.3	6.2	6.7	4.8
	6.5	5.3	5.6	4.9
	5.3	3.2	3.9	3.7
Source: Sixth Malaysia Plan, p. 36.				

It is clear that a vast majority of Bumiputera are still in the agricultural sector which has been traditionally associated with low income compared with the return gained through other sectors. They formed about three quarters of the total work force in this sector for the stipulated period. However, they have made great strides in the manufacturing, wholesaling, retail trade and restaurant sectors as well as in the Government services. For instance, in 1985 their share in manufacturing sector was 45.1% which later rose to 53.9% in 1995. As this research does not place emphasis on economic analysis, a detailed study of this aspect is not to be done here.

An area in which good ethnic and social relations find it difficult to prevail is, understandably, religion. Despite the nobility of religious teachings like tolerance, cooperation, respect for others and common humanitarian ideals, people are seldom able to put them into practice. However, the Government's

116

Figures in the first row are for the year 1985, the second 1990, and the third 1995.

move to bring people of various religions into more formal discussion as reflected in such seminars as those on the Role and Influence of Religions in Society and Towards Enhancing Working Relations in Multi-Cultural Society mentioned earlier which have been important in the attempt to reduce this inter-ethnic problem. If the Government's liberal approach in implementing religious programmes proves to be beneficial for all, it will be a great contribution to Malaysian ethnic relations.

#### 2.4. The Islamic Religious Impact.

Earlier in this chapter we have shown that the development process has also altered peoples' religious perception and patterns of behaviour. A new religious culture has developed especially among the younger generation alongside physical advancement. Wider educational opportunities and improved religious awareness around the world have been among the major factors which have contributed to this new phenomenon. Here, we would argue that this religious perception has evolved over a certain period of time, and only began to appear in the present form and become more significant since the 1970s. Religion from a revivalist perspective was no longer seen as a tool for mere personal and spiritual satisfaction. Instead, it was an ideology that embraces and relates to all aspects of human existence and life. Consequently, people saw a greater role for religion in society and felt obliged to work for its realization. It is this religious activism variously known as "Islamic Revivalism", "Then Rising Tide of Islam", "Islamic Resurgence", "Islamic Revival" etc. that provides a significant background to the current religious practice of the Muslims and has also influenced the Government's religious policy. The latter's involvement only helped to reinforce this religious phenomenon.

In the face of widespread religious consciousness, the Malaysian Government has been calculative and has reacted with various types of responses. Of all the various options, the

consolidationist or accommodationist approach has been more preferred by the Mahathir administration, a decision whose sincerity and rationality it was not easy to convince various quarters. In his own style, Mahathir attempted to demonstrate that he was correct to take this religious approach and that he was serious about it. He tried to prove his realistic stand mainly through his Islamization policy and a frequent stress on the balance between material and moral-spiritual development, an approach that did not easily go uncriticised throughout his administration. Earlier, we have offered an appraisal of the Government's religious approach: What follows is an examination of the impact that this policy has had upon society. First, we will look into some quantitative manifestations of this policy before coming up with a survey of responses from various quarters in the next chapter.

Some said that the Islamization policy was a result of Government's fear of the increasing Islamic consciousness among the public.<sup>117</sup> Although such an opinion might not be entirely fair to Mahathir himself for various political and personal reasons, the Government's more positive approach to Islam compared to that of the previous administrations has, directly or indirectly, become part of this resurgence.

As Islamic resurgence reflects, among other things, "an endeavour to reestablish Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere... (and) an attempt to recreate an Islamic ethos",<sup>118</sup> an Islamization policy is expected to bear these religious ingredients.

Striking indicators reflecting an increasing religious awareness among the public are said to have been observable in

---

117

See Diane K. Mauzy, "Discipline Through Islam...", op.cit..

118

See Chandra's *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*.



contemporary Malaysia since 1970.<sup>119</sup> First, Chandra observes that some significant religious manifestations among the public were: a) diffusion of what was regarded as Islamic attire especially among female Muslims in urban areas, b) a decline in social communication among sexes, c) wide practice of Islamic greetings and the use of Arabic terms by the resurgents in speech, d) more overt concern about Muslim dietary rules, e) noticeable decline in inter-religious socializing as a result of this concern, f) hobbies, tastes and values are slowly being moulded by this new attachment to religion resulting in disapproval of Western pop music, Western drama, Western dances and even Western films, and inclination to home-based hobbies especially among women, g) prominence of early-morning religious lectures, talks and forums on Islamic themes in cultural programmes, h) a multitude of cassette tapes and publications on Islamic topics, i) serious efforts to manufacture *halal* products especially for the Muslim clientele, j) the younger generation especially are more serious about their daily prayers, k) countless seminars and forums calling for the establishment of an Islamic education system, an Islamic economy, an Islamic political order and an Islamic legal framework, and, l) an increasing demand for the establishment of an Islamic state especially by the young adherents.

As the State has also participated, directly or indirectly, in this religious tide as evidenced through its greater involvement in the name of Islam, some Government-initiated activities could also reflect this religious activism. Some of them were: a) introduction of *azān* and a series of new programmes aimed at educating Muslims and non-Muslims alike in the pristine ideals of the religion over the State-run radio and television service, b) UMNO, the leading party of the ruling

Though not entirely accurate, Chandra's *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia* provides a good account which "enumerates" the general "signs" of this religious phenomenon. They can be reiterated in the following summary.

*Barisan Nasional* began to place more emphasis on Islam in its communication with the Malay populace, c) the introduction of the Islamization programme in 1982 emphasizing the inculcation of Islamic values in administration, d) establishment of Islamic Banks on 1 July 1983 and the International Islamic University in the middle of 1983 (IIUM), e) the launching of an interest-free insurance scheme known as *Takaful Islam* and its plan for establishing an Islamic pawnshop system.

The joining of Anwar Ibrahim, the ex-President of ABIM, with the Government in 1982 seemed to reinforce the Government's Islamization programmes. Anwar has been seen as the man behind the success of most Islamic projects carried out by the Government. Hence, the Anwar factor cannot be overlooked if one is to understand Mahathir's Islamization policy.

The above listing of the *signs* of Islamic resurgence forms only part of the whole situation relating to the increasing desire to practice Islam in its totality. This partly explains the significant implication that this phenomenon has had for society and the Government, and the demand of the resurgents for more concrete Islamic manifestations. Many other indicators will also be noticeable as we go on to review Islamic expression during the Mahathir era. Most relevant to our present context of analysis is, however, the impact of Government development strategy in general, and its Islamic "programmes" in particular, on contemporary Muslim society. In other words, to what extent have the Government Islamic activities been able to infiltrate into society and influence its religious performance and conduct? Two newly-established Islamic institutions, the Islamic Bank and the International Islamic University, have been chosen for a deeper scrutiny. Others will only be given a brief assessment afterwards.

#### 2.4.1. Islamic Bank (*Bank Islam [Malaysia] Berhad* or BIMB).

Khoo Kay Kim observes that Mahathir's main concern in the overall implementation of his development strategy seemed to have been basically economic.<sup>120</sup> Thus, most of his policies were meant to achieve as much as possible the economic objective. In this sense, what seemed to be a non-economic project can be said to possess an economic objective in the long run. It was, perhaps, in the light of this concern that the Islamic Bank has received his particular preference in view of its potential to improve the economic standards of the people, especially the Malays and hence, the Muslims.<sup>121</sup> The Bank whose transactions must be free from *Riba* is a considerably new feature in the current conventional setup.<sup>122</sup>

Mahathir himself has said that the establishment of the Islamic Bank is meant to fulfill the need of Muslims in the modern world to deal with financial matters based on religious principles.<sup>123</sup> As existing conventional banks cannot provide such a facility to them, it is the responsibility of the Government

---

120

Interview with Prof. Khoo Kay Kim, op.cit..

121

It should be noted that the first institution in Malaysia to have formally started its operation based on *shari'ah* principles is the Pilgrim's Management and Fund Board (LUTH) which was officially launched in September 1963. See Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji, *Tabung Haji 25 Tahun*, (Kuala Lumpur: LUTH, n.d.), p. 4, and Dayangku Zarina bt. Mohd. Sabri, *Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji: Peranannya Dalam Pembangunan Umat Islam di Malaysia*, BA Thesis, University of Malaya, 1992.

122

The concept of *Riba* lies in the principle of fixed payment given to persons involved in a transaction regardless of the amount of profits gained by one party through the agreed transaction as against the principle of *Bay'* which encourages profit making through an agreed buy-and-sell transaction or the profit sharing principle. For an explanation of *Riba'*, see for instance, Al-Sayyid Sabiq, *Fiqh al-Sunnah*, Vol. 3, (Cairo: Dar al-Fath Li I'lam al-'Arabi), pp. 253-260.

123

Mahathir, speech at the launching ceremony of Bank Islam Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, on 1st. July 1983 (*Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (ekonomi)*, p. 84).

to help provide such a service.<sup>124</sup> Whatever the reason may have been, the launching of the Islamic Bank in Malaysia on 1 July 1983 was considered timely as it was established in the midst of a high demand from the people, an important factor for success.<sup>125</sup> The Malaysian concept of the Islamic Bank was then formulated by taking into consideration various principles relevant to an Islamic financing and economic system as derived from the two main sources of *Sharī'ah* namely *al-Qur'ān* and *al-Sunnah*, as well as the opinions of scholars in various fields. Bank Islam however is not an institution to deal with an administration and collection of *Zakat* although it pays *Zakat* as part of its religious obligation.<sup>126</sup>

As the Government considers that any project done in the name of Islam must not only be ideal but also realistic, the operation of the Islamic Bank in the early stages was mainly to offer Islamic services to the clients while ensuring its stability and survival. Abd. Halim Ismail, the first and current Director-General of BIMB, who received both conventional and Islamically-oriented education, argued that the Bank's ability

124

Not only had the Islamic Bank to be compatible with the Islamic principles in concept, its implementation also had to take into account local realities particularly in view of complex political and ethnic circumstances. For the philosophical and operational framework of the Islamic Bank, see for instance Dr. Sobri Solomon, *Bank Islam*, (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Ulama Malaysia (PUM), 1984), Dr. Abdul Halim Ismail, "Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad", op.cit..

125

For a history of the establishment of Islamic Bank see for instance Dr. Abdul Halim Ismail, "Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad: Establishment and Operations", a paper presented at Conference on Islam and Technology, at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, December 1985.

126

*Zakat* literally means 'growth', 'increase' or 'purity'. Technically it refers to the compulsory due imposed by Islam on Muslims who have fulfilled various specific conditions. For a fuller understanding of the concept, see for instance Abdul Aziz bin Muhammad, "The Concept and Practice of *Zakat* Before and After Islam" in his *Zakat and Rural Development in Malaysia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1993). *Zakat* in Malay is dealt with especially by the Islamic Religious Department of each state. In recent years, a special centre for a systematic collection of *Zakat* has been established in Kuala Lumpur known as Centre for Collection of *Zakat* or *Pusat Pungutan Zakat*.

to survive was crucial at that time as failure could tarnish the image of not only the Muslims but more seriously of the Islamic religion itself. As such, it was important to ensure that the Bank should be able to make profits in order to survive and to contribute successfully and actively in wider business affairs in future.<sup>127</sup> At least, in this limited sense, the Government seems to have been quite realistic and liberal in implementing this Islamic-based economic project. At this juncture, one can expect that an insight into the Bank's performance over the stipulated period will be crucial to measure the extent of its progress. For this purpose, a study of some indicators may help to provide grounds for an objective judgment.

The fact that an Islamically-based bank is able to operate in a complex multi-ethnic society like Malaysia's is, perhaps, an achievement by itself. Prior to the 1980s, and especially before 1970s, no one would not have believed that such a bank could be established.<sup>128</sup> In this sense, the Islamic resurgence can be credited for its role in creating a conducive environment which has led to Islam being practised and implemented in more concrete terms by various quarters including the Government. The establishment of Bank Islam is one such manifestation.

Ever since its commencement, the bank has drawn an increasing number of ndepositors, not only among the Muslims but also the non-Muslims. As at June 1993, the number of depositors had reached 362,111. The bank's progress in terms of deposits over the period is shown in Table 4.8.

---

127

Disagreement over what should be the concept of and approach to Islamic banking has given rise to some criticism among the public.

128

Sidek Baba and all ABIM leaders always stress this change in attitudes to justify their support for such an institution.

Table 4.8  
BIMB: Total Deposits from 1985 to 1993 (RM '000)

YEAR	DEPOSITS	YEAR	DEPOSIT
1985	405.0	1990	1221.1
1986	566.9	1991	1175.5
1987	809.9	1992	1321.8
1988	1022.2	1993	1612.2
1989	1229.2		
Source: BIMB Annual Reports of Various Years up to 1993.			

The response from the non-Muslims not only to the Islamic Bank but also to other conventional banks which offered interest-free transactions has also been encouraging. For instance, when MBf Finance, one of the main conventional banks in Malaysia, launched its Islamic financing scheme towards the end of 1992, it drew a considerable number of non-Muslim customers. By March 1993, out of 87,000 account holders, 18,000 were non-Muslims.<sup>129</sup>

A change of attitude among the non-Muslims towards the Islamic religion might be another reason behind their increasing acceptance, though this might not be truly so for the majority of them. Many argue that the non-Muslim's response is due to the economic advantage that they can gain. When more profits can be drawn from certain transactions with the Bank compared to what is offered by other conventional banks, they turn to it. Paradoxically, there have also been views that the Government's strategy to implement Islam through an economic-based project is a wise approach to break the fear especially among the non Muslims. Thus, for better or worse, the bank managed to start its operation and expanded within these cultural and psychological challenges until now.

As an expanding institution, the bank, no doubt, has been able to provide jobs for a considerable number of job-seekers.

129

News Straits Times, 14 March 1993, p. 11.



By the end of June 1987, the total number of staff members employed by the bank was 537, which included 218 officers at various levels and 319 in clerical and non-clerical grades. The rate of employment increased as the Bank began to expand its activities and opened new branches in other states, first one in every state, and later in many other districts (known as mini-branches), making the number of its staff 667 (267 officers and 400 clerical) in 1989, and 895 (370 officers and 525 clerical) in 1991.<sup>130</sup>

By 1987 the total number of branches opened was 18, which later increased to 24 in 1989 and 32 in 1991. It was during the year 1993 that the Bank began to install an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) system using a smart card technology at its branches. The eventual aim was that all banks with full service and mini-branches would have ATM.<sup>131</sup>

If the Bank's progress is to be judged by its achievements, the statistics in Table 4.9 for major aspects of its operation may help to provide a picture.

Table 4.9  
BIMB: Net Profit Before Zakat and Total Assets from 1985 to 1993

YEAR	NET PROFIT BEFORE ZAKAT (Million)	TOTAL ASSETS
1985	4.4	514.2
1986	3.7	682.9
1987	4.5	932.3
1988	6.2	1133.9
1989	11.6	1388.7
1990	15.7	1425.9
1991	17.8	1400.4

<sup>130</sup> The Annual Reports of the relevant years.

<sup>131</sup> The annual reports of the relevant years

1992	20.7	1676.2
1993	35.7	2009.1
Source: BIMB Annual Reports of Various Issues up to 1993		

In 1993, except in the aspect of finance of customers, all other important indicators have achieved the highest score ever in the history of the Bank's operation. Capital share rose up to RM133,405,000 along with the rise in the reserve (RM68,717,000), shareholders' fund (RM202,122,000), total deposit (RM1,612,172,000), total assets (RM2,009,088,000) and net profit before zakat and taxation (RM35,659,000). The dividend rate was the highest recorded at 8%.<sup>132</sup>

The impact of the Islamic Bank in particular and the Islamic financial system in general can also be observed by looking at the expanding influence that this bank has had on other conventional banks. As the customers began to respond positively to this type of service, other conventional banks also took various steps to accommodate this demand. At first, it was common to find a *meja* (table) or *kaunter Islam* (Islamic counter) as an additional service for those who prefer Islamically-based transactions at these banks.<sup>133</sup>

As the time passed by, they took more aggressive initiatives by absorbing, to a greater degree, the principles of Islamic transactions in their bank's operation. Nowadays, it is common to find that most conventional banks offer various types of transaction and services like loans and savings based on

---

132

Annual Reports of the relevant year (1993).

133

Besides this facility *Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.* was established as the Bank's subsidiary offering various types of insurance based on Islamic principles including car insurance and life insurance. The rate of achievement recorded by this subsidiary was also encouraging.

Islamic principles.<sup>134</sup>

The Islamic Bank has been operating for more than a decade since its commencement in 1983. There is no doubt that its emergence has been faced by various challenges - psychological and political as well as circumstantial. The concept it offered might be thought best by the Government though it remains a subject of scrutiny and criticism among the public in view partly of the non-existence of a single agreed and universal theoretical framework that can ensure its success in local circumstances. However, this particular issue is not meant to be studied in depth in this research. With the existence of *Shari'ah* Advisory Body to monitor its operations, the Government seems to be in a better position to convince the public that what is taking place in the operation of the Islamic Bank is truly Islamic. Hence people's support for it.

The prospects of the Islamic Bank in Malaysia can be said to be developing in an encouraging direction. This is as far as the statistical impression of some major indicators is concerned. If the present trend and response can be taken to reflect a greater and more positive participation among the public in supporting the Bank, a promising future for an Islamic economic system in Malaysia can be expected as a logical consequence of this promising development. In the course of its development, however, various other aspects of the bank are expected to develop in a more realistic manner as part of its maturing process. As the practice of Islamic banking system is relatively new in the modern world, its philosophical and operational framework might have to undergo a series of reviews from time to time not only to make it most compatible with the divine teaching, but at the same time to become more realistic in

practice. It is here that continuous involvement in a Research and Development (R & D) programme is expected to play a greater role to correct any possible deficiencies in order to maximize its benefits both quantitatively and qualitatively.

#### 2.4.2. International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM).

If the establishment of the Islamic Bank can be said to incorporate simultaneously religious and economic dimensions, the existence of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) since early 1983 can be said to reflect similar aspirations.<sup>135</sup> Its sphere of influence is, however, wider, more multi-faceted and not confined only to education. In the context of Islamization, the establishment of IIUM can be said to symbolize an early step towards greater reform in the national education system as the Government's subsequent moves have proved.

The Dean of IIUM Matriculation Centre, Dr. Sidek Baba, is of the opinion that it was the three big Islamic projects namely IIUM, the Islamic Bank and the mandatory Islamic Civilization subject in universities that partly influenced the former President of ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim, to join UMNO in 1982.<sup>136</sup> He says that the establishment of IIUM is not only timely but also strategic as it can prepare the work force for the existing system. For him, the system can only be Islamic in substance and content if the people are intellectually and educationally Islamic. Upon graduation, IIUM products are expected to take up various posts in both private and public sectors and to spread Islamic values at their working places. Meanwhile Mahathir has said at the foundation stone-laying ceremony at the University

---

135

The University operates as a company under the ownership of a board representing the University's sponsoring governments and organizations, mainly, Malaysia as the host nation, Maldives, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and The Organization of Islamic Conference.

136

Interview with him on 12.4.1994.

on 24 August 1993 that, "The IIUM's objective should not only to become an institution of higher learning which is recognised and respected by the Islamic world, but also by other world universities in general".<sup>137</sup> It is in this way that the IIUM is functioning within the Government Islamization programme.<sup>138</sup>

Claimed to have been founded on the Islamic philosophy of knowledge and education, IIUM is said to be among the direct results of the First World Conference on Islamic Education held in Makkah in 1977.<sup>139</sup> Under this philosophy, the University regards knowledge as a trust from Allāh, to be utilized in accordance with His will, and the quest for knowledge is regarded as an act of worship.<sup>140</sup>

The present Deputy Prime Minister, who is also the Finance Minister and President of the University and widely seen as the man behind the Government's Islamic projects, says that the IIUM is founded upon a renewed awareness of the perennial value of the teachings of the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* and is dedicated to the re-orientation of the *ummah* and mankind.<sup>141</sup> The education offered at this institution includes a dimension that is missing elsewhere, for IIUM strives not merely for excellence in teaching and research but also to create an arena in which the student can develop as a balanced, integrated person ready to face the

---

137

*Newsbulletin*, July-September 1993, p. 1.

138

*Ibid.*

139

See, for instance, *International Islamic University Undergraduate Prospectus 1992/93*, p.1.

140

*Ibid.*

141

*Ibid.*, in President's Message.

challenges of the contemporary world.<sup>142</sup>

Based on the above philosophy, IIUM first offered an integrated course in Laws and Economics, and later expanded to include various other science subjects like engineering and Human Science subjects including Sociology/Anthropology, Communication, Political Sciences, Education, History, Languages and Islamic Civilization.

In the early years of its operation, all economic and law students were required to take compulsory subjects offered by the Centre for Fundamental Knowledge (CFK), a department responsible for providing service courses mainly on Islamic subjects like *Tafsīr*, *Ḥadīth*, Islamic Worldview or *al-Taṣāwwur al-Islāmī*, Islamic *Daʿwah*, Islamic Civilization and Comparative Religion and lessons in *Qur'ān* Recitation. While lecturers in the conventional subjects were encouraged and expected to instill Islamic values and principles during their teaching, the CFK service courses were hoped to provide a better opportunity for students to have a proper insight into Islam so that they could develop an integrated perception of the subjects they studied by themselves.

Apart from this formal academic orientation, students were also required to attend a weekly religious circle known as *Ḥalaqah* as a compulsory co-curricular. During the *Ḥalaqah* session, a group of ten or more students will discuss religious subjects like selected Qur'anic exegesis, selected *Aḥādīth*, contemporary issues etc. among themselves based on the syllabus specially prepared by the CFK. This circle was led by a leader known as *naqīb* or *naqībah* who was also responsible for monitoring and taking notes of the progress of the session. He or she also took note of the attendance. The overall running of the session was then documented in a standard report sheet to be submitted to the CFK through the respective lecturer who acted as supervisor. The performance of each participant is assessed by



assigning points to every *ḥalaqah* activity.<sup>143</sup>

At the end of every term, an *ʿIbādah Camp* was organized by CFK for students of different levels. The motto for all levels of the camps was based on *Āyah* 56 of *Sūrah al-Dhāriyāt* which can be translated as, "I have not created the Jinn and man except to worship Me". Different themes were introduced in different levels of the camps. Upon his or her graduation, a student was expected to have undergone all eight camps. The first few camps normally took place inside the campus, and in some other more distant venues for the later camps. The programme lasted for about two or three days with speakers and participants discussing more serious religious and contemporary issues as contained in the camp's programme book. The *Qiyām al-Layl* and other spiritual exercises were also incorporated as part of its integrated agenda.

For both the *ḥalaqah* and the *ʿIbādah Camp*, attendance and other qualitative achievements were given points. These points were added to the student's total academic score. A student's failure in a CFK subject would affect his overall academic achievement. It is in this way that an integrated philosophy of knowledge and education seemed to have been operationalized in IIUM. Lack of lecturers who were conversant in both religious and conventional subjects might be the main reason behind the adoption of this type of *tarbiyah* approach. Over time, students, having undergone both academic and religious orientation during their University days, were expected to have a better and more integrated religious perspective that would enable them to *Islamise* whatever knowledge they acquired. Such a process is, understandably, not easy, admits Sidek.<sup>144</sup>

---

143

On IIUM *halaqah* see also Sidek Baba, *The Malaysian Study Circle Movement and Some Implications for Educational Development*, PhD Dissertation, (Illinois: Northern Illinois University, 1991), pp. 36-38.

144

Interview with Sidek, op.cit..

In what way, then, IIUM can be seen to have left an impact on society? Upon observation, one can identify several important aspects in which the establishment of IIUM has had such an impact.

First and foremost among them is that IIUM has been able to provide greater educational opportunity for local and foreign students based on an integrated system of education. The IIUM is not only accommodating an increasing number of local candidates for tertiary education including the non-Malays, it also helps underprivileged foreign students to get places for learning, especially when such an opportunity is absent or hardly available in their own countries.

In this way, the IIUM has developed its international image, especially among the countries from which these students have come. Currently, there is a sizable number of students from such countries as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, Japan, China, the Philippines, Burma, Albania and several African countries. For instance, by the 1993, there were about 50 students from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 50 from Albania, 40 from China, 70 from the countries of the former Soviet Union and a big number from neighbouring Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.<sup>145</sup> According to the Rector, Dr. Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, foreign students constitute about 16 per cent or about 800 of the total number of students in both undergraduate and postgraduate programmes.<sup>146</sup> With the establishment of IIUM, local candidates also have more choices of courses and universities to further their education.

What is more important is that the IIUM has provided opportunities for students, especially the Muslims, to foster a better relationship with the public, especially the non-Muslims, through such programmes as the Community Relations Day, the

---

145

*Newsbulletin*, July-September 1993, p. 2.

146

*Ibid.*

Foster Family Programme, the Community Service Programme, the IIUM Open Day, the Interaction Programme with *Orang Asli*, sports and intellectual discourse.<sup>147</sup> In the words of Dr. Leo Michael Toyad, the Deputy Minister of Education when officiating a Community Relations Day organised by one of the IIUM societies, such a programme can pave the way "for a smooth two-way communication which will then eventually benefit both sides".<sup>148</sup>

As the number of students increases, potential employees have to be recruited to fulfill the needs of the University's work force. On a larger scale, the IIUM is directly or indirectly preparing the work force for the nation like lawyers, economists, engineers and social scientists. This process is timely in view of the nation's robust development which demands more skilled workers in various fields. As the Government is frequently heard to desire a balanced development, with people of good knowledge and morality, the IIUM can be, theoretically, expected to supply this quality of employees. With such an integrated system of education, a high expectation is placed on IIUM to produce an integrated generation able to undertake the challenges in the real world now and in the future.

Perhaps, more than any other expectation, the ultimate aim of IIUM is to help create a generation of high moral standards or simply a moral society. The previous and the present Rectors, Deputy Rectors and leadership of the IIUM used to lay stress on this aim to the students each and every time they addressed them. The would-be lawyers, economists, engineers, scientists, social scientists and graduates in specialized fields are expected to

---

147

For examples, the IIUM Student Outreach (IIUSO) had organised an interaction programme with the aborigines in Kelantan from 1 to 13 July 1993 (*Newsbulletin*, July-September, 1993, p. 2) and the Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences Students' Society had their one day Community Relations Day on the theme "Towards Cultivating a Better Understanding and Harmonious Relationship Between Muslims and Non-Muslims" on 3 October 1992 (*Newsbulletin*, October-December 1992).

148

*Newsbulletin*, October-December 1992, p. 7.

be acquainted with the worldview of Islamic Tarbiyah and to give an example in different working environments. It is often held by the IIUM authority that *Da'wah bi al-Hāl* must be most prevalent in modern society. Given the nature of the education system in IIUM which, among other things, utilizes English as the medium of instruction, this process of disseminating Islamic ideals is hoped to penetrate into a wider spectrum of society more effectively.<sup>149</sup>

Whether or not the IIUM concept has appropriated exactly the ideal of an Islamic education is a matter of argument as different people may have their own perception of the nature of Islamic education, and of the best way to implement it. More than anything else, this polemic seems to take place more at a political than an academic level, especially among the political actors. Nonetheless, the absence of an ideal model of Islamic education worthy of emulation in other parts of the world seems to justify the Government's version of an Islamic university as it continues to operate until today. It is against this backdrop and within the said constraints that the IIUM has shown a considerable progress. According to the Rector of the University, Dr. Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, in his speech at the Seventh Convocation Ceremony of IIUM on 22 August 1993, the IIUM which started with only 150 students in 1983, now had about 8,000 students from 70 countries.<sup>150</sup> The degrees offered have also increased from only three in 1987 to eight in 1990 and sixteen in 1993.<sup>151</sup>

---

149

For instance, there have been a number of police officers of various categories studying in IIUM. Upon graduation, these officers possess "integrated personalities", able to take on their duties with a new image and vitality.

150

*Newsbulletin*, July-September 1993, p. 2.

151

The figures are provided by Management Services Division of IIUM. See also *Tenth Anniversary Corporate Report 1992/993* published by IIUM, 1994.

The growth charts provided in the Appendix V may help to describe the overall progress in terms of student and staff population, and numbers of graduates and postgraduates.<sup>152</sup> Looking at the charts, it is clear that the University is fast expanding and moving towards greater participation in various education and socio-cultural and religious-related activities. Hence it has a wider influence in society. Until there is a significant change, especially in political power transfer to the opposition, the IIUM will continue to function within the Government's Islamic aspirations and approach.

Meanwhile, there has been a considerable increase in Islamic institutions established under the Islamization policy. In addition to some of the already established institutions which have been given a new role so as to function more dynamically, some others have been established. Among them are the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM) and the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization. A brief profile of these institutes is hereby provided.

i. Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM).

Realizing the tarnished and distorted image of Islam among the local and international communities, the Government under Mahathir initiated steps to gradually eliminate this type of perception. The inculcation of Islamic values into the Government administration, the establishment of economic and educational institutions like the Islamic Bank, the Islamic Insurance, the IIUM, the ISTAC are all concrete manifestation that reflect this desire. However, another institute which was established specially to undertake this task was the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia or *Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia* (IKIM).

---

152

The charts are taken from *The Tenth Anniversary Corporate Report 1992/1993* published by the IIUM in 1994, p.40.

Officially registered on 18 February 1992 as a Company Limited by Guarantee Under the Companies Act (1965), IKIM, according to its Director-General, Ismail Ibrahim, was purposely established as a think tank to undertake research pertaining to various issues and to come up with proper Islamic perspectives so that people, Muslims and non-Muslims, will have a correct understanding of them.<sup>153</sup>

In retrospect, it is found that researches carried out by IKIM were related particularly to contemporary issues of modern days and were based on a broad perspective of Islamic worldview. In other words, the analysis was not based merely on legal elaboration but more on a global religious perception. For instance, one negative view of some Muslims today is to regard scientific and technological advancement as merely Western, hence, secular and unIslamic. This perception, according to IKIM, is not correct.<sup>154</sup> Having realized that Muslims have not been sufficiently involved in industry due to such a view, the Government felt it necessary to find out the real arguments for the issue and the reasons behind such an attitude which might retard their own progress. Having conducted in-depth study of the subject, IKIM came to a conclusion that, contrary to the negative view that industry is only a business for greedy people to gain excessive profits who are only interested in an affluent lifestyle, industry according to Islam is actually an important service to society although it can also lead to destruction if misapplied.<sup>155</sup> Various religious arguments have been studied before coming to this conclusion.

---

153

Interview with Dr. Ismail Ibrahim at his office on 14 April 1994.

154

Syed Othman AlHabshi, *An Inspiration for the Future of Islam: A Brief History and Objectives of the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM)*, (Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia, 1994), p.17.

155

Ibid, p.18.



The research results were conveyed to the public through various ways. According to Ismail, IKIM now has such channels as newspapers, radio, television,<sup>156</sup> monthly and quarterly publications<sup>157</sup> as the means to channel their findings. As researches were more for problem solving than academic purposes, their standard has to be lowered down to suit the public level of understanding. In addition, IKIM also has organised various seminars, talks, conferences etc. which were participated by renown local and international scholars.<sup>158</sup>

For some, IKIM might be a Government's tool to counter other Islamic groups who opposed to the Government. On this, Ismail says that there have been such allegation from the very beginning but it proved to be unsubstantiated as IKIM's research findings did not always match the Government's opinions. As an independent body, IKIM's main task was to make sure that any findings were based on proper research procedures despite their incompatibility with any particular segment of society or even the Government.

While some quarters were doubtful about IKIM's role, others have welcomed it as a positive move on the part of the Government to help reduce misunderstanding among Muslims and non-Muslims about various issues.

---

156

A series of IKIM's forums are televised once a month. Among the topic discussed are on "Quality and Productivity", "Investment in the Stock Market" and others.

157

IKIM's monthly publication is called *Perspective IKIM* and quarterly publication is *Visi IKIM*.

158

For instance, talk by John L. Esposito on 10 January 1994 entitled, "Coping with Modernization: An Islamic Perspective" and by Richard Murphy on "Development in the Middle East and the Implications on the Islamic World" (11 November, 1993). See section "Dairi IKIM" in each issue of *Perspectif IKIM*.

## 2.5. The Educational Impact..

The above analysis has indicated that, for better or worse, the main institutions established under the Islamization programme have had a considerable impact on society by way of providing institutional alternatives - financial, economic and educational - to the Muslim community and people at large.

It has also indicated that the IIUM can be said to have been first step towards the Government's greater participation in reforming the national education system to fulfill the aspirations of the new administration. Later, it proved to be so when a series of other significant moves were taken in the educational sphere which altered the established educational practice.

Although the Government's early initiative in introducing what it called 3M (reading, writing and arithmetic) was also an important manifestation of its efforts to upgrade educational standards, it was not until the major revision of the whole primary and secondary curriculum was undertaken that a major event relating to education reform during the Mahathir administration could be discerned. Since 1988, a new curriculum known as *Kurikulum Baru Sekolah Rendah* (KBSR) or New Integrated Curriculum for Primary Schools has been implemented throughout the country. This was followed by the implementation of *Kurikulum Baru Sekolah Menengah* (KBSM) or New Integrated Curriculum for Secondary Schools. Among other things, the aim of the new curriculum was to emphasize the importance of noble values in teaching and learning as a process to develop an integrated person who possesses an intellectual, emotional, physical and spiritual integrity. It is said that the formulation of the new curriculum for primary and secondary levels is meant to achieve the aspirations of Vision 2020.<sup>159</sup> In theory, it is hoped that

---

159

See for instance Tajul Ariffin bin Noordin and Nor'aini bte Dan, *Pendidikan dan Wawasan 2020: Falsafah, Perguruan dan Persekolahan*, (Kuala

when all children have undergone this new educational orientation, a new generation of more integrated citizens, able to face the challenges of modern times, will develop.

The most remarkable event relating to educational affairs that took place during the Mahathir period, however, was what is now known as *Reformasi Pendidikan* (education reform) which defined the national education philosophy in more concrete terms. On 13 February 1987, a high level committee was formed in the Ministry of Education. Its main purpose was to review the Education Act 1961 and to come up with suggestions for the Government to improve national education policy so that it could be more compatible with the needs of the present and future development of the country.<sup>160</sup> Upon early recommendations of this committee, Anwar Ibrahim, the then Education Minister, on 22 March 1988, directed the committee to undertake a detailed and comprehensive study of the Act.<sup>161</sup> Parallel with this development, the Ministry had also from time to time issued various directives, regulations and circulars reflective of education reform. The various aspects of the implementation of the new KBSR and KBSM curriculum, the use of standard Bahasa Malaysia, education policy, learning culture, examination and assessment systems, curricula, higher learning institution education programmes, educational technologies, and private education have been included as guidelines for their study.<sup>162</sup>

To facilitate this process, a number of ad-hoc committees were formed to study and review specific aspects of this reform.

---

Lumpur: Arena Ilmu (M) Sdn. Bhd.), 1992.

160

Hussein Hj. Ahmad, *Pendidikan dan Masyarakat: Antara Dasar, Reformasi dan Wawasan*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1993), p. 359.

161

Ibid.

162

Ibid.

The public was consulted through these committees. As a result, more than one thousand proposals - general and specific - had been received by the Ministry for consideration.<sup>163</sup> Based on these recommendations, the Ministry had come out with a draft of Education Reform. A cabinet level committee was then formed to look into each and every recommendation. As the reformation was very related to the national development and the interests of various ethnic, cultural and religious groups, a consultative body consisting of 68 organizations and societies representing people of various interest groups was formed which was known as *Majlis Perundingan Akta Pendidikan* (MPAP). It held its first meeting in early 1990.<sup>164</sup> Discussions and debates on various aspects of the proposed reformation took place for several months.

In the end, a precise statement reflecting the main substance of the National Education Policy was agreed which reads as follows:

"Education in Malaysia is a continuous process aiming at creating an integrated and balanced personality - intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and physically - based on faith and belief in God. This effort is meant to create a generation of educated, moral, responsible and able Malaysians who will be able to achieve happiness for themselves and to contribute to the harmony and prosperity of society and the nation."<sup>165</sup>

As the national education policy has been redefined and reformulated in such a precise philosophy to serve the

---

163

Ibid, p.360.

164

See, Hussein's *Pendidikan dan Masyarakat*, page 363 to 364 for a full list of the involved organization.

165

Ibid, p. 368. *Pendidikan di Malaysia adalah satu usaha berterusan ke arah memperkembangkan lagi potensi individu secara menyeluruh dan bersepadu untuk mewujudkan insan yang seimbang dari segi intelek, rohani, emosi, dan jasmani berdasarkan kepercayaan dan kepatuhan kepada Tuhan. Usaha ini adalah bagi melahirkan rakyat Malaysia yang berilmu pengetahuan, berketrampilan, berakhlak mulia, bertanggungjawab dan berkeupayaan mencapai kesejahteraan diri serta memberi sumbangan terhadap keharmonian dan kemakmuran masyarakat dan negara".*

aspirations of the present national leadership, it can be said that the process of creating the future Malaysian generation through education has been placed on a more concrete foundation. The question now is whether the product of this education system will be as expected given the expansion of various other non-educational developments. For certain, the issue continues to be a subject of constant scrutiny.

As far as the quantitative progress in education during the Mahathir era is concerned, the relevant tables provided here are self-explanatory of selected aspects of one sort or another. They provide data for major educational variables, namely number of learning institutions, number of students per teacher, total number of students in each level of education, number of students per category of selected courses and total Government expenditure on education over stipulated period of time. Longitudinal comparison of these related educational aspects can be made based on these tables.<sup>166</sup>

Table 4.10  
 Peninsular Malaysia: Number of Schools in 1980-1991<sup>167</sup>

Type of School	1980		1987		1991	
Primary	4330		4517		4626	
Secondary	808		986		1082	
	9T	24V	9T	35V	9T	45V

Table 4.11  
 Peninsular Malaysia: Number of Teachers in 1980-1991

Type of School		1980	1987	1991
Primary	M	33,270	35,906	40101
	F	28,062	47,157	58,604

166

All the tables are based on the data in Educational Statistics Bulletins, Ministry of Education and Social Statistics 1991, Department of Statistics, Malaysia.

167

T stands for technical and V for vocational.

TOTAL		61,332	83,063	98,705
Secondary	M	22,856	27,275	29,477
	F	19,055	26,916	34,289
TOTAL		41,911	54,191	63,766

Table 4.12  
Peninsular Malaysia: Number of Pupils in 1980-1991

Type of School	1980	1987	1991
Primary	1,661,258	1,848,409	2,056,820
Secondary	933,046	1,120,673	1,140,538

Table 4.13  
Malaysia: Number of Higher Learning Institutions in 1987-1991<sup>168</sup>

Type of Learning Institutions	1987	1989	1990	1991
Teachers Teaching Institutions (Primary and Secondary)	28	28	(2183)	28 (2209)
Polytechnics	5	6	(646)	7 (1031)
Colleges/Institutes	2	2	(2080)	2 (2496)
Universities	7	7	(5260)	7 (5503)

Table 4.15  
Malaysia: Federal Government Expenditure on Education

PARTICULARS	1987	1989	1991
TOTAL	4648.6	5649.4	5590.9
% of TOTAL EXPENDITURE	18.6	17.4	19.1
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION PER CAPITA (\$)	281.3	325.1	513.5

Note: Figures in the brackets for the year 1990 and 1991 indicate the total number of lecturers for each category of institution.



It is clear from these tables that various aspects of education have made progress over the 1980 decade. For instance, the numbers of schools of both categories, primary and secondary, and students have increased over the period. There were about 4330 primary schools in Peninsular Malaysia in 1980 compared to 4626 in 1991, and the number of secondary schools also increased from 808 to 1082 in the respective years of which there were 9 technical and 24 vocational schools in 1980 and 9 and 45 respective schools in 1991. The number of teachers has also increased from 61,332 in 1980 to 98,705 in 1991 for the primary education, and 19,055 and 63,766 in the respective years for the secondary level. With these figures, it can be seen that the teacher-student ratio for each level of education has also made a significant progress. For instance, the ratios for primary education in 1980, 1987 and 1991 were 1:27.08, 1:22.25 and 1:20.84 respectively, and 1:22.26, 1:20.68 and 1:17.89 accordingly respectively for the secondary education.

Education as an important agent for socialisation process has been universally accepted. An improvement in various educational concerns is vital in order to create a generation of certain character. In this context, the reform of the national education philosophy to reflect a more comprehensive and substantive national education was a great achievement by itself, and certainly more in line with the Islamic aspiration and spirit than ever before. It was on such a clearer statement of philosophy that all educational activities at all levels in Malaysia were supposed to be based. Thus, the quantitative progress of various educational aspects as we have seen earlier cannot be said to be separated from the nation's new educational reform.

## 2.6. The Impact on Health.

Health has been cited as one of the important indicators to measure one's or society's progress. As our earlier Islamic development concept has implied, health is part of a global

individual and societal development because, "a strong believer (al-Mu'min al-qawiyy) is better than a weak believer (al-Mu'min al-qa'if) and "a sound mind is in a healthy body". Therefore, concerns for health and health-related practices are, by religious perspective, part of 'ibādah (worship). A typical way of measuring the progress of health is by looking at the numerical increase or decrease of health related indicators like number of hospitals, beds, life expectancy, mortality rate, fertility and death rate. Some of this indicators have been cited elsewhere in this research. The following are some these statistics to show the progress or decline in health during a stipulated period.<sup>169</sup>

Table 4.16  
Number of Government Hospitals and Beds

Type of Hospital		1980	1987	1991
GENERAL	Total	16	16	16
	Beds	13,448	13,510	13,688
DISTRICT	Total	72	79	81
	Beds	10,967	12,535	12,676
SPECIAL	Total	8	7	7
	Beds	10,235	7116	7112

By 1991, the total number of Government hospitals in Malaysia was 97 which includes 16 General hospitals and 81 District hospitals. In addition, 7 other special medical institutions are available for mental illness, leprosy and tuberculosis disease.<sup>170</sup> The numerical progress of Government hospitals and beds since 1980 until 1991 is shown in Table 4.16.

Meanwhile, the number of private hospitals, nursing and

<sup>169</sup>

All tables on health are based the data in the Social Statistics Bulletin 1992.

<sup>170</sup>

See *Social Statistics Bulletin 1991*, op.cit., p. 129.

maternity homes has also increased during that period as illustrated by Table 4.17.<sup>171</sup>

Table 4.17  
Malaysia: Number of Private Hospitals and Beds

Hospital/Bed	1980	1987	1991
Hospitals/Homes	50	152	173
Beds	1,171	4,225	4,901

Altogether, the number of health centres of all categories from 1987 to 1991 can be summarized as follows:

Table 4.18  
Malaysia: Number of Health Centres

Health Centres	1987	1989	1991
Main Health Centre	161	166	181
Health Sub-Centre	308	318	404
Midwives Quarters Cum-Clinics	829	803	753
Rural Clinics	1085	1150	1183

From these tables, it can be seen that, except in Midwives Quarters Cum-Clinics, the number of all other aspects have made a progress. Meanwhile the number of doctors in Peninsular Malaysia has also shown an increase from 3,518 in 1980 to 6,544 in 1991.<sup>172</sup> Similarly, the number of dentists has risen from 630 to 1,359 for the respective years.<sup>173</sup>

---

171

Ibid.p. 132.

172

*Social Statistics Bulletin 1991*, p. 136.

173

Ibid.

## 2.7. The Impact of Urbanization and Industrialization.

As can be seen clearly in Table 1.1, over the past twenty years until 1990, urban population has increased dramatically from just 2,798,648 in 1970 (and 4,492,408 in 1980) to 8,896,225 in 1991 against rural 7,640,798 (and 8,643,701) and 8,670,757 respectively. The total number of population for these years is 10,439,430, 13,136,109 and 17,566,982 respectively.<sup>174</sup> By 1991, the urban population in Malaysia outnumbered the rural by 225,468.<sup>175</sup> Thus, the urban population constituted 50.6% of total population in 1991 compared to 26.8% in 1970 and 34.2% in 1980. This means that the first decade of the implementation of NEP witnessed a 7.4% increase of urban population compared to 16.4% in the second decade. Demographically, Malaysia was, by 1991, half urbanized.<sup>176</sup>

In the course of Malaysian development, urbanization has had a significant impact on socio-cultural arrangements and patterns of religious behaviour. Lee Boon Thong has identified some impacts of urbanization. Among them are migration, higher rate of fertility, and the reclassification of rural areas to

174

---

Department of Statistics Malaysia, *Social Statistics Bulletin* 1991., op.cit..

175

Ibid.

176

We also indicated that diversification of economic resources has created more job opportunities in towns and cities than in rural areas. As the agricultural sector has been gradually modernized, traditional modes of production have been replaced by modern machines and techniques of production which did not require massive utilization of manpower. Coupled with various town attractions, rural people found it necessary to find a new life in towns. Thus they migrated to the urban areas where more promising job opportunities were waiting. It was not surprising then to find that in 1991 the urban population outnumbered the rural by 225,468. Apart from these migrants, an enormous number people have applied to be relocated in specially designated lands in different states under the *Rancangan Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan* scheme initiated by the Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA), a semi-Government body responsible for venturing into new land for development. Under this scheme, an applicant is offered a piece of land in a given designated area to enable him to begin a new life and to take part in a particular economic activity developed for that area like palm-oil and rubber tapping.

urban,<sup>177</sup> especially for industrial purposes. It is estimated that there are about 30,000 people migrating to the urban areas every year, most of whom have reached marriageable and child-bearing age. This, in turn, has contributed to the rise of the birth rate in urban areas.<sup>178</sup> Sanusi Osman is of the opinion that the most important factor for the Malay migration is basically economic.<sup>179</sup> Motivated by job opportunities in towns and their desire to improve their economic and social status, the Malays seek to risk their fate in towns. Some of them have been in several urbanized areas before settling down in big cities.<sup>180</sup>

If there is anything significant contributing to the migration of rural people to urban areas for job purposes, it can be held with a certain degree of rationality that activities in the urban areas have developed those opportunities due especially to Government and private sector involvement in various non-agricultural economic activities. This is particularly clear when studied against the progress of town-based economic activities and the Government's industrialization programme as the following analysis shows.<sup>181</sup>

In the Malaysian context, the industrialization process began as early as the existence of indigenous people with

---

177

Lee Boon Thong, "Cabaran-cabaran Urbanisasi: Realiti dan Penyelesaian" in *Pembangunan Di Malaysia: Perencanaan, Perlaksanaan dan Prestasi*, (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1987), p.92.

178

Ibid.

179

Sanusi Osman, "Dasar Ekonomi Baru dan Pencapaian Orang Melayu di Kota" in *Pembangunan di Malaysia*, p. 106.

180

Ibid.

181

However, it must be accepted that it is not industrial activities alone that cause the rural people to settle down in towns. Industrial related activities and the service sector or generally city-based economic activities have been collectively responsible for the migration.

traditional and small scale industries like handicrafts etc. being the main activities of village people. Industries relating to long-distance trade and fishing like building small boats, making fishing-nets etc. also developed to accommodate the need for economic activities, especially during the Malaccan or pre-colonial period. Tin and rubber-related industries were introduced to serve the economic and political purposes of the colonial masters upon their arrival in the country. The Chinese and Indian labourers were later brought into the country in enormous numbers to support their economic production.

In the post-independence period, the Malaysian economy and industrialization process has undergone significant structural change as it evolved from the emphasis on promoting 'import-substitution' industries (the so called first "plums" of industrialization) and resource-based manufacturing in the 1960s, towards greater involvement in increasingly higher value-added non-resource-based industries since mid 1970s.<sup>182</sup> In the early stages of the post-independence industrial process, local investors did not possess sufficient or adequate capabilities, financial or technological, to enable them to become involved in heavy industries on their own.<sup>183</sup> Therefore, industries which did not require high technological expertise or skill were most popular during that time.<sup>184</sup> However, some local investors had also conducted joint-ventures with foreign investors in return for the latter's provision of management and production

---

182

Tan Sri Dato' Dr. Lin See Yan, paper on "Towards Effective Muslim Participation in Industrialization: Future Directions in Malaysia" presented at the Conference on Islam and Industrialization organized by IKIM on 21st. January 1993.

183

Anwar Ali, p.248.

184

Ibid.



techniques and capital.<sup>185</sup>

Since Mahathir came into office in 1981, industrialization has been his prime concern in the overall planning of a development strategy in order to develop Malaysia, first as a Newly-Industrializing Country (NIC) and later a fully developed country by the year 2020 (as enshrined in his Vision 2020). Indeed, Mahathir's preference for and commitment to industrialization can be discerned as early as the mid-1940s when he frequently wrote articles in the *Sunday Times* in Singapore on various issues confronting the Malays and his proposals for the Malays to use modern techniques and economic know-how.

Perhaps the best way to observe the rate of achievement by the industrial sector during the Mahathir era is to look closely at the contribution of major sectors to the national economy, especially in relation to the structure of GDP and export-import proportion.

As of 1992, the breakdown of major exports by percentage is as follows: Manufactured goods 19.6%, thermionic valves & tubes, photocells etc. 13.9%, Crude Petroleum and LNG 11.4%, palm oil 5.2%, saw logs 3.7%, rubber 2.3% and others 43.9%.<sup>186</sup> The major imports proportion is as follows: machinery & transport equipment 54.9%, manufactured goods 16.0%, chemicals and related products 8.1%, food 5.4%, mineral fuels, lubricants etc. 4.2% and others 11.4%.<sup>187</sup>

The intensity of industrial development in Malaysia can also be seen in the pattern of employment that developed over the years. For instance, in 1992, the employment by sector shows that major sectors related to modern industry and business like

---

185

Ibid.

186

Yearbook of Statistics, Department of Statistics Malaysia, p. xii.

187

Ibid. Cf. Aidit Ghazzali, ed., *Industrialization from an Islamic Perspective*, op.cit., p. 107.

manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants formed nearly 50 per cent of total employment. This is against the 25.9 per cent of agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing.<sup>188</sup> Considering the significant demographic change in the rural-urban proportion, especially in the 1980s, represented by the earlier figures, rapid industrialization growth in the 1980s can be said to have been providing job opportunities for the migrants. Hence the major factor of migration.

The above analysis of urbanization and industrialization is hoped to have provided a reasonable background for understanding the nature of socio cultural arrangements, religious behaviour and social problems and prospects in the contemporary industrializing society. As the urban population has been more than half the total population of the country since 1980, and given the fact that urban culture is increasingly embracing a larger portion of Malaysian populace, the study of the impact of urbanization and industrialization is believed to reflect, in one way or the other, the present and future social and religious tendencies of Malaysian society. It is also against this backdrop that our earlier study of the impact of Islamic resurgence and Islamization policy can be better understood.

The fact that the numbers of the Malay population have increased remarkably after independence compared to other ethnic groups is significant not only viewed from the current need for greater Malay participation in relatively new economic sectors but also the need to strengthen their political status in society, a condition necessary for effectively dealing with the demands of various other ethnic groups. For the Malays, political power is always crucial to ensure the effectiveness of their participation in various fields under the Government's

---

188

Ibid, Statistics 1992.

development programmes.<sup>189</sup> Nonetheless, numerical increase will prove to be insignificant if this is not parallel with the increase of their income. Although the NEP target was set to achieve 30% Bumiputera participation in corporate sector, they could manage to achieve only 20.3% of the share in 1990.<sup>190</sup>

#### Conclusion.

Mahathir strongly believes that in the course of the present nation-building process, the Malays must be able to involve themselves in modern economic activities, especially in business and industry, a view that he has held consistently since the Tunku era. In this sense, the Government is reasonably right to base its post-NEP development strategy on qualitative participation of the Bumiputera in the national economy. Accordingly, he often says that he wants to help create as many Malay millionaires as possible so that they can, in turn, help other Malays to improve their living standards without suppressing other races.<sup>191</sup> For instance, it has been decided that by 2020 there should be at least one businessman in each five families.<sup>192</sup> While this approach may be seen to be important to improve the Malay economic standard at a faster speed, some quarters remain sceptical as to how this will be beneficial to the majority of people especially to the rural people, hence to the Malays themselves.

---

189

Mahathir might not have survived had his political will not been convincingly demonstrated when he first launched the Malaysian car project during the recession period.

190

Sixth Malaysia Plan, p. 13.

191

For example, refer to his speech and question and answer session with Malaysian students in London on 14.3.1995.

192

Rustam Sani, "Melayu Baru".

The question of moral-material development continues to be the most important subject in contemporary Malaysian development process, especially among the Islamists. The various socio-economic and religious policies introduced by the Government's seemed to have moving towards a certain direction in order to achieve a desired noble aim, as enshrined especially in Vision 2020 and the Islamization policy. Nonetheless, the translation of this desire into practice will continue to face greater challenges in view of continuing progress in various aspects of national development. The positive and negative impacts of development on the various aspects of the society as we have seen in this chapter reflect this unavoidable paradox in the nation's struggle for achieving the status of a developed nation in its own mould by the year 2020. This is generally one of the main dilemmas in the present day development process apart from the various achievements as reflected in the present quantitative analysis. The next chapter is particularly devoted to surveying the responses from various Islamic groups to the Government policy as part of qualitative assessment of development during the Mahathir administration.

Chapter Five

**THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY II:  
VARIOUS MUSLIMS RESPONSES**

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE IMPACT OF THE GOVERNMENT POLICY II:

#### VARIOUS MUSLIM RESPONSES

We have indicated in Chapter Two that the analysis of Malaysian development is to be done in the light of Islamic and conventional perspectives with greater emphasis on the former. Chapter Four was trying to impress the reader of the quantitative impact of such development and changes on the Muslims. To complement the analysis, it is relevant to survey some responses from local Islamic groups to the Government-sponsored development so that a general picture of evaluation made particularly by Malaysian Islamists can be obtained. We called this as the qualitative assessment of the impact and selected among them are three major Islamic movements, namely ABIM, Darul Arqam and PAS, which can be said to be most influential among a vast majority of the Malaysian Muslim community.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Perspective I: The ABIM Response.<sup>2</sup>

ABIM claims to have developed its own vision of Islamic societal reform based on the staunch propagators of *salafī*<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> The order of these groups does not reflect any preference but simply follows an alphabetical sequence.

<sup>2</sup> ABIM was established in 1971 and by August 1994 had more than 50,000 registered members. See *BERITA*, Vol. 7, No. 39, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Salafī* refers to the early generations of Muslim propagators after the demise of the Prophet p.b.u.h..



which makes *tajdīd* (renewal), *iṣlāḥ* (reform) and *jihād* (righteous struggle) its important vehicles for social change.<sup>4</sup> Among existing organizations associated with Islamic identity in Malaysia, ABIM is widely acknowledged as a modernist, accommodationist, rationalist and realist movement.<sup>5</sup> For ABIM, its moderate approach, which is based on the principle of *waṣaṭiyyah al-Islām*, is not only in line with Islamic teaching, but also most practical for local reality and will be able to last longer.<sup>6</sup>

For comparison, our study of ABIM's response to the Government policy will also touch on its ideology, programmes and approach as rooted in its *da'wah* and *tarbiyah* method and experience. Our main source of reference is Dr. Mohammad Nur Manuty's PhD dissertation entitled "Perceptions of Social Change in Contemporary Malaysia: A Critical Analysis of ABIM's Role and Its Impact Among The Muslim Youth" besides other relevant materials.<sup>7</sup>

ABIM holds that the main task of an Islamic movement is not only to propagate the ideal of Islam but more importantly to provide practical and better alternatives to various

---

4 Mohd. Nur Manuty, *Perception of Social Change*, op.cit., p.4.

5 See for instance Hussin Mutalib, *Community of Islam and Sons of the Soil: The Islamic Reassertion in Peninsular Malaysia, 1963-1984*, PhD Dissertation, (Sydney: Sydney University, 1985), p. 167, and Mohamad Abu Bakar, "Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia", *Asian Survey*, Vol XXI, No. 10, October, 1981, p. 1042.

6 *Risalah*, No. 3, March 1992, p. 14. To reemphasise the importance of this approach, ABIM organised a special seminar on "*Wasatiyyatul Islam*" which was held at IIUM Matric Centre on 7 August 1994 and was attended by about 200 of its national and state leaders and workers, see *BERITA*, Vol. 6, No. 38, 1994, p. 12.

7 Dr. Mohammad Nur Manuty is presently the President of ABIM and he obtained his PhD degree from Temple University in 1989.

problems while maintaining its moderate image.<sup>8</sup> ABIM does not consider political party to be the *jawhar al-ʿamal* (chief or core) of an Islamic movement. Instead, it views it as only *umūr jānibiyyah* (secondary) to be dealt with wisely in various ways as the occasion arises.<sup>9</sup> ABIM is convinced that Islam should be spread more through *daʿwah* than politics.<sup>10</sup>

In general, ABIM believes that the effects of Government development are contrary to the earlier expectations among statesmen and policy makers,<sup>11</sup> and have achieved far less than might have been desired.<sup>12</sup> While acknowledging the importance of developing the society, the Government's serious effort in devising various useful projects for people, and the satisfactory physical progress which Malaysia has made so far, ABIM draws public attention to the negative elements brought about by the present development strategy when viewed from an Islamic perspective.<sup>13</sup> For instance, while accepting the fact that industrialization may help to improve certain aspects of society, ABIM says that it needs detailed guidelines so that the problems of immorality like those among some of factory

---

<sup>8</sup> *Risalah*, Vol. 3, March 1994, op.cit..

<sup>9</sup> Mohd. Nur, *Perception of Social Change*, op.cit., p. 25.

<sup>10</sup> See interview with Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, *Risalah*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1990, p. 25. He also says that Islamic state exists not only in the Constitution but more importantly in practice.

<sup>11</sup> Mohd. Nur, op.cit., p. 301.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. Mohd. Nur, p.3.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, Mohd. Nur, p.302.

workers can be overcome.<sup>14</sup>

In its earlier criticism of the Government's development philosophy, ABIM questioned the Government's unreserved and uncritical endorsement of the Western development paradigm, as its former President, Anwar Ibrahim, puts it.<sup>15</sup> Its blind adoption of Western development philosophy was charged with possessing a "captive mind". Anwar's critique of the Western capitalist model of development is due to the fact that it is based on wealth as the only yardstick of development. As a result, secular values, an unjust society, excessive profit making and individualism become major features of a capitalist society. The Marxist paradigm is said to reflect the same ideological foundation which is based on the Western concept of human existence.<sup>16</sup>

For Anwar, the capitalist system reflects the planned stages of development by Western countries, hence a new form of imperialism. The negative effects of this approach in the Third World, like oppression, imbalance of wealth and power, national debt and moral decadence, only help to explain Gunnar Myrdal's opinion that developing nations are predominantly controlled by foreign and domestic special interest groups, the phenomenon that Wertheim describes as "betting on the strong".<sup>17</sup>

---

14

BERITA, Vol. 7, No. 39, 1994, p. 15. See also his Presidential speech at ABIM AGM entitled, "Ketahanan Umat Penjanaan Generasi Abad 21", 21-23 August 1994 at Agriculture University Malaysia, Serdang.

15

Anwar resigned from ABIM in 1982 to enable him to be active in UMNO to realize his idealism.

16

Mohd. Nur, op.cit., p.303.

17

A policy which gives more profit to the established groups, either in cities or in villages. Mohd. Nur, op.cit., p.304.

Having cited the defects and deficiencies of this approach, Anwar suggests that development should be based on a more noble and comprehensive philosophical foundation. In this regard, Mohd. Nur quotes Anwar's statement that in the final analysis ABIM's notion of development is one that is "more comprehensive, including the moral, spiritual and material dimensions. Ethical axioms as the basis of the economic system would by their very nature discipline man's desire and greed. Meaningful development must liberate the masses from the clutches of a dehumanizing system to a human social order."<sup>18</sup>

Specific in its suggestions to tackle the issue of poverty in Malaysia, ABIM, for instance, has proposed that the Government must be able to implement more effectively land reform programmes, to grant more loans to poor farmers, and to improve marketing infrastructures.<sup>19</sup> This is to avoid oppression of farmers by landlords, small traders and rural capitalists. On this point, ABIM agrees with Ungku Abdul Aziz, a leading Malaysian economic thinker, that the poverty and exploitation of the Malays remains the same if "non-Malay capitalists are replaced by Malay capitalists."<sup>20</sup>

Admitting the difficulties in implementing development programmes, Anwar outlines three major considerations that all Malaysians must take into account in their move to progress: First, development efforts should not be left entirely to the desire and will of the Government; second, Government officials must learn to be more flexible in their attitude and to abandon

---

18

Ibid, ohd. Nur, p.304.

19

Ibid, p.305.

20

Ibid.

their traditional conservatism in order to accept the true meaning of reform; third, development efforts must be exercised in an unchauvinistic manner accepting the fact that the Malays are still behind especially in the sphere of the economy.<sup>21</sup>

Meanwhile, Dr. Siddiq Fādil, Anwar's successor, urges the Government to undertake more serious efforts to ensure fairer distribution of income among its citizens. For him, this is the most immediate problem confronting the people, as statistics show that inequalities and poverty are still rampant especially among farmers, fishermen and labourers<sup>22</sup> He proposes that the widening gap between the wealthiest and the poor should be bridged through economic programmes which are based on universal justice and not per capita income *per se*.<sup>23</sup> Siddiq's view is shared by Mohd. Nur who says that although the NEP has shown some impact in improving the standard of the Muslim community, the level of poverty among them, especially the rural people, is still obvious. Thus, any attempt to eliminate it, especially what is termed "hard core poverty" is always in line with Islam.<sup>24</sup>

ABIM is also of the opinion that negative elements have increasingly permeated an increasingly-urbanized Malaysian society and have shaken positive traditional values. Siddiq thus suggests that Muslims must prepare themselves spiritually to stand up against this ostentatious life and culture of consumerism. For ABIM, the war against lavish expenditure in

---

21

Ibid, p.307.

22

Ibid, p.305.

23

Ibid, p.306.

24

*Risalah*, No. 2, April 1991, p. 37.

the midst of people's suffering is, indeed, an urgent matter. In short, ABIM's criticism of Government development has something to do with the lack of emphasis on morality in national development philosophy and approach. For ABIM, "development without morality only means dehumanization."<sup>25</sup> Nonetheless, ABIM recognises difficulties in adopting this type of development as its Vice President, Anuar Tahir remarks, "You can see the fast development. But we don't want our country to become another America, Germany or England. We want development without losing moral values. This is a very difficult job."<sup>26</sup>

When Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981 and embarked on a series of concrete Islamic projects to improve society, ABIM seemed to have appreciated some of the Government's moves.<sup>27</sup> It thus stated clearly that any move by the Malaysians to implement Islam, even on the smallest scale, will be welcomed.<sup>28</sup> As a result, ABIM, contrary to other Islamic groups, is the most supportive of the Government Islamic projects like the International Islamic University, the Islamic Bank and Islamic Insurance (*Takāful*). It is its long standing moderate approach, as widely acknowledged, that has allowed this conciliatory stand to pervade.<sup>29</sup>

---

25

Mohd. Nur, op.cit., p.308.

26

P.K. Abdul Ghafour, "ABIM Becomes Malaysia's Main Da'wa Organization", in *Islamic Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, October 1993), p. 13.

27

The year Mahathir came into office coincided with the first decade of ABIM's existence (1971-1981) and the NEP.

28

P.K. Abdul Ghafour, op.cit.. See also article on "ABIM Gains Recognition for Its Works" in *NST*, 16 August 1991.

29

ABIM rationalizes this stand based on the principle and spirit of al-Ta'āwun 'Ala al-Birr. See, *Koleksi Risalah*, p. 25.



In general, ABIM's stand on the Government's Islamization programme is positive. However, its acceptance seems to be tentative and conditional. It reiterates, as stern as ever, that infusion of Islamic values is not the same as Islamization in the true sense of the word. For ABIM, Islamization means a process of changing something unIslamic into purely Islamic. On this ground, ABIM, at the same time, has also been critical of the Government's approach which only wanted to infuse certain values into administration. Instead, it demands that a total structural change be made as a precondition to the total process of Islamization.<sup>30</sup> Otherwise, ABIM has every reason to express scepticism about the Government's version of Islamization by adopting extra carefulness in its silent and conditional recognition.

For an idealist movement like ABIM, limited infusion of some selected positive values is insufficient without total implementation of Islamic *Shari'ah* as such a move does not fulfil the requirement of an Islamic worldview. It considers that mere infusion of these ethical values cannot guarantee the Islamicity of a Muslim or a society.<sup>31</sup> It is in this sense that we can see ABIM is ideologically a fundamentalist religious movement.

Nonetheless, from a realistic point of view, ABIM welcomes the Government's positive move, coupling it with its own suggestions to help make this infusion of Islamic values programme more meaningful and something serious and continuous. Among other things, it proposes that the programme should at least include all basic changes organized into a list of

---

30

Mohd. Nur, op.cit., p.309.

31

Ibid, p. 311. See also ABIM's response to adoption of values from the East and the West in *Koleksi Risalah*, p. 42.

priorities (*tartīb al-awlawiyyāt li al-taḥawwuli al-Islāmī*).<sup>32</sup> Some practical suggestions to achieve this objective were proposed as follows: a. the abolition of all behaviours which are contrary to the categorically established texts (*al-Naṣṣ al-Qaṭʿī*); b. the implementation of all basic Islamic teachings such as solidarity of the *ummah*, human dignity and social justice; c. the widening of the scope of Islamic propagation; and d. the implementation of the Islamic educational system.<sup>33</sup>

On the movement's reconciliatory approach, Siddiq for instance often emphasized that ABIM is not an organization which prefers a *table-banging* approach all the time to achieve its objectives.<sup>34</sup> He insists that despite ABIM's stern devotion to Islam, a suitable approach must be adopted to tackle problems of various times.<sup>35</sup> Having observed that the Mahathir era is more supportive of Islam and has opened a wider opportunity for Muslims to improve themselves, ABIM decides to change its course of action by adopting a problem-solving approach, an approach claimed to be more compatible with the Islamic spirit of *al-taʿāwun ʿalā al-birr* or cooperation for the good cause. On this Siddiq says,

---

32

Mohd. Nur, *op.cit.*, p.311.

33

*Ibid.* p.311.

34

*Koleksi Ucapan Dasar Presiden*, (Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia), p. 57.

35

This is due to the fact that solutions to social problems from an Islamic perspective in modern times are still at the *ʿumūmiyyāt* (generalities) stage. *Ibid*, *Koleksi Ucapan Dasar Presiden*, p. 52.

There is a general agreement on the part of the Government to consider some of ABIM's ideas, especially those regarding the gradual assimilation of Islamic values in matters relating to national administration. ABIM's criticisms of the Government are now offered with more thought, in tone that reflect concern, not anger, that reflects care and a certain amount of responsibility."<sup>36</sup>

ABIM rationalizes its shift from the previous approach on the ground that since many things can be effectively done "silently" now there is no need to proceed with "noisy slogans".<sup>37</sup> Gradually, ABIM's aspiration and ideals are translated into concrete forms through its continuous cooperation with the Government and its increasing number of projects up to the present time.<sup>38</sup>

Obviously, ABIM seems to have adopted the principle of legal maxim, "if one cannot do all, do not leave all." Its gradual and subtle approach during the Mahathir era seems to be compatible with Mahathir's own "progressive improvement" approach, to borrow Zainuddin Maidin's term. Thus, ABIM claims

---

36

NST, "ABIM Gains Recognition...", op.cit., 16 August 1991. Siddiq reiterates that earlier a confrontational approach was preferred as there was little hope for Islam to express itself in its totality due to ideological resistance from the leadership whose perception of Islam was secular in nature. A strong advocate of this perception was the first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman who made it plain that Malaysia was a secular state and that religion should not be mixed with politics. As a result, Islamic practices were peripheralised and reduced to personal and ceremonial matters of the nation. This worldview has become that deep-rooted and profound among the Malaysian leadership and people. It was this narrow ideological perception of religion that had hindered Islam and made it impossible for it to play an active and greater role in all aspects of nation building. Hence, the *table-banging* approach was inevitable. Siddiq also is reported in *Utusan Malaysia* (18 March 1989) to have said that Mahathir administration is the most positive one.

37

Siddiq often says that he does not want to be blamed later for not taking advantage of this conducive opportunity which may not always be available.

38

See *Berita Harian*, 18 August 1990, pp. 1-2.

that its change of approach is in various ways justified.<sup>39</sup>

In retrospect, ABIM's change of attitude towards the Government can be said to have been due to two main factors as Mohd. Nur admits: a) some ABIM leaders and members who are presently working in the Government agencies become more aware of the difficulties in fulfilling the Government's Islamic programmes, and; b) the experience of some predominantly Muslim countries like Pakistan and Sudan has shown that implementing *Shari'ah* within the present system is not as easy as one might think.<sup>40</sup> Hence, the change of approach has been adopted to accommodate the existing circumstances so that social reform can progress more effectively.

Many quarters have welcomed the move as a sign of ABIM's maturity and practicality in the face of changing situations and problems. Others, however, are sceptical and have charged ABIM with being inconsistent, opportunist and unprincipled. This includes such political parties as PAS and DAP. Over time, this allegation seems to be less heard as more quarters increasingly incline to align and adjust themselves to the changing situation and began to appreciate Government's efforts, a stand that ABIM has preceded.<sup>41</sup>

In the light of this change, it is interesting to note that ABIM's idealist philosophy to implement a total Islamic

---

39

For a brief explanation of ABIM's new approach, see for instance an interview with Mohd. Nur Manuty, the present President, in *Utusan Malaysia*, 9 September 1991.

40

Mohd. Nur, op.cit., p.312.

41

See ABIM response to this allegation, "ABIM Masuk Kocek Kerajaan?", in *Utusan Malaysia*, 9 September 1991.

system has been expressed in a more flexible manner.<sup>42</sup> For instance, it has cautioned its members that "the demand for exercising the Islamic Shari'ah does not mean everybody must become too "legalistic-oriented" where the Shari'ah becomes a mere arbiter of *halāl* (permitted) and *harām* (forbidden)"<sup>43</sup> as preferred by certain Islamic groups. Instead, it must be seen in a broader sense, that is as a consistent process that ensures justice, peace, freedom and equality as expected by the general objectives of the *Shari'ah* (*Maqāṣid al-Shari'ah*) themselves.<sup>44</sup>

With this strategy, ABIM, more than ever, has implicitly made Muslim aspirants more aware of the practical problems arising from local realities including the pluralistic nature of Malaysian society and the difficulties it poses to any attempt for structural change. In another example, Siddiq argues that despite its constitutional, historical, religious and environmental justifications, the call for total Islamization and applicability of the *Shari'ah* in modern heterogenous Malaysian society can only be meaningful if it is not exercised as the demand of a fanatical group.<sup>45</sup> It is in the light of ABIM's religious principles and change of strategy and approach that some of its critical observations vis-a-vis Government policy have prevailed.

ABIM holds that, in the economic sense, Islamization is a process of just and humanitarian values which could promote

---

42

See its elaboration of the problems confronting the Muslims in implementing *Shari'ah* in *Koleksi Ucapan Dasar*, op.cit., p. 65.

43

Mohd. Nur, op.cit., p.313.

44

Ibid, p.313.

45

Ibid, p.313.

efforts for equalizing the income of all citizens.<sup>46</sup> On this score, the Government's slogans such as eradication of poverty, better quality of life and better income distribution should not only be judged by statistical progress of economic growth.<sup>47</sup> On human rights issues, ABIM has also been critical of certain Government acts like the Internal Security Act and the Societies Act because they said to be contrary to the noble aim of Islamization which places high respect on human dignity (*karāmah insāniyah*) and human rights (*ḥuqūq al-Insān*).<sup>48</sup> However, ABIM appreciates the present more open attitude of the Government in discussing issues pertaining to human rights.

Another aspect of ABIM's critique lies in its understanding of acculturation of values as an important process to help create a healthy Islamic environment in society. It urges that practical ways must be sought to replace, for instance, sensate culture with more healthy cultural alternatives. One serious effect of the national development process which has been consistently raised by ABIM is the increase of immoral activities. On this social issue, it remarks:

The so-called Islamization has no permanent value if all vices (*munkar*) are not wiped out but continue to be protected by law such as usury, gambling, liquor and others. There are many acts and ordinances which are contrary to texts in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, e.g. Pawnshop Act (1981), Horse Racing Act (1965), Gambling Ordinance (1952), Lottery Ordinance (1952) and others, and there are many provisions in the Enactment of the Administration of Islamic Law which are contradictory to the real Islamic injunctions such as the law of adultery which

---

46

Ibid, p.315.

47

Ibid, p.515.

48

See Siddiq's view in *Koleksi Ucapan Dasar*, op.cit., p.33.



contradicts the law of *ḥudūd*.<sup>49</sup>

Having observed some practical problems faced by the Government, ABIM soon realized that even the movement itself is lacking in qualified manpower to fulfil the increasing demand from the new build up of government-controlled Islamic institutions and agencies. The challenge before this movement is thus greater than ever before. It is partly this reality that has prompted it to cooperate and work hand in hand with the Government in order to provide a more Islamic content in the spheres of education, economy, politics and national integration and the infusion of Islamic values in a more effective manner.

Perhaps it is also because of this that ABIM has intensified and expanded its activities in various educational, social, economic and other spheres besides strengthening its traditional programmes like *usrah*, *tamrin*, *da'wah*, *rihlah* and *ziarah*. One such project is called *Pembangunan Masyarakat* or Community Development which, according to Mohd. Nur:

"... is just a start to prove that Islam is a practical solution for mankind... We have to develop a new generation of Islamists who combine intellectualism with *iman* (faith in God) and function professionally. Muslims must realize that *iman* without preparation will not be strong. Neither will there be any meaning for intellectuals devoid of spiritual uplifting".<sup>50</sup>

In other words, ABIM has placed more emphasis on *da'wah bi al-lisān* (propagation by words) besides *da'wah bi al-hāl* (propagation by action and example).<sup>51</sup> Indeed, there are now more educational, economic, social and other projects which

49

Cited in Mohd. Nur, op.cit., p.312.

50

P.K. Abdul Ghafour, op.cit..

51

*Risalah*, Vol. 2, April 1991, p. 37. For an explanation of this approach, see for instance Nizal Muhammad, "The Essence of Da'wah Bil Hal", *Islamic Review*, No. 1, January/February 1994, pp. 20-21.

have been carried out by ABIM in order to prove that Islam is workable for social development and progress. Among such projects are *Koperasi Belia Islam* (Muslim Youth Cooperative) or KBI, *Institut Pengajian Ilmu-ilmu Islam* (Institute for Islamic Learning) or IPI, *Dewan Pustaka Islam* (Islamic Book Centre) or DPI, *Sekolah Rendah Islam* (Islamic Secondary School) or SRI, *Taman Asuhan Kanak-kanak Islam* (Islamic Nursery) or TASKI.

Perhaps ABIM's success so far can be attributed not only to its ability to reconcile its Islamic fundamentalist idealism with a moderate approach, but also to its consistent emphasis on the importance of educational and intellectual dimensions in all its activities. For instance, IPI which was launched officially on 15 July 1989 is meant among other things to provide an academic venue for those who want to deepen their religious knowledge especially among the working officers including non-Muslims. Among the courses which lead to a Diploma degree are Islamic Thought, Islamic Education, Comparative Law, Comparative Management, Study of al-Quran, Study of al-Hadis, Philosophy of Islamic Science, Arabic Studies and Preliminary and Advanced Arabic (certificate). The numbers of students who have graduated in the 89/90, 90/91 and 91/92 sessions were 62, 68 and 200 respectively.<sup>52</sup>

ABIM's intellectual, moderate and modernist approach is also reflected in the line-up of its Executive Committee as well as its insistence on the active participation of women in national development. For instance, out of its twenty seven central executive committee members for the 93/95 session, about fourteen are PhD holders specialising in various fields, Islamic and non-Islamic, and most of the rest are graduates

from local and overseas universities. Besides being active in the Islamic movement, these activists also hold important posts in various Government departments. ABIM also has been active in various economic projects especially in business and property through KBI and its subsidiary called ABIMAL.<sup>53</sup>

On Vision 2020, ABIM considers that this call should be perceived as a goal and value-oriented development agenda.<sup>54</sup> Development should not only be multi-dimensional but integrated in which case all economic, political, social, cultural and other aspects of society are integrally developed alongside man's intellectual, physical, emotional and spiritual dimensions, emphasising the latter as the core of development.<sup>55</sup> Only then can the nation produce a generation of committed Muslims (*al-jīl al-rabbānī al-multazim*) in an ideal national development blessed by God (*baldah ṭayyibah wa rabb ghafūr*).<sup>56</sup>

In summary, it can be said that if the Government was said to have responded to the forceful Islamic demands of various groups by attempting to adjust itself through its promising Islamic projects, ABIM also seemed to have allowed a certain degree of tolerance and cooperation to prevail by adjusting itself to the current process of development in order to realize its idealism. In the course of this process, both

---

<sup>53</sup> *BERITA*, Vol 7, No. 39, 1994, op.cit., p. 2.

<sup>54</sup> *Risalah*, Vol. 3, June 1991, p. 3.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*. See also *al-Qur'ān* (Saba' 34:15) and *Risalah*, Vol. 3, March 1994, p. 14 for a brief discussion by Siddiq Fadil of the necessary characteristics of future Malays if they are to expect a successful future.

parties have more opportunities to improve the course of their actions.

## 2. Perspective II: The Darul Arqam Response.<sup>57</sup>

Darul Arqam's critique of the Government's development strategy and the former's own alternative development approach are more clearly manifested especially in Muhammad Syukri Salleh's *An Islamic Approach to Rural Development: The Arqam Way*, to which we now turn to analyze. Muhammad Syukri, himself a committed follower of Darul Arqam, carried out a research specifically on the Arqam movement for his D.Phil. degree at Oxford University. This work is an extended version of his research.<sup>58</sup>

Muhammad generalizes that the post-independence development strategy in Malaysia reflects the continuation of colonial policies based on exogenous thinking with continued imposition of foreign theories and practices on already weakened local values and culture.<sup>59</sup> He argues that there is no attempt to evolve indigenous theories based on authentic

---

57

Darul Arqam was initiated by Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad in 1968 as a study group consisted of only ten followers, which occupied a house called *rumah putih*, or "white house", at Kampung Datuk Keramat as the group's early study centre. Its early emphasis was on self-purification through 'ibādah like *qiyām al-layl* (night vigil), *taḥlīl* and others. Later it became involved in wider social services and business. It is basically a *ṣūfī*-based movement which practices *tariqat aurad Muhammadiyyah*. Ashaari was once a PAS and ABIM member. By 1993, Arqam claimed to have about 10,000 full time followers. For a history of Darul Arqam see for instance, a pamphlet, *Profile: Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad - His Mind & Struggle*, (Arqam n.d.). and its special edition of *25 Years of Darul Arqam: The Struggle of Abuya Sheikh Imam Ashaari Muhammad At-Tamimi*, (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Abuya, 1993).

58

Although Darul Arqam has produced a great deal of publications, they are mostly concerned with matters of 'ibādah and Arqam's activities, and thus do not directly respond to specific issues like development etc..

59

Muhammad Syukri Salleh, *An Islamic Approach to Rural Development : The Arqam way*, London: Asoib International Limited, 199

Malaysian values and culture which he terms "self-generated improvement of living standard."<sup>60</sup> For him, all the Government's development plans<sup>61</sup> are basically Western-based due especially to their financial indebtedness to such international bodies as the Asian Development Bank, the Ford Foundation, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations and its specialised agencies. These bodies and agencies have directly or indirectly played a dominant role in assisting, formulating and influencing the Malaysian approach to development. In various ways, they monitored the progress of Malaysian development and ensured the continuity of their means and goals in development strategy.<sup>62</sup> For instance, the first three plans before 1970, classified as the Growth Strategy Phase, emphasized productivity and economic stability within an essentially free-enterprise framework. The main orientation of this phase was towards infra-structural and development economics, investment and growth generating projects and concentration on sectoral development especially agriculture, mining and primary industries.<sup>63</sup>

Despite some rapid strides, there have been negative effects of this phase of development. Muhammad points out that

---

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p.35.

<sup>61</sup> This includes the Draft Development Plan of 1951-1955, the First Five Year Plan of 1956-1960 (also known as the First Malaya Plan, A Plan of Development of Malaya 1956-1960 and General Plan of Development), the Second Five Year Plan 1961-1965 and the First Malaysia Plan of 1966-1970.

<sup>62</sup> Op.cit., p.36.

<sup>63</sup> We have seen earlier that in the historical development of conventional theories, the pre-1970s period was especially influenced by a modernization approach which tried to impose fixed stages of development on developing countries after their political liberation. These countries were expected to be, first of all, able to establish their economic stability through various economic based projects.

the country continued to face the problems of poverty, unemployment and economic imbalance particularly between racial groups, leading to the 1969 racial riot which marked the dividing line between the two development phases.<sup>64</sup>

In the post-1970 period, the Government adopted what is referred to as "the Redistribution-with-Growth strategy" in its second phase of national development which includes the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Malaysia Plans. This time the plans placed more emphasis on achieving social development goals. In a way, this was the beginning of a planning phase to achieve economic growth with a better distribution of its benefits through the First Outline Perspective Plan of 1970-1990 with the implementation of the NEP which was incorporated for the first time in the Second Malaysia Plan of 1971-1975. The NEP was meant to achieve inter-ethnic harmony through a faster rate of economic growth, the creation of greater employment opportunities and a reduction in the relative economic imbalance in the distribution of income and wealth through its two-pronged strategy, eradication of poverty regardless of race, and restructuring of society.<sup>65</sup>

In short, the second phase which adopted the "trickle-down" concept of development, had a basically liberal-humanist ideal in its economic and social progress approach and a capitalist, export oriented, diversified but open or dependent, industrialising economy, increasingly based on manufacturing, extractive industries and the cultivation of commercial crops for world markets.<sup>66</sup>

---

64

Op.cit., p.37.

65

Ibid. p.38.

66

Ibid.



Generally, the pre- and post-1970 development strategies shares common conventional development features because: 1) both were basically an exogenous development strategy which continued the colonial strategy; 2) both were based on foreign theories of development;<sup>67</sup> 3) both adopted top-down direction and laissez-faire; 4) both were liberal-capitalist, productivity-oriented and infra-structural in approach. All these features and elements are rooted fundamentally in a Western philosophy of approach to development and have produced a negative impact on society as evidenced in the persistence of inter- and intra-ethnic income inequalities despite an incidence of decrease of poverty.<sup>68</sup>

In view of the importance of the concepts of Islamic state and Islamic society in the study of development, it is appropriate to look into Argam's notion of these subjects so that its criticisms of the Government can be put in a proper perspective. Muhammad Syukri in another article says that people normally understand Islamization of the state as, "the changing of constitutions, laws, and in some cases, of power", and Islamization of society as, "the transformation of cultures and values, but merely at ceremonial and ritualistic levels". Sometimes, Islamization is used as a tool to achieve the aims of the existing secular system, and he claims that the Government's campaign for an efficient, clean and trustworthy society is such an example.<sup>69</sup> He believes that the present Islamization is a reaction to the increasing pressure of

---

67

Ibid. p. 35.

68

Ibid, p.39.

69

Muhammad Syukri Salleh and Siti Hayati Abdullah, " Islamization of State and Society: Change in Substance or Change in Structure?", *Aliran Monthly*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1993, p. 25.

rejuvenation in Islam from various Islamic groups to discontinue the secularistic system in question.<sup>70</sup> Under these circumstances, Islamization means neither a reformation of the existing structure nor a transformation of the individual into a person with strong faith (*īmān*) and piety (*taqwā*) as it maintains the existing structure while accommodating Islamic elements in fragmentation. People continue to be ruled by their unIslamic attributes (*mazmūmah*). Thus, he says,

They might introduce new 'Islamic' institutions such as Islamic Banks, Islamic Insurance, Islamic Pawnshops and Islamic Universities, but the implementation is within the existing socio-economic and political structure.<sup>71</sup>

Darul Arqam is also critical of the PAS approach, in particular of the latter's attempt to introduce *hudud* laws. For Arqam, this is the other extreme of Islamization which is done without initially educating the society, let alone reviving and practising comprehensive Islamic doctrines.<sup>72</sup> For Arqam the implementation of this type of Islamization will not produce the desired result as, "... instead of protecting an apparently already good society from a few disobedient individuals, the *hudud* laws are inflicted on the members of the public who are as yet not guided and able to understand fully the Islamic way of life."<sup>73</sup>

As an alternative, Arqam proposes a development strategy based on a mystico-spiritual idealism. This is called, a

---

70

Ibid.

71

Ibid, p. 25.

72

Ibid.

73

Ibid, p. 26. For a discussion and comment on the implementation of *Hudūd* laws in the present society by the leader of Darul Arqam, see Ashaari Muhammad, *Falsafah Perlaksanaan Hudud Dalam Masyarakat*, (Kuala Lumpur: Asoib International Limited, 1992).

"grass-root-initiated approach" to development through what Muhammad calls a "villagization" development concept, which can be summarized in the following words:

Darul Arqam therefore established its own self-managed and self-contained villages throughout the rural areas of Malaysia. In doing so it formulated its distinctive grassroots approach to rural development. The philosophical underpinning of this villagization programme is governed by its own ideological worldview, while the operation of the programme evolves from within the framework of its self-defined concept of development discussed earlier. Whereas the inhabitants of the Darul Arqam villages form a community with its own Islamic characteristics, the link between the villages throughout the country forms, at the movement level, an autonomous, socio-economic and political system. Participation in the villagization programme is almost exclusively by the Darul Arqam members and sympathizers themselves, but its socio-economic benefits, as will be evident later, reach to the non-Arqam rural and urban population at large.<sup>74</sup>

As a practitioner of a bottom-up development approach,<sup>75</sup> Arqam established its model villages throughout the country in which members of the community built their houses in a selected *kampung* or rural area and organized their religious and economic activities in a *jamaah* (group). The centre of Arqam is at Sungai Pencala, itself the most popular *perkampungan* Arqam. The physical and social environment of the village reflected the community's image.<sup>76</sup> Arqam's male members normally wear a *jubah* (a long Arab-style gown) and *serban* (turban) normally in dark green, while the female members cover the whole body with a loosely-made gown, mostly black but sometimes white. They also cover their face with *purdah*. Arqam believes that self-purification gained through *amalan tariqat*

---

74

Muhammad Syukri, op.cit., p.93.

75

Although Muhammad Syukri says that development should take place in both top-down and bottom-up directions, Darul Arqam seemed to be more inclined to the latter approach as reflected in their activities.

76

See *25 Years of Darul Arqam*, op.cit., p. 61.

(*ṣūfī* practices) should be reflected in one's individual and social life. The practice of *sharī'ah* must be visibly apparent as the Islamic *shīar* (identity) of the community.<sup>77</sup> Hence, this literal understanding has caused its members to resort to these types of attire and social environment.

Darul Arqam considers Islamic village concept as a step in the formation of Islamic society which, in turn, should undergo three main phases: First, intensive and extensive *da'wa* is preached throughout the country and all over the world; second, *dā'īs* (missionaries) and teachers amalgamate guidance in their *da'wa*, apart from promulgating a unique system of formal education to prepare the next generation of successors in the *jamaah*; and third, the *jamaah's* workforce is mobilized to instigate material development.<sup>78</sup> Darul Arqam also has its own primary school called *Yayasan Arqam*, clinic and polyclinics, publication unit and *kumpulan nasyid* (a group of Muslim artists).<sup>79</sup>

In short, Darul Arqam prefers a mystico-spiritual *tarbiyah*<sup>80</sup> in order to develop personality especially by practising *tariqat aurad Muhammadiyah*. A group of spiritually-purified individuals developed through this method will form a small Islamic community who practise Islam inwardly and outwardly in an Islamic village. The number of Islamic *kampungs* is expected to gradually expand to form what will then be known

---

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, p. 61.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 60.

<sup>79</sup> See Ch. 13 of *25 Years of Darul Arqam*, pp. 179-203.

<sup>80</sup> For an interpretation of Islamic education by the leader of Darul Arqam, see Ashaari Muhammad, *Pendidikan Rasulullah*, 2nd. ed., (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Syeikhul Arqam, November 1990).

as an Islamic society. Only then is an Islamic state possible.<sup>81</sup>

Nonetheless, as members of Arqam have become more and more sufistic, especially in the practice of the *tariqat*, it has come to be penetrated by some deviant mystical elements which contradict the teachings of Islam themselves. Upon investigation, both the Government and PAS have come to a similar view that Arqam's *aurad Muhammadiyyah* is against Islam. For example, it claims that Ustaz Ashaari, the leader of the movement, met and talked to the Prophet p.b.u.h. and received his command to represent him in realising Islam.<sup>82</sup> This has prompted it to be banned in 1994.

### 5.3. Perspective III: The PAS Response.

Perhaps the most pertinent aspect of the study of various Islamic responses to the Government's development policy can be found in the perspective of PAS, the most influential Islamic-based political party in Malaysia. This is particularly so for two main reasons: First, PAS, like UMNO, is itself a political party seeking to achieve its ideal through political means; and second, during the Mahathir era, PAS managed to rule a state (Kelantan) and has since then claimed to develop it

---

81

See Ashaari Muhammad, *Meninjau Sistem Pemerintahan Islam*, (Kuala Lumpur: Asoib International Limited, 1993) for the leader's elaboration of the concept of Islamic government and how it can be realised.

82

Among other things, the dialogue reveals that the Prophet s.a.w. uses the word *tuan* when addressing Ashaari and he has also praised the silver jubilee anniversary of Darul Arqam. See the 19-page transcription on the dialogue entitled, "Transkripsi Dari Kaset Suara Ashaari Muhammad: Dialog Ashaari Muhammad Dengan Syeikh Suhaimi dan Dialog Ashaari Muhammad Dengan Rasulullah", (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Affairs Division, Prime Minister's Department, Julai 1994).

according to Islamic principles.<sup>83</sup> Although a comparison of Kelantan with the Federal Government will not do justice in many respects, especially because of the different levels of operation, it can however serve as an important ground in which some of the programmes/projects carried out by these two Governments may reveal in general their respective notions of and approach to development.

Although PAS was originally the religious wing of UMNO,<sup>84</sup> it has been developed through various historical events into a party with its own religious idealism and identity. From the very beginning of its inception, PAS claimed to base its struggle on Islamic ideology as is clearly reflected in the objectives of the party which, among other things, are to: 1) form a united Islamic force which aims to realize Islamic aspirations and Islamic politics based on democracy; 2) seriously attempt to unite the religious administration all over the country; 3) protect and smaintain religious and Muslim interests; and 4) cooperate with all other political parties whose policy and objectives are not against Islamic teaching in realising democracy, social justice and human rights.<sup>85</sup>

In practice, however, PAS has been viewed by some as a Malay Islamic-nationalist party rather than a purely Islamic one until the end of the Muhammad Asri era in 1983. Nonetheless, PAS's philosophy of nationalism is different

---

83

Although PAS also makes development as its major issue, it has stressed the Islamic approach to development.

84

Previously, it was known as *Persatuan Ulama Se-Malaya* and existed within UMNO. For the history of its establishment see for instance, Alias Mohamed, *Malaysia's Islamic Opposition: Past, Present and Future*, (Kuala Lumpur: Gateway Publishing House, 1991), Ch. 1.

85

Ibnu Hashim, 1950-2000: *Sejarah Kebangkitan Dan Masa Depan PAS Kuasai Malaysia?*, (Kuala Lumpur: GG Edar, Jan. 1993), p.30.



because it is claimed to have been based on Islamic principles, as its second president, Dr. Burhanuddin Al Helmy, asserted.<sup>86</sup> In 1964, this leader of PAS said, "in the present national political struggle, PAS emerges with its Islamic state aspiration which exists and is being maintained due to the religious confidence among PAS followers."<sup>87</sup> After Datuk Muhammad Asri left the party,<sup>88</sup> its new leadership began to claim that it was fighting for pristine Islam, which is inconsistent with nationalism.<sup>89</sup> PAS's adoption of a more radical approach in the contemporary Islamic struggle has given rise to what was later known as *Era Kepimpinan Ulama'* or the era of 'ulamā' leadership. The slogan implies that the highest authority in the party is in the hands of religious scholars. The PAS philosophy and approach under the new leadership can be described as follows:

PAS's approach under the ulama' leadership is comprehensive. It strives for Islamic identity regardless of race, for realising pristine Islam, for wanting an Islamic state, for realising

86

---

Kamarudin Jaffar, ed., *Dr. Burhanuddin al Helmy: Politik Melayu dan Islam*, (Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Anda Sdn. Bhd., 1980), p. 14.

87

*Ibid*, Kamaruddin, op.cit, p.16.

88

Due to an internal party leadership crisis, the leader of PAS at that time, Datuk Haji Muhammad Asri Muda, left the party and formed HAMIM in 1983 which then joined the Barisan. HAMIM however, withdrew from Barisan to join APU in the face of the 1990 election in which APU were able to win all parliamentary and state seats from UMNO.

89

See, Ibrahim Ahmad, *Konflik UMNO PAS Dalam Isu Islamisasi*, (Petaling Jaya: IBS Buku Sdn. Bhd., 1989), p.55. With such a religious mission PAS has been involved in Malaysian politics as an alternative political party, especially for the Malays, after the banning of the first Islamic political party, *Hizbul Muslimin*, by the British. There have been successes and failures throughout its political experience. PAS was able to control Kelantan and Trengganu from the 1959 general election until 1969, after which it joined Barisan Nasional in 1972 and participated in the 1974 general election under Barisan Nasional's ticket. However, it withdrew from it in 1977 and contested the 1978 general election on its own but lost to Barisan.

Islamic culture, implementing Islamic laws and the nation led by the ulama'.<sup>90</sup>

Upon its victory in the October 1990 general election, the PAS-dominated APU has been governing the state of Kelantan until now (1995). In that election PAS won all state and parliamentary seats in Kelantan. However, in the 1995 general election, although APU still controlled the state, some inroads were made by UMNO which regained ten state seats and two parliamentary seats.

As PAS's shift of approach coincided with some contemporary local and international developments associated with Islam, some observed that the move might have been taken for two main reasons: First, PAS was inspired by the success of Ayatollah Khomeini in overthrowing the Shah in the historic Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, and second, it feared that the Government would gain credibility and support for its Islamic programmes especially, after Anwar joined it.<sup>91</sup> With the new approach PAS was hoping to be seen as the real Islamic group with a genuine struggle for Islam.

Perhaps some subsequent developments will help to explain a new religious behaviour arising from new religious approach. For better or worse, there have been occasionally such incidences as *kafir-mengkafir* (accusing others as infidels) and *dua imam* (two congregational prayers in the same place). In such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that even ABIM, generally claimed to be a PAS sympathiser, had to face a serious challenge from this party besides from its own members. PAS followers were very much critical of ABIM and used

---

90

A. Ghany Ismail, *Muzakarah UMNO dan PAS*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Islam Sdn. Bhd., 1987), p.19.

91

Interview with Dr. Sidek Baba, op.cit.

to label the latter as the agent of the Government.<sup>92</sup> PAS's aspiration became further evident when it proclaimed that its mission is to become involved in the *tajdīd hadārī* (civilisational renewal) process as reflected in the Presidential speech of the 33rd. annual general meeting on 10 April 1987.<sup>93</sup>

It is against this backdrop that the PAS response to the Government's development policy and approach has taken shape. In the following analysis, we prefer to view it from two angles, namely the various PAS reactions to some aspects of Government development, and its own development approach, policy and programmes which have been carried out since it came into power in Kelantan.

PAS is convinced that what the Government is doing in the course of its development strategy is against PAS's ideal development goal, that is to establish an Islamic state based purely on Islamic principles and guidance. For instance, Ustaz Haji Hadi Awang, one of the prominent figures within the *ulama'* circle, has said that the implementation of Islam by any Government is of two kinds: the one which is based on *hidāyah*, and that on *jibāyah*.<sup>94</sup> The former refers to any Government which implements Islam and fully believes in the help of Allah in the course of development process, while the latter refer to a Government whose Islamic implementation is very selective. It only chooses the programmes which can guarantee material

---

92

It should be noted that some quarters in UMNO were also wary of ABIM and more so of Anwar for fear of losing their own political influence. See response from ABIM's president in *Berita Harian*.

93

Presidential speech by PAS President, Haji Yusuf Rawa entitled "Ke Arah *Tajdid Hadari*", at the 33th Annual General Meeting, 10 April 1987.

94

Ibrahim Ahmad, *op.cit*, p.85.

return.<sup>95</sup> PAS argues that as the Federal Constitution is supreme and placed above any other things including *al-Qur'ān* and *al-Sunnah*, the two primary sources of Islam, and thus the Malaysian Government has practised the second type of development.<sup>96</sup> For PAS, the Government is unIslamic because it is based primarily on a secular Constitution.<sup>97</sup>

Specifically, PAS claimed that the Government's Islamization policy is not consistent with Islam because the Government "is not really committed to establishing an Islamic state based on the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah*."<sup>98</sup> On various occasions, some labels have been used to describe the Islamization policy. Among other things, the Government Islamic programmes have been considered as *gincu dan bedak* (lipstick and powder), *tempelan* (fragmentary), *Islam kulit* (skin Islam) and *hiasan* (decoration). What the Government does is only to establish an Islamic Bank, but it is not keen to close other *jahiliyyah* (unIslamic) banks, it has established an Islamic University but is not willing to Islamize other universities.<sup>99</sup>

Furthermore, PAS considers that the Government's inculcation of Islamic values into the administration programme is a political move made by a secular Government. PAS thus considers that the establishment of such Islamic institutions as the Islamic University, an Islamic Bank and *Takaful Islam*

---

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 87.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 89.

<sup>99</sup> Ibrahim, op.cit., pp. 89-90.

will not be able to change the nature of the present secular structure of the nation.<sup>100</sup> This is especially so because the Government is pragmatic and liberal in its religious approach and activities. It takes such steps without consulting the true *kaedah-kaedah syarak* (the rules of Islamic laws). The argument that the plurality of society hinders the Government from embarking on a large-scale implementation of Islam cannot be accepted by PAS as this will allow the type of tolerance unacceptable to Islam to prevail. For PAS, action to implement Islam in society is an unchangeable principle. In other words, people have no choice but to implement it.<sup>101</sup> To show its concern and seriousness in its struggle for Islam, PAS has pledged that if the Government changes the existing Constitution so that it can be more in line with Islam, it will forever support the Government.<sup>102</sup>

While PAS, like all other Islamic groups, also holds the view that Islam is a comprehensive system covering all aspects of life, consisting mainly the *'aqā'id* (creeds), *ibādat* (ritual/worship), and *mu'āmalat* (transaction), *munākahat* (marriage) and *jināyat* (criminal) aspects, it places greater emphasis on the need to establish an Islamic state in order to

---

100

Ibid, p. 91.

101

Ibid, p. 93.

102

Ibid, p.93. For PAS responses to some programmes of the Government, see, for instance, a series of publications published by the PAS's Information, Research and Dakwah Department containing the speeches of PAS's members of parliament during the parliamentary session. The series called *Siri Suara PAS di Parlimen* (1-6) includes speeches by Haji Abdul Hadi Awang (No.1 - *Kaedah Islam dan Implikasi Perang Teluk*), Dr. Sanusi Daeng Mariok (No. 2 - *Menjaga Agama Menebus Maruah*), Haji Nik Abdullah Arshad (No. 3 - *Ke Mana Rakyat Dibawa?*), Muhammad bin Sabu (No. 4 - *Masyarakat Penyayang Yang Terkongsong*), Haji Ibrahim Mahmood (No. 5 - *Kenali Budaya Islam*), and Wan Mohd. Jamil Mahmood (No. 6 - *Pembangunan Mesti Berkat*). All were printed in April 1991.

realize the ideal of the Islamic system.<sup>103</sup> For PAS the Government's alleged aim of attempting to bring about balanced development is only meant to improve certain discrete aspects of development, not integrated as Islam desires. Such an approach has been responsible for the increase negative social elements.<sup>104</sup>

PAS considers that such elements as consuming alcohol, gambling, interest, free intermingling and displaying aurat<sup>105</sup> are detrimental to society and should be contained. Thus, PAS insists on the creation of a healthy social environment as a prerequisite for Islamic development. This can be achieved partly through the elimination of these elements. As the Government is reluctant to take action to ban them, PAS argues that the Government has no intention to create an Islamic state, and is only concerned with 'money'.<sup>106</sup>

The above elaboration reveals PAS's principal criticisms of the Government development and especially of its Islamization programmes. Although PAS has been consistently critical of the Government, it has turned to be more receptive since it took control of Kelantan. This can be well understood as it is not only expected to criticise but also to provide models of Islamic programmes that it sees as consistent with an ideal Islamic aspiration. Partly because it realizes that it must prove that it can develop the state more Islamically, PAS is committed to providing concrete Islamic programmes in

---

103

Haji Abdul Hadi Awang, *Antara Wawasan dan Jumud*, (Kuala Lumpur: GG Edar, 1993), p. 17.

104

Ibid.

105

Aurat is the parts of the body which Islam decrees to be covered.

106

Ibid. p. 18.



place of its earlier rhetoric and generalizations. It is here that one can see some of the "changes" taking place during its administration.

According to the paper issued by Kelantan's Economic Planning Unit (UPEN) entitled "*Pelaksanaan Pentadbiran Secara Islam Di Negeri Kelantan*" (The Implementation of Islamic Administration in Kelantan), the Government policy is based on *al-Qur'ān* and *al-Sunnah*.<sup>107</sup> PAS is committed to upholding and implementing the Islamic system as enshrined in its constitution (Section 3, Article 5(1)) which reads. "to struggle for the establishment of a society and Government which practises Islamic values and laws in expectation of the pleasure of Allah s.w.t..."<sup>108</sup>

Based on this religious philosophy PAS introduces its development policy which is based generally on two professed strategies: a) to ensure that all the new and amended policies will be based on Islam, and b) to implement supporting programmes to ensure a full implementation of an Islamic system either fully (*mutlak*) or alternatively.<sup>109</sup> The goal of the Government is, "to desire Allah's consent (*keredaa*n), love

---

107

Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Kelantan, '*Pelaksanaan Pentadbiran Secara Islam Di Negeri Kelantan*', (File: UPEN.KN D200/02/338/106/Vol.2), 12.2.1994, p.1. It says that this policy is not an option but a compulsory obligation which needs to be implemented fully. This demand is part and parcel of one's conviction (*'aqīdah*) and *'ibadah*, a real obligation of man as a *hamba* or servant and *khalifah* or vicegerent of Allah on this earth (*al-Qur'ān* 51:56).

108

*Ibid*, p.3.

109

*Ibid*, p.6. The *mutlak* implementation refers to the programmes which are fully under state jurisdiction (state list), and alternative programmes are the ones under Federal Government (Federal List) which cannot be changed but only modified within the jurisdiction of the state Government.

(*kasih sayang*), blessing and mercy (*keberkatan and restu*).<sup>110</sup>

Some of the programmes which have been introduced by the Kelantan Government are as follows:<sup>111</sup>

Economic: transfer of Government's accounts and those of its agencies to Islamic Banks; establishing Islamic pawnshops (*al-Rahn*); and changing the present scheme of car loans to an interest-free one.<sup>112</sup>

Social: Changes in this aspect are based on three strategies, namely to prohibit evil doings (*al-Nahy 'An al-Munkar*), to enjoin goodness (*al-Amr bi al-Ma'rūf*) and to improve social justice. For the first strategy, the following steps have been taken: prohibiting all kinds of gambling,<sup>113</sup> limiting the selling and consumption of alcohol among non-Muslims, and prohibiting it altogether for Muslims, making it compulsory for women to cover the aurat, encouraging relevant authorities not to employ woman workers for night shifts unless they can ensure their safety and prohibiting the use of pictures of women engaging in immoral behaviour in advertisements.<sup>114</sup>

In terms of enjoining the *ma'rūf*, the Government claims to have taken the following steps: encouraging people to pay

---

110

Ibid, p.4.

111

See also Muhammad Syukri Salleh, "Perlaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam di Kelantan: Masalah dan Cadangan Penyelesaian", a paper presented at *Syarahan Perdana Kali Kedua*, organised by Kelantan Economic Planning Unit at Kota Darulnaim on 23 April 1994, pp. 3-7 for a list of changes provided by UPEN.

112

Op.cit., pp. 7-8.

113

This was done by ceasing to issue licences for gambling premises.

114

Op.cit., pp. 9-10.

zakat, revitalising the concept of *Serambi Mekah*<sup>115</sup> establishing Tok Kenali funds in order to encourage people to engage in charity, and encouraging people to perform their prayers, especially among the traders. As for the strategy to improve social justice, the Government has emphasized upgrading the standard of living of the poor people, allowing sixty days for a woman worker to be absent from work after childbirth instead of forty, contributions and donations to the needy, reducing or exempting the licence required for the trishaw hawkers, replacing the "Tender-By-Negotiation System" with an "Open-Tender System" based on the highest offer for logging tenders, strengthening the *gotong-royong* practice, and displaying leadership by example.<sup>116</sup>

Educational: Greater emphasis on the quality and proper understanding of Islam in the schools administered by the Kelantan Islamic Foundation (*Yayasan Islam Kelantan*) and improving the informal education system like the *pondok*, *madrasah* and mosque.<sup>117</sup>

Cultural: The Kelantan Government considers that the popular understanding of culture as being a synonym for entertainment, songs and dancing is inappropriate to its more global concept. The government has a policy of allowing or encouraging the local cultural practices which are not against Islam and of changing the unIslamic aspects of some others.

---

115

*Serambi Mekah* literally means veranda of Mecca as Kelantan was known to be among the earliest places to have had Meccan influence in terms of education and religion.

116

Op. cit., pp. 10-13.

117

Ibid, p.14.

Such traditional cultures as *Mak Yong*<sup>118</sup> and *Wayang Kulit* are banned.<sup>119</sup>

Political: In this sphere, there seems to be only general statements on what it has done. Among them are: implementing Islamic policy and rules in the administration, using political power to serve the people and not for the interest of certain quarters, eliminating nepotism, favouritism and dictatorship, and establishing an administration based on *Taqwā* in order to eliminate disunity.<sup>120</sup>

Legal: Perhaps the biggest attempt made by the Kelantan Government in the legal sphere is to introduce *hukum hudud* to replace secular criminal laws. It took about three years for Kelantan to come out with such an enactment which was passed by the State Legislative Council at the end of 1993. The enactment was, however, not gazetted for implementation as it contradicts the Federal Constitution.

Upon observation, it can be seen that PAS also was trying to implement Islam in stages as it has "limited power to exercise". As the Political Secretary to the Chief Minister has said, PAS is doing what it can without necessarily changing the existing structure due to this limitation.<sup>121</sup> Going through relevant publications published by PAS and the Kelantan Government, one will find that PAS continues to blame the Federal Government, the Constitution, mass media, secularism,

---

118

A kind of traditional theatrical performance like pentomine which has Hindu and Buddhist elements.

119

Ibid, p.16.

120

Ibid, pp. 16-17.

121

Interview with Encik Husam Musa, the Political Secretary to the Chief Minister of Kelantan.

the Government acts like Internal Security Act (ISA) and Societies Act, the materialist religious scholars, and materialism in general for the various constraints it imposes on implementing Islam *in toto*.<sup>122</sup> While there may be some truth in this claim, a mere blaming of others for the various weaknesses would just make people to interpret it as an attempt to avoid responsibility. Some observe that the absence or lack of detailed operational programmes for economic, social, legal, political, educational and religious development has contributed to this deficiency. Again, the crucial question is whether simplicity in religious rhetoric can well be translated into practice effectively and realistically. While the various "changes" made by the Kelantan Government might be seen appropriate for creating a conducive social environment or maintaining a type of social order in a particular society, PAS approach may not be fully acceptable elsewhere. This partly explains why PAS cannot gain enough support to form governments in other states or penetrate especially the metropolitan areas where people have been involved in a more sophisticated modern life. However, in political terms PAS, like all other political parties, is obliged to continue disseminating the ideas that it believes to be truly Islamic to the people.

#### Conclusion.

The above discussion of various religious perspectives provides an overall impression of different Islamic qualitative assessments made by major local religious movements. Compared to these three groups, other Islamic organizations or movements

---

122

Tengku Razaleigh for instance has been quoted in *Buletin* (No. 23, July, 1992, p.5) as saying that no state can carry out various development projects without the help of the Federal Government. That was why development in Kelantan was slow. See also paper on "Pelaksanaan ..", *op.cit.*, pp.22-24.

like PERKIM and *Jamaah Tabligh* are not entirely relevant to our study. Despite the importance in their own ways, these groups are generally less influential and have not offered any remarkable ideological criticism of the Government. PERKIM, being established and dominated by Government political figures and concentrating only on the welfare especially of Muslim converts, is obviously not a kind of group which deserves consideration for this type of analysis. Being a group which places greater emphasis only on self-realisation and proper individual conduct in respect of daily routine as well as travelling in *jamaah* from one mosque to another, *Jamaah Tabligh* is not an organized ideological movement with a political aim despite a sizable number of followers. Hence, it is also not quite relevant in the context of our discussion. Non-Muslim response is also excluded as it is irrelevant to the defined research framework which only focuses on Muslim perspectives.

In general, the above three groups share the same ideological foundation which views Islam as a complete system of life, and emphasises the need to implement it *in toto*. Nonetheless, they differ as to how this Islamic ideal can be translated into practice. It is here that we can see different types of reaction to the Government policy. ABIM has adopted a more reconciliatory approach because of its moderate, accommodationist and modernist method, and its preference for a gradual process of Islamizing society. While disagreeing with the Government's adoption of conventional philosophy and its approach to development which it claims to have resulted in the rise of various social evils, Darul Arqam, based on its mystico-spiritual principles, has adopted a bottom-up development approach through its "villagization" development concept. PAS, being a political party, is understandably against the Government's development approach as it prefers to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state through



political means. For PAS, legal enforcement of the Islamic system is crucial for an Islamic Government. In the next concluding chapter, we shall return to consider these perspectives in the light of our own evaluation and assessment.

## CONCLUSION

## CONCLUSION

The changing perception of the development concept over the past decades forces us to adopt a selective mode of investigation, studying, for instance, only certain major post second World War conventional paradigms as well as contemporary views of local Muslim scholars on development and change. Against the differing perspectives of these concepts as propounded by scholars of both traditions, it must be admitted that an assessment of the Government development policy and its impact on the society cannot be resolved to the fullest satisfaction. Furthermore, the research involves such elusive subjects as cultural traits, social interaction and religious behaviour which are hardly measurable. Nonetheless, this attempt is worth undertaking for it provides an opportunity to obtain an overall picture of the present development process and its various ethnic, social, political, psychological, cultural, economic and other impacts, especially in the light of the Government's Islamization programmes and its drive to develop the country into a Malaysian-style developed nation by the year 2020. The current lack of a comparative approach in the study of religious activism in Malaysia in general, and the current religious role in the nation building process in particular, further justifies this endeavour. What has been presented in this research will, it is hoped, have provided reasonable insights into these concerns.

It has been noted that although the main features of a conventional theory may be found in all secular paradigms, the scholars' emphasis on different indicators of progress has contributed to the difficulty of identifying standard parameters for measuring the achievement of a nation. For instance, heavy dependence upon economic indicators, as emphasized in the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s, has not been fully acceptable to the advocates of dependency theory as the latter believe that other social indicators like

education, health and culture are also important yardsticks in measuring development progress besides, for instance, the GNP. The greater preference for a more holistic view of development is supposed to be a positive development towards implementing a broader development strategy worldwide. In practice, however, there have been varieties of development strategies adopted by different nations around the globe to suit specific demands of a nation. Malaysia is one such example.

As with the secular theorists, so with the Muslims. Different levels of understanding, academic preference, educational background and local social surroundings have been among the factors behind a variety of Muslim perspectives of development and change. To reduce the problem of conceptualization caused by these intellectual, social and geo-cultural differences, we have decided to emphasise only selected views of local Muslim scholars and Islamic groups. Upon a deeper analysis, we found that the Islamic concept of development and change is fundamentally distinctive from conventional one particularly at the ideological (primary) level, as the two do not share similarity at least in such aspects as the sources of reference, the concepts that constitute one's worldview like man, society, God, world and life, religion-state relationship, morality and axiomatic issues.

Despite the above differences, both perspectives seem to agree on a number of broad aspirations including, 1) the need for recognising a broader development perspective, 2) the need for a more comprehensive development strategy, and 3) the need for recognising the responsibility of both government and people to help establish global "peace, stability and happiness". An Islamic development is also hardly distinguishable from the conventional one in a number of other more specific respects (secondary level). For instance, it is untenable to talk of their distinction in terms of utilising various modern utilitarian and mechanical techniques and products. Hence, the use of modern development outputs or facilities like computers and other electronic devices,

management and business skills, office mechanics and new findings in such fields as medicine, economy, education etc. is necessarily *Islamic* as long as it is for constructive purposes and not against the various other religious principles. It is the noble objective and proper utilisation of these things that define their religious value.

The same religious principle applies in the social realm. Although Islam does not strictly stratify people according to such criteria as economic, social and political status, the existence of various social groups and strata as identified by social scientists, is not totally denied by or entirely irrelevant to religion. Islam recognises the existence of people of various social, cultural, economic and other classes or categories, but it reminds them of the superficiality of this stratification as it does not reflect a true or real categorization. The existence of these socio-economic differences should be perceived as only necessary for actualization of various Islamic principles, and not as a permanent or actual classification, or as two conflicting interests which need to be synthesised as Marxists hold. For example, it is important to identify the groups of people who are bound to dispense *zakāt* (alms due) and those who are eligible to receive it. Appropriate legal actions against those who do not discharge their *zakāt* can only be possible upon identification of their economic status. A deeper knowledge of people's various social, economic and cultural backgrounds is also crucial for an effective *da'wah* (missionary) work as this can provide appropriate information about the *maḍ'ū* (target group) so that a suitable approach of propagation (*uslūb al-da'wah*) can be adopted accordingly.

In the political sphere, the existence of such categories as *ulū al-amr* (leaders) and *ra'yat* (people) is especially necessary for effective administrative purposes and actualization of religious legal principles. In general, the strict demarcation of Islamic and conventional elements in the process of development should not be oversimplified, and it is

sometimes unnecessary, especially in view of the present complex society and social system.

At any rate, it remains important to consistently recognise that the only overriding criterion used by Islam to value one's position is righteousness or *taqwā*. A member of any social or economic class is equally qualified for this religious status when *taqwā* is observed. Despite the difficulty in measuring people's level of righteousness, it is generally agreed that, when referring to an Islamic-based development outlook, the overall feature of a society should reflect people's religious concern manifested for instance in their serious observance of prayer, continuous efforts in finding out solutions based on religion to various social, economic and other problems, and in their negative attitude towards destructive social behaviours. Other qualitative indicators will follow suit after *taqwā* is observed. This includes one's or society's intellectual level or knowledge (*ʿilm*), standard of morality (*akhlāq*) and good deeds (*ʿamal ṣāliḥ*). Islam teaches that such qualities are the lasting guardian of all material and non-material achievements. Although these criteria are abstract, they are manifestable in all aspects of human activities - social, economic, political etc.

In short, it can be said that the relationship between Islamic and conventional development is not straightforward. In practical terms, one can hardly demonstrate a clear demarcating line between conventional and Islamic development apart from their ideological differences. It is therefore not unusual to find that what is interpreted as conventional may be, in reality, Islamic, not perhaps by its place of origin, but at the very least by necessary utilisation of various technical facilities and products natural to all human beings. Hence, in Malaysia it is not a question of wholesale Islamic against conventional development, but the interpretation of whether the existing strategy and some aspects of national development are more or less compatible with Islamic guidelines, which in turn are always open for improvement. The



practical question which seems to develop here is one of the religious standard of development practice as much as of the philosophical foundation itself which is not, as we have seen, straightforward. It is here that development during the Mahathir era seems odd or otherwise to different people.

On various scores, his development strategy has been perceived both positively and negatively depending on one's perception of development and his interpretation of the policy and strategy. Besides these factors, we have seen that political inclination has also been influential in one's bias. In general, the prevailing perspectives and attitudes towards the Government's development strategy are based on two main premises with regard to the Islam-development issue. The first premise reflects an uncompromising demand for a professed declaration that national development is based on an Islamic philosophy whose sources of reference are the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah*. Consequently, the Government is expected to be responsible for taking necessary actions to eliminate all elements contrary to this philosophy. Government's reluctance to publicly demonstrate its inclination to this kind of approach has prompted the advocates of this perspective to justify their accusations about the *secularity* of the national development. For instance, one of our interviewees, a well known university lecturer, has said that the development philosophy and strategy during this period are not different from the previous ones, and the roles of existing policies in promoting Islam are not clear.

On the other hand, the Government's development practice has been considered acceptable to religious aspirations as it reflects a more practical way to implement development within Islamic guidelines. Islam, according to this perspective, should be practised more by example, behaviour and concrete programmes than by outward manifestations, words and rhetoric. Furthermore, the absence or lack of practical models of Islamic solutions to various modern problems in economic, social, educational and other spheres, even in the Muslim world,

justifies the need for this gradual religious approach. The failure of Government critics to come forward with concrete and practical programmes to realise religious aspirations in the nation building process has further added to this preference. After all, it has been argued that in practical terms the Islamization of society is more crucial than Islamization of state, or in the words of Dr. Wan Mohd. Nor, it is more crucial now to talk of religion and morality than of law as the law is not an issue for those who have a proper conception of religion. Mahathir's stress on the noble values, and his version of Islamization, seem to be in line with this realist accommodationist approach although his approach appeared to be somewhat liberal and pragmatic for some quarters. Mahathir himself believes that his approach will benefit people in the long run. On this point, the same lecturer observes that it is quite acceptable to move on a gradual scale, but policies towards achieving a noble objective must be clearly defined so that development process is moving towards a clear direction.

Against this backdrop, Mahathir is found not only to have stood by his own perception of development as propounded especially in his Vision 2020, but also to have adopted a distinctive approach in implementing it through various policies and strategies. Douglas Bullis may be right to summarize Mahathir's philosophy of development in the context of Malaysia's approach to nation building by quoting the latter's words as follows:

"The issue at hand is to find out the ways and means of how a nation can produce a society that has at its core a deep sense of religious consciousness, is committed to the highest standards of ethical and moral values, and yet is also industrious, dynamic, and devoted to advancement. We can easily achieve material progress by physical planning and development. But the stark truth is that all the material wealth that we have accumulated can be completely wiped out if we do not have the morally right set of values among the people who manage them. We have repeatedly seen this happen at the individual and family levels; we have also read in history about the fall of empires for invariably the same reason."<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> See "Rediscovering Islam at Kuala Lumpur's Institute of Islamic Understanding", by Douglas Bullis in *Wings of Gold*, March 1995.

From this statement, one can discern the Islamic elements in Mahathir's development philosophy. It reflects a desire to harmonize religious values with the benefits of modern material achievements. What might have made him prefer such a philosophy and to adopt such an approach has been discussed earlier. His strict upbringing, medical orientation, personal preference, experience during colonial occupation, the backwardness of his own race, the state of Malaysian multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, the Islamic resurgence, the wider impact of neo-colonialism and Western domination of developing countries, are some factors that might have contributed to this preference.

The impact of his policies has also been dealt with in greater detail in the earlier chapters. To summarise, we provide the following brief review. It must be realised that the main thrust of Malaysian development during the Mahathir era was based on the socio-economic strategies laid down in the NEP which was formulated in the 1970 under the OPP1, and covered a period of 20 years (1971-1990). Hence, the first decade of the Mahathir administration (1981-1990) was basically a continuation of earlier development efforts to achieve the objectives of the policy which were based on the two main prongs, namely eradication of poverty regardless of race and the restructuring of society in order to eliminate association of ethnic groups with economic functions. It was said that the NEP had incorporated a considerable amount of Mahathir's earlier radical ideas when he was expelled from UMNO after the 1969 incident. Hence, he seemed comfortable to inherit and realise the objectives of the NEP. Replacing the NEP and become effective since 1991 under the OPP2 covering a period of ten years (1991-2000), was the NDP which basically inherited the same NEP aspirations with a number of new strategies and greater emphasis on qualitative than merely quantitative achievements.

As demonstrated earlier, the efforts to eradicate poverty have resulted in the overall incidence of poverty being reduced from 49.3 per cent in 1970 to 17.1 per cent in 1991, with the

rural area recording a 36 per cent drop from 58.7 per cent to 21.8 per cent in the respective years, and the urban area scoring a 13per cent reduction from 21.3 per cent to 7.5 per cent in the same period.

Despite these achievements, the objective of restructuring society could not be easily attained, especially due to the strong economic base of the non-Malays. Hence, the Malays were still far behind other ethnic groups in terms of real mean household income by the end of the NEP period despite the overall increase of income by all ethnic groups over the period. Similarly, the objective of ensuring 30 per cent *Bumiputera* participation in the corporate sector as part of the restructuring strategy had not been achieved by that time when only 20.3 per cent of the ownership of share capital, the main indicator used in measuring its achievement, was in their hands. Even this percentage included the shares of such trustee agencies as MARA, PERNAS, PNB etc.

Due to the troubled recession period, especially during the second and third quarters of the 1980-1990 decade, the overall increase of *Bumiputera* participation over this period was slightly lower (7.8 per cent) than that of the previous decade (8.2 per cent). However, after the recession period, the national economic outlook has been more promising which enabled the nation to record an achievement of more than 8 per cent economic growth consecutively 1987 to 1994. The first six months of 1995 have also shown similar progress in this direction. Many people have attributed this fast economic recovery and higher economic achievement to the policies and strategies adopted by the Mahathir Government, especially during the recession period. Thus, a wider opportunity for creating a brighter future for Malaysia seemed to have regained momentum with this development which enabled the Government to exploit it for fulfilling its development agenda. Despite the fluctuation in the economic achievements, other socio-cultural and educational aspects have in general recorded encouraging improvements as our earlier analysis has shown.

What was more distinctive during this period was the emergence of various Islamic institutions unprecedented at any stage of Malaysian history apart from the establishment of the LUTH in 1963. Under the banner of the Islamization policy, which was based primarily on the inculcation of Islamic values into the Government administration, such new economic and educational institutions as the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), the Islamic Bank (BIMB), the Islamic Insurance Company (*Syarikat Takaful Islam Malaysia*), the Islamic pawnshops (*rahn*) the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC) and the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM) were established. All these institutions were only part of a number of other formal and informal drives initiated by the Government, which have been assigned special functions to tackle problems of different natures. The impact of these institutions has also been touched on earlier.

Analysis of all aspects of Malaysian development is impossible. Accordingly, we have selected some of them to serve the limited purpose of our analysis. Other untreated areas can be proposed for further investigation by other researchers. In general, we have looked at the positive and negative impacts of various policies like the Islamization policy, Vision 2020 and the industrialization policy on such aspects as demographic change, education, health, religious behaviour and ethnic relations. The quantitative evaluation was based mainly on simple statistical presentation of the data obtained from various sources. While many aspects have made drastic progress quantitatively, some others were slower. At times fluctuations also occurred due to the reasons stated. Having realised that quantitative measurement is not the sole criterion of assessment, we have also considered qualitative evaluation made by selected Islamic groups. Various perspectives were identified when we studied the opinions of such accommodationist rationalist, mystical, and political groups as ABIM, Darul Arqam and PAS in response to the Government



policy and in support of their differing stands. Comments by some individuals have also been included whenever relevant.

Despite this impact, the future prospect of Malaysian development in general and the Islamization strategy in particular remains a subject of prediction. Given the fact that development in Malaysia must be able to make continuous progress in all aspects to ensure its internal stability as well as its reputation and security in the international arena, on what ground can one assume that the present development strategy and religious policy may produce greater or lesser implications for the society and the world in general? We believe that this depends on Malaysia's ability to progress at a reasonable speed and in a proper direction towards achieving the desired aims.

The size of the Malaysian territory (approximately 330,000 sq. km) cannot be said to be an important factor in ensuring its future progress as other more developed nations like Singapore (1,000 sq. km), United Kingdom (245,000 sq. km) and South Korea (99,000 sq. km) are smaller in size than Malaysia. Therefore, geographical area is quite irrelevant for development to take place. Similarly, the size of population, though important, cannot be said to be highly determinant given Singapore as an example. In fact, most of the present developed nations were not highly populated when they were beginning to achieve the status of an industrialized country. However, from an economic point of view, a relatively large population is important in various ways, especially for marketing purposes.

While a larger size of population may be useful for various economic purposes, the reverse effect is equally possible, especially when economic growth of a nation is not consistent with the rate of population growth. From an Islamic point of view, whatever the size of population, the most important principle is to ensure that people are able to access to their rights as human beings in order to live peacefully without unnecessary malnutritional, social, psychological, environmental and other constraints. It is the responsibility of both the Government and the people to maintain and uphold



this principle. The question of whether this can be achieved through an increased economic achievement or a reduced fertility rate or both is a matter of polemics which is beyond the scope of this research. At any rate, the role of especially religion and education in this respect can be said to be a crucial factor in present day Malaysian development.

The new population policy introduced by Mahathir which aims at achieving a 70 million population by the year 2100 might be thought ideal by the Government for various reasons. For some people this may be interpreted as a move to slow down people's fertility rate so that the annual growth rate will be lower than the present 2.3 per cent. If people are allowed to grow consistently at the existing rate, the size of Malaysia's population by that year will be triple the desired target, or 217.25 million.

Meanwhile, the Government's radical economic strategies seemed to aim at achieving continuous economic growth to facilitate the future growth of population. Industrialization, privatization and other industrial and business-related policies are manifestations of this effort. In view of the desire to develop Malaysia into an industrialized country by the year 2020, it is important for Malaysia to maintain its economic growth above 7 per cent annually up to the stipulated year. Given the nation's present economic performance which has recorded more than 8 per cent growth for consecutive years since 1987, Mahathir has every reason to be confident in achieving the aim.

Equally important is the desire to develop Malaysia "in its own mould" as Mahathir puts it which takes into consideration various qualitative features like people's morality, standard of education, psychology, religious and spiritual values, social justice and national unity. Afterall, Mahathir himself has said that, "Economic development must not be the be-all and end-all of our national endeavours." It is here that people can interpret the wisdom behind such policies and slogans as the Look-East policy, Islamization policy, Caring Society, Clean-Efficient-Trustworthy and Leadership-by-

Example slogans.

Against this backdrop and parallel development side effects like white collar crimes, drug addiction, incidence of divorce and other social, cultural and political constraints, integration of religious values with material achievements as Mahathir desires will be faced with greater challenges throughout the remaining years of his administration. While Mahathir has a strong desire to liberate Malaysia from all political, economic and psychological controls by setting various short, medium and long term development strategies, a question can always be asked as to whether this can be materialized fully in view of various internal and external challenges. First, the Government needs continuous mass support to ensure political stability, continuous economic growth, better military and material preparation in the face of any international threat, and second, it needs to adopt a principled religious approach which is yet acceptable to the majority of the Malaysian populace in order to create a conducive socio-cultural and religious environment for continuous national unity.

If the present momentum is to prevail in expectation of more effective and constructive social progress, people and institutions of various types must be able to come to terms with the current challenges in their own practical approaches. The role of such Islamic institutions as the Islamic Centre, IKIM, IIUM and ISTAC can be reasonably expected to be more challenging in defining their dynamic, vibrant and active role, especially in providing proper guidelines to the Government as well as in moulding the behavioral patterns of Malaysian society. After all, it is the intellectuals in general and the intellectual-based institutions in particular who should be more responsible for guiding national development towards a proper direction. The non-Governmental organizations have a similar task to shoulder. Of all Islamic groups, perhaps ABIM, due to its moderate, rational and accommodationist approach and present constructive cooperation with the Government, might be seen to offer more help for the Government

progressive approach. Nonetheless, things may develop in a different direction as political, economic and social circumstances in Malaysia can never be accurately predicted. This certainly demands wisdom and sacrifice from every quarter in dealing with changing situations in their efforts to change the society for the better.

It must be admitted that the task of implementing a good development for Malaysia is not an easy affair. Muslims of all walks of life must not only be more critical of any changes that take place within the society, but should continuously be able to demonstrate a wise utilization of the principle and spirit of *ijtihad*, a preliminary requisite for a dynamic and effective social change. Redefinition or interpretation of an Islamic role in the development process must have its roots in a proper understanding of various Islamic concepts which, as Dr. Wan Mohd. Nor says, is among the major tasks of ISTAC. Efforts to correct confusions and misconceptions regarding religious concepts are equally crucial if the programmes proposed for solving problems of different nature are to be religiously guided. Over time, Malaysia should be able to develop a conducive Islamic ethos that will allow major complicated modern problems to be rationally discussed and agreed upon by a majority of the Muslim community. More important, however, is to work out practical solutions which are acceptable to all or the majority of the Malaysian populace, a task that, despite the encouraging signs at the moment, remains challenging. Meanwhile, Malay political support seems likely to remain crucial for UMNO and the Government at least for the period until 2020 when all races are hopefully no longer identified by their economic functions. If that takes place by that time, Malaysia can expect a reasonable stage of progress whereby the degree of seriousness posed by the nine potential challenges mentioned in Vision 2020 is significantly reduced. Hence, a fully developed Malaysia may come about.

## APPENDICES & BIBLIOGRAPHY

## Appendix I

### FIELDWORK IN MALAYSIA: A SUMMARY REPORT

DATES	PLACES OF RESEARCH
19.4.1994	UMNO Headquarter, Kuala Lumpur (Wan Mahyuddin and Hj. Nik Mustaffa)
20.4.1994 & 11.5.1994	National Archive, Kuala Lumpur (Zainal Abidin Abdul Rahman)
20.4.1994	Angkasapuri, Ministry of Information, KL.
21.4.1994	Department of Information Services of Malaysia (Mohamad Salleh Rafie, Deputy Director-General)
10.5.1994	Pan Lai Chang, Director, Press Division
21.4.1994	National Library, Jalan Tun Razak
24.4.1994	Pondok Maharizan (Mahathir's Residence in Kedah - Miss Tan (clerk) and Shafie (gardener), Rumah Kelahiran Mahathir (Fatimah Abu Hassan - Archive Assistant), Mahathir's sisters at Taman Malek, Alor Star (Rafeah and Bibi)
25.4.1994	Institute for Policy Research (IKD)
27.4.1994	The New Straits Times Headquarters (Sopiah Suid - Manager, Research and Information Services)
28.4.1994	The MCA Headquarters (Cheong Yuet Siew, Senior Research Officer)
28.4.1994	The MIC Headquarters (A.S. Asokan PPN, Public Relation Officer)
28.4.1994	Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (Siti Nor Sarida Saidin, Public Relation Officer)
28.4.1994	Syarikat Takaful (Malaysia) Berhad

29.4.1994	Department of Islamic Affairs, Federal Territory (Nordin Harun, Executive Officer [Administration] and Zawanah Mohammad - Family Counselling Unit)
2.5.1994	PAS State Headquarters in Kota Bharu (Mazlan Ibrahim, Secretary to PAS State Legislative Body representatives)
5.5.1994	Darul Arqam's Publication Unit, Taman Tun Dr. Ismail, Damansara
7.5.1994	Kolej Sultan Abdul Hamid, Alor Star, Kedah and Stuart Library (Hj. Nordin Hassan, Zakaria Othman and Aziz Hashim - Library Assistants)
8.5.1994	Department of Social Welfare Kedah (Mohammad Rashid)
10.5.1994	ABIM Headquarters (Azhar - Resource Centre)
3.5.1994	Council for Religious Affairs and Malay Customs Kelantan (Raja Rohana Raja Salleh - Assistant Secretary)
3.5.1994	UPEN (Noraini Abd. Samad, Assistant Registrar [Secretariat])



## Appendix II

### LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND DATES OF INTERVIEW

Date	Ref./Notes	Interviewees/designation
8.4.1994	*	Mustaffa Kamil Ayub - ex-President National Association of Muslim Students Malaysia (PKPIM) and Deputy Director, Students Affairs Division, IIUM.
12.4.1994	Tape 1	Dr. Sidek Baba, Dean, Matriculation Centre, IIUM and Vice President (international) of ABIM.
14.4.1994	Tape 2	Dato' Dr. Ismail Ibrahim - Director-General, Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM).
16.4.1994	Tape 3	Ustaz Zainuddin Abdullah and Ustaz Faisal Abdullah - Mubalighs of Islamic Welfare Organization of Malaysia (PERKIM).
17.4.1994	*	Tujiman and Hj. Mohd. Sidek - Tabligh members.
18.4.1994	*	Hj. Ramli Othman - Secretary/Assistant Director-General (Administration), Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.
18.4.1994	*	Haji Mohd. Ali Saripan, Director, Islamic Dakwah Foundation Malaysia (INDAH).
19.4.1994	*	Othman Ahmad, Assistant Secretary-General, Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
23.4.1994	Tape 4	Hj. Ahmad Abdullah, Secretary, Council for Islamic Affairs Kedah (MAIK).

23.4.1994	Tape 5	Ustaz Ibrahim Abdullah, Information Officer, Dakwah Centre Alor Star, Kedah.
23.4.1994	*	Mrs. Nafisah Abdullah - Legal and Administration of Shari'ah Laws Division, Department of Islamic Affairs Kedah (JAIK).
23.4.1994	*	Ustaz Jamaluddin Hj. Yaakob - Information Officer, JAIK.
23.4.1994	*	Abd. Ghani Hj. Othman - Solicitor and Head of Reinforcement Division, JAIK.
26.4.1994	Tape 6	Dato' Prof. Khoo Kay Kim - Dean, History Department, University of Malaya.
29.4.1994	Tape 7	Vijaya Samarawickrama, Vice-President, Sasana Abwurdhi Wardhana Society, Buddhist Maha Vihara, KL, and, Sarata Wickrama Surendre, Hon. Secretary.
29.4.1994	*	Nordin Harun - Executive Officer (Administration), Department of Religious Affairs, Federal Territory (JAWI).
29.4.1994	Tape 8	Hj. Mohd. Nakhaie Ahmad - Director, Special Division, Information Services of Malaysia.
29.4.1994	*	Zawanah Mohammad - Family Counselling Unit, JAWI.
30.4.1994	*	Hj. Abdul Jalil Ibrahim, Secretary-General, PERKIM.
2.5.1994	Tape 9	Sahlan Ismail - Director, Civic Bureau, Kelantan.
2.5.1994	*	Abd. Manan Hassan, Secretary-General, S46 Kelantan.
3.5.1994	Tape 10	Mohd. Yasin Mohd. Nor, Director, Organization and Budget, UPEN.

3.5.1994	*	Rawi Mat Yaman, Deputy Kadi Besar Kelantan.
3.5.1994	Tape 11	Hj. Husam Musa - Political and Press Secretary to Chief Minister of Kelantan.
6.5.1994	Tape 12	Assoc. Prof. Dr. Wan Mohd. Nor Wan Daud, Acting Director and Senior Fellow, ISTAC.
8.5.1994	*	Ustaz Fadzil Noor - President, PAS.
9.5.1994	Tape 13	Dato' Prof. Emiritus Hj. Shahnnon Ahmad, Director, Islamic Centre, Science University of Malaysia (USM).
11.5.1994	Tape 13	Assoc. Prof. Dr. Faisal Othman, Senior Fellow, IKIM.
11.5.1994	Tape 14	Datuk Dr. Syed Othman Alhabshi, Deputy Director-General, IKIM.
12.5.1994	Tape 15	Rev. Albert S. Walters, Lecturer, Seminari Theologi Malaysia.
13.5.1994	Tape 16	Dato' Abd. Hamid Othman, Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister's Department.

Note:

\* Indicates either the interview was conducted without recording for various reasons (such as not preferred or not allowed by the respondent or the situation did not make such recording possible), or the meeting with respondent was rather informal, and/or information was obtained from relevant materials provided by the respondent.

## Appendix III

### MAHATHIR: A CHRONOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY

YEARS	EVENTS
1925	- Born in Alor Star, Kedah (December 20)
1942-1945	- [Japanese Occupation] - his secondary education at Sultan Abdul Hamid College, Alor Star interrupted - involved in small business at <i>Pekan Rabu</i> first by selling coffee and cakes and then fruits and handicrafts
1945	- resumed his secondary education - became the first editor for the new series of the school magazine <i>Darulaman</i>
1946	- joined <i>Massa Melayu</i> - joined <i>Kesatuan Melayu Kedah</i> - joined <i>UMNO</i> - started writing in <i>Sunday Times</i> ,
Singapore	
1947-	- studied medicine at King Edward VII Medical College, Singapore - participated in various forums and debates - President of the Muslim Society - editor of the college medical students' magazine
1951	- attempt to open <i>UMNO</i> to non-Malays failed
1953	- graduated from the college with MBBS

- 1954
  - joined Malayan Medical Service (first as houseman for one year and medical officer for three years in Alor Star, Langkawi and Perlis)
- 1956
  - worked in Alor Star General Hospital
  - got married to Hasmah Haji Mohammad Ali (August 5)
- 1957
  - resigned from Government service
  - opened *Maha Klinik* at Jalan Tunku Ibrahim Alor Star, Kedah
  - birth of the first child
- 1959
  - his clinic moved to *Pekan Rabu*, Alor Star
  - was offered chance to contest for State Assembly Legislation but rejected
- 1964
  - contested in General Elections and won Parliamentary seat for Kota Star Selatan constituency
- 1965
  - represented Malaysia to UN Assembly etc.
- 1967
  - represented Malaysia to Harvard Seminar on International Affairs
- 1968
  - chairman of the first Higher Education Council (and later Higher Education Advisory Council)
- 1969
  - defeated by PAS candidate Haji Yusuf Rawa in General election
  - wrote several fateful letters to Tunku
  - expelled from UMNO by Tunku Abd. Rahman (August)
  - returned to his clinic
  - wrote *The Malay Dilemma*
  - labelled as *ultra*
- 1970
  - *The Malay Dilemma* was published and banned
- 1972
  - brought back into UMNO by Tun Abdul Razak
  - member of Supreme Council
- 1973
  - appointed senator
  - chairman of the Food Industries of Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. (FIMA)

- 1974
- won election uncontested
  - Minister of Education
  - chairman of National University of
- Malaysia
- 1975
- won UMNO vice-president post (June)
- 1976
- Deputy Prime Minister
  - Minister of Trade and Industry
  - *Menghadapi cabaran* published
- 1981
- Prime Minister of Malaysia at 55. (July 16).



## UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT: TWO BASIC MODELS




Fig. A

In the above, science and technology merely play the role of bridging the natural and other material resources and man's material needs.





Fig. B




८३५

## INTEGRATED HUMAN DEVELOPMENT : The Islamic Perspective

FIG. C: PROGRESS OF IUUM: A GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION

GROWTH CHARTS


IUUM STUDENT UNDERGRADUATE POPULATION (1983- July 1993)



IUUM STAFF POPULATION: ACADEMIC AND NON ACADEMIC (1983- July 1993)



GRADUATES: POST-GRADUATE AND FIRST DEGREE (1987- 1993)



GRADUATES BY ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (1987 - 1993)

Year	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
LL.B	56	68	89	103	172	199	285
LL.B(S)			3	4	8		42
B.Econ	68	79	10	17	62	96	171
BBA		29	45	43	88	188	73
B.Acc					28	137	58
B.H.Sc							4
B.H.Sc(Ad)							9
Ph.D					1	1	2
MCL		2	4	25	15	22	50
M.RKH						18	7
M.Econ					11	11	4
DESL					24	14	3
DASL					5		
DSL		17	16	15		33	22
Dip.Ed		108	164	239	351	419	457
DAUJ	29	31	21	22		38	37
Adv.Dip.Ed						8	3
DIS						76	52
TOTAL	153	294	382	498	770	1147	1171

LL.B

LL.B(S)

B.Econ

BBA

B.Acc

B.H.Sc

B.H.Sc (AL)

Ph.D

MCL

- Bachelor of Laws (Shariah)

- Bachelor of Laws (Shariah)

- Bachelor of Economics

- Bachelor of Business Administration

- Bachelor of Accounting

- Bachelor of Human Sciences

- Bachelor of Human Sciences in Arabic Language and Literature

- Doctor of Philosophy

- Master of Cooperative Laws

M.RKH

M.Econ

DESL

DASL

DSL

Dip.Ed

DAUJ

- Master of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences

- Master of Economics

- Diploma in English as Second Language

- Diploma in Arabic as Second Language

- Diploma in Shariah Law and Practice

- Diploma in Education

- Diploma in Law and Administration of Islamic Judiciary

- Advanced Diploma in Education

- Diploma in Islamic Studies

M.RKH

M.Econ

DESL

DASL

DSL

Dip.Ed

DAUJ

Adv. Dip. Ed

DIS

- Master of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences

- Master of Economics

- Diploma in English as Second Language

- Diploma in Arabic as Second Language

- Diploma in Shariah Law and Practice

- Diploma in Education

- Diploma in Law and Administration of Islamic Judiciary

- Advanced Diploma in Education

- Diploma in Islamic Studies

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### A. Works by Mahathir.

Mohamad, Mahathir. *The Malay Dilemma*. Singapore: Times Books International, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Challenge*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1993.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Hak Asasi dan Kebebasan Manusia". Speech by the Prime Minister at the 48th UN General Assembly on 1 October 1993. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information Malaysia, 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Penjelasan Mengenai Perlaksanaan Hukum Hudud di Malaysia". Speech by the Prime Minister on 3 March 1994. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Affairs Division, Prime Minister's Department, 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Inter/action, Inte/gration". *Intisari*. Vol. 1, No. 3. n.d., pp. 37-44.

\_\_\_\_\_. "From Here to Vision 2020". Speech by the Prime Minister at the International Conference on 'Malaysia: Powerhouse of the Nineties' on 15 November 1993. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information Malaysia, 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ke Arah Membangunkan Masyarakat Perdagangan dan Perindustrian Bumiputera Yang Berdaya Tahan". . Speech by the Prime Minister at the Third Bumiputera Economic Congress on 10 January 1992. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information Malaysia, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Perspectives on Islam and the Future of Muslims*. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, n.d..

\_\_\_\_\_. *Malaysia: Melangkah Ke Hadapan*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP and ISIS, 1991.

\_\_\_\_\_. "6th Malaysia Plan (1991-1995): Sustaining Growth Momentum for Balanced Development". A speech by the Prime Minister when presenting the motion on the Sixth Malaysia Plan at Parliament on 10 July 1991. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information Malaysia, n.d..

\_\_\_\_\_. *Menghadapi Cabaran*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pustaka Antara, 1976.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Malay Women Make Their Own Freedom", *Sunday Times*, 20.7.1947, p. 6.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Rains Bring Fish to 'sawahs'", *Sunday Times*, 6.2.1949, p. 6.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Malay - 'Modern' and Standard", *Sunday Times*, 24.4.1949, p. 24.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Weekly Fair at Alor Star", *Sunday Times*, 18.9.1949, p. 4.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Rulers & Ra'ayats - Cilmax is Near", *Sunday Times*, 9.10.1949, p. 8.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Malay Padi Planters Need Help", *Sunday Times*, 30.10.1949, p. 8.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Changing Malay Marriage Customs", *Sunday Times*, 20.11.1949, p. 6.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Malay Progress & the University", *Sunday Times*, 27.11.1949, p. 8.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "New Thought on Nationality", *Sunday Times*, 9.4.1950, p. 8.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Plight of Malay Fisherfolk", *Sunday Times*, 23.4.1950, p. 11.

Department of Information Service, *Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (Politik)* (Collection of Mahathir Speeches (Politics)). Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Information Malaysia, November, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (Sosial)*. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Information Malaysia, November, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (Ekonomi)*. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Information Malaysia, November, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir (Antarabangsa)*. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Information Malaysia, November, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Speeches of the Prime Ministers 1992 - Collection I*. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Information Malaysia, 1993.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Speeches of the Prime Ministers 1993 - Collection II.*  
Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Information Malaysia, 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Speeches of the Prime Ministers 1994 - Collection III.*  
Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Information Malaysia, 1994.

B. Works on Mahathir.

Adshead, Robin. *Mahathir of Malaysia: Statesman and Leader.* United Kingdom: Hibiscus Publishing Company, 1989.

Ahmad, Aziz Zariza. *Mahathir: Triumph After Trials.* Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co., 1990.

Case, William. "Comparative Malaysian Leadership: Tunku Abdul Rahman and Mahathir". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXXI, No. 5. May 1991, pp. 456-473.

Hamzah, Hasan Hj.. *Mahathir: Great Malaysian Hero.* 2nd. ed.. Kuala Lumpur: Media Printext (M) Sdn. Bhd., October 1990.

M. Rajendran. *Mahathir Mohamad: Prime Minister of Malaysia.* Petaling Jaya: IBS Buku Sdn. Bhd., 1993.

Maidin, Zainuddin. *Mahathir: Di Sebalik Tabir.* Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications and Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1994.

Mauzy, Diane K., R.S. Milne. "The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline Through Islam". *Pacific Affairs*. Vol. 56, No. 4. An International Review of Asia and the Pacific, Winter 1983-84, pp. 617-648.

Morais, J. Victor. *Mahathir: A Profile in Courage.* 3rd. print. Petaling Jaya: Eastern Universities Press (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1984.

National Library Malaysia. *Bibliografi Dr. Mahathir.* Kuala Lumpur: Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia, 1990.

Pathmanathan, Murugesu. *Malaysia and World Affair: The Mahathir Impact.* Petaling Jaya: Economic Research Associates and Murugesu Pathmanathan, 1990.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Winds of Change: The Mahathir Impact on Malaysia's Foreign Policy.* Petaling Jaya: Eastview Productions Sdn. Bhd., 1984.

Shaari, Rahman. *Politik Mahathir: Sikap dan Pemikiran*. Kuala Lumpur: 'D' Enterprise, 1990.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Politik Mahathir: Langkah dan Perhitungan*. Kuala Lumpur: 'D' Enterprise, 1989.

Sunderam, Jomo Kwame. ed.. *Dasar-dasar Ekonomi Mahathir*, 4th. ed.. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Analisa Sosial (INSAN), 1989.

Wariya, Chamil. *Dasar Luar Era Mahathir*. Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sd. Bhd., 1989.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Pandangan Politik Era Mahathir*. Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1990.

\_\_\_\_\_. *UMNO Era Mahathir*. Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1988.

Yoong, Chung Kek. *Mahathir Administration: Leadership and Change in A Multi-racial Society*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1987.

#### C. Main Works on Malaysian Development.

Department of Information Service Malaysia. *Dasar-dasar Negara*. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Information Malaysia, n.d..

Department of Statistics Malaysia. *Malaysia: Census of Professional and Institutional Establishments 1991 (Private Sector)*. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, September 1993.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Yearbook of Statistics 1992*. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, July 1993.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Bank Data Negeri/Daerah 1991 (State/ District Data Bank 1991)*. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, July 1993.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Social statistics Bulletin Malaysia 1985*. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Vital Statistics Time Series - Peninsular Malaysia 1911-1985*. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, March 1991.



- \_\_\_\_\_. *Social Statistics Bulletin 1991*. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Jadual Hayat Ringkas Semenanjung Malaysia 1981-1990* (Abridged Life Tables Peninsular Malaysia 1981-1990). Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, July 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Vital Statistics Malaysia 1991 (Preliminary Release)*. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, March 1993.
- National Printing Department. *Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985*. Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1981.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990*. Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1986.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-1995*. Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1991.

#### D. Other Works.

##### 1. Books, Articles, Reports, and Journals.

- Abadi, Zakry. *Melayu Baru: Mengisi Wawasan Perdana Menteri*. Cheras, Selangor: Intisari Sekutu (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kualiti Kepimpinan Selepas Dr. Mahathir dan Ghafar Baba: Suatu Perspektif Dalam Ketokohan*. Kuala Lumpur: Sarjana Enterprise, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Dilema Barisan Nasional*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Syarikat Grafikset, July 1986.
- Abdullah, Hairi. ed.. *Penduduk Semenanjung Malaysia*. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1989.
- Abdullah, A. Karim Haji. ed.. *Perjuangan Suci UMNO*. Kuala Lumpur: Goodmark Enterprise, 1993.
- Abdullah, Mohd. Ridhuan Tee. ed.. *Persoalan Islam dan Isu Semasa*. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, n.d.

- Abdullah, Abdul Rahman Haji. *Islam Dalam Sejarah Asia Tenggara Tradisional*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pena Sdn. Bhd., 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Gerakan Islam Tradisional Di Malaysia: Sejarah dan Pemikiran Jamaat Tabligh & Darul Arqam*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Kintan Sdn. Bhd., 1992.
- Abidin, Amat Anwar Zainal. "Permulaan Pensejarahan Islam". *Jurnal Islamiyat Fakulti Pengajian Islam*. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1979, pp. 1-12.
- Abughosh, Bassam Sulaiman, Waffaa Zaki Shaqra. *A Glossary of Islamic Terminology*. London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd., 1992.
- AbūSulaymān, ʿAbdulḤamīd Ahmad. Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, tr.. *Crisis in the Muslim Mind*. Virginia: IIIT, 1993.
- Adam, Abu Hassan. *Menebus Maruah*. Petaling Jaya: Kumpulan Rusa Sdn. Bhd., 1994.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Menghala Wawasan 2020*. Kuala Lumpur: Arena Ilmu Sdn. Bhd., 1991.
- Adil, Hafiz M.. *Introduction to Qur'ān*. New Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors, 1990.
- Agus, Mohd. Razali. *Pembangunan Perumahan: Isu Dan Prospek*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Pola-pola Petempatan Masyarakat Melayu di Kuala Lumpur*. Kuala Lumpur: Akademi Pengajian Melayu, Universiti Malaya, 1991.
- Ahmad, Hussein Hj.. *Pendidikan dan Masyarakat: Antara Dasar, Reformasi dan Wawasan*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1993.
- Ahmad, Mohd. Nakhaie Hj.. *Mantapkan Landasan Perjuangan*. Kuala Lumpur: Rangkaian Analisa & Penyelidikan Islam, October 1993.
- Ahmad, Muhammad Saleem. "Islam in South East Asia: A Study of the Emergence and Growth in Malaysia and Indonesia". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. XIX, No. 2. Summer 1980, pp. 134-141.
- Ahmad, Akbar S.. *Toward Islamic Anthropology: Definition, Dogma and Directions*. Virginia: IIIT, 1986.
- Ahmad, Ibrahim. *Konflik UMNO-PAS Dalam Isu Islamisasi*. Petaling Jaya: IBS Buku Sdn. Bhd., 1989.

- Ahmad, Zakaria Haji. "Malaysia in 1984: No More Free Lunches?". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXV, No. 2. April 1970, pp. 206-213.
- Ahsan, Muhammad. "Theories of Migration with Particular Reference to Islam and Pakistan". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3. 1994, pp. 193-204.
- Akintola, Ishaq. "Creation Theories in the Qur'an". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVI, No. 3. 1992, pp. 192-201.
- al-Ṣabbāgh, Muḥammad. *al-Ḥadīth al-Nabawī*. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1981.
- al-Ḥamaṣī, Muḥammad Ḥassan. *al-Īmān bi Allāh*. 2nd. pr.. Damascus: Dār al-Rashīd, 1987.
- Al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib. *Preliminary Statement on A General Theory of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesia Archipelago*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul*. Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1990.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islam and Secularism*. Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1978.
- Al-Azmeh, Aziz. "The Historicity of Kitāb al-ʿIbar". *Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation*. Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1982, pp. 145-165.
- Al-Badri, Sheikh Abdul Aziz. *Islam: Di Antara Ulama dan Pemerintahan, Haji Mohd. tahir Daeng Mengati*. Kota Bharu: Pustaka Aman Press Sdn. Bhd., 1988.
- al-Bāqī, Muḥammad Fuād ʿAbd. *al-Muʿjam al-Mufahras*. Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 1988.
- al-Bayṭār, Muḥammad Sabjah. *Qawāʿid al-Taḥdīth min Funūn Muṣṭalāḥ al-Ḥadīth*. Dār Akhyā' al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyah, n.d..
- Al-Buraey, Muhammad. Abdullah Md. Noor, Norlida Abdul Halim and Noorlela Hassan. tr.. *Pembangunan Pentadbiran Menurut Perspektif Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1992.
- al-ʿAlwānī, Tāhā Jābir. *Ijtihād*. Vol. 4. Virginia: IIIT, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Qur'an and the Sunnah: The Time-Space Factor*. ʿImād al-Dīn Khalīl. tr. Vol. 3. Virginia: IIIT, 1991.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam*, A.S. al-Shaikh Ali, ed.. Virginia: IIIT, 1993.
- al-‘Athīmayn, Muḥammad al-Ṣāliḥ. *‘Aqīdah Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah*. Kuwait: Dār al-Arqam, 1983.
- al-‘Umarī, Akram Diyā'. *Madinan Society at the Time of the Prophet: The Jihād Against the Mushrikūn*. Hudā Khaṭṭāb, ed.. Vol. 2. Virginia: IIIT, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Madinan Society at the Time of the Prophet: Its Characteristics and Organization*, Hudā Khaṭṭāb, ed.. Vol. 1. Virginia: IIIT, 1992.
- al-Dhahabī, Muḥammad Ḥusain. *al-Tafsīr wa al-Mufasssirūn*. 2 Vols. Cairo: Dār Khutub al-Ḥadīthah, 1976.
- al-Fārūqī, Ismā‘īl Rājī. *Al-Tawḥīd: Its Implications for Thought and life*. Virginia: IIIT, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islam and Culture*. Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 1980.
- al-Futuh, Abu al-Maati Abu. *Sistem Pemerintahan Dalam Islam*. Md. Akhir Hj. Yaacob, tr., 2nd. print. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Affairs Division, Prime Minister's Department, 1991.
- al-Harran, Saad Abdul Sattar H. *Musharakah Financing: Concept, Principles and Methodology*. Kuala Lumpur: IKD, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islamic Banking: Managing the Challenges*. Kuala Lumpur: IKD, n.d..
- Al-Ismail, Tahia. *The Life of Muḥammad s.a.w..* Jeddah: Abul-Qasim Bookstore, 1988.
- al-Jāmī, al-Shaykh Muḥammad Āmān bin ‘Alī. *Aḍwā' Alā Ṭarīq al-Da‘wah Ilā al-Islām*. Beirūt: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1979.
- al-Miṣrī, Muḥammad Amīn. *al-Mujtama‘ al-Islāmī*. 4th. print. Kuwait: Dar al-Arqam, 1986.
- al-Sadlān, Ṣāliḥ bin Ghānim. *Ḥadīth Innama al-A‘māl bi al-Niyyāt: Dirāsah wa Takhrīj wa Dabṭ wa Ta‘līq*. Riyāḍ: Dār al-Waṭan, 1993.
- al-Saleh, Subhi. *Politik dan Pentadbiran Dalam Islam*. Osman Haji Khalid, tr., 2nd. print. Kuala Lumpur: Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam JPM, 1986.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Sistem Sosial Dan Pertahanan Dalam Islam*. Osman Hj. Khalid, tr.. Kuala Lumpur: Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam JPM, 1986.
- Alatas, Syed Farid. "Notes on Various Theories Regarding the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago". *The Muslim World*. Vol. LXXV. 1986, pp. 162-175.
- Alatas, Syed Hussein. *Modernization and Social Change*. London: Angus and Robertson (Publishers) Pty. Ltd., 1972.
- Alhabshi, Syed Othman. *An Inspiration For the Future of Islam: A Brief History and Objectives of the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia*: Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1994.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and Aidit Ghazali. ed.. *Islamic Values and Management*. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1994..
- \_\_\_\_\_ and Syed Omar Syed Agil. ed.. *The Role and Influence of Religion in Society*. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1994.
- Ali, Syed Husin. *Isu Raja dan Pindaan Perlembagaan*. Petaling Jaya: Syed Husin Ali, Februari 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Malays: Their Problems and Future*. Petaling Jaya: Longman Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., 1981.
- Ali, Hasan Hj.. "Konsep Individu Bersepadu di Dalam Kehidupan Profesional Muslim". *Seminar Tuntutan Profesionalisme Kini: Pendekatan Islam*. Islamic Consultative Bode and Ministry of Education Malaysia, 1-2 December 1986.
- Aliran Kesedaran Rakyat. *Nation on Trial*. Penang: ALIRAN, December, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Human Being: Perspectives From Different Spiritual Traditions*. Penang: ALIRAN, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Cabaran-cabaran Semasa*. Penang: ALIRAN, January, 1986.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Pandangan Aliran*. Penang: ALIRAN, February, 1985.
- Allen, Francis B.. *Socio-cultural Dynamics: An Introduction to Social Change*. New York: MacMillan, 1971.
- Ḍamīriah, °Uthmān Jama°ah. *al-Taṣawwur al-Islāmī li al-Kawn wa al-Ḥayāt wa al-Insānī*. Kuwait: Dar al-Arqam, n.d.

Amsden, Alice H.. ed.. "The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy". *World Development*. Vol. 22, No. 4. April 1994, pp. 615-661.

Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia. *ABIM Dengan Isu-isu Semasa 1990-1992*. Petaling Jaya: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Perlembagaan ABIM*. Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, n.d..

Anwar, Zainah. *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among the students*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1987.

Arberry, Arthur J.. *Revelation and Reason in Islam*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957.

Arsalan, Amir Shakib. *Our Decline and Its Causes*. M.A. Shakoor, tr., 6th. print. Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976.

Arshad, Nik Abdullah. *Ke Mana Rakyat Dibawa*. A Series of PAS Speeches in Parliament - No. 3. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, Research and Dakwah of PAS, April 1991.

Arudsothy, P.. "Malaysia". *The Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia*. Shinichi Ichimura, tr.. Honolulu: An East-West Center Book, pp. 81-128.

Hasan, ʿUthmān ʿAlī. ed.. *Qawāʿid al-Istidlāl ʿAlā Masāʾil al-ʾItiqād*. Riyadh: Dār al-Waṭan, 1993.

Asian Development Bank. "Malaysia". *Asian Development Outlook 1994*. Oxford, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 103-108.

Askari, Hasan. "Religion and Development: Search for Conceptual Clarity and New Methodology - A Special Case of Islam". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXX, No. 2. 1986, pp. 69-81.

Association of Social Scientists Malaysia. ed.. *Pembangunan Di Malaysia: Perencanaan, Perlaksanaan dan Prestasi*. Kuala Lumpur: Association of Social Scientists Malaysia, 1987.

Awang, Abdul Hadi. *Kaedah Islam dan Implikasi Perang Teluk*. A Series of PAS Speeches in Parliament - No. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, Research and Dakwah of PAS, April 1991.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Antara Wawasan dan Jumud*. Kuala Lumpur: GG Edar, Januari 1993.



- Azami, Muhammad Mustafa. *Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature*. Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1977.
- Baali, Fuad. *Society, State and Urbanism: Ibn Khaldun's Sociological Thought*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1988.
- Baba, Sidek. *The Malaysian Study Circle Movement and Some Implications for Educational Development*. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1991.
- Babeair, Abdulawahab Saleh. "The Role of the 'Ulamā' in Modern Islamic Society: An Historical Perspective". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVII, No. 2. 1993, pp. 81-94.
- Bagader, AbuBaker A.. ed.. *Islam and Sociological Perspectives*. Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1983.
- Baharuddin, Shamsul Amri. *Masyarakat Malaysia dan Alam Sosialnya*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1993.
- Bakar, Osman. *Tawhid and Science: Essays on the History and Philosophy of Islamic Science*. Kuala Lumpur: secretariat For Islamic Philosophy and Science, 1991.
- Bakar, Mohamad Abu. "Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXI, No. 10. October 1981, pp. 1040-1059.
- Baraka, Magdn. "Islam and Development From the Perspective of An Islamic thinker and a Labour Unionist: Gamal al-Banna". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXVIII, No. 3. 1984, pp. 201-215.
- Barnett, Tony. "Defining and Measuring Development". *Sociology and Development*. London: An Imprint of Century Hutchinson Ltd., 1988, pp. 173-191.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Feeling the Effect of Development". *Sociology of Development*. Hutchinson: An Imprint of Century Hutchinson Ltd., 1988.
- Barracclough, Simon. "Managing the Challenges of the Islamic Revival in Malaysia". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXIII, No. 8. August 1983, pp. 958-975.
- Basri, Ghazali. ed.. *An Integrated Education System in A Multi-Faith and Multi-cultural Country*. Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Christian Mission and Islamic Da'wah in Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise, 1990.

- Bass, Jerry. "Malaysia in 1983: A Time of Troubles". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXIV, No. 2. February 1984, pp. 167-177.
- Bastin, John and R. Roolvink. ed.. *Malayan and Indonesian Studies: Essays Presented to Sir Richard Winstedt on His Eighty-fifth Birthday*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964.
- Bayat, Assef. "The Work Ethic in Islam: A Comparison with Protestantism". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVI, No. 1. 1992, pp. 5-23.
- Benson, Steven R.. "Islam and Social Change in the Writings of 'Alī Sharī'atī: His *Hajj* as a Mystical Handbook for Revolutionaries". *The Muslim World*. Vol. LXXXI, No. 1. 1991, pp. 9-26.
- Berger, Mark T.. "The End of the Third World". *Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 15, No. 2. London: Centre for Developing Areas Studies, University of London, 1994, pp. 257-275.
- Berlin, Isaiah. *Karl Marx: His Life and Environment*. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Boestaman, Ahmad. *Sorotan Sekilas: The Malay Dilemma*. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Percetakan Polygraphic Sdn. Bhd., 1981.
- Booth, David. "Marxism and Development Sociology: Interpreting the Impasse". *World Development*. Vol. 13, No. 7. Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., July 1985, pp. 761-787.
- Browett, John. "The Newly Industrializing Countries and Radical Theories of Development". *World Development*. Vol. 13, No. 7. Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., July 1985, pp. 789-803.
- Brown, C.C.. tr.. *Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals*. Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Browne, Laurence E.. "The Conception of the Unity of God in Islam and Other Religions in the Light of Modern Science". *Islamic Culture*. Vol. XXV, Part I, Jubilee Number. January, April, July and October 1951, pp. 1-17.
- Bryman, Alan. *Quantity and Quality in Social Research*. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Bu-Rashed, Adel. "Social Inequality: A Comparison Between Marx, Weber and Islam". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXIV, No. 2. 1989, pp. 77-100.

- Bucaille, Maurice. *What is the Origin of Man?: The Answers of Science and the Holy Scriptures*. Vol. 8th. ed.. Paris: Seghers, 1982.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Qur'an and Modern Science*. Singapore: The Muslims Converts' Association of Singapore, n.d..
- Bukhsh, S. Khuda. "Islam and the Modern World". *The Moslem World*. Vol. XIX, 1929, pp. 62-69.
- Bullis, Douglas. "Rediscovering Islam at Kuala Lumpur's New Institute of Islamic Understanding". *Wings of Gold*. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia Airline System, March 1995, pp. 20-29.
- Cachia, Pierre . Alford T. Welch, ed.. "World Religions as Seen in the Light of Islam". *Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979.
- Case, William, "Malaysia in 1992: Sharp Politics, Fast Growth, and a New Regional Role". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXXIII, No. 2. February 1993, pp. 184-193.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Malaysia in 1993: Accelerating trends and Mild Resistance". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXXIV, No. 2. February 1994, pp. 119-126.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The UMNO Party Election in Malaysia: One for the Money". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXXIV, No. 10. October 1994, pp. 916-930.
- Chambers, Robert. *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*. New York: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1991.
- Chan, C.K.. "Development Re-defined? Economics As If Ecology Mattered". *Aliran Monthly*. Vol. 13, No. 12. ALIRAN, 1993, pp. 33-35.
- Cheek, Ahmad Shabery. ed.. *Cabaran Malaysia Tahun Lapan Puluhan*. Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1989.
- Chik, Sabaruddin. "Strategi Pembiayaan Projek-projek Rancangan Malaysia Kelima". *Rancangan Malaysia Kelima*. Mohd. Haflah Piei and Chamhuri Simar, ed.. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1989, pp. 30-34.
- Coatalen, Paul. "The Coming of Islam to S.E. Asia: A Critical Review of Some Extant Theories". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXV, No. 3 & 4. 1981, pp. 100-119.

- Consumers' Association of Penang. *Rural Malaysia: Poverty, Basic Needs Problems and Policy Proposals*. Penang: Consumers' Association of Penang, 1990.
- Corbridge, Stuart. "Post-Marxism and Development Studies: Beyond the Impasse". *World Development*. Vol. 18, No. 5. Oxford: Pergamon Press Plc., , pp. 623-639.
- Cotgrove, Stephen. *The Science of Society*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967.
- Coulson, N.J.. *A History of Islamic Law*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1964.
- Court, Thjis de la. "Towards Sustainable Development". *Beyond Brundtland*. Ed Bayens and Nigel Harle, tr.. London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., pp. 9-27.
- Cowan, J.Milton. ed.. *Arabic-English Dictionary: The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. Vol. 3rd. ed.. New York: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 1976.
- Cuba, Lee , John Cocking. *How to Write About the Social Sciences*. London: Harper Collin Publishers, 1994.
- Cuba, Lee. *A Short Guide to Writing About Social Science*. 2nd. ed.. Harper Collins College Publishers, 1993.
- Cushman, J.W. A.C. Milner. "Eighteenth and Nineteenth-century Chinese Accounts of the Malay Peninsular". *JMBRAS*. Vol. 52, Part I. 1979, pp. 1-53.
- Dabla, Basheer Ahmad. "Sociology of Islam: Shariati's Viewpoint". *The Islamic Culture*. Vol. LVII, No. 4. October 1983, pp. 277-282.
- Darul Arqam. *Profile: Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad - His Mind & Struggle*. Kuala Lumpur: Darul Arqam, n.d..
- Daud, Wan Mohd. Nor Wan. *The Beacon on the Crest of A Hill: A Brief History and Philosophy of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization*. Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Concept of Knowledge in Islam and Its Implication for Education in a Developing Country*. London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1989.
- Daud, Fatimah. *Pengenalan Teori-teori Sosiologi*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1992.

- Davis, Kingsley. *Human Society*. New York: MacMillan, 1974.
- Dawood, N.J.. *The Koran*. 5th ed.. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1990.
- Denffer, Ahmad von. *‘Ulūm al-Qur’ān: An Introduction to the Sciences of the Qur’ān*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1989.
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN). *Popular Participation in Development: Emerging Trends in Community Development*. New York: United Nations, 1971.
- Deraman, Abdul Aziz. *Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Malaysia*. Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1990.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Peranan Kebudayaan di Dalam Pembentukan Masyarakat Malaysia*. Vol. 4. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Falsafah dan Pemikiran Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan*. Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Pembangunan Kebudayaan: Kenapa Satu Kemestian*. Vol. 2. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Tamadun Melayu Dan Pembinaan Bangsa Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Arena Ilmu Sdn. Bhd., March 1992.
- Desai, A.R.. "Need for Revaluation of the Concept". *Essays on Modernization of Underdeveloped Societies*, ed. A.R. Desai. Vol. 1. Bombay: Thacker and Co. Ltd, 1971, pp. 458-474.
- Dhaouadi, Mahmud. "An Exploration into Ibn Khaldun and Western Classical Sociologists' Thought on the Dynamics of Change". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXX, No. 3. 1986, pp. 139-266.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "An Interpretation of the Implications of Human Nature for Ibn Khaldun's Thinking". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXII, No. 4. 1988, pp. 5-20.
- Din, Kadir H.. ed.. *Development and the Muslims*. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1993.
- Dixon, Beverly R., Gary D. Bouma and G.B.J. Atkinson. *A Handbook of Social Science Research: A Comprehensive and Practical Guide for Students*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Doi, 'Abdul Raḥmān I.. *Non-Muslims Under Sharī'ah*. 5th. print. Kuala Lumpur: A.S. Noordeen, 1990.

Drummond, Stuart , David Hawkins. "The Malaysian Elections of 1969: An Analysis of the Campaign and the Results". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXI, No. 10. October 1981, pp. 320-335.

Eaton, Hasan Gai. "A Review of *Islam, Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future*". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXX, No. 1. 1986, pp. 65-68.

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. "Malaysia". *Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 1993*. Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the United Kingdoms, 1993, pp. 238-253.

Edari, Ronald. *Social Change*. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1976.

Eisenstadt, S.N.. "The Problem of Modernization in Sociological Study". *Tradition, Change and Modernity*. New York, Sydney and Toronto: John Willey and Son, 1973, pp. 3-21.

El-Ezabi, Y.A. , A.S. Hornby and E.C. Parnwell. *English Arabic Reader's Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

el-Muhammady, Abd. Halim. ed.. *Pendidikan Islam: Peranannya Dalam Pembangunan Ummah*. Bangi: Persatuan Bekas Mahasiswa Islam Timur Tengah, 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Pendidikan Islam: Falsafah Disiplin dan Peranan Pendidik*. Petaling Jaya: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991.

el-Nagar, Ahmed Abdel Aziz, Mohamed Samir Ibrahim and Mahmud Mo'man al-Ansari. *100 Soal Jawab Bank Islam*. Mohd. Dziyauddin Hj. Ahmad, tr.. Kuala Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise, 1984.

Esposito, John L.. "Islamic Fundamentalism". *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia Knowledge in Depth*, 15th. ed.. Vol. 22. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1994, pp. 377-378.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Islam: The Straight Path*. Expanded Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Etzioni-Helevy, Eva. *Social Change: The Advent and Maturation of Modern Society*. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.



- Evers, Hans-Dieter. ed.. *Modernization in Southeast Asia*. Singapore and Kuala Lumpur; Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Fadil, Siddiq. *Tradisi Kesultanan: Perspektif Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kajian Dasar, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Faktor-Faktor Penerimaan Masyarakat Melayu Terhadap Islam". A paper presented at conference on Islamic Resurgence: Issues and Perspectives. Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Students Association, 13-14 December 1986, pp. 1-4.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kepemimpinan Melayu Era Perubahan*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kajian Dasar, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Gerakan Islam Dekad 90an: Visi dan Strategi*. Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Mengangkat Martabat Umat: Koleksi Ucapan Dasar Muktamar Sanawi ABIM*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Minda Melayu Baru*. Kuala Lumpur: IKD, 1992.
- Fatimi, S.Q.. *Islam Comes to Malaya*. Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Limited, 1963.
- Firzly, George S.. *Ibn Khaldun: A Socio-economic Study*. Ph.D Dissertation, University of Utah, March 1973.
- Foster-Carter, Aidan. *The Sociology of Development*. Lancashire: Causeway Press Ltd., 1986.
- Gabriel, Jurg Martin. *Worldviews and Theories of International Relations*. New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1994.
- Gagliano, Felix V.. *Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath*. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies Southeast Asia Program, 1970.
- Garaudy, Roger. "The Balance Sheet of Western Philosophy in This Century". A paper presented at the Third Seminar on Islamic Thought organised by Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in Kuala Lumpur on 26-31 July 1984.
- Garner, Robert Ash. "Imperialism and Underdevelopment". *Social Change*. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1979, pp. 358-412.
- Gazalba, Sidi. *Islam dan Perubahan Sosiobudaya: Kajian Islam Tentang Perubahan Masyarakat*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Pustaka Antara, 1983.

Gerth, Hans , C. Wright Mills. *Character and Social Structure*. New York: Harcourt, 1953.

Ghafour, P.K. Abdul. "ABIM Becomes Malaysia's Main Da'wa Organization". *Islamic Review*. Vol. 3, No. 1. Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, October 1993.

Ghazali, Aidit. *Development: An Islamic Perspective*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1990.

\_\_\_\_\_. ed.. *Industrialization From An Islamic Perspective*. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia, 1993.

\_\_\_\_\_. ed.. *Islam and Justice*. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1993.

Ginsberg, Morris. "Social Change". *British Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 4, No. 1958, pp. 205-229.

Glewwe, Paul , Jacques van der Gaag. "Identifying the Poor in Developing Countries: Do Different Definitions Matter?". *World Development*. Vol. 18, No. 6. Oxford: Pergamon Press Plc., 1990, pp. 803-814.

Goldthrope, J.E.. "Religion and Economic Development: Cause and Effect". *The Sociology of the Third World: Disparaty and Development*. 2nd. ed.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Colonial Episode and the Race Question". *The Sociology of the Third World: Disparity and Development*. Vol. 2nd. ed.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Golshani, Mehdi. "Philosophy of Science from the Islamic Perspective". *Towards Islamization of Disciplines*. Herndon, Virginia: IIIT, 1989.

Grabowski, Richard. "The Successful Developmental State: Where Does It Come From?". *World Development*. Vol. 22, No. 3. Oxford: Pergamon Press LTd., March 1994, pp. 413-422.

Gullick, J.M.. "Law and the Adat Perpatih: A Problem from Jelebu". *JMBRAS*. Vol. 54, No. Part 1. 1981, pp. 7-20.

Halepota, A.J.. "Islamic Social Order: A Study Based on Sūra al-Naḥl". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. XIV. 1975, pp. 115-122.

Hambling, Christian , Pauline Matthews. *Human Society*. London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1979.

- Hamid, Isma'īl. "A Survey of Theories on the Introduction of Islam in the Malay Archipelago". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. XXI, No. 3, 1982, pp. 89-100.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Islamic Influence on Malay Culture in Malaysia and Indonesia". *The Islamic Culture*. Vol. LVI, No. 4. October 1982, pp. 275-282.
- Hamilton, Malcolm B.. *The Sociology of Religion: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Hamzah, BA and Mustafa Mohamed Najimudin. *Pembangunan di Asia Tenggara: Cabarannya*. Kuala Lumpur: ISIS, n.d..
- Haralambos, Michael. ed.. *Sociology: A New Approach*. Lancashire Causeway Press Limited, 1993.
- Haras, Muḥammad Khalīl. *Sharḥ al-ʿAqīdah al-Wāsiṭiyyah Li Shaykh al-Islām ibn Taymiyyah*. Jeddah: Dār al-Madani, n.d..
- Harun, Yusof. *Tunku: Idealisme Dalam Kenangan*. Penang: Yayasan Bumiputra Pulau Pinang, 1991.
- Hasan, Ahmad. "The Sources of Islamic Law". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. VII, No. 2. June 1968, pp. 165-184.
- Hasan, ʿUthmān ʿAlī. ed.. *Qawā'id al-Istidlāl ʿAla Masā'il al-ʿItiqād*. Riyadh: Dār al-Waṭan, 1993.
- Hassan, Mohd. Affandi. *The Tawhidic Approach in Management and Public Administration: Concepts, Principles and An Alternative Model*. Kuala Lumpur: National Institute of Public Administration, 1992.
- Hassan, Muhammad Kamal. *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1982.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Pendidikan dan Pembangunan: Satu Perspektif Bersepadu*, Zambry Abd. Kadir, ed.. Kuala Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Moral and Ethical Issues in Human Resource Development: Old Problems and New Challenges*. Kuala Lumpur: IKD, n.d..
- Hasyim, Ibnu. *PAS Kuasai Malaysia: 1950-2000 Sejarah Kebangkitan dan Masa Depan*. Kuala Lumpur: GG Edar, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Konflik UMNO-PAS: Satu Penyelesaian Menurut Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: GG Edar, 1993.

- Hock, Oo Yu. *Ethnic Chameleon: Multiracial Politics in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1991.
- Hoogvelt, Ankie M.M.. "Theories of Social Evolution: Old and New". *The Sociology of Developing Societies*. 2nd. ed.. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978, pp. 11-19.
- Hoong, Khong Kim. "Malaysia-Japan Relations in the 1980s". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXVII, No. 10. October 1987, pp. 1095-1108.
- Hornby, A.s.. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Hourani, George F.. "The Dialogue Between al-Ghazzali and the Philosophers on the Origin of the World". *The Muslim World*. Vol. XLVIII, No. 2. October 1958, pp. 308-314.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Reason and Revelation in Ibn Hazm's Ethical Thought". *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, Parviz Morewedge, ed.. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979, pp. 142-148.
- Howard, Michael C.. *Contemporary Cultural Anthropology*. Simon Fraser, USA: Simon Fraser University, 1989.
- Hussain, Admad Atory. *Pentadbiran dan Politik Pembangunan: Satu Analisis Terhadap Pembangunan Masyarakat di Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Politik Dan Dasar Awam Malaysia*. 2nd. ed.. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1992.
- Hussain, Mohammed Yusoff. "Al-Ash'arī's Doctrine of Human Actions". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVI, No. 2. 1992, pp. 75-83.
- Hussein, Ismail, Aziz Deraman and Abd. Rahman Al-Ahmadi. ed.. *Tamadun Melayu*. Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1989.
- Hussin, Abdul Aziz. *Institusi Raja*. Kota Bharu, Kelantan: Dian Darulnaim Sdn. Bhd., 1992.
- Ibrahim, Ahmad. "The Administration of Islamic Financial Institution". *Syariah Law Journal*. Vol. 7. Petaling Jaya: IIUM, September 1991, pp. 13-28.
- Ibrahim, Anwar. *Menangani Perubahan*. Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn. Bhd., 1989.

- Ibrahim, Ahmad. "The Shariah and Codification: Malaysia Experience". *Syariah Law Journal*. Vol. 4. Petaling Jaya: IIUM, January 1987, pp. 47-61.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islamic Law in Malaya*, Shirle Gordon, ed.. Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd., 1965.
- Ichimura, Shinichi. ed.. *The Economic Development of East and Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: An East-West Center Book, 1975.
- Idris, Taufiq H.. *Mengenai Kebudayaan Islam*. Surabaya: Pt Bina Ilmu, 1983.
- Idris, Gaafar Sheikh. *The Process of Islamization*. Brentwood, Maryland: The MSA of the U.S. and Canada, 1983.
- Idris, S.M. Mohamed. *Malaysian Consumers and Development*. 3rd. Print. Penang: Consumer's Association of Penang, 1992.
- IIUM. *Tenth Anniversary Corporate Report 1992/1993*. Petaling Jaya, Selangor: IIUM, 1994.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *IIUM Undergraduate Prospectus 1992/93*. Petaling Jaya, Selangor: IIUM, 1992.
- Imam, S.M.A.. *Some Aspects of Ibn Khaldun's Socio-political Analysis of History: A Critical Appreciation*. 2nd. ed.. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1988.
- Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia. *Jurnal IKIM*. Vol. 2, No. 1. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, January/June, 1994.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Jurnal IKIM*. Vol. 1, No.1. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, Julai/Disember, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kongress Menjelang Abad 21: Islam dan Wawasan 2020*. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kefahaman Orang Bukan Islam Tentang Islam: Kesannya Terhadap Peningkatan Syiar Islam di Malaysia*. SIBKI 1. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 16 January 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kefahaman Orang-orang Bukan Islam Tentang Islam Dan Pembangunan Imej Islam*. SIBKI 2. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1993.
- Institute of Strategic and International Studies. *Malaysia: Past, Present and Future*. Kuala Lumpur: ISIS, 1987.

International Monetary Fund, "Developing Countries". *World Economic Outlook*. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, May 1992.

International Law Book Services. *Federal Constitution*. Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services, 1990.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Malaysia Kita: Panduan dan Rujukan Untuk peperiksaan Am Kerajaan*. Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services, n.d..

Ishak, Mohd. Sidin, Salihudin Saidin and Zubaidah Ahmad Ishak. ed.. *Pengajian Am I: Kenegaraan Malaysia*. 3rd. ed.. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Elman, 1991.

Islamic Affairs Division, Prime Minister's Department. *Risalah Penerangan Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Prime Minister's Department, n.d..

\_\_\_\_\_. "Transkripsi Dari Kaset Suara Ashaari Muhammad: Dialog Ashaari Muhammad Dengan Syeikh Suhaime dan Dialog Ashaari Muhammad Dengan Rasulullah". Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Affairs Division, Prime Minister's Department, July 1994.

Ismail, Engku Ibrahim Engku, and Osman Bakar. ed.. *Bibliografi Manuskrip Islam di Muzium Islam Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Akademi Pengajian Melayu Universiti Malaya and Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1992.

Ismail, Yusof. ed.. *Muslim Women in Organizations: A Malaysian Perspective*. Kuala Lumpur: A.S. Noordeen, January 1994.

Ismail, A. Ghany. *Muzakarah UMNO dan PAS*. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Islam Sdn. Bhd., 1987.

Ismail, Abdul Halim. "Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad; Establishment and Operation", A paper presented at a Conference on Islam and Technology at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur in December 1985.

ISTAC. *ISTAC Program of Graduate Studies 1993-1995*. Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, n.d..

Jaafar, Kamarudin and Hazami Habib. ed.. *Wawasan 2020*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kajian Dasar, 1993.

Jabnoun, Naceur. *Basic Concepts of Management in Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kajian Dasar, n.d..



- Jaffar, Kamarudin. *Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy: Politik Melayu dan Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Anda Sdn. Bhd., 1980.
- Jalaluddin, Abul Khair Mohd.. *The Role of Government in an Islamic Economy*. Kuala Lumpur: A.S. Noordeen, 1991.
- Jalaludin, Jurij Hj., Mahayudin Hj. Yahya, Nik Azis Nik Pa et.al.. ed.. *Wawasan 2020: Aspek Politik dan Sosial*. Kuala Lumpur: Arena Ilmu Sdn. Bhd., November 1991.
- Jalil, Khailani Abdul and Ishak Ali Shah. ed.. *Pendidikan Islam Era 2020: Tasawur dan Strategi*. Petaling Jaya: Jabatan Pendidikan MPI, 1993.
- Jameelah, Maryam. *Islam and Western Society*. 2nd. ed.. Lahore: Khan Mohammad Yusuf, July 1978.
- Johari, Mohd. Yaakub Hj.. ed.. *Socio-cultural Dimension of Development Planning*. Kota Kinabalu: Institute For Development Studies (Sabah), 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ed.. *Regional Development in Malaysia: Issues and Challenges*. Kota Kinabalu: Institute for Development Studies (Sabah) and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1992.
- Johnson, Harry M.. *Sociology: A Systematic Introduction*. New York: Harcourt, 1960.
- Jusuh, Abdullah. *Pengenalan Tamadun Islam Di Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1989.
- Kamali, Mohamad Hashim. *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*. Cambridge: Islamic Text Society, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Characteristics of the Islamic State". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. 32, No. 1. 1993, pp. 17-40.
- Karim, Mohammed Azhari, Llewellyn D. Howel, Grace Okuda. ed.. *Malaysian Foreign Policy: Issues and Perspectives*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Tadbiran Awam Negara Malaysia, 1980.
- Karim, Wazir Jahan. *Women and Culture: Between Malay Adat and Islam*. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1992.
- Kasimin, Amran. *Masalah Sosial Dan Hubungannya Dengan Didikan Agama*. Kuala Lumpur: Dinie Publishers, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Agama Dan Perubahan Sosial Di Kalangan Penduduk Asli Di Semenanjung Tanah Melayu*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1993.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Religion and Social Change Among the Indigenous People of the Malay Peninsula*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1991.
- Kelantan Economic Planning Unit. "Pelaksanaan Pentadbiran Secara Islam di Negeri Kelantan". Kota Bharu: UPEN, February 1994.
- Khaldūn, Ibn. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. 3 Vols.. Franz Rosenthal, tr.. New York: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Khalil, 'Imād al-Dīn. *Islamization of Knowledge: A Methodology*. Vol. 2. Virginia: IIIT, 1991.
- Khan, Mohsin S.. "An International Seminar on the Holy Qur'ān". *The Islamic Culture*. Vol. LVIII, No. 2.. 1984, pp. 171-177.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and Abbas Mirakhor. "Islamic Banking: Experiences in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Pakistan". *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. Vol. 38, No. 2. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, January 1990, pp. 353-375.
- Khashshān, 'Alī. *Wujūb al-Rujū' ilā al-Kitāb wa al-Sunnah wa Khaṭar al-Taqlīd*. Dār ibn al-Qayyim, 1993.
- Khoon, Tan Chee. *The Monarchy in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 15th May 1984.
- Kiat, Kok Wee, Ling Liong Sik, Fong Chan Onn, Chua Jui Meng and Michael Yeoh. *The Malaysian Challenges in the 1990s - Strategies for Growth and Development*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd. and Malaysian Chinese Association, 1990.
- Kim, Khoo Kay. "Islam and Economic Development in Malaysia: A Historical Perspective". A paper presented at the International Seminar on *Islam and Development in Southeast Asia* organised by Akademi Pengajian Melayu and Akademi Islam in Kuala Lumpur from 25-26 September 1991.
- Kirmani, M. Zaki. *Western Civilisation: Its Impact on Individual, Society and Knowledge*. Aligarh: Nai Naslen Publications, 1983.
- Ks, Gurmit Singh. *Malaysian Societies: Friendly or Political*. Petaling Jaya: Selangor Graduates Society, 1984.
- Lambry, Mohamed Salleh , Hasan Mat Nor. ed.. *Masyarakat dan Perubahan*. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1993.

- Landis, Judson R.. *Sociology: Concepts and Characteristics*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1974.
- Lapidus, Ira M.. "British Malaya and Independent Malaysia". *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 776-783.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia". *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Lapiera, Richard T.. "Theories of Social Change". *Social Change*. New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965, pp. 1-39.
- Lauer, Robert H.. *Perspectives of Social Change*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1982.
- Lawrence, Bruce B.. "Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Reform". *Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology*, Bruce B. Lawrence, ed.. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984, pp. 2-13 and 69-88.
- Layla, Muhammad Abū. "The Qur'ān: Nature, Authenticity, Authority and Influence on the Muslim Mind". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, 1992, pp. 227-241.
- Lee, David , Howard Newby. *The Problem of Sociology: An Introduction to the Discipline*. London: Hutchinson, 1985.
- Lee, Goh Ban. *Urban Planning in Malaysia: History, Assumptions and Issues*. Petaling Jaya: Tempo Publishing (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1991.
- Leong, Stephen. "The Chinese in Malaya and China's Politics 1895-1911". *JMBRAS*. Vol. 50, No. Part 2. 1977, pp. 7-24.
- Leong, Stephen. "Malaysia and the People's Republic of China in the 1980s". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXVII, No. 10. October 1987, pp. 1109-1126.
- Lim, David. "Malaysian Social and Economic Development Strategies for the 1980s". *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific*. Vol. XXXI, No. 2. Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the United Nations, 1981, pp. 54-76.
- Limqueco, Peter and Bruce McFarlane. ed.. *Neo-Marxist Theories of Development*. London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin and Reinhard Bendix. *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.

- MacDonald, John. "The Creation of Man and Angels in the Eschatological Literature". *Islamic Culture*. Vol. III, No. 3. September 1964, pp. 285-308.
- Machado, Kit G.. "Malaysian Cultural Relations with Japan and South Korea in the 1980s: Looking East". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXVII, No. 6, June 1987, pp. 638-660.
- MacIver, R.M. , Charles H. Page. *Society: An Introductory Analysis*. London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1950.
- Mackeen, Abdul Majid. "The Revelational Criteria in Islamic Thought". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXX, No. 1. 1986, 45-53.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Contemporary Islamic Legal Organization in Malaya*. Yale, New Haven: Yale University South East Asian Studies, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Some Thoughts on the Meaning of "Following the Sunnah"". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, 3rd. Quarter 1984, pp. 241-249.
- Macleish, Martin , Kris Szaniawski. ed.. *The Commonwealth Minister Reference Book 1991/1992*. London: Kensington Publications Limited in conjunction with the Commonwealth Secretariat, n.d..
- Mahbob, Sulaiman. ed.. *Issues in Recent Malaysian Economic Growth*. Kuala Lumpur: Arena Ilmu Sdn. Bhd., July 1992.
- Mahmassani, S.. *Falsafat al-Tashrīf fī al-Islām*. Farhat J. Ziadeh, tr.. Shah Alam, Selangor: Penerbitan Hizbi, 1987.
- Mahmood, Rohana , Thangam Ramnath. ed.. *Southeast Asia: The Way Forward*. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, January, 1992.
- Mahmood, Wan Mohd. Jamil. *Pembangunan Mesti Berkat*. A Series of PAS Speeches in Parliament - No. 6. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, Research and Dakwah of PAS, April 1991.
- Mahmood, Ibrahim. *Kenali Budaya Islam- Siri Suara PAS di Parlimen*. Vol. 5. Jabatan Penerangan, Penyelidikan dan Dakwah PAS Pusat, April 1991.
- Majid, Rosnah. *Koleksi Temuramah Khas Tokoh-tokoh*. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributions Sdn. Bhd., 1985.

- Majid, Zuraina. ed.. *Masyarakat Malaysia: Tinjauan dan Perbincangan Terhadap Beberapa Isu dan Topik Semasa*. Penang: Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1985.
- Mamat, Razak, Muhammad Zakaria. *Fakta dan Maklumat Kenegaraan Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Longman Malaysia, n.d..
- Mann, Michael. ed.. *MacMillan Student Encyclopedia of Sociology*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1992.
- Mannan, M.A.. *Economic Development and Social Peace in Islam*. London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd., 1989.
- Manuty, Muhammad Nur. *Memperteguh Khittah Perjuangan Menghadapi Era Perubahan*. Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Perceptions of Social Change: The Role of ABIM and Its Impact on Malaysian Society*. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Temple University, 1990.
- Marrison, G.E.. "Persian Influences in Malay Life". *JMBRAS*. Vol. 28, No. 169 Part 1. 1955, pp. 52-69.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Early Cham Language, and Its Relationship to Malay". *JMBRAS*. Vol. 48, Part 2. 1975, pp. 52-59.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Marican & Sons (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1983.
- Mazhar, Muhammad Yasin. *Organisasi Kerajaan Pimpinan Rasulullah*. Khalil Mohd. Zain and Md. Yunus Md. Said, tr.. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1993.
- MCA Headquarters. *Malaysian Chinese Association: The Way Ahead - New Commitment on Key Issues (A Compilation of Speeches on Key Issues by MCA Leaders)*. Kuala Lumpur: MCA Headquarters, May 1986.
- MCA Federal Territory Research and Service Centre. *The Malaysian Chinese: Towards National Unity*. Kuala Lumpur: MCA Federal Territory Research and Service Centre, 1982.
- McLeish, John. "Theories of Social Change: A Comparative Analysis". *The Theory of Social Change: Four Views Considered*. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1969, pp. 70-90.
- Means, Gordon P.. *Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Malaysia: Islam in a Pluralistic Society". *Religion and Society: Asia and the Middle East*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1982.
- Mehden, Fred R. von der. "Malaysia in 1981: Continuity and Change". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXII, No. 2. February 1982, pp. 212-225.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Religion and Modernization in Southeast Asia*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Political and Social Challenge of Islamic Revival in Malaysia and Indonesia". *The Muslim World*. Vol. LXXVI, No. 3-4. July/October 1986, pp. 219-233.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Malaysia in 1990: Another Electoral Victory". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXXI, No. 2. February 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Political and Social Challenge of the Islamic Revival in Malaysia and Indonesia". *The Muslim World*. Vol. LXXVI. 1986, pp. 219-233.
- Mehmet, Ozay. "Malaysian Employment Restructuring Policies: Effectiveness and Prospects Under the Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1980-85". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXII, No. 10. October 1982.
- Mills, Lennox A.. *Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.
- Milner, A.C.. "Islam and Malay Kingship". *JRAS*. London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1981, pp. 46-70.
- Minda Syeikhul Arqam Publication Unit. *25 Years of Darul Arqam: The Struggle of Abuya Sheikh Imam Ashaari Muhammad At-tamimi*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Abuya, 1993.
- Ministry of Culture and Tourism. *Kepimpinan dan Pengajian Budaya*. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Kajian Interdisiplin Tentang Alam Melayu". *Jurnal Budaya*. Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, December 1989.
- Ministry of Education Malaysia. *Perangkaan Pendidikan di Malaysia 1991 (Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1991)*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Laporan Jawatankuasa Kabinet Mengkaji Pelaksanaan Dasar Pelajaran*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1982.



- Mirza, Muhammad R., Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi. ed.. *Muslim Contribution To Science*. Lahore: Kazi Publications, April 1986.
- Modern Humanities Research Association. *MHRA Style Book: Notes for Authors, Editors and Writers of Theses*. London: MHRA, 1991.
- Mohamad, Alias. *Malaysia's Islamic Opposition: Past, Present and Future*. Kuala Lumpur: Gateway Publishing House, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kepimpinan Demokrasi Dan Tradisi*. Kuala Lumpur: AMW Communications Management, 1984.
- Mohamed, Hussain. *Gerakan Belia Di Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Gateway Publishing House Sdn. Bhd., 1986.
- Moore, Wilbert E.. *Social Change*. Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
- Morais, J. Victor. *Hussein Onn: A Tryst With Destiny*. Singapore: Times Books International, 1981.
- Moussalli, Ahmad S.. "The Views of Islamic Fundamentalism on Epistemology and Political Philosophy". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVII, No. 3. 1993, pp. 175-189.
- Muhammad, Nizal. "The Essence of Da'wah Bil Hal". *Islamic Review*. Vol. 1, No. January/February 1994, pp. 20-21.
- Muhammad, Ashaari. *Meninjau Sistem Pemerintahan Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Asoib International Limited, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Falsafah Perlaksanaan Hukum Hudud Dalam Masyarakat*. Kuala Lumpur: Asoib International Limited, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Pendidikan Rasulullah, Khadijah AAm*, ed.. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Syeikhul Arqam, 1990.
- Muhammad, Abdul Aziz. *Human and Institutional Capacity to Achive National Development: The Malaysian Approach*. Kuala Lumpur: IKD, 1992.
- Muhammady, Abdul Halim. "Prinsip-prinsip Utama Dalam Pembentukan Tamadun Islam". *Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia*, 22/3/1988, pp. 1-13.
- Muhibbu-din, M.A.. "Ideal Moral and Spiritual Guidance in A Multi-Religious State (Nigeria): An Islamic Approach". *Islamic Culture*. Vol. LXVIII, No. 1. January 1994, pp. 57-70.

- Mukmin, Mohd. Jamil. *Melaka Pusat Penyebaran Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise, 1994.
- Mullick, M.A. Hussein. "The Challenge of Modern Development Before the Muslim World - Considered in the Light of European and Islamic Cultural History". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. VI, No. 3. September 1967, pp. 225-240.
- Muslehuddin, Mohammad. *Sociology and Islam: A Comparative Study of Islam and Its Social System*. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., Julu 1977.
- Mutalib, Hussin. *Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Islamic Revivalism in Asean States: Political Implication". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXX, No. 9. September 1990, pp. 877-891.
- Muzaffar, Chandra. *The NEP: Development and Alternative Consciousness*. Penang: Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN), 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Challenges and Choices in Malaysian Politics and Society*. Penang: Aliran Kesedaran Rakyat, September, 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Human Rights and the New World Order*. Penang: Just World Trust, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1987.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Islamic Resurgence: A Global View". *Challenges and Choices in Malaysian Politics and Society*. Penang: ALIRAN, September 1989, pp. 346-387.
- Nadwi, Abul Hasan Ali. *Religion and Civilization*. Muhiuddin Ahmad, tr., 4th. ed.. Lucknow: Islamic Research and Publication Academy, 1980.
- Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. "Islamization of Knowledge: A Critical Review". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. 30, No. 3. 1991, pp. 287-400.
- Nawawi, Razali Hj.. "The Administration of Islamic Financial Institutions: Malaysia's Experience". *Syariah Law Journal*. Vol. 7. Petaling Jaya: IIUM, September 1991, pp. 1-12.
- Nawawi, Mohd. Noor. "Islam in Malaysia". A paper presented at a seminar on *Gerakan Islam di Dunia Melayu* organised by ABIM in Kuala Lumpur on 6 December 1986, pp. 1-21.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Undang-Undang Islam, Masyarakat Majmuk dan Hubungan Etnik di Malaysia". *Sarjana*. Vol. 4. Kuala Lumpur: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences UM, 1989, pp. 139-148.
- Newbold, T.J.. *British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*. Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur & Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Nisbet, Robert. *Social Change: Key Concepts in the Social Sciences*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972.
- Noordin, Wan Mohd. Zahid Mohd.. *Wawasan Pendidikan: Agenda Pengisian*. Kuala Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise, 1993.
- Noordin, Tajul Ariffin. *Perspektif, Falsafah dan Pendidikan di Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and Nor Aini Dan. *Pendidikan Dan Wawasan 2020: Falsafah, Perguruan dan Persekolahan*. Kuala Lumpur: Arena Ilmu (M) Sdn. Bhd., Februari 1992.
- Nordin, Abu Bakar. ed.. *Reformasi Pendidikan Dalam Menghadapi Cabaran*. Kuala Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise, 1994.
- NSTP Research and Information Services. *Elections in Malaysia: A Handbook of Facts and Figures on the Elections 1955-1986*. Kuala Lumpur: Balai Berita, 1990.
- O'Donnell, Mike. *A New Introduction to Sociology*. London: Harap Limited, 1981.
- Olayiwola, Abdur Rahman O.. "Democracy in Islam". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVII, No. 3. 1993, pp. 190-205.
- Omar, Asmah Haji. *Malay in Its Socio-cultural Context*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1987.
- Ongkili, James P.. *Nation-building in Malaysia 1946-1974*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Othman, Faisal Haji. "Permasalahan Pemikiran Semasa Umat Islam Malaysia". A working paper presented at International Symposium on *Wawasan Islam Menjelang Abad Ke-21* organised by ABIM, 16-17 August 1991, pp. 1-10.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Woman, Islam and Nation Building*. Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1993.
- Ott, Martin C.. "Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XII, No. 3. March 1971, pp. 225-239.

- Parkinson, Brien K.. "Non-Economic Factors in the Economic Retardation of the Rural Malays". *Modern Asian Studies*. Vol. 1, No. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, pp. 31-46.
- Peh, Ting Chew, Chua Yee Yen. "Keberkesanan Dasar Ekonomi Baru Dalam Menyusun Semula Masyarakat dan Mencapai Perpaduan Negara". *Rancangan Malaysia Kelima*. Mohd. Haflah Piei and Chamhuri Simar, ed.. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1989, pp. 140-158.
- Piei, Mohd. Haflah. "Strategi-strategi Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Dalam Rancangan Malaysia Kelima". *Rancangan Malaysia Kelima*. Mohd. Haflah Piei and Chamhuri Simar, ed. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1989, pp. 20-28.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Sejarah Ringkas Perancangan dan Pembangunan Sosioekonomi Malaysia". *Rancangan Malaysia Kelima*. Mohd. Haflah Piei and Chamhuri Simar, ed. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1989, pp. 9-19.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Perkembangan Terakhir Ekonomi Malaysia". *Malaysia: Isu-isu Pembangunan*. Mohd. Haflah Piei, ed.. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1987, pp. 228-281.
- Pilgrim's Management and Fund Board. *Tabung Haji 25 Tahun*. Kuala Lumpur: LUTH, n.d..
- Pottier, Johan. ed.. *Practising Development: Social Science Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Prendergast, Renee , H.W. Singer. "Introduction: Development Perspectives for the 1990s". *Development Perspectives for the 1990s*, Renee Prendergast, ed.. London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991, pp. xvii-xxiv.
- Putra, Tunku Abdul Rahman. *May 13: Before and After*. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press Limited, October 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Malaysia: The Road To Independence*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1984.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Sudut Pandangan*. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Challenging Times*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1986.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Looking Back*. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977.
- Qardawi, Yusof. *Kedudukan Non-Muslim Dalam Negara Islam*. Mat Saat Abd. Rahman, tr., 3rd. ed.. Shah Alam: Penerbitan Hizbi, 1989.
- Rahim, Rohani Abdul. *Muslim in Indonesia and the Notion of An Islamic State*. Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1991.
- Rahman, Fazlur. "The Qur'anic Concept of God, the Universe and Man". *The Islamic Studies*. Vol. VI, No. 1. March 1967, pp. 1-19.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Status of the Individual in Islam". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. V, No. 4. International Islamic University, December 1966, pp. 319-330.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Concepts of *Sunnah*, *Ijtihād* and *Ijmā'* in the Early Period". *The Islamic Studies*. No. 1. March 1962.
- Rahman, Ahmad Tajuddin Abdul. "Peranan Bank Islam Terhadap Usahawan Muslimin di Malaysia". A paper presented at *Seminar Usahawan Muslimin Peringkat Kebangsaan* organised by Persatuan Ulama Malaysia from 11-13th September 1987.
- Rahman, Ismail Ab.. ed.. *Pendidikan Islam Malaysia*. Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1993.
- Rahman, Ahmad Faiz Abdul. ed.. *Heaven and Earth: The Human Factor*. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1994.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ed.. *Ke Arah Negara Maju Berdasar Sistem Nilai*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia, 1993.
- Ramli, Wan Azmi. *Dasar Sosial Di Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Golden Books Centre Sdn. Bhd., 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Pembangunan Masyarakat Dari Perspektif Kebajikan*. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributions Sdn. Bhd., 1992.
- Rao, V.V. Bhanoji. *Malaysia: Development Pattern and Policy 1947-1971*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980.
- Ratnam, K.J.. "Religion and Politics in Malaya". *Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia*, ed. Robert O. Tilman. London: Pall Mall Press, 1969, pp. 351-361.

- Rauf, Muhammad Abdul. "Revelation and Reason", a paper presented at Seminar Pemikiran Islam organized by Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam JPM on 9-11 October 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *A Brief History of Islam With Special Reference to Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Rawa, Haji Yusuf. "Ke Arah Tajdid Hadari". A presidential speech delivered at the 33th PAS AGM". 10 April 1987.
- Reader's Digest. "Malaysia". *Reader's Digest Guide to Places of the World - A geographical Dictionary*. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited, 1987, pp. 408-409.
- Roald, Anne sofie. "A Renaissance for Islamic Education: Al-Hidāyah Islamic Pre-School Centre in Malaysia". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. 33, No. 1. 1994, pp. 83-95.
- Robertson, Roland. ed.. *Sociology of Religion*. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1985.
- Roff, William R.. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*. New haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Rosenthal, Erwin I.J.. "Islam in Malaya". *Islam in the Modern Nation State*. Cambridge: The University Press, 1965, pp. 287-306.
- Roy, Durgadas. "Financial Structure and Development in Some Third World Asian Countries: A Cross-Country Review". *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific*. Vol. XXXVII, No. 1. Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations, December 1980, pp. 55-66.
- Rudner, Martin. "Changing Planning Perspectives of Agricultural Development in Malaysia". *Modern Asian Studies*. Vol. 3, No. 17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 413-435.
- Saad, Ibrahim. *Pendidikan dan Politik Di Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1986.
- Sadayandy, Batumalai. *A Malaysian Theology of Muhibbah: A Theology for A Christian Witnessing in Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Seminari Theologi Malaysia, March 1990.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ed. *Vision 2020: A Malaysian Christian Response*. Petaling Jaya: Seminari Theologi Malaysia, July 1992.



- Sadeq, AbulHasan Muhammad. *Economic Development in Islam*. 2nd. print. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1991.
- Safi, Louay. "Developmental Trends in Contemporary Muslim Experience". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. 33, No. 1. International Islamic University, 1994, pp. 27-47.
- Said, Ahmad Mohamad. "Wawasan 2020: Model Pembangunan Negara dan Implikasi Pendidikan". A paper presented at *Konvensyen Pendidikan Komuniti: Pengisian Wawasan 2020 in Genting Highlands, Pahang* from 26-31 December 1991.
- Salamon, Sobri. *Bank Islam*. Petaling Jaya: Persatuan Ulama Malaysia, 1984.
- Saleh, Mohamad Idris and Che Su Mustaffa and Fuziah Shaffie. *Sejarah Pembangunan Bangsa dan Negara*. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1994.
- Salleh, Muhammad Syukri. ed.. *Konsep dan Pelaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam*. Penang: Penerbit Universiti sains Malaysia, 1990.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Pelaksanaan Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam di Kelantan: Masalah dan Cadangan Penyelesaian". A paper presented at *Majlis Syarahan Perdana Kali Kedua 1994* organised by Kelantan State Economic Planning Unit on 23 April 1994, pp. 1-16.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *An Islamic Approach to Rural Development: The Arqam Way*. London: Asoib International Limited, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Falsafah Ilmu Pembangunan Berteraskan Islam*. Penang: Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1985.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and Siti Hayati Abdullah. "Islamization of State and Society: Change in Substance or Change in Structure". *Aliran Monthly*. Vol. 13, No. 1. Penang: ALIRAN, 1993.
- Salleh, Shafie Hj. Mohd. and Mohd. Affandi Hassan. ed.. *Kecemerlangan Pentadbiran: Dasar dan Amalan Dalam Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Tadbiran Awam Negara, 1991.
- Sani, Rustam A.. *Melayu Baru dan Bangsa Malaysia: Tradisi Cendekia dan Krisis Budaya*. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications and Distributions Sdn. Bhd., 1993.
- Sani, Hashim Yeop A.. *Bagaimana Undang-undang Kita Diperbuat*. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1990.

- Sardar, Ziauddin. *The Future of Muslim Civilization*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1988.
- Sarupria, Shantilal. "Paradigms of an Integrated Technology Policy for Development". *of Third World Science, Technology and Development Forum*. Vol. 12, No. 1. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, April 1994.
- Sayeed, Khalid. "Islamic Resurgence and Societal Change". *Islamic Culture*. Vol. LX, No. 1. January 1986, pp. 45-60.
- Seferta, Yusuf H.R.. "The Concept of Religious Authority According to Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Ridha". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXX, No. 3. 1985, pp. 159-164.
- Shari'ati, Ali. *On the Sociology of Islam*. Hamid Algar, tr.. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique*. R. Campbell, tr.. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980.
- Shepard, William E. "A Modernist View of Islam and Other Religions". *The Muslim World*. Vol. LXV, No. 2. April 1975, pp. 79-92.
- Short, D.E. James C. Jackson. "The Origins of An Irrigation Policy in Malaya: A Review of Developments Prior to the Establishment of the Drainage and Irrigation Department". *JMBRAS*. Vol. 44, No. Part I. 1971, pp. 78-103.
- Siddiqi, Mazheruddin. "General Characteristics of Muslim Modernism". *The Islamic Studies*. Vol. IX, No. 1. March 1970, pp. 33-68.
- Singh, Hari. "Political Change in Malaysia: The Role of Semangat 46". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXXI, No. 8. August 1991, pp. 712-728.
- Sodhy, Pamela. "Malaysia and the United States in the 1980s". *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXVII, No. 10. October 1987, pp. 1074-1094.
- Stockwell, A.J.. "The Formation and First Years of the United Malays national Organization (U.M.N.O.) 1946-1948". *Modern Asian Studies*. Vol. 11, No. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 481-513.
- Sultan Abdul Hamid College. *Darulaman*. Vol. 1, No. 3. Penang: Penang Premier Press, December 1946.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Darulaman*. Vol. i, No. 2. Penang: Penang Premier Press, May 1946.
- Sunderam, Jomo Kwame. "Rancangan Malaysia Kelima: Suatu Tinjauan". *Rancangan Malaysia Kelima*. Mohd. Haflah Piei and Chamhuri Simar, ed.. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1989, pp. 35-44.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Beyond 1990: Considerations for A New National Development Strategy*. Institut Pengajian Tinggi, 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Growth and Structural Change in Malaysian Economy*. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and Ishak Shari. *Development Policies and Income Inequality in Peninsular Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Pengajian Tinggi, 1986.
- Sztompka, Piotri. *The Sociology of Social Change*. Oxford UK and Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1994.
- Tahir, Mohd. Anuar. *Pendirian Politik ABIM*. Petaling Jaya: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1993.
- Tahir, Ungku Maimunah Mohd.. "Sastera Islam: Malaysia's Literary Phenomenon of the 1970s and 1980s". *The Muslim World*. Vol. LXXIX. 1990, pp. 232-248.
- Taylor, John G.. "The Sociology of Development: Theoretical Inadequacies". *From Mode of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment*. London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1979, pp. 3-41.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Sociology of Development - Unfounded Axioms: The Restricted and Uneven Development of Third World Economies". *From Modes of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment*. London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1979, pp. 42-98.
- Telda Corporation Sdn. Bhd.. *Pelaksanaan Hukum Hudud di Kelantan*. Kota Bharu, Kelantan: Telda Corporation Sdn. Bhd., Februari 1994.
- Thalib, Mohammad. *Manusia Dalam Pandangan Islam*. Singapore: Alharamain Pte. Ltd., 1980.
- The Association of Muslim Social Scientist and the International Institute of Islamic Thought. *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*. Vol. 5 No. 2. Herndon: The Association of Muslim Social Scientist and IIIT, December 1988.

- The World Bank, "Path to Development". *World Development Report* 1991. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 4-6.
- The Association of Muslim Social Scientist and the International Institute of Islamic Thought. *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*. Vol. 10 No. 3. Herndon: The Association of Muslim Social Scientist and IIIT, Fall 1993.
- The Islamic Studies. "Shariah Criminal Code (II) Act 1993 (State of Kelantan)". *The Islamic Studies*. Vol. 33, No. 1. 1994, pp. 101-132.
- The International Institute of Islamic Thought. *Toward Islamization of Disciplines*. Virginia: IIIT, 1989.
- The Open University Press. *Understanding Society*. London and Basingstoke: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1970.
- Thinker's Library Sdn. Bhd.. *Islam dan Pembaharuan: Ensiklopedia Masalah-masalah*. Batu Cave, Selangor: Thinker's Library Sdn. Bhd., 1987.
- Thomas, John W., Merilee S. Grindle. "After the Decision: Implementing Policy Reforms in Developing Countries". *World Development*. Vol. 18, No. 8. Oxford: Pergamon Press Plc., 1990, pp. 1163-1181.
- Thomas, Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis. "Malacca's Society on the Eve of the Portuguese Conquest: A Tentative Interpretation Based on the Extant Portuguese Documents". *Jurnal Budaya: Kajian Interdisiplin Tentang Alam Melayu*. Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, December 1989, pp. 32-67.
- Thomson, William. "Review of Revelation and Reason in Islam". *The Muslim World*. Vol. XLVIII, No. 2. April 1956, pp. 148-150.
- Thong, Lee Boon. "Cabaran-cabaran Urbanisasi: Realiti dan Penyelesaian". *Pembangunan di Malaysia: Perencanaan, Perlaksanaan dan Prestasi*. Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1987.
- Todd, Emmanuel. *The Causes of Progress: Culture Authority and Change*. Richard Boulind, tr.. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Limited, 1987.
- Tole, Lise Ann. "Durkheim on Religion and Moral Community in Modernity". *Sociological Inquiry*. Vol. 63, No. 1. Texas: The University of Texas Press, Winter 1993, pp. 1-29.

- Troil, Margareta Von. ed.. *Changing Paradigms in Development - South, East and West*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1993.
- Tumin, Melvin M.. *Stratifikasi Sosial: Bentuk dan Fungsi Ketaksamaan*. Atiah Hj. Salleh and Zainab Ahmad, tr.. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1988.
- Turabian, Kate L.. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses and Dissertations*. London: Heinemann, 1982.
- United Nations Research Institute for Social Development Report. "Styles of Development: Definitions and Criteria". *The Quest for a United Approaches to Development*. Geneva: United Nations, 1980, pp. 13-24.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Styles of Development: Definitions and Criteria". An *UNRISD Report*. Geneva: UN, 1980, pp. 13-24.
- Universiti Malaya. *Monograph Syariah: Pengenalan Ilmu-ilmu Syariah*. Kuala Lumpur: Fakulti Syariah Universiti Malaya, Jun 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Alam Melayu: Jurnal Akademi Pengajian Melayu*. Kuala Lumpur: Akademi Pengajian Melayu, Universiti Malaya, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Monograf Syariah*. Vol. 1, No. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Jawatankuasa Penyelidikan dan Penerbitan, Fakulti Syariah Akademi Islam, Universiti Malaya, June 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Sarjana: Jurnal Fakulti Sastera dan Sains Sosial*. Vol. 4. Kuala Lumpur: Fakulti Sastera Universiti Malaya, Jun 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Jurnal Syariah*. Vol. 1, No. 2. Kuala Lumpur; Fakulti Syariah Universiti Malaya, Julai, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Jurnal Syariah*. Vol. 1, No. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Akademi Islam, Universiti Malaya, January-June 1994.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Jurnal Syariah*. Vol. 2, No. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Akademi Islam, Universiti Malaya, January 1994.
- Vago, Steven. *Social Change*. Vol. 2nd. ed.. Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1980.
- Vahiduddin, S.. "The Qur'anic Vision of God, Man and His Destiny". *The Islamic Culture*. Vol. LX, No. 1. 1986, pp. 1-18.

- Veitch, James. "Muslim Activism, Islamization or Fundamentalism: Exploring the issue". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. 32, No. 3. 1993, pp. 261-277.
- Wah, Soo Khin, Wong Khek Seng. *Aspirasi Negara: Satu Kumpulan Esei*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1992.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Development: Lodestar or Illusion?". *Capitalism and Development*, Leslie Sklair, ed. London: Routledge, 1994.
- Wan Teh, Wan Hashim. ed.. *UMNO Dalam Arus Perdana Politik Bangsa*. Kuala Lumpur: Mahir Publications Sdn. Bhd., 1993.
- Wariya, Chamil. *Politik Kompromi: Satu Tinjauan Kerjasama Melayu Dengan Bukan Melayu*. Kuala Lumpur: 'K' Publishing & Distributors Sdn. Bhd., 1987.
- Waters, Malcolm. *Modern Sociological Theory*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994.
- Watt, W. Montgomery and R. Bell. *Introduction to the Qur'an*. Edinburgh: The University Press, 1977.
- Webster, Andrew. *Introduction to the Sociology of Development*. 2nd. ed.. London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990.
- Weeramantry, C.G.. "The Sources of Islamic Law". *Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective*. Basingstoke and London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1988, pp. 30-45.
- Wilder, William. "Islam, Other Factors and Malay Backwardness: Comments on an Argument". *Modern Asian Studies*. Vol. 2, No. II. Cambridge: The Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, 1965, pp. 155-164.
- Winkel, Eric. "Tawhid and Science: Essays on the History and Philosophy of Islamic Science By Osman Bakar", book rev.. *The Muslim World*. Vol. LXXXIII, No. 3 & 4. July-October 1993, pp. 329-335.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Sharī'ah, Fiqh and Spirituality". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVII, No. 1. 1994, pp. 23-33.
- Winstedt, Sir Richard. *Malaya and Its History*. 5th. ed.. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1958.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and P.E. de Josselin de Jong. tr.. "The Maritime Laws of Malacca". *JMBRAS*. Vol. XXIX, Part III, 1956.



- Winzeler, Robert L.. "Traditional Islamic Schools in Kelantan". *JMBRAS*. Vol. 48, No. Part 1. 1975, pp. 91-103.
- World Bank. *World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Worsley, Peter. ed.. *The New Introducing Sociology*. London, New York et.al.: The Penguin Group, 1992.
- Yaacob, Md. Akhir Hj.. *Perlembagaan Islam: Satu Pendekatan Perbandingan*. 2nd. print. Petaling Jaya: Al-Rahmaniah, January 1990.
- Yaacob, Abdul Monir , Ahmad Faiz Abdul Rahman. *Towards A Positive Islamic World-view: Malaysian and American Perceptions*. Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1994.
- Yaacob, Mohd. Fauzi. "Perniagaan Dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu: Satu Catatan". *Jurnal Akademi Pengajian Melayu*. Vol. 1, No. 1. Kuala Lumpur: UM, April 1993, pp. 187-192.
- Yan, Lin See. "Towards Effective Muslim Participation in Industrialization: Future Directions in Malaysia". A paper presented at the Conference on Islam and Industrialization organised by IKIM on 21 January 1993.
- Yanagihara, Toru. "Anything New in the Miracle Report? Yes and No". *World Development*. Vol. 22, No. 4. Washington DC: Elsevier Science Ltd., April 1994, pp. 663-670.
- Yee, Tang Chee. *Negara Kita: untuk Peperiksaan Am Kerajaan*. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1993.
- Yurdaydin, Huseyin Gazi. "Non-Muslims in Muslim Societies: The Historical View". *Journal, Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*. Jeddah: The Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, , pp. 183-188.
- Yusuf, Badmas Lanre. "Evolution and Development of Tafsir". *The Islamic Quarterly*. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1. 1994, pp. 34-47.
- Zahrah, Muhammad Abū. *Tanẓīm al-Islām li al-Mujtama'*. Cairo: Dar alFikr al-'Arabī, 1965.
- Zakaria, Shaikha. ed.. *The Foreign Policy of Malaysia 1957-1987: A Bibliography*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Library, 1989.
- Zaman, S.M.. "The Concept of An Islamic University". *Islamic Studies*. Vol. 24, No. 2. 1985, pp. 125-135.

Zhong, Lao. *The Struggle for the MCA*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1984.

2. Interviews and Observations, Newspapers, Serials and Bulletins.

- i. For a full list of interviewees, see appendix II.
- ii. Newspapers
  - Berita Harian
  - News Straits Times
  - Utusan Malaysia
  - Sunday Times (Singapore, 1947-1950)
- iii. Bulletin and Serials
  - BULETIN, monthly bulletin of State Economic Planning Unit, Kelantan (UPEN)
  - BERITA, bi-monthly bulletin of ABIM
  - HARAKAH, fortnightly newspapers of PAS
  - Newsbulletin, bi-monthly bulletin of IIUM
  - RISALAH, monthly magazine of ABIM